"New" HMS Prince of Wales sinking analyzes

[Bill Jurens]

There were classification issues involved which at times required the books to publish information the author's knew to be incorrect in order to publish anything at all. I don't know if that was the case in this situation, though. I have the rough drafts and all of the developmental rewrites for these books here in Winnipeg, but not here at the office from whence I write.

I will try tonight to take a peek at the original text and diagrams and see how they match up with the War Damage report, and check the text drafts as well.

The full North Carolina War Damage Reports appears, for some reason, to be quite difficult to find. I am the only fellow I know who actually has a copy.

I am sure that there were some relocations to berthing spaces, etc. as the war progressed, but suspect these were mostly driven by the requirement to accomodate more sailors than to correct any serious difficulties with the arrangements above the side protection system.

Bill Jurens

[Bill Jurens]

I've now had a chance to look at the North Carolina questions in a little more detail. This took me back to the contract plans for North Carolina, which are BIG -- about 20 feet long -- and a bit of a pain to haul out of storage. These plans show that there were indeed some crew spaces originally located on the 3rd Deck outboard abreast Turret III. One report states that about 165 berths were relocated after the torpedo hit, and these are undoubtedly the ones, as they are gone on the later Booklets of General Plans with the spaces previously used for crew now being assigned to storage etc. The numbers add up almost exactly. It would be quite time consuming to determine with certainty exactly where these berths went, as it's impossible (or very difficult) to determine if "new" berths are just berths which were added as the crew size increased or relocated berths from the 3rd Deck aft. It appears, however, that many -- or at least some -- of them ended up on the 2nd Deck further forward, where many of the rack stacks were changed from 4 berths high on the contract plans to 5 berths high on the BGPs. Whether that reflects added berths or relocated berths remains uncertain.

A brief re-read shows me nothing in Dulin and Garzke suggesting that they ever said that the spaces above the torpedo protection system on the North Carolinas was void, and the cross-sectional diagrams do not indicate the allocation of these compartments in detail, which is quite reasonable considering how small they had to be made in order to fit on a book-size page.

Hope this helps...

Bill Jurens

[dunmunro]

I've now had a chance to look at the North Carolina questions in a little more detail. This took me back to the contract plans for North Carolina, which are BIG -- about 20 feet long -- and a bit of a pain to haul out of storage. These plans show that there were indeed some crew spaces originally located on the 3rd Deck outboard abreast Turret III. One report states that about 165 berths were relocated after the torpedo hit, and these are undoubtedly the ones, as they are gone on the later Booklets of General Plans with the spaces previously used for crew now being assigned to storage etc. The numbers add up almost exactly. It would be quite time consuming to determine with certainty exactly where these berths went, as it's impossible (or very difficult) to determine if "new" berths are just berths which were added as the crew size increased or relocated berths from the 3rd Deck aft. It appears, however, that many -- or at least some -- of them ended up on the 2nd Deck further forward, where many of the rack stacks were changed from 4 berths high on the contract plans to 5 berths high on the BGPs. Whether that reflects added berths or relocated berths remains uncertain.

A brief re-read shows me nothing in Dulin and Garzke suggesting that they ever said that the spaces above the torpedo protection system on the North Carolinas was void, and the cross-sectional diagrams do not indicate the allocation of these compartments in detail, which is quite reasonable considering how small they had to be made in order to fit on a book-size page.

Hope this helps...

Bill Jurens

Yes, thanks. In fact the description of the higher bunks matches what I recall (wish I could remember where I read that). I may have remembered the passage incorrectly or it may have been the crewman's perception of large scale changes being required to berthing arrangements. The book I previously mentioned does state that many crew preferred not to sleep in certain berthing areas, after the hit, and this may have led to overcrowding in other more desired spaces.

Here's the passage from Garzke+D+D:

"The torpedo defense system in way of "B" Turret performed well, with one exception. Part of the gas jet from the torpedo explosion did vent into the Seamen's Mess Deck over the impact area near Frame 109. Unlike American warships of that period which were fitted with the same type of sandwich torpedo protection, the British system was unable to contain the explosion completely within the system. American battleships had a void over the system that was designed to contain structural debris or prevent the gas jet from reaching spaces within the ship. The North Carolina was the only new American battleship tested in combat by a torpedo which was one of the Japanese Type 95 submarine torpedoes, with an explosive charge of 40 kilograms that exceeded the explosive force that the system was designed to defeat. Despite being of riveted construction that system performed rather well." p44 of the document or p46 by Acrobat's count.

I don't dispute that the NC's TDS was overstressed by such a massive warhead and it may have performed well in a relative sense, but it had no void over it and it did not, apparently, prevent the gas jet from reaching spaces within the ship, in this case a magazine or a powder handling room.

cheers

Duncan

[Bill Jurens]

Ah, I understand now, I think. The quote you were reading is evidently from the description of damage to Prince of Wales, or at any rate some other ship than North Carolina, probably in the Allied battleships volume. I looked only in the American Battleships volume, under the discussion of the North Carolina class and could find nothing there. That explains it...

The passage you quote is a tricky one and -- at least in retrospect -- not that well-written, stating "...American battleships had a void over the system that was designed to contain structural debris or prevent the gas jet from reaching spaces within the ship. The North Carolina was the only new American battleship tested in combat...". This makes it sound as though the first phrase, i.e. "American battleships" probably includes the North Carolina class, which is mentioned specifically in the subsequent sentence. My guess is that the real intent of the first passage was to refer only to the South Dakota and Iowa classes, which did have a void over the side protective system, but that the authors (or the editors) neglected to place a caveat in the second sentence indicating that the void was not present in the North Carolina class. The text should have been more specific in adding the phrase "of the Iowa and South Dakota classes" after "American battleships".

This does not represent ignorance or an attempt to mislead on the part of the authors, just poor editing...

It's my general feeling that Buships was correct in noting that the impingement of the gas jet into the magazines, whilst certainly undesirable, probably did not represent a signficant threat to the ship as a whole. The North Carolina war damage report discusses a number of other cases, e.g. USS Boise and USS Savannah, where much more serious things took place inside magazines without causing an ignition. The resistance to explosive ignition of bags in magazines and handling rooms, etc., was also clearly demonstrated in the 1989 Iowa explosion, where propellant bags were burning freely within the barbette, but no overall secondary explosion occurred.

It's surprisingly hard to set off nitrocellulose accidentally...

Comments welcome...

Bill Jurens

[dunmunro]

It is a quote from their new report:
http://www.rina.org.uk/article810.html
sorry, I should have made that clearer.

I suppose one could consider the spaces above NC and KGV's TDS/SPS as "sacrificial spaces" rather than voids per se. As you point out the USN had additional redundancies built into their system in the form of a very stable propellant, but all the same it is better to keep the explosion on the outboard side of the magazines!

I was just a bit annoyed to have the report state that PoW's SPS defeated the torpedo hit abreast B turret, albeit with venting above the SPS, and then have the authors state or imply that the hit on NC didn't do the same, IE vent above the TDS.

BTW my quote above states "...with an explosive charge of 40 kilograms..." Of course this should read: "...400 kilograms..."

cheers

Duncan

[Sparky]

Hullo Duncan,

Thank you for the response to my questions. I cant say much about the north Carolina issue you raise as I do not have Mt Garzkes books you mention and have only the basic knowledge of the torpedoing incident itself except to say that in my opinion if what you say is correct then the mistake regarding the North Carolinas TDS in the overall context and scope of the analyzes of the Prince of Wales sinking is a rather minor if unfortunate error and takes little if anything away from what appears a very detailed and illuminating report.

In reference to you comment on the side indentations. If you go the hull indentation PDF referenced on the last page of the analyzes you will see that there are several deeper to use your phrase saucer shaped indentations marked on the ship outline diagrams at points along the overall area of indentation. And while you appear correct regarding no intentional flooding of those TDS voids effected by the indentations there is every reason to believe owing to the torpedo explosion reported abreast but out from the hull at the P3 turret and the near miss bombs along there from the last attack that at least the hull along the port TDS in the area in question had sprung seams and was partially if not completely flooded. If as you say that the indentation occurred after sinking then I wonder why the port area forward of amidships where no bombs or torpedoes exploded nearby did not compress in the same manner. In the few photos I have seen of other ships hulls indentations caused from the water pressure after sinking the damage was much more crumpled or scalloped around frames and other reinforcements along hulls as opposed to how these indentations appear in the photos in the referenced PDF.

With your take on the damage done by the restart of the outer port propeller shaft it appears to me from reading this latest analyzes several times now that the restart was not the actual cause of the damage to the shaft passage way it self much of which may have been done when the shaft began running out of center right after the torpedo hit but restarting then added significantly to the damage by allowing the ingress of water faster into Y action machinery room and subsequently opening up the generator room bulkhead allowing ingress of water into there and from there allowing water into the engine room.

I assume as the authors themselves seem to acknowledge there will always be some contention with the timeline of events to when the shaft actually separated from the supporting strut and when the propeller then actually separated from the shaft. I suppose we can always speculate then how much flooding would have taken place through hatches reportedly left open in the passage way and the deformed bulkheads and glands had not the shaft been restarted and broken and the resultant damage that that caused.

This latest analyzes certainly does go a long way to show though how much can be learnt from on site investigation by in this instance divers as opposed to only relying on the historical record and deductions made from that. It is also fascinating to see for the first time a depiction in those 3d images of the torpedo holes and exactly where the torpedo hits were taken. I find it interesting that many earlier reports or books had the aft hits positions juxtaposed as to there placement.

Sparky

[dunmunro]

I have placed your comments in italics for clarity.

Thank you for the response to my questions. I cant say much about the north Carolina issue you raise as I do not have Mt Garzkes books you mention and have only the basic knowledge of the torpedoing incident itself except to say that in my opinion if what you say is correct then the mistake regarding the North Carolinas TDS in the overall context and scope of the analyzes of the Prince of Wales sinking is a rather minor if unfortunate error and takes little if anything away from what appears a very detailed and illuminating report.

Yes, by itself it is a minor error, but a very glaring one, given that two of the authors wrote a whole volume on USN BBs and in that volume discuss the torpedoing of NC, and provide the very data which completely contradicts their statement.

In reference to you comment on the side indentations. If you go the hull indentation PDF referenced on the last page of the analyzes you will see that there are several deeper to use your phrase saucer shaped indentations marked on the ship outline diagrams at points along the overall area of indentation. And while you appear correct regarding no intentional flooding of those TDS voids effected by the indentations there is every reason to believe owing to the torpedo explosion reported abreast but out from the hull at the P3 turret and the near miss bombs along there from the last attack that at least the hull along the port TDS in the area in question had sprung seams and was partially if not completely flooded. If as you say that the indentation occurred after sinking then I wonder why the port area forward of amidships where no bombs or torpedoes exploded nearby did not compress in the same manner. In the few photos I have seen of other ships hulls indentations caused from the water pressure after sinking the damage was much more crumpled or scalloped around frames and other reinforcements along hulls as opposed to how these indentations appear in the photos in the referenced PDF.

Dishing of the hull from near misses would be not be unexpected and may have occurred in specific spots, but the completely regular indentations that parallel the entire SPS in the after part of the ship is not what would be expected from near misses, and using Occam's razor, the simplest explanation is hull collapse from water pressure, post sinking. The forward part of the ship is in shallower water and the hull there may not have suffered a rapid collapse but rather a slow leakage , but is is conceivable that the outer port voids may have been counter flooded to reduce the trim aft, but this is all speculation on my part.

With your take on the damage done by the restart of the outer port propeller shaft it appears to me from reading this latest analyzes several times now that the restart was not the actual cause of the damage to the shaft passage way it self much of which may have been done when the shaft began running out of center right after the torpedo hit but restarting then added significantly to the damage by allowing the ingress of water faster into Y action machinery room and subsequently opening up the generator room bulkhead allowing ingress of water into there and from there allowing water into the engine room.


No doubt there was major damage done by the initial hit, but the simple fact remains that both the generator rooms abaft B engine room were intact and functional until the shaft was restarted. The shaft alley has very little volume and even relatively minor flooding would have been sufficient to rapidly fill the compartments along the alley up to B engine room yet this did not occur until the shaft was restarted... Restarting the shaft appears to have been the cause of the destruction of the watertight bulkheads along the alley and this in turn led to the loss of electrical power in the after part of the ship and the flooding of large parts of PoW's machinery spaces, leading to her loss.

I assume as the authors themselves seem to acknowledge there will always be some contention with the timeline of events to when the shaft actually separated from the supporting strut and when the propeller then actually separated from the shaft. I suppose we can always speculate then how much flooding would have taken place through hatches reportedly left open in the passage way and the deformed bulkheads and glands had not the shaft been restarted and broken and the resultant damage that that caused.

Again, if the shaft passage had lost it's watertight integrity, it would have caused rapid and immediate flooding of the small compartments along the passage to B engine room, but apparently this did not happen. Many RN ships were torpedoed along the prop shafts and none ever flooded in the manner that occurred in PoW. I'm afraid there's only one explanation for the manner and causes in which it occurred on PoW.

This latest analyzes certainly does go a long way to show though how much can be learnt from on site investigation by in this instance divers as opposed to only relying on the historical record and deductions made from that. It is also fascinating to see for the first time a depiction in those 3d images of the torpedo holes and exactly where the torpedo hits were taken. I find it interesting that many earlier reports or books had the aft hits positions juxtaposed as to there placement.

Yes and it dispels many myths about design flaws, etc.

[WGarzke]

I will answer some of the criticisms of the Prince of Wales paper. Many of you may not be aware that the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers in concert with the American Society of Naval Engineers, the Royal Instution of Naval Architects, the Institute of Marine Engineers, Engineering, Science, and Technology, and the Marine Technology Society have sponsored the Marine Forensics Committee which is composed of recognized experts in the marine field. This Committee (formerly the Marine Froensics Panel) has been investigating major ship wrecks which include RMS Titanic, RMS Lusitania, HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Repulse, HMS Hood, DKM Bismarck,and USS Yorktown (CV 6). One of the major conclusions that our Committee of which I am chairman is the failure of riveted joints under contact and explosive loads. Bismarck is an exception, as she was 95% welded construction. That is one of the reaons why she was hard to sink. Mr. Monro is mistaken in his criticism of our conclusion on the significance of the those seven near miss 500 kilogram bombs. If he read the the Bucknill Report as I did and interviewed some of the survivors as I did, it was clear that there was internal flooding going on after this bombs' explosions. In the Battleship book concerning Prince of Wales I had to rely solely on suvivor testimony as there was no photo imagery from the wreck site until Kevin Denlay and Andrew Fock made their visit in 2007 for a complete photo survey of the wreck. This event coupled with research into the behavior of riveted joints clearly indicate that there was rivet failure involved, not only with the bomb attack, but also with the torpedo attacks. Further revision of this paper will occur with analysis of new data that will clearly show why the first torpedo hit was so devastating. That information was not available in 1980 when Volume II of Battleships was published. Mr. Munro also has not answered in criticism of why those folds occurred when the air pocket, if it existed would have been at the bottom of the tank and not at where the air folds occurred because the ship was upside down when it arrived at the seabed. The paper was written with the intent of gathering opposing views and my co-authors and I welcome constructive criticisms.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Wow! Garzke himself!

A real expert!!!!

[boredatwork]

That information was not available in 1980 when Volume II of Battleships was published.

Off topic - but are there any plans for an updated (or at least reprinted) edition of Allied Battleships In WW2 for those of us who have grown rather attached to the arms and legs being demanded as payment for one of the used copies?

[dunmunro]

Mr. Munro also has not answered in criticism of why those folds occurred when the air pocket, if it existed would have been at the bottom of the tank and not at where the air folds occurred because the ship was upside down when it arrived at the seabed. The paper was written with the intent of gathering opposing views and my co-authors and I welcome constructive criticisms.

Thanks for the reply! However, as luck would have it, I am away from home (and in sunny southern Arizona) and my library for about 2 weeks, and it is unlikely that I will be able to consider this question until I get back. If I get a chance, I will try and reply in more detail.

[Bgile]

Wow! Garzke himself!

A real expert!!!!

Yes Karl, but your enthusiasm is in direct contrast to your prior statements that the internet is not a worthwhile source of good information.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Yes Karl, but your enthusiasm is in direct contrast to your prior statements that the internet is not a worthwhile source of good information.

Aside from the already known fact that Garzke is author of several books I will not answer this provocation because I´m really tired of such attempts.

[Legend]

I am suddenly intruiged by the fact that Britain was using riveting techniques even by that point in time, and especially with their new battleships. Did they not have welding technology (I think about this and then remember the US Navy had welding by that point)? And did they not realize that riveting was obviously inferior to the new welding method?

[dunmunro]

I am suddenly intruiged by the fact that Britain was using riveting techniques even by that point in time, and especially with their new battleships. Did they not have welding technology (I think about this and then remember the US Navy had welding by that point)? And did they not realize that riveting was obviously inferior to the new welding method?

The RN tested riveted and welded joints for the SPS holding bulkhead during the Job 74 SPS trials and riveted joints proved superior. In theory welding is lighter and stronger than riveting but welding was in its infancy in the 1930s and a number of problems with welding had yet to be resolved. Several USN ships experienced structural failure due to welding problems during WW2