More on KGV Class main armament problems

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HMSVF
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Re: More on KGV Class main armament problems

Post by HMSVF »

alecsandros wrote: Thu May 30, 2019 5:32 pm
HMSVF wrote: Thu May 30, 2019 5:00 pm We don’t know whether standing off and entering 20 km exchange would have been better.
It is not about working better, it's about doing the correct thing according to tactical situation and orders. As it was, Leach was simply extremely lucky that day, firstly by not being killed on the spot by a shell that killed 9 other officers on the bridge, and secondly because the enemy had to reduce speed to 22, later to 16kts (later to 12kts) in order to effectuate emergency repairs, offering invaluable time for PoW to re-approach, and for Victorious to close to attack range.

With the information available to Leach at 6:00 ( enemy undamaged , steaming at 28kts South, while Prince of WAles was damaged and steaming at 27kts East), the enemy was simply left to roam the central Atlantic - as with the parameters then existing (Tovey at 400nm East , steaming at 27kts), there was simply no interception possible .

The dead have no reply. We don’t really know what was going through Leach’s mind on 24/5/19 and due to his death 7 months later we have very little to go on. His son saw him briefly in Singapore prior to his death of Kuantan where apparently they talked about the progress of the war and the threat of Japan. Whether Henry Leach had and kept correspondence from his father ? Who knows. I would expect that the censor would have had to be busy if he had written down the level of detail wanted on here.
Leach gave ample explanation in his report to Tovey, quoting firstly "teething troubles" on his main artillery, but we now know that , during the second action, Prince of WAles was outputting at the same efficiency as Prinz Eugen was. There were no teething troubles to be blamed, or not blamed too harshly: the geometry and water poruing into turret A caused substantial problems.
A couple of years ago I read on here that there was nothing wrong with the guns of POW. We know seem to have moved along to an acknowledgement that this was, but this was a known problem with the KGV class ( though I’ll never understand why the RN could build a perfectly good twin mounting but not a triple or quad. I believe that it took 10 years to iron out The Nelson class issues to a point where they were considered reliable). We have seen official DNC documents stating the issues being dismissed in favour of a report written by the manufacturer. One is apparently “valid” the other apparently not. Why is this is the case? What is the motive behind it? The truth ? Who’s truth? Pro British or Pro German. The proposed thesis IMHO is certainly in the latter camp.
All ships had problems with their guns.

Bismarck had substantial problems with her main artillery, as described in AVKS/March-April 1941. Where they checked by mid-May ? We do not know. Prinz Eugen outputted at 85%. Hood clearly shot badly.

In other places, contemporary battleships outputted between 80 to 90% efficiency, and that includes trials.

So no, Prince of Wales wasn't far off from "normal" operting output, and if someone reads carefully her GAR of May 24th, one finds 85% efficiency for second engagement, AND a clear phrase indicating that , due to the huge efforts put up by the crew, only minor errors occured during firings and operations.
I’ve seen and worked with a lot of people who where great at saying they would do x,w,z in a given critical situation. That they would do better, that they were braver/cleverer/superior


Very interesting to see how they reacted in a real event . Doesn’t tend to be as “clean” as they thought it would be when it wasn’t an exercise....


As I said it’s a very pro German thesis.
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Re: More on KGV Class main armament problems

Post by alecsandros »

HMSVF wrote: Thu May 30, 2019 6:24 pm

As I said it’s a very pro German thesis.
It's the simple truth.
The endless debates here and in other places are simple modes of explaining away a tactical error, but one executed with good intentions and based on the available information, which was incorrect.
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Re: More on KGV Class main armament problems

Post by dunmunro »

alecsandros wrote: Thu May 30, 2019 5:32 pm
HMSVF wrote: Thu May 30, 2019 5:00 pm We don’t know whether standing off and entering 20 km exchange would have been better.
It is not about working better, it's about doing the correct thing according to tactical situation and orders. As it was, Leach was simply extremely lucky that day, firstly by not being killed on the spot by a shell that killed 9 other officers on the bridge, and secondly because the enemy had to reduce speed to 22, later to 16kts (later to 12kts) in order to effectuate emergency repairs, offering invaluable time for PoW to re-approach, and for Victorious to close to attack range.

With the information available to Leach at 6:00 ( enemy undamaged , steaming at 28kts South, while Prince of WAles was damaged and steaming at 27kts East), the enemy was simply left to roam the central Atlantic - as with the parameters then existing (Tovey at 400nm East , steaming at 27kts), there was simply no interception possible .



Bismarck had substantial problems with her main artillery, as described in AVKS/March-April 1941. Where they checked by mid-May ? We do not know. Prinz Eugen outputted at 85%. Hood clearly shot badly.

In other places, contemporary battleships outputted between 80 to 90% efficiency, and that includes trials.

So no, Prince of Wales wasn't far off from "normal" operting output, and if someone reads carefully her GAR of May 24th, one finds 85% efficiency for second engagement, AND a clear phrase indicating that , due to the huge efforts put up by the crew, only minor errors occured during firings and operations.
I hope your stay in the hospital is/was brief and successful.

PoW engaged Bismarck on 3 occasions. During the first action she suffered one gun permanently out of action and then Y turret shell ring jammed. On the 2nd occasion A1 gun went out of action after the 5th salvo, but this was her most successful shoot. During the 3rd and final engagement, A turret shell ring jammed on the 3rd salvo and remained jammed for several hours while repairs were being made, so after firing ~106 rounds in 3 separate engagements (allowing time for repairs between each), PoW suffered two complete turret jams that effected both her quad turrets. From this we can see that PoW just wasn't ready to engage in single handed combat against two efficient ships, and Leach was correct to disengage from the 1st action before his ship's mobility was further impaired.

I disagree that Lutjens was loose in the Atlantic since W-W's cruisers were still in contact and Tovey had a aircraft carrier battle group closing rapidly. Additionally, even without damage to Bismarck Lutjens would have had to reduce speed to conserve fuel, since PE only narrowly avoided running out of fuel before finding a tanker.
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Re: More on KGV Class main armament problems

Post by HMSVF »

alecsandros wrote: Thu May 30, 2019 6:43 pm
HMSVF wrote: Thu May 30, 2019 6:24 pm

As I said it’s a very pro German thesis.
It's the simple truth.
The endless debates here and in other places are simple modes of explaining away a tactical error, but one executed with good intentions and based on the available information, which was incorrect.


Alec,
tactical error, but one executed with good intentions and based on the available information

Thats about the fairest assessment I have seen on here in a long while. :ok:
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Re: More on KGV Class main armament problems

Post by alecsandros »

dunmunro wrote: Thu May 30, 2019 6:49 pm single handed combat against two efficient ships, and Leach was correct to disengage from the 1st action before his ship's mobility was further impaired.
The ships were not efficient. Prinz Eugen accumulated various problems of gunnery, and Bismarck was firing extremely slowly for a ship on rapid fire (28 shells in 4 minutes according to von Mullencheim - because he says rapid fire was ordered after semisalvo3 fell). Also we do not know the output of the Bismarck for the 3 battles (engagements) with PoW. (But, if we take von Mullencheim's info and Luetjens's message at face value, we get that Bismarck consumed 53 shells in firing against PRince of Wales.. Duration of fire 6:00 - 6:09... About 9 minutes. Oddly enough, Prince of Wales fired against Bismarck , on director control, for also about 9 minutes, and consumed 55 shells.)
and Tovey had a aircraft carrier battle group closing rapidly.
Victorious dettached to steam at 29kts, against a target with speed reduced to 16..later 12kts, at 400nm away. Easy catch.
Impossible catch with target at 28kts (as was the state of information available to Leach at 6:00).
Additionally, even without damage to Bismarck Lutjens would have had to reduce speed to conserve fuel, since PE only narrowly avoided running out of fuel before finding a tanker.
Mmm, no,
Prinz Eugen got to the tanker at 8 in the morning of May 26th, after steaming for some time at 31kts (in the process burning more fuel then it would have been at 27-28kts).

by that time, Suffolk would have been gone to refuel on May 25th (mid-day), leaving Norfolk to shadow until night fell (25th/26th), and contact lost for lack of workable radar.

At 27kts, Prinz Eugen's fuel would probably last until May 26th at 22:00 or 23:00.

It is irrelevant anyhow - what matters is the state of information available for Leach on May 24th 6:00, and that state was enemy undamaged, heading at 28kts due South.
Last edited by alecsandros on Thu May 30, 2019 7:43 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: More on KGV Class main armament problems

Post by alecsandros »

dunmunro wrote: Thu May 30, 2019 6:49 pm

I hope your stay in the hospital is/was brief and successful.
Thanks ,
unfortunately it will be alot more to it then today.

Hope the best for everyone on the forum, I think I'll be here one or two days next week.
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Re: More on KGV Class main armament problems

Post by dunmunro »

alecsandros wrote: Thu May 30, 2019 7:23 pm
dunmunro wrote: Thu May 30, 2019 6:49 pm single handed combat against two efficient ships, and Leach was correct to disengage from the 1st action before his ship's mobility was further impaired.
The ships were not efficient. Prinz Eugen accumulated various problems of gunnery, and Bismarck was firing extremely slowly for a ship on rapid fire (28 shells in 4 minutes according to von Mullencheim - because he says rapid fire was ordered after semisalvo3 fell). Also we do not know the output of the Bismarck for the 3 battles (engagements) with PoW. (But, if we take von Mullencheim's info and Luetjens's message at face value, we get that Bismarck consumed 53 shells in firing against PRince of Wales.. Duration of fire 6:00 - 6:09... About 9 minutes. Oddly enough, Prince of Wales fired against Bismarck , on director control, for also about 9 minutes, and consumed 55 shells.)
and Tovey had a aircraft carrier battle group closing rapidly.
Victorious dettached to steam at 29kts, against a target with speed reduced to 16..later 12kts, at 400nm away. Easy catch.
Impossible catch with target at 28kts (as was the state of information available to Leach at 6:00).
Additionally, even without damage to Bismarck Lutjens would have had to reduce speed to conserve fuel, since PE only narrowly avoided running out of fuel before finding a tanker.
Mmm, no,
Prinz Eugen got to the tanker at 8 in the morning of May 26th, after steaming for some time at 31kts (in the process burning more fuel then it would have been at 27-28kts).

by that time, Suffolk would have been gone to refuel on May 25th (mid-day), leaving Norfolk to shadow until night fell (25th/26th), and contact lost for lack of workable radar.

At 27kts, Prinz Eugen's fuel would probably last until May 26th at 22:00 or 23:00.

It is irrelevant anyhow - what matters is the state of information available for Leach on May 24th 6:00, and that state was enemy undamaged, heading at 28kts due South.
Prinz Eugen's gunnery output started at 100% and ended, after ~14min at 100%, PoW went to 90% after one salvo and ended with ~50% output after ~10min and remained at that for several hours. There is no comparison between PoW and PE and PoW's output only looks comparable because the output calculation was arbitrarily cut off at salvo 18 and if extended to ~0609, as per PE, it would have been something like ~55% . We don't know what Bismarck's output was at any point in the action nor how many rounds were fired at any given point in the action.

Lutjens reduced speed but never below about ~20 knots. Lutjens and BrinkMann's immediate concern was to find fuel for PE.
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Re: More on KGV Class main armament problems

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hello everybody,
Dunmunro wrote: "Prinz Eugen's gunnery output started at 100% and ended, after ~14min at 100%, PoW went to 90% after one salvo and ended with ~50% output after ~10min and remained at that for several hours"
Totally incorrect data, presented as facts.

Who tells that the B turret right gun was back in action ? Speculation. Jasper says the gun was disengaged, never that it was re-engaged...

PG started at 100% as well as PoW. It's not written when she went to 87,5%, very early in the engagement (the GAR allows a calculation...). Do it.

PoW ended her centrally directed action with 8 guns in action (80%) and, only AFTER Leach decision to disengage and the consequent Y turret jam, she went down to 50%.

Please let's not try to sell wrong information here.


"the output calculation was arbitrarily cut off at salvo 18"
The output loss was arbitrarily calculated by her GO and arbitrarily signed by her Captain + arbitrarily accepted by Tovey and by the Admiralty.
Please stop inventing your own data and accept the reality. The fairy-tale is over since a while.


Bye, Alberto
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"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: More on KGV Class main armament problems

Post by dunmunro »

As I've stated earlier I will no longer reply to posts from members of the forum who are not, IMHO, amenable to reasoned argument.

It would be remarkable if PE's B turret was partially out of action at ceasefire but Jasper's report states otherwise. Page 40 of the PG-KTB gives the status of PE's main battery at the end of the action:
"After the ceasefire... ...We did not experience any damage to our selves. The main battery was fully combat ready..."
However, I have no doubt that Jasper's plain statement, above, will try and be twisted into meaning something else.
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: More on KGV Class main armament problems

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hello everybody,
Dunmunro wrote: "As I've stated earlier I will no longer reply to posts from members of the forum who are not, IMHO, amenable to reasoned argument."
Possibly Mr.Dunmunro is just unwilling by now to discuss any GAR (after his errors with Rodney and KGV) with people pointing out his mistakes....


As I wrote:
"PG started at 100% as well as PoW. It's not written when she went to 87,5%, very early in the engagement (the GAR allows a calculation...). Do it."
I will do it for him once again, as he has carefully (but wisely...) avoided to do it himself:

After having fired 5 salvos against Hood, and 28 against PoW "B" turret was wooded. As the 5 and 28 salvos include 3 Vollsalve (2+1), it means "B" turret fired in total during a (7+29) 36 (semi-)salvos interval that means 18 shots per each gun (as German turrets fires in even and odd (semi-)salvos only), before being wooded (pag.39-41 here http://www.kbismarck.com/archives/pg-ktb.zip).
We have already discussed (and hopefully agreed once forever...) that Germans were starting count of salvo from zero each time they switch target...

The right gun in B turret lost 15 shots out of these 18, thus the problem that initially blocked 2 guns (for one salvo only, lowering PG output to 75%...) and then kept the right gun out of action for a long time (87,5% excluding the other problems), happened very early in the engagement (between salvo 1 against Hood and salvo 1 against PoW (semi-salvos 8 and 9 in absolute values)).

We cannot know whether the gun was back in action just before salvo 36, just after the same salvo (but wooded) or at the very end of the engagement at 06:09 (or even shortly later, despite the generic statement of Jasper about combat readiness: of course PG artillery was full combat ready even if a single B gun problem was still being fixed by personnel...).


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: More on KGV Class main armament problems

Post by pgollin »

.

Alberto,

It is no good you trying to take some sort of moral high ground when you have consistently broken your commitment (given when accessing the document) to give the title and archive reference of the "Vickers report".

[personal commentary redacted. WJJ].
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: More on KGV Class main armament problems

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hello everybody,

again, no arguments above [personal commentary redacted. WJJ]

I will not answer this guy as he deserves [personal commentary redacted. WJJ]


Bye, Alberto
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"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: More on KGV Class main armament problems

Post by paul.mercer »

Gentlemen,
Once again, even in this thread, some of the posts have reverted back to the actions of Capt Leach who, in other posts on this Forum has been all but accused of downright cowardice by some members due to his decision to retire from the battle. While not wanting to reopen this particular point which I think has been adequately discussed (and the accusation dismissed) I have often wondered if such accusations could be classed as libelous by his relatives (if there are any), perhaps Bill Jurens or Mr Rico could advise on this in case it might affect the Forum at a later date should the subject reappear?
Just out of interest, there have been many occasions where a battle turn away when confronted by superior forces ( Adml Sheer at Jutland),Scharnhorst at North Cape, (arguably) Graf Spey at River Plate and the twins on several occasions even though their guns far out ranged the old battleships that faced them (except Rodney)yet not one accusation of cowardice has been made against their Captains and it is interesting to note that -as far as I can recall, none of the authors of books on Bismarck or the DS battle have done so either.
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Re: More on KGV Class main armament problems

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hello everybody,
Paul mercer wrote: " there have been many occasions where a battle turn away when confronted by superior forces..."
Hi Paul,
in almost all cases there were orders not to risk against superior forces or even to simply avoid any engagement. Leach had no orders in this sense and the mission given to Holland was to prevent Bismarck to raid in Atlantic, mission that, for what Leach knew at the time of his disengagement, had not been fulfilled yet.

Superiority could have still been with British even after the Hood explosion and as Alec has correctly pointed out (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8556&start=60#p83855) .


" I have often wondered if such accusations could be classed as libelous by his relatives"
Don't worry for that. We speak history here, we are not judging people but military and tactical behaviors, as we will do in or publication. I have always said that we don't know whether Leach paniked or took a cold decision after the CP hit (only the BofI and Court Martial would have decided): IMO, militarily this decision was "timid" and in line neither with the mission he was up to nor with the traditions of the Royal Navy.

In Italy, when the King run away from Rome after the armistice (September 8, 1943), anyone has clearly written this was a coward act (that costed him the crown and the honor of his family, btw, despite having some good reasons for doing that). There are relatives still of the Savoy family, but nobody accused any of the writers/journalists for having condemned his behavior.
History is done by heroic and coward acts, there is no way to prevent an historical judgement to be written after almost 80 yeras from the facts.
I just wonder why Capt.Leach should escape the history judgement, even if I see that your opinion here is different from mine.


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: More on KGV Class main armament problems

Post by alecsandros »

dunmunro wrote: Thu May 30, 2019 9:04 pm Lutjens reduced speed but never below about ~20 knots. Lutjens and BrinkMann's immediate concern was to find fuel for PE.
von Mullencheim describes speed reduction down to 16kts; other sources 12kts.

It is a simple arithmetical calculus to be done to check this fact: if Victorious was at 350nm away on May 24th 6:00*, to the S-E of Bismarck, steaming at 27kts (later 29kts), what was the required average delta speed between Victorious and Bismarck , so that, at around 23:00 (17 hours later), the distance between the 2 ships would be reduced to approx. 80nm (which was the distance from which the Swordfish bombers were historically launched) ?

* from here: https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chron ... orge_V.htm

'(At0601/24/5/41 in approximate position63-22N, 32-17W HOOD was sunk by theBISMARCK'

'At 0600 hours the Home Fleet was in approximate position 60N, 22W. This was about 350 NM south easterly of the position of HOOD's sinking.

At 0800hours the Home Fleet altered course to260¼ and later to 240¼.

At 1509hours, VICTORIOUS, GALATEA, AURORA, KENYA and HERMIONE were detached to steer the best course to get within 100 miles of the enemy and carry out an air strike on BISMARCK'
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