Naval History Forums

Dave Saxton wrote:

Ersatz Yorck wrote:That really shows how far the KM had fallen from the WW1 German Navy. In WW2 the KM repeatedly failed to coordinate even a few destroyers and heavy ships, both North Cape and Barents Sea are examples of this.

You not taking into consideration the conditions. At Barents Sea the visbility when they made contact with the convoy was extremely limited. So much so that friend from foe could not be determined. Kummtez re-called his destroyers so he could use the Hipper's long range artillery without sinking his own destroyers. Stange didn't send in his distroyers or open fire because he didn't know if the radar only contacts were the enemy or not. He, like Kummetz, didn't want to confuse his own destroyers with enemy ships once he joined battle with his pocket battleship. See my previous post about how Scharnhorst became seperated from its destroyers.

Visibility was not exactly great at Jutland either, and there were far more ships and formations to coordinate.

Langsdorf wasn't unique in demonstrating some torpedo schreck. It started with Langsdorf and ended with Bey. This was a common theme throughout WWII for the KM. The British torpedos were not as fancy as the Long Lance, and despite what many have argued were unwarranted precautions practiced by German commanders; they worked, and the Germans were on the receiving end of more than enough of them.

An interesting comparison is to compare Kummetz being so careful about torpedoes at Barents Sea to Wright 30 days previously at Tassaforonga being oblivious to the threat. Kummetz had to deal with critism of being too timid, but Wright lost a whole battle fleet in ten minutes.

Dave Saxton wrote:

No, in both cases they operated with several destroyers. At the time of the air attack Tirpitz had recently detached two destroyers to refuel, but Friedrich Ihn had returned from refuelling solo. Friedrich Ihn was with Tirpitz during the air attack. As for Scharnhorst becoming separated from its destroyers I will comment on what I know below.

I know - but what's important, IMO is that in the end, the ships remained pretty much alone. That's why I put emphasis on "the KM tried"... Yes, Friedrich Ihn was around Tirpitz, but I don;t think that was hardly enough...

Ersatz Yorck wrote: S&G vs Ardent & Acasta: Don't know, but the accounts I have read mention no 5.9 in hits.

Accordinging to Garrett there were several 5.9 inch hits on the destroyers.

Bismarck - no

There are some recent suggestions of one 5.9 inch hit on Rodney

North Cape - no

One destroyer was hit by 5.9 inch fire

delcyros wrote:
I disagree with Rasenack and Your interpretaion of Langsdorffs moves. his concepts and decision making processes were clearly not made from a gunnery point of view. I base my position on the comments of the IGO of AGS, who was in charge of directig the main batteries. He complained heavily about Langsdorffs overacting and occupation of possible an imaginary torpedo tracks, a solid gunnery solution was impossible to sustain under conditions of multiple course changes in rapid successions and overruling to shift fire to a different target.

You have taken my post entirely out of context. My post concerned the prior reasoning for Langsdorfs' actions at the point the Allied force was sighted. Your post is concerned with the conduct of the battle itself, a later event. I can certainly agree with the criticisms you cite of Langsdorfs' conduct of the battle, but I was concerned with the reasoning for closing with the Allied ships in the first place.

I apologize. Then I misunderstood You.