Poorly trained AA crews on Bismarck?

[RF]

There are some other curious sidelights to the Swordfish attack upon Bismarck. Apparently, on their run-in to torpedo launch point, they were flying into a gale force head wind blowing from 45deg to port. This, as was explained to me, reduced their speed over the ground to less than 60 knots and also introduced a pronounced lateral drift to starboard - which would have made any AA fire prediction efforts challenging indeed.

I was wondering how this would affect the aiming/release of torpedoes, presumably it makes it more difficult to find the target?

Another story I have heard is that the decision to rely upon the old but proven contact fuze on the torpedoes rather than the theoretically more destructive but highly unreliable magnetic exploder, was made only at the last minute after rather heated argument.

Presumably that argument was settled with the attack on Sheffield, when the magnetic exploders failed at the right time.......

[wadinga]

Hi All,

According to Ark Royal's report on the attack on Sheffield 11 aircraft dropped their weapons and 50% of the magnetic exploders detonated prematurely, the rest of the torpedoes were evaded. The flight leaders persuaded the Captain that contact exploders should be used but there was concern that maintaining the specified 22ft depth in the wild seas prevailing might cause them to miss underneath, so they were set for 10ft despite the likelihood of a belt armour hit. (John Moffat's book I Sank the Bismarck) {OK OK OK I know he didn't}

Given the situation Byron suggests:

also introduced a pronounced lateral drift to starboard - which would have made any AA fire prediction efforts challenging indeed.

The aircraft would have been pointing say 45 degrees off her actual course over the sea toward the target, ie crabbing along (relative to the sea). Dropping the torpedo at an angle like this would have been risky. Also the so-called "torpedo sight" a piece of horizontal bar marked for "aim off" ie deflection due to target speed wouldn't be much use if the aircraft was crabbing so badly. Moffat describes delaying dropping to ensure the fish dived into the base of a wave to avoid the gyro being thrown out of kilter on water impact, but he aimed for deflection by guesswork. He says most of the explosive bursts were in front of him, reinforcing the story of German F/C deflection allowance being too great. Whatever the depression characteristics of the 4.1" mounts, he said when he got low enough the tracer fire was his only problem.

The "spotter plane" was one of the ASV equipped Swordfish, which could give a direction to target from the icing zone in the clear air above, but once the attackers dived through the heavy cloud they were on their own emerging at only 300 ft above the waves. Virtually all the attacks were made on the port side of the twisting turning Bismarck because the wild weather made co-ordinating the planned anvil attack impossible. Aircraft speed over the ground was extremely variable, due to the strong winds.

The Kriegsmarine had lost quite a few ships by May 1941, there must have been a few experienced hands (survivors) drafted to Bismarck surely? Since Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were immobilised in France, Lutjens could have brought some combat veterans with him, instead of letting them holiday in the bars and bordellos of Brest They wouldn't have the AA experience of RN crews assaulted by swarms of Ju87, Ju88, He-111, off Norway, Dunkirk or in the Mediterranean (plus SM-79s) but they had some sea-time.

All the best

wadinga

[RF]

Operation Berlin didn't see any air attack on the Twins, though at the end they were observed by Ark Royal's Swordfish and instead of firing on those aircraft Lutjens changed course to north-north east to make it look as if he was heading for the Iceland/Faroes gap instead of Brest.

You can't simply offload the crews of one ship on to another without causing operational disruption to both ships. Bismarck had several months training in the Baltic so her crew had been ''run in'' there shouldn't be any need to transfer personnel.
The real experience the KM should have observed was the British attack on the Italian Fleet at Taranto. Here intense Italian AA fire supported by searchlights shot down only one of the attacking aircraft, again because of the slow speed of the attacking carrier aircraft. While the Japanese naval attache certainly focussed on this attack (albeit for different reasons) the KM basically ignored it assuming the Italians were incompetent. Had the KM properly studied that attack they could have drawn the correct conclusions and adjust the training of crews and weapons to attack by Swordfish.

Even better the real answer to air attack is take your own carrier with you - if a fully operational Graf Zeppelin was with Bismarck would Victorious or Ark Royal have even launched air attacks? More likely an aggressive German Fleet Commander would have turned the tables and hunted Victorious down.....

[marcelo_malara]

if a fully operational Graf Zeppelin was with Bismarck would Victorious or Ark Royal have even launched air attacks? More likely an aggressive German Fleet Commander would have turned the tables and hunted Victorious down.....

There is no way that a carrier would accompany BS and PE on a merchant traffic attack mission. It is not just the carrier, you need fleet tanker for this.

[dunmunro]

Operation Berlin didn't see any air attack on the Twins, though at the end they were observed by Ark Royal's Swordfish and instead of firing on those aircraft Lutjens changed course to north-north east to make it look as if he was heading for the Iceland/Faroes gap instead of Brest.

You can't simply offload the crews of one ship on to another without causing operational disruption to both ships. Bismarck had several months training in the Baltic so her crew had been ''run in'' there shouldn't be any need to transfer personnel.
The real experience the KM should have observed was the British attack on the Italian Fleet at Taranto. Here intense Italian AA fire supported by searchlights shot down only one of the attacking aircraft, again because of the slow speed of the attacking carrier aircraft. While the Japanese naval attache certainly focussed on this attack (albeit for different reasons) the KM basically ignored it assuming the Italians were incompetent. Had the KM properly studied that attack they could have drawn the correct conclusions and adjust the training of crews and weapons to attack by Swordfish.

Even better the real answer to air attack is take your own carrier with you - if a fully operational Graf Zeppelin was with Bismarck would Victorious or Ark Royal have even launched air attacks? More likely an aggressive German Fleet Commander would have turned the tables and hunted Victorious down.....

I'm fairly certain the RN would have responded differently to events, upon the commissioning of a KM aircraft carrier. For example Victorious was only 24 hrs away from embarking an additional squadron of Albacores, but departed without them. In any event it would have taken the KM a long time to work up GZ and this would have delayed things considerably.

Victorious' attack was made in lighting conditions that would have made interception unlikely, and even the Swordfish could have been armed with 1500lbs of bombs (2 x 500lb and 2 x 250lb) for a DB attack which would have made a shambles of GZ's flight deck, if even one Swordfish made it through.

We have to remember that ASV radar was instrumental in finding Bismarck for all the TB strikes made against her; the KM didn't have ASV radar, nor even a long range AW radar.

[Herr Nilsson]

...
The Kriegsmarine had lost quite a few ships by May 1941, there must have been a few experienced hands (survivors) drafted to Bismarck surely?
...

IIRC a lot of Bismarck's crew were from ships lost during the Norway campaign. Von Müllenheim-Rechberg was first officer of "Erich Giese", some others served on "Karlsruhe" for example.
Specialised crew members had to complete training courses, which lasted several month.

[wadinga]

Hi All,

Herr Nilsson's point is obviously valid. Konigsberg's AA gunners had put on quite a show before the RN Skuas sank her, but then she was tied to a jetty. Various ships attacked at Wilhelmshaven by the RAF had defended themselves vigorously.

Scharnhorst, limping home after being torpedoed by Acasta was attacked by a variety of RN and RAF aircraft en route to Germany and if you are combat experienced on 10.5 cm, 37mm or 20 mm weapons on one ship you are good to go on another. One advantage of the Kriegsmarine's youth was that many systems were common between ships. With her engine room in pieces for months in Brest, individual gunners were available to be transferred to other ships. Crewmen were constantly shifted between ships in time of war for one reason or another. .

Since no-one had realistic experience of conducting naval AA fire against modern aircraft before 1939 and the RN's expansion was far greater than the KM's, young inexperienced men faced each other on both sides. With far fewer vessels and fewer operations the KM had more opportunity to concentrate experience for maximum benefit.

The wild weather conditions and hard manoeuvring experienced during the Swordfish attacks made accurate shooting difficult for Bismarck. Arguably, no other torpedo aircraft could have operated in the sea and wind conditions prevailing due to high take off and landing speeds required by monoplanes like the Douglas TBD Devastator and Nakajima Kate. Arguably, maintaining a steady course would have given the Bismarck's gunners a better chance, but there is no way to know really.

There were no KM aircraft carriers in 1941 nor much real enthusiasm for one, because the Luftwaffe controlled all air operations and did not really want to go to sea. The wresting of control away from the RAF and into the newly formed Fleet Air Arm for British carriers just prior to WWII was the start of a rocky road back to effectiveness for a service which had pioneered the use of air power at sea in WWI.

All the best

wadinga