3 German battleships in May 1941.

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Ersatz Yorck
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Re: 3 German battleships in May 1941.

Post by Ersatz Yorck »

Well, the S&G didn't dare atack well escorted convoys even when together. And I think the risks of attacking a convoy with say an R-class battleship would have seemed too great even with three German battleships. The problem for the raiders is that a damaged ship might well be a lost one, so you really cannot afford even moderate damage. One lucky hit can be enough, as the Bismarck discovered. Ther chance of finding a lightly escorted convoy increases with the raiders operating independently.

An often overlooked aspect is that the presence of friendly raiders would put a damper on the U-boats. They will have to be very careful about attacking heavy surface units when friendly raiders are operating in the same area.
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Re: 3 German battleships in May 1941.

Post by alecsandros »

I do not think so. 3 x 15"-guned battleships would destroy any R-class rather quickly. Also, U-boat would have been helped by the destruciton of the convoys Ds and corvettes by the surface raiders.
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Re: 3 German battleships in May 1941.

Post by RF »

Yes, and add in air support as well - whether Luftwaffe land based, or a naval air arm - and the balance swings further. The objectives of raider warfare - dispersion of enemy forces - and the U-boat tonnage war should be seen as complimentary and not competing. They should both combine in a campaign of gradual attrition.

The key thing with all this is to have all the resources to do it. The problem for Raeder and Donitz is that Germany didn't deploy enough resources to have both a substantial long range surface fleet, including carriers, plus a large force of U-boats.
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Re: 3 German battleships in May 1941.

Post by alecsandros »

RF wrote:
The key thing with all this is to have all the resources to do it. The problem for Raeder and Donitz is that Germany didn't deploy enough resources to have both a substantial long range surface fleet, including carriers, plus a large force of U-boats.
I think so also.
This lack of resources probably played a good part in not trying to seize the Vichy French fleet in summer 1940. After all, the KGM could barely keep 2-3 raiders on the high seas on any given time.
However, the addition of the 2 x Strasbourgs, a good number of heavy cruisers and ocean-destroyers could have helped very much...
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Ersatz Yorck
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Re: 3 German battleships in May 1941.

Post by Ersatz Yorck »

alecsandros wrote:I do not think so. 3 x 15"-guned battleships would destroy any R-class rather quickly. Also, U-boat would have been helped by the destruciton of the convoys Ds and corvettes by the surface raiders.
I am not sure 6 x 15" guns will be all that much more advantageous than 9 x 11" guns against an R-class, especially if she is outnumbered. But my point is that even with a RN battleship outnumbered at 3-1, the risks are unacceptable to the raiders. One lucky hit, like the one on Bismarck's forward oil tanks, will cut your mission short, you have to go to Brest, or home the northern route, and either you are sunk on the way or you lie in Brest as a bombing target for the RAF, perpetually out of action and/or with an untrained crew.

No, my view is that in 1941, the days of surface raiders were over, with better air coverage and radar technology. The fate of the Bismarck was simply a symptom. The surface raider strategy by the KM was really the classic case of fighting the previous war in a better way. In WW1, Germany had a giant battle fleet with short range that was unusable for ocean raiding, so for the next war they build long range raiders. Problem is, the raiders that would have been an excellent asset in WW1 were overtaken by technology in WW2.
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Re: 3 German battleships in May 1941.

Post by alecsandros »

The 6 x 15" guns delivered 800kg AP shells, compared to the 330kg shells of the 11". Long-range and mid-range ballistics (danger space/hitting space) also favors the 15" shell.

Yes, it's one ting to have 9 shells in the air, and another to have 6... But when engaging heavy opponents, you need punch, not bee-stings.

Bismarck was sent to Brest and sunk because the entire North Atlantic-based Royal Navy was in pursuit of her. I strongly doubt such adventures could be repeated...
S&G for instance where damaged during the sinking of Glorious, and during the engagement with Renown. They steamed back to port @ 20kts. Were they encircled and sunk... ?

Finaly, older battleships did not have the technology the KGV had, and I doubt the firing solution would be good fast enough to deliver some damage until a 15" shell would strike the magazines.
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Re: 3 German battleships in May 1941.

Post by Ersatz Yorck »

True, 15" shells give a greater shell weight, but shell weight is not everything. For example, the engagement between the Renown and the S&G is often put forward as an example why 11 in ships were inferior to 15 in ships. But when you examine the engagement, you discover that the crucial hits were:

One 15" hit on the fire control of the Gneisenau. This hit would in all likelihood have the same effect if it had been 11 in or 8 in or even 6 in.

One turret hit by a 4.5 in that broke open the sighting hood and rendered the turret inoperable in the heavy weather.

S&G inflicted more 11 in hits on the Renown, but these were all inconsequential, but there is no reason why they could not have had as dramatic consequences. It is very much about hit location and luck!

I think this shows quite clearly that anything can happen in a naval engagement, the smallest hit can have unforeseen consequences, and for a raider always on the run, those consequences will be magnified.

As for the retreat from Norway with torpedo hits, yes, but that was after two weeks of temporary repairs in Trondheim. Where would you do that in the middle of the Atlantic?
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Re: 3 German battleships in May 1941.

Post by alecsandros »

IIRC, Krupp did some tests in the 30s regarding shell explosions in the machinery spaces.
Conclusions were that:
- 11" explosions inside machinery spaces would cause damage, but repairable. The bursting charge was ~ 6.6kg, total mass ~ 330kg
- 15" explosions woudl completely destroy the space. The bursting charge was ~ 18kg... total mass ~ 800kg...

Another example of 11" vs heavier guns is, of course, battle of North Cape...

In theory, 11" shell hits may be very dangerous. But in practice, the heavier adversaries need to be "treated" with heavier guns...
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Re: 3 German battleships in May 1941.

Post by Saltheart »

If 3 battleships would not attack a convoy protected by an old battleship in the escort because of fear of damage then they would have no business being in the Atlantic at all.
They would have to accept the risk of damage, maybe superficial or maybe severe, if they're going to hope for any gain like the destruction of a convoy. If the worst happened and a ship took a crippling hit and never made it home then that's war, that's the risk run in return for the chance of wiping out shipping. Either you wrap up the ships unused or send them to war. I'm suggesting they sent them and therefore risked the losses involved in war.
I think three 15inch armed ships would have been a very serious problem for the Royal Navy.
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Re: 3 German battleships in May 1941.

Post by Thorsten Wahl »

One lucky hit, like the one on Bismarck's forward oil tanks, will cut your mission short
the problem with that hit is that the possible trajectory did not affected any fuel tank directly in that area
from a recent post of mine at the bismarckclass forum


the trajectory passes through the ship above the upper platformdeck wich is armored

red line projectile path approx 17 degrees AOF
armored oberes platformdeck green line
waterline dark blue

flooding light blue
waterline past flooding light blue line approximately 1 m increased draft

compartments XX and XXI had a lenght of approx 21 m
an approx average width 10m
flooding heigth approx 3,5 m therfor flooding roughly 750 cubic meters

and the ship bottom only contains trim tanks according official description
spant 210.jpg
spant 210.jpg (40.05 KiB) Viewed 1280 times
----------------------------------------
my opinion
If a hit was a mission kill hit, it was the other hit, wich hit the machinery spaces, putting 2 boilers out of order, wich reduces the maximum velocity, wich makes shaking off pursuers almost impossible /a random event. This makes future contacts with british battleships at this mission more likely.

Because of fortunate circumstances the consumption was only 93 projectiles- but these projectiles were about 1/3 of th AP load.
But Danmark Strait makes clear that RN capital ships operate at least in pairs against Bismarck. Any more prolonged battle - wich is likely to occur - will exhaust the complete provision of AP-ammo making the ship defenseless aginst british battleships after a short time of a battle.
Last edited by Thorsten Wahl on Tue Mar 06, 2012 12:08 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: 3 German battleships in May 1941.

Post by alecsandros »

Thorsten Wahl wrote:
Because of fortunate circumstances the consumption was only 93 projectiles- but these projectiles were about 1/3 of th AP load.
But Danmark Strait makes clear that RN capital ships operate at least in pairs against Bismarck. Any more prolonged battle - wich is likely to occur - will exhaust the complete provision of AP-ammo making the ship defenseless aginst british battleships after a short time of a battle.
Thanks Thorsten,

IN this scenario with 3 German battleships, the ammo load would probably be 2/3 AP and 1/3 HE, or 50-50%, because the order to avoid contact with enemy BBs would not be given...
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Ersatz Yorck
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Re: 3 German battleships in May 1941.

Post by Ersatz Yorck »

Good point about the ammo supply!

BTW standard outfit for WW2 German ships was 1/3 each of HE, SAP and AP, and AFAIK this was not changed depending on mission parameters.

Edit: And I would hardly call it defensless if AP ammo ran out, even if it of course would be preferable against heavy ships. The PE put the Hood on fire with a HE hit and the Lützow nearly blew up the Lion with a SAP hit.
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Re: 3 German battleships in May 1941.

Post by Dave Saxton »

Ersatz Yorck wrote:True, 15" shells give a greater shell weight, but shell weight is not everything. For example, the engagement between the Renown and the S&G is often put forward as an example why 11 in ships were inferior to 15 in ships. But when you examine the engagement, ......... It is very much about hit location and luck!.......
These factors are so often over looked. Another thing about this particular skirmish was the weather gauge. It occured at dawn amid a winter storm. The British forces were mostly hidden from visual view to the west while the Germans were nicely back lighted by the eastern glow for the British. Therefore the fact that the British had no radar did not hurt them. The Germans had radar and had been tracking the "radar contacts" for some time. But these radar contacts were just that- radar contacts. They did not tell the Germans what these radar contacts were. Once battle was joined the Scharnhorst lost its radar rendering it ineffective in these circumstances, but the Gneisenau did not. It therefore became a one on one essentially, and not a 2 on one as many assume. Once Gneisenau's foretop got hit and she lost her radar as well, the Germans were at severe disadvantage due to the weather gauge.

If the battle developed with the Germans to the west and the British to the east, then everything changes. The British without radar would be helpless and the Germans have a 2 on 1 situation in there favor, with or without their radar advantage. The Germans are likely to be much more aware of the composition of the British forces as well, being able to correlate radar contact data with visual observation.
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Re: 3 German battleships in May 1941.

Post by alecsandros »

Maybe Dave,
But there were still 330kg shells vs 880kg shells... Scharnhorst was incredibly unlucky that day, and Gneisenau didn't score any important hits on Renown.
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Re: 3 German battleships in May 1941.

Post by RF »

Ersatz Yorck wrote:
But my point is that even with a RN battleship outnumbered at 3-1, the risks are unacceptable to the raiders. One lucky hit, like the one on Bismarck's forward oil tanks, will cut your mission short, you have to go to Brest, or home the northern route, and either you are sunk on the way or you lie in Brest as a bombing target for the RAF, perpetually out of action and/or with an untrained crew.

No, my view is that in 1941, the days of surface raiders were over, with better air coverage and radar technology. The fate of the Bismarck was simply a symptom. The surface raider strategy by the KM was really the classic case of fighting the previous war in a better way.
This I think is a rather harsh verdict. Bismarck on its own was only just caught, and it took a large force of ships to do it. The weakness of Bismarck is that it was one ship operating alone.

Combined forces of the type envisaged in a more sensible, watered down version of the Z Plan which could have been initiated right from 1934 onwards, building along the lines the British had agreed to, could have yielded crippling results by spring 1941 that would have thoroughly vindicated raider warfare.

The key point of such combined forces is that the loss of one capital ship by the Germans would not matter; also stronger forces, including Atlantic Narvik destroyers, will afford greater cover for ships returning to the Biscay ports. Strong land based heavy bombers and torpedo bombers (including Italian SM 79's) from Brittany can provide further weighty support. The U-boat threat also adds to the strength of the surface fleet.

A strong combined force is a different proposition to sending raiders out in ones and twos. They pose multiple threats and can support each other. That is a true naval strategy for winning a war. Not send out one raider and hope for the best.
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