late 1943 Tirpitz instead of Bismarck in May 1941

[delcyros]

I second lwd here. Random distribution of hits rule when no direct aiming point in direct line fire can be achieved.

I wouldn´t expect catastrophic damage that soon in a second run, either. Hits on turrets can have very negative consequences (this is true for all ships involved in the DS action), at the very least, they may effectively put a turret out of action for some time.

I can´t help but think that there is a distinct tactical advantage for a force composed of two battleships and two heavy cruiser over another one composed of one battleship and one cruiser. HMS HOOD certainly isn´t an underdog. Our perception from the DS action may lead to false projection of likelyhoods and capabilities.

[Saltheart]

I second lwd here. Random distribution of hits rule when no direct aiming point in direct line fire can be achieved.

I wouldn´t expect catastrophic damage that soon in a second run, either. Hits on turrets can have very negative consequences (this is true for all ships involved in the DS action), at the very least, they may effectively put a turret out of action for some time.

I can´t help but think that there is a distinct tactical advantage for a force composed of two battleships and two heavy cruiser over another one composed of one battleship and one cruiser. HMS HOOD certainly isn´t an underdog. Our perception from the DS action may lead to false projection of likelyhoods and capabilities.

I agree. If the hit on Hood that blew up the whole ship had happened to strike say just 50 metres to one side instead and hit an anchor chain instead the Hood would have just carried on levelling out and fired it's first full salvo. Prince of Wales instead of taking desperate evasive action to avoid wreckage would have been levelling off as well to fire 7 or 8 gun salvos. Bismarck would have been facing a massive disadvantage. Of couse it took technology and skill to get the hit on Hood but where it happens to strike is still a matter of luck. At 18,000 metres they're not aiming for the magazine they're aiming for the ship and hoping they'll hit something important on it. PoW wasn't aiming for Bismarck's fuel supply, it was just trying to hit Bismarck.

[Karl Heidenreich]

lwd:

Again: I am a bit tired of your rethoric games. Everybody in this thread and probably forum knows what we are discussing. You only want to made a mess in which you would win by semantics.

Not quite. The Bismarck was clearly not aiming at that precise spot. Even if they were the probility of hittingit would be extremely low. So yes this is where the luck came in.

Of course not! No one has said so! We are not the ones playing "the Iowa's FC was superb becuase they NEARLY hit Nowaki" falacy here! The fact remains that Adalbert Schneider hit Hood, not once but several times as he did hit PoW afterwards. If the fatal hit, the penetrated a weak horizontal armor, did not happened when it happened then Bismarck would have continued to hit until severe damage or destruction of Hood would have occurred. At least we can afirm on this more than in the Nowaki falacy.

In reality I can continue counter arguing this but is worthless. Things have been brought up and again in this and previous threads and you play "I forget all about it and let's start" once and again so you can play retorical thricks, semantics and so on.

In order to finish this, too: the Bismarck was a piece of crap design, not like the Iowas that managed to sink Yamato and lots of battleships in numerous heroical combats during WWII. Bismarck was lucky to hit Hood and the Swordfish that hit the rudder aimed to do that precise damage. As a matter of fact Hood's shooting was much better than Bismarck's and the real "winner" was PoW. Bismarck's artillery was always bad which is why Hood was sunk and PoW run away. Bismarck's performance in DS was much worse than that of South Dakota at II Guadalacanal, etc. etc. etc. God Save America, the only ship builders of some worth in the world! Damn the Germans that know nothing of enginering! History of Bismarck was written by perverse nazis as Mullenheim Rechberg and Ludovic Kennedy and nothing that has been told is true: including Bonomi's article on DS. God Almighty! That's the fruit of year of your argumentative nonsense. Happy now?

[RobertsonN]

In thinking about the Hood's armor layout for the nth time I came up with a different 'solution', one that does not add weight. The main belt was set for a light ship condition of 41200 tons. However, the ship operated most of its career at a greater displacement resulting in more than an additional foot in draft. The solution is to move the main belt up one foot. The 7 in belt is then narrower and can be increased to 8 in thickness. This just about eliminates the weakness: The axis of a 'critical' shell is now 19.5 in above the top of the location of the real main belt. The price is greater vulnerability against diving shell, but still marginally better than what this would have been had the ship retained its designed final displacement. The lower edge of the main belt would then be about 4 ft 2in/7 ft 10 in below the light/deep waterline (and the top edge 5 ft 4 in/1 ft 8 in above). Raising armor in this way would have reduced the metacentric height a little.
There is an interesting article about the Hood on the Hood website (in the books section): it was given by the designer D'Eyncourt to the Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers in 1920.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Robertson:

However, the ship operated most of its career at a greater displacement resulting in more than an additional foot in draft. The solution is to move the main belt up one foot. The 7 in belt is then narrower and can be increased to 8 in thickness. This just about eliminates the weakness: The axis of a 'critical' shell is now 19.5 in above the top of the location of the real main belt. The price is greater vulnerability against diving shell, but still marginally better than what this would have been had the ship retained its designed final displacement. The lower edge of the main belt would then be about 4 ft 2in/7 ft 10 in below the light/deep waterline (and the top edge 5 ft 4 in/1 ft 8 in above). Raising armor in this way would have reduced the metacentric height a little.

It's interesting this proposal. However we have to consider that Hood's excesive draft was a condition she gained not since day one but only later, in ther thirties. I read about it in Taylor's book on Hood and is true. But Robertson proposal would in reality check the vulnerability if the belt was raised in combination with the improvement of adding a scarp as the one Bismarck had. The scarp then will armor against critical hits. That will add weight. On the other hand this solution do not help Hood's horizontal armor at all. I imagine that the admiralty considered all available options, specially in a cost related manner.

Also we have to remember that Hood, at the moment of it's sinking, was also presenting several other problems such as sea water leaks at her double bottom. This sea water not only added weight but went with the fuel to the boilers producing constant damages and repairs in the piping and coils. Another liability, that was not structural related was that she was equipped with a Dreyer table for FC solutions which was a reason of her inability to found target at DS. Maybe, just maybe another more sophisticated FC control system, as the one PoW and the Germans had would have helped her at DS and would have changed her demise (I have always think that if by any chance Hood make it out of DS in one piece would have been for her to be destroyed with Force Z months later).

[RF]

Is it now believed that the foretop was also hit before the fifth salvo? And was this hit likely to have been by PE?

Probably it was from Bismarcks' fourth salvo to Hood, a shell taking off the foretop without exploding. At that time of course the Eugen was switching its fire on to POW in accordance with Lutjens' order to Brinckmann.

[RF]

If the hit on Hood that blew up the whole ship had happened to strike say just 50 metres to one side instead and hit an anchor chain instead the Hood would have just carried on levelling out and fired it's first full salvo. Prince of Wales instead of taking desperate evasive action to avoid wreckage would have been levelling off as well to fire 7 or 8 gun salvos. Bismarck would have been facing a massive disadvantage.

Bismarck was always at a disadvantage at DS - until Hood blew up. But Hood itself had opened fire on Prinz Eugen and its gunnery had been degraded.

The issues here were debated in my first thread on this forum entitled ''what if Hood hadn't blown up'' and the consensus of opinion there was that if Hood hadn't blown up the Bismarck was still in a winning position because Hood was already in a bad way. POW would still have its gunnery problems, with salvoes down to three guns rather than seven or eight. The unknown aspect is that it wouldn't be under fire from anything heavier than eight inch guns so the POW gunnery on Bismarck would be more effective. But by how much? And how long before Hood drops out?

[lwd]

Again: I am a bit tired of your rethoric games. Everybody in this thread and probably forum knows what we are discussing. You only want to made a mess in which you would win by semantics.

What are you talking about? I have not been playing "rethoric games" or trying to "win bly semantics".

Not quite. The Bismarck was clearly not aiming at that precise spot. Even if they were the probility of hittingit would be extremely low. So yes this is where the luck came in.

Of course not! No one has said so!

Well your post certainly implied it.

We are not the ones playing "the Iowa's FC was superb becuase they NEARLY hit Nowaki" falacy here!

Since you are the only one who brought this up your post is irrelevant. Calling it a falacy is also incorrect. But this is OT in this thread.

The fact remains that Adalbert Schneider hit Hood, not once but several times as he did hit PoW afterwards. If the fatal hit, the penetrated a weak horizontal armor, did not happened when it happened then Bismarck would have continued to hit until severe damage or destruction of Hood would have occurred. At least we can afirm on this more than in the Nowaki falacy.

Actually you can't. It is likely that if the battle had continued Bismarck would have hit Hood again. Severe damage or destruction would also be a distinct possibility. On the otherhand it is extremely likely that Bismarck also would have taken more damage with very serious consequences for her and possibly Eugen as well.

In reality I can continue counter arguing this but is worthless.

Given your arguments to date I agree.

In order to finish this, too: the Bismarck was a piece of crap design, not like the Iowas that managed to sink Yamato and lots of battleships in numerous heroical combats during WWII. Bismarck was lucky to hit Hood and the Swordfish that hit the rudder aimed to do that precise damage. As a matter of fact Hood's shooting was much better than Bismarck's and the real "winner" was PoW. Bismarck's artillery was always bad which is why Hood was sunk and PoW run away. Bismarck's performance in DS was much worse than that of South Dakota at II Guadalacanal, etc. etc. etc. God Save America, the only ship builders of some worth in the world! Damn the Germans that know nothing of enginering! History of Bismarck was written by perverse nazis as Mullenheim Rechberg and Ludovic Kennedy and nothing that has been told is true: including Bonomi's article on DS. God Almighty! That's the fruit of year of your argumentative nonsense. Happy now?

Why would I be happy that you posted more garbage?

[lwd]

If the hit on Hood that blew up the whole ship had happened to strike say just 50 metres to one side instead and hit an anchor chain instead the Hood would have just carried on levelling out and fired it's first full salvo. Prince of Wales instead of taking desperate evasive action to avoid wreckage would have been levelling off as well to fire 7 or 8 gun salvos. Bismarck would have been facing a massive disadvantage.

Bismarck was always at a disadvantage at DS - until Hood blew up. But Hood itself had opened fire on Prinz Eugen and its gunnery had been degraded.

The issues here were debated in my first thread on this forum entitled ''what if Hood hadn't blown up'' and the consensus of opinion there was that if Hood hadn't blown up the Bismarck was still in a winning position because Hood was already in a bad way. POW would still have its gunnery problems, with salvoes down to three guns rather than seven or eight. The unknown aspect is that it wouldn't be under fire from anything heavier than eight inch guns so the POW gunnery on Bismarck would be more effective. But by how much? And how long before Hood drops out?

Would POW's salvoes really be down to three guns though? According to http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 09guns.htm Y turret was jammed during the turn away so if Hood hadn't have blown up it might not have jammed. Furhtermore if we take the case of Tirpitz replacing Bismarck it is likely that Hood wouldn't have blown up. Tirpitz does have a very good chance of dishing out more damage than she recivies in return. However there is a very good chance that both the British battleships survive and that Tirpitz takes significantly more damage than Bismarck did historically. Compared to the historical action I don't think Tirpitz has a very good chance of improving the results from the German POV. Now if the question is which would be expected to do better in such an action, i.e. compare the expected results of Bismarck as of May 41 with those of Tirpitz of late 43, one would indeed expect Tirpitz to do better.

[RF]

Its very difficult to calculate the statiistical probability of Hood blowing up in the DS action, so the chances of it happening have to be subjectively weighed up. I am inclined to think that at the range the action started the probability was fairly high and would reduce as the range closed. That is why I believe Tirpitz could blow up the Hood more quickly than Bismarck did by simply opening fire earlier, at around the time the British opened fire.

With respect to POW's guns and salvo firing, again it is a conjectural matter; what we know is that they were worse than those on KGV three days later because POW was the newer ship, but KGV did suffer numerous breakdowns without either being under serious fire or having to wildly maneouvre. It is my considered belief that in a prolonged action that it would be reasonable to see POW down to three firing guns for some periods, then five or six or more guns at other times, but not consistently at least seven firing guns.

[lwd]

Its very difficult to calculate the statiistical probability of Hood blowing up in the DS action, so the chances of it happening have to be subjectively weighed up. I am inclined to think that at the range the action started the probability was fairly high and would reduce as the range closed.

A fairly small area was mentioned in a previous post based on that I calculated a rough estimate and it would seem to require quite a few hits to even get over a 25% probability of it happening (around 100 for what I believe was a conservative estimate.

That is why I believe Tirpitz could blow up the Hood more quickly than Bismarck did by simply opening fire earlier, at around the time the British opened fire.

But why would she? Unless we assume that she correctly ID's the British ships as something other than cruisers. Also if she opens fire first then it pretty well ID's her as the battleship so both British ships are likely to be firing on her from the beginning. We do know that Hoods early salvoes on Eugen were pretty much on. So Tirpitz may start taking damage earlier as well.

With respect to POW's guns and salvo firing, again it is a conjectural matter; what we know is that they were worse than those on KGV three days later because POW was the newer ship, but KGV did suffer numerous breakdowns without either being under serious fire or having to wildly maneouvre. It is my considered belief that in a prolonged action that it would be reasonable to see POW down to three firing guns for some periods, then five or six or more guns at other times, but not consistently at least seven firing guns.

Looking at http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... m#14turret

Salvo 20 - Owing to the motion of the ship, a shell slid out of the port shell room and fouled the revolving shell ring while the latter was locked to the trunk and the turret was training. The hinge tray was severely buckled, putting the revolving shell ring out of action. The tray was removed, but on testing the ring it was found that No. 3 and 4 hinge trays of the starboard shell room had also been buckled and were fouling the ring. The cause of this is not yet known. The trays were removed and as the action had stopped by this time, No. 4 tray was dressed up and replaced. The ring was out of action until 0825.

So Y turret being out of action was directly attributable to "motion of the ship" in particular the turn away. Thus it is unlikely that it would happen unless PoW has to make such a turn. I'd agree that she would be unlikely to be firing 7 guns consistently. But upon examing the linked document they may have gotten up to 9 guns firing on ocasion and if Y turret doesn't jam they probably won't drop below 5 or 6 guns firing.

[delcyros]

I am not convinced that the probabiliyt to blow up HOOD is really very low. From a point during the turn it is vulnerable to the main belt penetration and an upper side belt penetration. It´s also quite endangered by hits on the barbette or the turret faces in any range (altough blast and flash proof doors were refitted, don´t know if pressure proof, too). I might also point out that the 380mm AP has a very destructive explosive capacity. That is it´s lateral fragments can really do some damage in distance according to Nathan Okun´s misc. armour penetration formula article:

Since HMS HOOD only had a single 1" HTS plate (equaling circa 0.8" STS) between its aft machinery room and its aft magazines, even at over 50 calibers distance (over 62.33 feet) a considerable number of fragments--dozens--from such a 38cm APC projectile penetrating into the aft machinery room and properly detonating could still punch through that bulkhead and allow blast effects and projectile fragment impacts to occur on propellant-filled 4" secondary ammunition cases, with a very good chance of them blowing up the secondary magazine and setting off the aft main magazine, as actually occurred. No "fluke" hits are needed to destroy HOOD from BISMARCK.

[José M. Rico]

"It cannot be truly said that, "Hood was destroyed by a lucky hit". There are numerous magazines in a capital ship in addition to the four large ones which lie beneath the main turrets.
If therefore, a heavy shell penetrates the armour at the angle of descent given by long ranges, the chance of one of the magazines being ignited is quite considerable."

Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield

Of course a second run of the Denmark Strait made have ended up with Hood afloat, but the possibility of blowing up again by an explosion of, let's say, the forward magazines this time, is there too.

A question for all: Would the battlecruisers Queen Mary, Indefatigable, and Invencible blow up again in a second battle of Jutland?

[Byron Angel]

A question for all: Would the battlecruisers Queen Mary, Indefatigable, and Invencible blow up again in a second battle of Jutland?

..... IMO, it would have depended upon the fervor with which the RN implemented its ammunition handling reforms. Although the basic cause of the problem was the fundamental nature of the cordite propellant itself, a number of other factors (some mechanical, but mostly procedural) materially contributed to making the problem as dangerous as it was. The post-Jutland Grand Fleet Gunnery and Torpedo Memorandum spotlighted a number of issues requiring immediate remediation. Even then, I'm not certain that the problem would necessarily disappear entirely.

B

[Karl Heidenreich]

lwd:

Why would I be happy that you posted more garbage?

I will not counter answer anymore in order not to pollute the thread. Note enough is the arrogance of this statement.