BRITISH AA OF WW2

[Dave Saxton]

For the main battery being knocked out Hornfischer cites the 1944 USN narrative by Captain Claypool (SD's Chaplain) and also cross refences the action report (not the damage report) on power failures. I didn't think this was just an over sight on Hornfischer's part.

[Steve Crandell]

I looked at Hornfischer's references and I can't seem to find one to an action report that doesn't include the damage report. Here is section 10 or the action narrative (Section II of the damage report) from South Dakota; the part pertaining to the period during which she received gunfire damage:

10. The SG radar was inoperative from 0041 to 0046 which complicated station keeping and detection of new targets. One report of enemy vessels on the starboard bow at a range of 7000 yards had been overlooked in conn while directing fire on targets bearing 112° relative. Radar plot had just finished reporting the enemy bearing 070° relative, range 5800 yards, when SOUTH DAKOTA was illuminated at 0048 by four searchlights on the second ship in the enemy column. This force was reported to be four ships in column on an opposite course. SOUTH DAKOTA identified the first ship as a battleship and the second and third ships in column as cruisers. It is probable that the first ship was the battleship KIRISHIMA and the second and third ships the cruisers TAKAO and ATAGO. WASHINGTON opened fire on the leading ship of the enemy column almost immediately. About thirty seconds after illumination, the enemy opened fire concentrating on SOUTH DAKOTA. Simultaneously SOUTH DAKOTA's secondary battery commenced firing on the illuminating ship. The searchlights were quickly extinguished on the second ship in column and the third ship assumed the task of illumination. SOUTH DAKOTA's main battery fired two or three salvos at the second ship in column and then shifted to the third ship. The enemy began hitting almost immediately and continued hitting until 0105. Steering and engine control were never lost, but extensive damage was done to radar, radio, fire control and I.C. circuits and instruments. At 0108 SOUTH DAKOTA ceased firing when all targets were lost. Enemy fire had already ceased. During the last part of the engagement contact with WASHINGTON was lost. SOUTH DAKOTA therefore withdrew to the 1000 rendezvous as her night-fighting efficiency had been seriously impaired.

The reader will note that it specifically refers to salvos fired at the second ship in column and then switching main battery fire to the third ship until contact was lost. I think it's extremely unlikely that these main battery salvos were fabricated after the fact. As near as I can tell, main battery Spot Two was still fully functional, including it's fire control radar.

[Dave Saxton]

But were those MB salvos fired before or after the 14" hit, or both? The context is that the MB shifted target and fired on the new target before the enemy began hitting. Afterward it is not stated clearly that firing until contact was lost was by MB, or SB, or both. If Hornfischer discovered evidence from Claypool that the MB was not firing after the 14" hit, then it would have cleared up that question for him.

Hammel was told by witness' that the gunnery officers suspected that Spot 2's radar was providing faulty data and tried to switch MB control to Sky (x) (I don't recall the number off the top of my head) which radar was also found not working properly. Did this cause the loss of contact and/or take the MB out of the loop? A problem of with 40cm sets during this time frame was how long it took to "reboot" them after the first power outage. According to the Rad-Three it should take about 50 minutes before they could provide accurate ranges again.

[Steve Crandell]

When it says the main battery starts firing, and then that the ship stops firing some time later without saying that the main battery was out of action, doesn't that at least imply that it was firing the whole time?

Sky 1-4 are the directors for the 5"/38 battery. These directors are capable of controlling the main battery, but sky 2 and 3 had their radars put out of action by a shell which passed through both antennas.

I still don't see anything that says that the 14" hit on turret 3 barbette knocked out out the entire main battery. What could possibly do that short of a citadel penetration? Why wouldn't it be mentioned in the damage report? For example, it did say that turret 3 was difficult to train after the hit. Nothing about impossible to train, or that the effect was somehow transferred to the other turrets.

At the end of the engagement it says her night fighting capability had been seriously impaired. Wouldn't they have mentioned it if the entire main battery was out of action due to a hit on turret 3 barbette? That would seem to have had an effect on day fighting as well as night fighting.

I thought one usually relied more on primary sources than on secondary sources. I don't dispute that South Dakota's main battery fire was ineffective. I don't think there was much evidence that they ever hit anything with it, and neither IJN CA received a 16" hit. I just don't see how the barbette hit would cause the ship to lose her entire main battery and I don't think there is any primary source evidence that it did. I do know there was a lot of confusion and a lot of explosions going off in the immediate vicinity of the ship's control personnel during the period of the hits being absorbed. It would be easy for someone there to think the ship was completely helpless.

[Dave Saxton]

I don't think Hornfischer would have written it, and left it there in the editing, that way without good reason. In the case of the Guadalcanal battles the documents are not all that trust worthy. These are the same documents that has SD sinking a battleship and three cruisers with 15 salvos, and Washington hitting ships at 18,000 yards when we now know that Hashimoto had none of his warships at that range. Putting together what happened with the Guadalcanal battles requires much detective work and it still leaves much undetermined. Hornfischer has done an admirable job and I think he deserves the benifit of the doubt here.

[Steve Crandell]

Well, on the one hand we have an unsubstantiated claim of damage and sinking of enemy ships in a confusing night battle.

On the other hand, we have a detailed report of damage to one's own ship after examination in the yard, accompanied by the recommended fixes.

Don't you think there might be a difference in accuracy between the two?

Don't you think it unlikely for a non penetrating hit on one turret's barbette to disable the entire main battery?

Could this have happened to Bismarck?

[Byron Angel]

I agree with Steve Crandell. The War Damage Report has to be favored over the subjective impressions of crewmen.

Byron

[Dave Saxton]

on the other hand, we have a detailed report of damage to one's own ship after examination in the yard, accompanied by the recommended fixes.

The survey may not give any indication of shock affecting one or more of several electrical circuits that was probably over come within the hour. The damage report can not disqualify or clarify witness reports of this kind of failure.

Could this have happened to Bismarck?

I think a similar thing could be indeed a possibility to explain turret Anton being off line and then coming back to life briefly some time later.

The barbet hit on SD is an example of decapping. The shell was de-capped by the upper yaw deck and so it was destroyed by the barbet armour instead of penetrating it. But a non-penetrating hit can still cause damage through the shock of impact. There is a possibility of simlar non penetrating hits and their affects on Bismarck.

The USN fast battleships did have problems of shock affecting their electrical circuits. The reason the breakers were tied together in the first place on SD was because the shock of the big guns firing caused certain breakers to trip. It was thought that by tying them together it would help prevent or minimize these problems. Instead it caused a much more widespread electrical outage. On Washington the reason all the radars blinked out and stopped registering targets after salvo 2 was likely because of brief power outages due to the shock of firing. In 1944 the New Jersey sent in a complaint about power blinking off every time a 16" salvo was fired. This kind of problem can debilitating if your radars use magnetrons.