German loss of initiative

[B19pilot]

Hello,
The Battle of the Denmark Straits is a fascinating topic of Naval history and tactics. For all the technology, weather, luck, etc... The battle was ultimately won and lost by the men manning the ships in the engagement.
Perhaps the most enegmatic player in the battle was the German commander VADM Lutjens. No doubt about it, ADM Lutjens was an experienced and capable officer that did his duty to the utmost. However, for a variety of reasons he failed to complete the task set before him. In fairness to the Admiral it must be recalled that he was ordered to avoid contact with hostile surface units and conduct commerce raiding.
In the sinking of Hood and silencing the Prince of Wales main battery. the German commander had the initiative to press the final attack and then disengage to retire, refuel and continue their intended mission. Why didn't Admiral Lutjens do this? Of course, we will never know what his thoughts were as he stood on the flag bridge with his staff.
Tactics are an perishible item in Naval warfare, and a good commander weighs all the options, and collects as much relevant information that he can before making a decision. Was Admiral Lutjens worried about his fuel?...yes, of course! British units that he couldn't "see", but knew were present (Force H comes to mind)...Damage to his flagship...Concern of British radar and vulnerability to air attack.
My personal opinion is that Bismark's fate was sealed before she left Bergen without refueling, and that was Admiral Lutjens biggest misjudgement. Fuel represents time and time represents alternative courses of action. With the bow hit over 1000 tons of fuel was useless and the Bismark was forced into a disadvantageous situation...Basically, her ability to take the initiative was lost and she was now the hunted.
She (He in German parlance) was a magnificent ship with a brave crew that fought in the finest tradtions of the Imperial German Navy of WWI.

[Gudbrandur]

Hallo, members
The Bismarck mission to Iceland has been a strange one as to purpose, tactiks and outcome. The Krigsmarine was an old fasion Keiser tradition system maned by old professionals, my viking warrior spirit tells me that somethings are not right. It is easy for us in 2006 to put together the theater as was, as now we have most of the information. By going over the war dairy of the ship we will see that there was an aborted mission in early mars, 1941. The ship gets an order as early as 19th of mars but does not leave until may. The reasion for the ship to sail with minimum fuel was to have speed over its adversary, that means less endurance. A comerce raider needs maximum fuel, sitting out there waiting for ships to attack. The Russian convoys had not started in may. 1941. There where not convoy´s on the German intellegence books in mars and may of 1941, the Germans had a number of U-Boats south and West of Iceland in mars and may of 1941. The KrigsmarineLuftwaffe had it´s own aircraft for long distance flight, (F) Fernaufklarung in service of the Bismarck and Tirpitz and the rest of the fleet. We need looking at the whole picture before jumping to conclusions. It is my belive that the Bismarck was sent to Iceland to stop the development of english airports at the time, that would have been in the spirit of old German professionals of the Krigsmarine as english aircraft where bad news for the U-Boat missions.

Gudbrandur.

[Terje Langoy]

I'll have to disagree with Lutjens decision not to refuel being a failure. If the fuel situation had been the most critical part after the DS battle, Lutjens most certainly had the opportunity available after shaking off his pursuers. He could have straightened up his starboard evade maneuver earlier and continued northwest to make contact with his replenish vessel south off Greenland. But Lutjens didn't. Why should the Bismarck continue her raid having 2000 tons of water trapped in her forecastle and 1000 tons of inaccessible fuel on top of that? Lutjens decided, as far as I know, to head to France mainly of two reasons. The obvious reason, to make repair, and also because the French coast offered a far better starting point to resume his mission later. He probably understood that the mission had to be aborted the very minute that the bow damage report was announced. But I guess he saw it as a temporary drawback and regarded the opportunities offered if the Bismarck would resume her mission from France instead. An easier breakout route and a massive force enlargement as the Twins hopefully would be ready. He had nothing to lose but a lot to gain.

Drawing the topic back to the fuel, if you were to say that the Bismarck in fact refuelled in Bergen, then what? That doesn't eliminate the lucky shot from Pow. I have asked, in another topic, whether Force H/Ark Royal would have entered attack position if the Bismarck sailed at top speed. I don't know. But how "healthy" could it be for the heavy bow to "smash" into the seas? I think that the fuel controversy concerns eventualities that probably wouldn't take place anyway. Lutjens had enough fuel to make it to France. He almost did. We must remember that the Bismarck was hunted down due to a lucky torpedo, not because she ran out of fuel. The only thing the Bismarck could have gained from a refuel in Bergen was a higher speed, and I don't think that it would be advisable (possible) having the bow in such a condition. But that's a technical area I know very little about. Maybe someone else can apply a proper answer on that?

I don't support the critisism of Lutjens as to why he didn't refuel or why he didn't turn 180 after the DS. These are scenarios that offers a better chance of successful outcome only because of what we know today.

[Bgile]

Lutjens may have been hesitant to head north because he may have been concerned that there would be other British heavy units in pursuit from that quarter. By changing course radically he would be giving up any advantage gained by running the gauntlett and being out in front of them.

[Terje Langoy]

You're probably right, Bgile. Amongst the concerns of Lutjens, I think nothing troubled the guy more than the range of Suffolk's radar set. And his reluctance to head north would probably prove solid as I seem to remember that the Germans fired a couple of rounds against a pursuing KGV-Class battleship. (That would be the PoW) A very good reason to suspect other heavy units astern, as you suggest in your post.

Still, he made the starboard maneuver going from northwest to southeast in a circle, crossing the wake of the pursuers. This despite his suggested reluctance to head north. We also know that he sent a radio message after the Bismarck broke contact, suggesting that he assumed they were still pursued. A question emerges on my behalf. Was Lutjens once again attempting to engage the stalkers or was it simply a diversion for the Prinz to slip away? The latter is a fact, but does anyone know what were the exact intensions behind the evading maneuver? I guess Lutjens must have been eager to engage Suffolk and bring that radar down.

[tommy303]

There were actually three manouvers at different times. The first was an aborted doubling back in order to detach Prinz Eugen; second was the successful detachment during which Bismarck briefly engaged Prince of Wales to distract the British; the third, some hours later, was the successful manouver around behind the British to break free of the shadowers.

As something of an aside, it was some time following the detachment of the Prinz Eugen that the British realized they were only pursuing one ship instead of two.

[Terje Langoy]

So it was a 3-point straight diversion... Lutjens gave up any hope of engaging the cruisers?

What exactly caused the radar "error" aboard Suffolk? I've read that the Bismarck was able to evade due to a frequent error on the radar set aboard Suffolk. A "signal loss" that would occur from time to time. Could anyone clarify why? Was it due to the weather or technical irregularities?

[RF]

There was no Bismarck mission to Iceland, full stop.

[RF]

Overall Lutjens held the initiative while his ship was able to manouevre. Yes the ship was being shadowed by cruisers, but all they could do was track and report his position. Lutjens could (and should) have continued his attack on Norfolk on the initial contact and continue that action until both British cruisers were sunk.

That in itself would have ensured that Rheinubung would have had a very different outcome, for starters Holland would not have been able to intercept on the morning of the 24 May.

The initiative was only lost after the fatal torpedo hit on the stern. It was that and only that which doomed the ship.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Lutjens began to loose initiative the moment he failed to see that his mission (Rheinubung, not the conquering of Iceland) was aborted when intercepted by the British at DS. The fact that after the blowing of Hood he didn´t hunt and sink PoW and turn around to the north in order to return to Norway is plain evident that he didn´t see his overall situation and that he, his squadron and his mission were discovered. After DS his only thought was to escape his hunters, which is not an offensive attitude but a merely defensive one. Maybe his ship was manouveralbe then, but tactically he was SNAFU.

Best regards.

[Terje Langoy]

SNAFU? Would you care to explain this to a newbie like me?

Quote - Karl:

"The fact that after the blowing of Hood he didn´t hunt and sink PoW and turn around to the north in order to return to Norway is plain evident that he didn´t see his overall situation and that he, his squadron and his mission were discovered."

And he was followed by two "superior" cruisers (Since they always managed to avoid him) and he might suspected several heavy units astern, just as Bgile suggested. Why pass through the "needle eye" once more when he had a greater chance of evading them in the vast areas of the Atlantic? Not a tactical blunder if you ask me. Lutjens could not know exactly what ships were astern of Bismarck. Further on, he would have a whole lot easier task breaking out from the French coast later than from Norway. They had a drydock big enough for the Bismarck here. Not in Norway. He could team up with the Twins and come back much stronger when he would have resumed his mission. Lutjens almost made it to France. Just a few hours away from safe waters and then a single darn torpedo managed to strike his ship where it hurted the most. Would you still critisize Lutjens if he had made it all the way to port? Considering their bow damage and fuel loss, would it be a good decision to play offensive at this time? He should have gotten rid of his stalking cruisers but knew he was unable due to their superior radar. The enemy was falling back each time he tried to engage. How could he be offensive against that?

[Karl Heidenreich]

SNAFU: Situation Normal: All F#$^@ed Up.

Needle eye? Going to the Atlantic with two cruisers shadowing, 2000 tons of water in her bow, listing, with not enough fuel to manouver, I believed Lutjens choose the needle eye.

[Terje Langoy]

It is my belief he chose the lesser of two evils, with the last offering far better opportunities upon any later resume of his mission. And also less danger of running into overwhelming British forces, as the strait probably (neither of us know for sure) occured to him as the lions nest. A strongly guarded "bottle neck" due to the naval base at Scapa Flow. The surprise element of the outbreak was long gone. I assume he would have, at least a little better, chance of eventual maneuvres in the vast Atlantic rather than the strait, don't you think? Besides, if you were to place yourself in Lutjens shoes after DS, which route would you pick? Remember, you don't know what we know. All you can rely on is the intelligence available at that time, (two enemy cruisers, a battleship and a naval base astern) and your suspicion. (probability of several heavy units astern?)

Best regards

[Gudbrandur]

Lutjens of the Bismarck was following orders and the orders came from nazi no one.,Hitler. To do what.?
As the situation was in the Atlantic in mars, may, 1941, to who would Hitler have responde to, for this mission.? If I read my books right, this was no other than Karl Dönitz. To do what.? Have the Bismarck go on seagul hunting for lonely ships.? What ships.? What conwoys.? None around at that time.
The Krigsmarine did invent every problem imaginativ not to go out to the big ocean, on a wild gees hunting. Saying no ,to nazi no one ,was big problem for the Krigsmarine, Admiral Raeder. So he gave in. But he knew more.
I have on my record the positions of all submarines around Iceland at the time, based on boats diray records, it´s so apears as if the boats knew nothing of the Bismarck mission, this is information form the Krigsmarine own books.
I see no common sense in the operation of the Bismarck, crusing by Iceland, The Forstress of the North. To see German documents not refering to the dangers related to Iceland, is pure down right dum, for the Krigsmarine of the Whermacht.

[RF]

Lutjens began to loose initiative the moment he failed to see that his mission (Rheinubung, not the conquering of Iceland) was aborted when intercepted by the British at DS. The fact that after the blowing of Hood he didn´t hunt and sink PoW and turn around to the north in order to return to Norway is plain evident that he didn´t see his overall situation and that he, his squadron and his mission were discovered. After DS his only thought was to escape his hunters, which is not an offensive attitude but a merely defensive one. Maybe his ship was manouveralbe then, but tactically he was SNAFU.

Best regards.

I don't really see things this way. If I was Lutjens (which clearly I'm not) I would have followed the military practice of Guderian and Rommel in the French campaign of 1940 and:

1)Continue the DS battle by going after POW and shelling her into a floating wreck. Order PE then to sink her with torpedoes, while Bismarck then targets Suffolk and Norfolk. If Hollands destroyers interfere shell them at long range. Ensure that Bismarck/PE are no longer shadowed.

2)After completing Germany's biggest ever naval victory, I would then task the fleet engineers with the possibility of repairing the damaged fuel tanks at sea, with a view to then commence commerce raiding.

3)If damage cannot be repaired at sea, fuel up from a tanker and lie low for a week/10 days in the Atlantic, to wait upon British reactions to DS to become apparent.

4)If 3) is followed then proceed to St. Nazaire dry dock, detaching PE for independent commerce war.


Doing all of these keeps the initiative with the Germans, and given the scale of the victory at DS I would be more secure in following my own interpretation of orders than either Marschall, or Boehm before him.