Hi All,
According to
Ark Royal's report on the attack on
Sheffield 11 aircraft dropped their weapons and 50% of the magnetic exploders detonated prematurely, the rest of the torpedoes were evaded. The flight leaders persuaded the Captain that contact exploders should be used but there was concern that maintaining the specified 22ft depth in the wild seas prevailing might cause them to miss underneath, so they were set for 10ft despite the likelihood of a belt armour hit. (John Moffat's book I Sank the Bismarck) {OK OK OK I know he didn't}
Given the situation Byron suggests:
also introduced a pronounced lateral drift to starboard - which would have made any AA fire prediction efforts challenging indeed.
The aircraft would have been pointing say 45 degrees off her actual course over the sea toward the target, ie crabbing along (relative to the sea). Dropping the torpedo at an angle like this would have been risky. Also the so-called "torpedo sight" a piece of horizontal bar marked for "aim off" ie deflection due to target speed wouldn't be much use if the aircraft was crabbing so badly. Moffat describes delaying dropping to ensure the fish dived into the base of a wave to avoid the gyro being thrown out of kilter on water impact, but he aimed for deflection by guesswork. He says most of the explosive bursts were in front of him, reinforcing the story of German F/C deflection allowance being too great. Whatever the depression characteristics of the 4.1" mounts, he said when he got low enough the tracer fire was his only problem.
The "spotter plane" was one of the ASV equipped Swordfish, which could give a direction to target from the icing zone in the clear air above, but once the attackers dived through the heavy cloud they were on their own emerging at only 300 ft above the waves. Virtually all the attacks were made on the port side of the twisting turning
Bismarck because the wild weather made co-ordinating the planned anvil attack impossible. Aircraft speed over the ground was extremely variable, due to the strong winds.
The Kriegsmarine had lost quite a few ships by May 1941, there must have been a few experienced hands (survivors) drafted to
Bismarck surely? Since Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were immobilised in France, Lutjens could have brought some combat veterans with him, instead of letting them holiday in the bars and bordellos of Brest They wouldn't have the AA experience of RN crews assaulted by swarms of Ju87, Ju88, He-111, off Norway, Dunkirk or in the Mediterranean (plus SM-79s) but they had some sea-time.
All the best
wadinga