Falklands! 1939

[19kilo]

That would not go over so well with Churchill.....or Roosevelt.

[RF]

This flip option suggested by lwd poses two questions.

Firstly what exactly would Argentina contribute to the Allies by declaring war on the Axis? Would it be worth Britain handing over the Falklands? No British government, certainly one led by Churchill, would have agreed to it.

Secondly if Argentina joined the Axis, or even threatened to do so, there would have been a sharp US reaction under the Monroe Doctrine. The OSS and US military were very concerned about the possibility of Axis infiltration into Latin America. If Argentina had joined in the war in 1942 on the Axis side with the threat of German U-boats alone operating from ports facing the River Plate the British and US would have sent the forces otherwise deployed to Madagascar straight into Argentina. There could also have been a sharp reaction from Brazil which on 26 August 1942 declared war on Germany and Italy after U-boats sank five of its merchant ships in one day. The British and Brazilians would also be concerned about the situation in Uruguay if Argentina had gone over to the Axis.

[lwd]

Well Argentina apparently was not an insignificant naval power at the time. Opening up Argentine ports for allied use and having the Argentine navy activly patrolling/hunting axis raiders could be of some use. I suspect you are right in that the British would be reluctant to give up the Falklands completely not sure if there would have been a compormise acceptable to both parties.

Argentina allying with the Axis would not stricktly speaking be a violation of the Monroe doctrine but it would obviously raise considerable concerns in the US and would likely result in long term problems for Argentina. Then of course there is ample evidence that rationality wasn't a requirement for national leaders especially durilng that period.

[RF]

I concur with your first paragraph about the strength of the Argentine Navy, but it would have been surplus to requirements for the Allies by 1942 and had little experience in anti-submarine warfare. The British and US already had access to Brazilian and Uruguayan ports which were closer to the critical Central Atlantic region than the Argentine ports. Once Brazil was in the war its coastal airfields became available to the Americans.

The Argentine ports would have been of much greater use to the Axis than the Allies, indeed in 1942 one point that would have been of concern was Argentine control around Cape Horn, a direct route between Germany and Japan.

[RF]

Argentina allying with the Axis would not stricktly speaking be a violation of the Monroe doctrine but it would obviously raise considerable concerns in the US and would likely result in long term problems for Argentina. Then of course there is ample evidence that rationality wasn't a requirement for national leaders especially durilng that period.

Interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine would be in the hands of the US and the security of the US would be the prime concern. Particulary with memories of the 1917 Zimmerman letter, Roosevelt would have regarded Hitler a much bigger threat to the US than the Kaiser ever was. Any sniff of the Wehrmacht establishing itself inside Latin America and Roosevelt would have been compelled to act. The US for example used Lend-Lease to strengthen their position in the Carribean, especially with those Vichy French colonies that needed close watching.

[tommy303]

If I recall correctly, FBI agents were sent to south America to keep an eye on certain German nationals and certain groups sympathetic to Germany even before the US was actively participating in the war.

[lwd]

There were even fairly advanced plans to invade Brazil at one point if it was considered necessary. I think the Proceedings of the Naval Institure or their historical magazine had an article on it a few years ago. This would not necessarily have been known in Latin America though.

As for the Argentines being surplus to needs of the allies in 42 that may be true in rehtrospect but in January or Feburary I doubt it would have been. Furthermore Argentina joining the allies at that point would have meant they wouldn't have to worry about an axis alliance and could also represent a considerable moral boost. Again while they might not have had a lot of ASW experiance there wasn't a huge amount of Uboat activity in the South Atlantic and the presence of Argentine vessels there would free up UK and US vessels for more critical areas.

[RF]

Yes I think that Argentina joining the Allies would have been a considerable moral boost for the few days after that event. But Roosevelt and Churchill knew right from the PH attack that the Allies were virtually certain to win an absolute victory and their one major worry during 1942 was that Stalin might do a deal with Hitler and take the USSR out of the war. If that happened it would have a major impact on the Anglo-American war effort and whether Argentina was on board or not would make no difference.

I think the Argentine Navy would have been of limited use for the Battle of the Atlantic, as indeed the Brazilian Navy proved to be once Brazil was in the war. They had no experience in dealing with U-boats or hilfskreuzer. Brazil's biggest actual contribution was to send several thousand troops to the Italian campaign, where they fought under US command. Would Argentina have contributed any troops to either the European or Pacific theatre's?

[Foggy]

In addition to Brazil supplying troops, Mexico supplied a P-47 squadron (equipped and trained by the US) to the Southwest Pacific area in 1945. That leads me to think there was some political drive to use some token force from our minor allies. Might it not have been possible, given the apparently good condition of the Argentine battleships, and given they had the same 12"/50s as the Arkansas, that they could have been used for gunfire support? Might have been useful at Normandy or Southern France, or in the Pacific (how good were their AA batteries; would the US have reworked them)??

[RF]

QWuite possibly, if the Argentines were prepared to send them there and were allowed to use British bases in respect of Normandy.