But even during operation Berlin, the S&G only sank a fraction of the tonnage the U-boats sank during the same period. True, the surface ships were a threat the British were forced to react to, but the real ship sinker was the U-boats.RF wrote:
This I think is a rather harsh verdict. Bismarck on its own was only just caught, and it took a large force of ships to do it. The weakness of Bismarck is that it was one ship operating alone.
Combined forces of the type envisaged in a more sensible, watered down version of the Z Plan which could have been initiated right from 1934 onwards, building along the lines the British had agreed to, could have yielded crippling results by spring 1941 that would have thoroughly vindicated raider warfare.
The key point of such combined forces is that the loss of one capital ship by the Germans would not matter; also stronger forces, including Atlantic Narvik destroyers, will afford greater cover for ships returning to the Biscay ports. Strong land based heavy bombers and torpedo bombers (including Italian SM 79's) from Brittany can provide further weighty support. The U-boat threat also adds to the strength of the surface fleet.
A strong combined force is a different proposition to sending raiders out in ones and twos. They pose multiple threats and can support each other. That is a true naval strategy for winning a war. Not send out one raider and hope for the best.
Even though I love warships, I múst say I think the surface fleet was an expensive distraction for Germany in both world wars. A distraction that created enemies and that took resources that could have been used to win the war where Germany's best chances lay - on land.