Destroyers in the Pacific

[Canyon.DS]

I wonder how Destroyers, (or other Kriegsmarine units), (say narviks) would have faired against the Japanese in the Solomons.

You might also consider how they would have compaired with the Americans, although I cannot see any way for them to actually have been there unless, some how Germany was assisting America in the Pacific War.

Have Fun

[frontkampfer]

I think the KM's problem was that their destroyers, as well as their other surface ships for that matter, did not have the number of oilers that the US navy had. Got to fill em up when their thirsty and just parking tankers in deserted patches of the ocean would not have worked in the Pacific - IMHO!

[Canyon.DS]

That's why they would almost have to be a US ally just to be there. Or perhaps a Japanese ally, but that would have meant being basically permanently cut off from Germany for the duration of the hostilities.

[ede144]

I wonder how many oilers USN, KM and RN had let's say 1940 or 1941. As the KN had no plans to fight in the Pacific they don't need the logistics for the Pacific.
Regards
Ede

[lwd]

From what I recall the KM DD's tended to be a bit top heavy and short legged. On the other US DD's got pretty top heavy as well. The lack of a good heavy AA gun might be a weakness in the Pacfic. The 5.9" gun of the bigger DD's would probably help vs cruisers especially heavies but the lower rate of fire of German DD's would be a weakness compared to US DD's but looks to be surperior to Japanese DD's. Obviously the Japanese DD's have the best tropedos and a lot of them; the German DD's on the otherhand only have 6-8 torpedoes which puts them at a disadvantage vs many of the US DD's except of course early in the war the US torpedoes were very problematic.

[Canyon.DS]

the US surface torpedo, I believe the Mk XV, was a slightly longer copy of the US Submarine torpedo, the Mk XIV. That was a copy of a German torpedo captured interwar, with improved speed, and no realistic testing (if it is German, it has to be good). It had multiple problems masking each other. US correction of these problems was due to the politics of the Naval Torpedo Station (why they tested the A bomb in New Mexico when there was another perfectly good location I do not know). Too many Admirals had their fingers in the pie for the Torpedo to be at fault, so it must be the crews. As the surface torpedo was similar I expect it had similar problems. I'm certain, once corrected, the US surface fleet would be capable of outstanding torpedo performance, within the capabilities of the weapon, as our fire control system was better than the simple parabolic arc used by the Japanese. This is shown by the destroyer attack in the Battle of the Suriago Strait. Tameichi Hara reports a torpedo passed through the rudder of the destroyer he commanded (Shigure i believe) without exploding. I have to commend Donitz. By the simple expedient of hanging some designers, he motivated his ordanance people to correct his torpedos (same masking problems) within a few months, not the 18 months (for surface combat, the most critical of the war) it took the US to correct them.

Its probably better to extensively test and get weapons right the first time.

On the Narviks, where they all 5.9" weapons, in single and double turrets, or were the single turrents 5"? I've seen it documented both ways on the internet. I would think mixing your main gun calibers would cause supply problems, however Battleships and cruisers did it successfully in all navies (I'm thinking of the major cruisers, heavy or light, such as designed by the US and others, not the smaller types, which seem to me to be more like the French concept of a Destroyer Leader, like the Yahagi, I'm not sure how I would classify the Atlantas, with their destroyer caliber guns and torpedos, but Cruiser sized hulls and range).

[tommy303]

The Narviks mounted 15cm in both single mounts and the twin turret.

[ede144]

I wonder which designers got hung by Donitz? Imho he named an expert as head of a committee which surched the reasons of torpedo desaster. They found several and got them straightend
Regards
Ede

[RF]

As the KN had no plans to fight in the Pacific they don't need the logistics for the Pacific.
Regards
Ede

This isn't entirely correct, as hilfskreuzer were used in Pacific areas outside the Japanese sphere of operations both before and during the Japanese hostilities. This included mining the ports of Australia and New Zealand.
U-boats could also have operated in the Pacific as well, as indeed did U-862. The problem was a lack of willing co-operation on the part of the Japanese, who didn't want the Germans involved in the Pacific.

As for Narviks - the problem would be in getting them there. Even then I could only envisage them operating on the Japanese side - the US wouldn't need them and indeed they would be critical of the Narviks design.

[RF]

I think the KM's problem was that their destroyers, as well as their other surface ships for that matter, did not have the number of oilers that the US navy had. Got to fill em up when their thirsty and just parking tankers in deserted patches of the ocean would not have worked in the Pacific - IMHO!

The Germans had plenty of oilers in the Far East. They managed to keep that gas-guzzler of a hilfskreuzer Orion going for the best part of a year. And Thor captured two tankers that the Germans couldn't do anything with beyond having them tied up in Yokohama.

The KM supply tanker Uckermarck was also sent to Japan in 1942, after supplying the hilfskreuzer Michel in the South Atlantic. It blew up in Yokohama in November 1942, burning out the Thor which was tied up next to it.

[alecsandros]

My impression is that all German destroyers were not suited for oceanic operations, being wet ships and lacking the range to serve in the vast expansions of the Indian or Pacific oceans...

[frontkampfer]

I could be wrong but it did not appear that the KM had fleet oilers capable of supllying forward deployed formations of surface ships similar to what the US had in the Pacific. The shorter legs of destroyers require a readily available fuel supply if anything more than two ships are to operate for long periods of time.

For example, my father's ship, the USS Missouri, served as a "gas station" for many destroyers so they could stay on station longer.

[RF]

My impression is that all German destroyers were not suited for oceanic operations, being wet ships and lacking the range to serve in the vast expansions of the Indian or Pacific oceans...

Generally I agree. However the Narviks were used in Arctic waters and also Biscay/Atlantic operations as far south as the latitude of Lisbon as blockade runner escorts. The main problem was short range - which was why the Germans planned for diesel engined destroyers for 1946 operations onwards. Obviously defeat and capitulation put paid to those plans.

[RF]

I could be wrong but it did not appear that the KM had fleet oilers capable of supllying forward deployed formations of surface ships similar to what the US had in the Pacific. The shorter legs of destroyers require a readily available fuel supply if anything more than two ships are to operate for long periods of time.

The Germans did have fleet oilers in operation throughout the war, which were used for refuelling destroyers in Norwegian waters, together with captured tankers by surface raiders.
Had destroyers operated in the outer oceans with the prospect of success, then the KM would have had a supply train available. However the destroyer operations and support logistics would have been on a much smaller scale than the US efforts.

[alecsandros]

Generally I agree. However the Narviks were used in Arctic waters and also Biscay/Atlantic operations as far south as the latitude of Lisbon as blockade runner escorts.

Indeed,
But in the Arctic they proved to be very bad ships... Very wet, unstable, and with short range...