The Decisive Battle.

Historical what if discussions, hypothetical operations, battleship vs. battleship engagements, design your own warship, etc.
tnemelckram
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Re: The Decisive Battle.

Post by tnemelckram »

This would have to happen in mid 1943 for the Iowa and New Jersey to be comissioned and worked up. By then the US had figured out how to handle the Japanese torpedo and night tactics. I don't think the little ships torpedoes would give Japan an advantage and radar and better fire control might turn night into a US advantage.

As historically modernized, Any ten of USS Pennsylvania Arizona Nevada Oaklahoma New Mexico Mississipi Idaho Tennessee California Colarado Maryland and West Virginia is at worst even and probably have the advantage over their contemporaries IJN Fuso Yamashiro Hyugo Ise Mutsu Nagato Kongo Haruna Kirishima Hiei.

The six or seven new US BB's are too much for Yamato and Musashi.
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Re: The Decisive Battle.

Post by lwd »

tnemelckram wrote:This would have to happen in mid 1943 for the Iowa and New Jersey to be comissioned and worked up. By then the US had figured out how to handle the Japanese torpedo and night tactics. I don't think the little ships torpedoes would give Japan an advantage and radar and better fire control might turn night into a US advantage.....
Especially when you consider that the Kongo class ships were suppose to take part in it. There's a very good chance that some of them get taken out of the battle at this point. It also means that the Japanese screening vessels are in a worse position during the day battle. They are already outnumbered and porportionally more of them are likely to be damaged and/or without torpedoes.
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Dave Saxton
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Re: The Decisive Battle.

Post by Dave Saxton »

In this hypothetical scenario the USN doesn't have previous and relatively recent war experience to draw on.
jazsa80 wrote:....If this was the first real naval clash for the War set in Jan 43, .....
If this is the first clash of a new war the USN doesn't have the hard lessons of night battle such as Savo to learn from. Tassafaronga historically had the previous experiences to draw on, but it was still a fiasco. Tassafaronga occured on the night of Nov 30th-Dec 1st 1942. The American battle plan was to utlize radar to turn night into day and utilize the longer range, heavier artillery, of cruisers against DD's. On paper the USN had a huge advantage in terms of numbers, armour, and fire power, and radar should have allowed them to bring these advatages to bear. The American force consisted of 5 cruisers and 8 DD's. The IJN force was six DD's. Moreover the US ships had both MK3/4 fire control radar and most had SG tactical radar.

The flag ship Minneapolis began tracking the IJN DD's on it's SG at 2306 hours. The radar-less IJN ships made out the American force at 2312 hours. Actually this was unusual as in most of the previous night battles in the Solomons the IJN had made first detection despite the lack of radar. The IJN of course had superior torpedoes that could be launched from far greater distances and had much greater running speeds. Tanaka's tactics of utilizing torpedoes neutralized most of the American advantages. The IJN DD's having relatively small radar cross sections were already close to their max luanching range before they could be detected by radar. The radar directed main battery salvos of the American cruisers were not quickly or consistantly enough on target to prevent torpedo attack. The typical 5-inch artillery of the American DD's and the secondary battery of the heavier warships wasn't of much utility.
Entering a night sea battle is an awesome business.The enveloping darkness, hiding the enemy's.. seems a living thing, malignant and oppressive.Swishing water at the bow and stern mark an inexorable advance toward an unknown destiny.
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Re: The Decisive Battle.

Post by Bgile »

I don't think anyone could fire effectively enough to stop destroyers outside about 8,000 yds in the daytime, let alone at night. I think we have a number of historical examples which illustrate that. Given that, it will be very difficult to stop Japanese torpedo attacks. It's kind of hard for me to imagine how I would prevent a massive salvo against my battle line in a major surface engagement, and that was their plan as I understand it. They would attrit the US battle line with torpedoes before a decisive gunnery action.
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Re: The Decisive Battle.

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I think the best way to counter destroyers are destroyers, or cruisers for that matter.
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Re: The Decisive Battle.

Post by tnemelckram »

1. My above post (No 16 in sequence, first on the second page) is flawed. The OP posits that this would be the first engagement and combat experience for both sides. I made the mistake of relying on the historic record showing that after a year and a half of experience, the US came to grips with Japanese doctrine and tactics, and had developed effective radar fire control by mid 1943..

2. It follows from this that the analysis should first determine what each sides' doctrine would have been in mid-1943 without the benefit of combat experience, and then what the effect of those doctrines would have been.

3. I think the OP intended to focus on a battle line clash on good daylight weather. Subsequent posters wisely raised the potential impact of Japanese doctrine and tactics using cruisers and destroyers for mass torpedo attacks, surprise attacks and night fighting. One posted this article.
http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-067.htm It makes a pretty persuasive case that these tactics were Japanese pre-war doctrine and thus almost certainly would have been used in a first battle that both sides thought would be decisive. The Japanese were very skillful at this and it enabled them to inflict disproportionate loss on several occasions.

4. Even without prior experience in battle, American day and night doctrine should still center on long range radar directed gunfire by mid 1943. First, the US would have had two years to observe British use which would have demonstrated that it was effective. Second, they would have learned tactics, practices and procedures for effective use from their ally. Third, the US would either know or strongly suspect that gave them a strong comparative advantage because: (a) the Japanese were far behind in its technical development; and (b) the Japanese did not have access to a similar ally with extensive operational experience with radar.

5. US radar would tend to turn night into day, striking at the essential heart of the Japanese "night" fighting advantage. Radar extends and enhances human sight and makes a surprise attack more difficult. It has a severe impact on two key aspects of Japanese doctrine and tactics.

6. The Japanese Mark 93 Long Lance has quite a reputation. However, I think the above article shows that this reputation is overstated and that Japanese torpedo tactics most likely would not have a significant effect in this first battle. Using the historic data from all battles where the Japanese fired torpedoes from cruisers and destroyers, it derives a 6.71% hit rate. More pertinent are the first three Indonesian battles with a 9.3% hit rate:

2/20/42 Battle of Badung Strait 8 launched 1 hit 12.5%
2/27/2 Battle of the Java Sea 164 launched 3 hit 1.8%
3/1/42 Battle of Sunda Strait 37 launched 5 hit 13.5%

These three actions were exclusively cruiser and destroyer affairs fought at close range. Hits are easier and the target has less time to spot and avoid. It seems that the hit percentage at the longer ranges inherent in a battleship clash would be 5% or less, especially when the crews are using them in anger for the first time. The article concludes:
To answer the question posed by this article; the IJN did not achieve the necessary hit rate or efficiency in action to make the Decisive Battle strategy a success, had that course been pursued. Even the world’s best surface torpedomen were not good enough to bring the Decisive Battle to fruition for the IJN.
7. Radar should allow the US ships as a whole to shoot more accurately at longer range than the Japanese and thus give each ship more flexibility in finding and keeping some ideal range where it can deliver more damage than it receives. The longer range also diminishes the torpedo threat.

8. Radar gun control makes it possible to keep the guns pointed at the target while the ship makes a turn. This ability to shoot while turning is an often overlooked but key advantage that US battleships enjoyed for most of the war. I think that the North Carolinas, South Dakotas and Iowas had this capability in mid 1943. I don't know whether it was retrofitted into the older ones when they were modernized.

9. Historically US crews proved to be excellent at damage control. US crews were carefully trained at damage control but I think that there is an innate sense for it in our national character (ingenuity and initiative?). Even in their first battle, US crews would be excellent by instinct as well as training. This would be an important advantage over the Japanese, who seem to have been terrible at damage control. Given the destructive power concentrated for this hair-pull, damage control will be vital and probably required on every ship to some extent. There might be a four ship swing , with the US saving two that should have sunk and the Japanese losing two that could have been saved.
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Re: The Decisive Battle.

Post by lwd »

Dave Saxton wrote:In this hypothetical scenario the USN doesn't have previous and relatively recent war experience to draw on.
....
That was not specified and indeed is not compatible with the ships as they existed in the time frame of the scenario.
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Re: The Decisive Battle.

Post by lwd »

Bgile wrote:I don't think anyone could fire effectively enough to stop destroyers outside about 8,000 yds in the daytime, let alone at night. I think we have a number of historical examples which illustrate that. Given that, it will be very difficult to stop Japanese torpedo attacks. It's kind of hard for me to imagine how I would prevent a massive salvo against my battle line in a major surface engagement, and that was their plan as I understand it. They would attrit the US battle line with torpedoes before a decisive gunnery action.
I couldn't find the reference in a quick search but I believe the US night steaming formations were set up so that the DD and cruiser screens were far enough away from the BBs to make it very difficult for the latter to close on the BB formations. The fact that the US DDs could freely use their torpedoes vs the Japanese and still complete their mission where the latter cannot is a major concern.
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Re: The Decisive Battle.

Post by lwd »

tnemelckram wrote:....9. Historically US crews proved to be excellent at damage control. US crews were carefully trained at damage control but I think that there is an innate sense for it in our national character (ingenuity and initiative?). Even in their first battle, US crews would be excellent by instinct as well as training. This would be an important advantage over the Japanese, who seem to have been terrible at damage control. ...
Japanese doctrine judged by 20:20 hindsight was flawed in that regard. US doctrine was the DC was an "other duties as assigned" task for all ships crew and all were trained in it to some extent. Japanese doctrine was to have a highly trained damage control team whose primary duty was damage control perform those tasks or at least supervise them. The problem was that these specialist were often in rather exposed positions resulting in significant losses just when they were most needed. In other cases they were not in the location where they were needed, at least quickly enough.
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Dave Saxton
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Re: The Decisive Battle.

Post by Dave Saxton »

All of the elements listed that should probably bring about American victory were in fact present at Tassafaronga only on a smaller scale. The numbers and fire power advantage, the destroyer screen, the radar, and much of the doctrine spoken here, it was all there.

The British could pass on very little full radar firecontrol war experience to the Americans because they had very little themselves. The radars used during the Bismarck episode did not have lobe switching and even the British gunlaying radar used during Barents Sea at the beginning of 1943 did not have lobe switching, and were therefore limited to ranging measurement only. The Duke of York at the end of 1943 still employed starshell, and as the range increased it had difficulty spotting the fall of shot forcing it to cease fire by 21,000 yards. Earlier the Duke's 284M had been able to fix the target bearing at a maximum of 26,000 yards. The 284M radar used by the Duke of York had superior performance compared to Mk3, particulary in terms of resolution.

Historically, the South Dakota and the Washington had waited until they had achieved an optical firing solution as well as a radar firing solution before opening fire the first time they were comitted to a night battle in Nov 1942, waiting until the range had closed to about 11,000 yards. I would expect the American commander in the scenario (probably Pie and not Lee) to also not put full faith and trust in radar alone.

I would expect the the IJN to want to followup their torpedo attacks with night battle using their bigger boys, and historcally the IJN was very good at night battle without radar assistance. Dawn occurs in the tropics at about 0430. I would expect the IJN to try and arrange matters so that the American battleline was highlighted by the rising sun at dawn.

I'm not saying the IJN would win the battle, but I don't find it any kind of slam dunk for the USN.

Early 1943 will probably exclude Iowa and New Jersey from taking part. Although in commission, these ships were still working up untill about Aug/Sept 43. Iowa ran over some uncharted rocks and was in dock yard hands until 27th of Aug, 1943 before resuming working up. BB61 and BB62 transferred to the Pacific in Jan 1944, but Iowa was kept in the Atlantic during late 43 to tranport FDR to North Africa and back.
Entering a night sea battle is an awesome business.The enveloping darkness, hiding the enemy's.. seems a living thing, malignant and oppressive.Swishing water at the bow and stern mark an inexorable advance toward an unknown destiny.
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Re: The Decisive Battle.

Post by Bgile »

Definitely the best defense against torpedo attack is destroyers and light cruisers "in the face" of the attackers. What complicates this for the US is that IJN torpedoes were much longer range than the US assumed. This means that the US screen would have to be much closer to the Japanese battle line than they would have intended to be in order to stop a massive torpedo attack.

I believe the Long Lance was essentially wakeless, was it not? I know they could be spotted, but I think they had to be pretty close.

Finally, perceived IJN lack of success with their torpedoes might be turned on it's head in a massive engagement where you have a US battle line in single file for several miles in a situation where a large number of torpedoes is likely to hit something. Even one of these torpedoes hitting a battleship is likely to have a significant effect. For example, North Carolina lost the use of at least 1/3 of her main battery and at least for a few minutes probably 2/3. One hit could very well slow one of the older battleships enough to force it out of the line, which is almost as good as sinking it as far as that engagement is concerned.

Such a battle might not happen this way, but I'd be really concerned about IJN torpedo attack.

As far as daylight gunnery is concerned I'd give the US a significant edge, assuming the gunnery radar is in effective range. They would use optical bearing and get good results from radar ranging on target and splashes. I think it's an open question whether gunnery superiority would trump IJN torpedoes, and I also think it would be hard to put the Yamato class ships out of action unless one got lucky with a main FC hit. I doubt they would be decisive in a large battle, though.

Someone mentioned radar gave US ships a free helm when shooting, and I doubt that was the case. I think RPC, stable vertical and advanced FC computers are equally important, and they make your shooting a lot better, but probably not as good as on a steady course. I'm assuming from the ship list that the PH attack didn't happen. If that is true, did any of the older ships get the extensive modification that essentially turned them into slow but modern battleships? I imagine West Virginia was a significantly better gun ship after her rebuild, for example, and that two or three of those "new" ships did most of the damage at Suriago Strait.
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Dave Saxton
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Re: The Decisive Battle.

Post by Dave Saxton »

One thing that nobody has brought up is that the IJN also had tactical radar on major warships and fleet subs by 1943. The 10cm Mark2 Model2 was first installed on battleships during 1942. The Mark2 Model1 operating on 150cm was also available. Although these radar models didn't ultilize lobe switching and used very long pulse widths so they were not fully blind fire capable, they could still be quite valuable for range measurement (which is the most important function of radar for gunlaying anyway) and situational awareness. The Mk2 Model2 had a BB to BB range of 38,000 yards according to some sources.
Entering a night sea battle is an awesome business.The enveloping darkness, hiding the enemy's.. seems a living thing, malignant and oppressive.Swishing water at the bow and stern mark an inexorable advance toward an unknown destiny.
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Re: The Decisive Battle.

Post by lwd »

Dave Saxton wrote:...
Historically, the South Dakota and the Washington had waited until they had achieved an optical firing solution as well as a radar firing solution before opening fire the first time they were comitted to a night battle in Nov 1942, waiting until the range had closed to about 11,000 yards. I would expect the American commander in the scenario (probably Pie and not Lee) to also not put full faith and trust in radar alone.
I'm not so sure. Part of the problem for the above BBs was the confused nature due to various groups of ships and terrain. The US also has at least 6 months to train with the radar and while that's not combat experience it is experience.
I would expect the the IJN to want to followup their torpedo attacks with night battle using their bigger boys, and historcally the IJN was very good at night battle without radar assistance.
That was because their smaller vessels trained for it so as to be able to play their role in the decisive battle. It was not part of their plan for the BB engagement.
Dawn occurs in the tropics at about 0430. I would expect the IJN to try and arrange matters so that the American battleline was highlighted by the rising sun at dawn.
And I see no reason that the US should allow them to do so.
...
Early 1943 will probably exclude Iowa and New Jersey from taking part. Although in commission, these ships were still working up untill about Aug/Sept 43. Iowa ran over some uncharted rocks and was in dock yard hands until 27th of Aug, 1943 before resuming working up. BB61 and BB62 transferred to the Pacific in Jan 1944, but Iowa was kept in the Atlantic during late 43 to tranport FDR to North Africa and back.
Here you insist on historical reason where earlier you try to throw them out. If we're being historical you probably won't see the above battle line all in the Pacific especially if there's a war going on in the Atlantic.
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Re: The Decisive Battle.

Post by tommy303 »

Someone mentioned radar gave US ships a free helm when shooting, and I doubt that was the case.
Not really. Radar can give superior range readings than optical means, and if the bearing accuracy is sufficient, good bearing readings, although optical was preferred. Out to certain ranges, depending on model of radar, one can get good spotting at night as well, but radar still has to work through the fire control computer and is therefore subject to all the limitations of the fire control system when trying to track a target from a manouvering ship.

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Dave Saxton
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Re: The Decisive Battle.

Post by Dave Saxton »

lwd wrote:I'm not so sure. Part of the problem for the above BBs was the confused nature due to various groups of ships and terrain. The US also has at least 6 months to train with the radar and while that's not combat experience it is experience.
..........
Here you insist on historical reason where earlier you try to throw them out. If we're being historical you probably won't see the above battle line all in the Pacific especially if there's a war going on in the Atlantic.
There wasn't any confusion during the opening phase of the battle. The scout force was east of Savo on a southerly course. Lee was also east of Savo on a westerly course. Washington's SG began tracking them at 18,000 yards. Kondo's main body wasn't even in the picture yet. Even if Kondo had been within radar range they would have been shielded by Savo Island.

I don't see how I'm being inconstistant? This thread is clearly within the context of war between Japan and the US not starting prior to 1943.
Entering a night sea battle is an awesome business.The enveloping darkness, hiding the enemy's.. seems a living thing, malignant and oppressive.Swishing water at the bow and stern mark an inexorable advance toward an unknown destiny.
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