More on KGV Class main armament problems

[Bill Jurens]

Mr. Robertson wrote:

"It makes up to some extent for the non-publication of the book about Bismarck by Garcke, Dulin and Jurens. Presumably they chose an inept publisher!"

It's "Garzke", not "Garcke". (That being said, Bill G. -- in correspondence I am typically addressed as "the OTHER Bill" has, over the years, become rather accustomed to this sort of thing, so I'm sure he forgives...)

As I understand it the book has already been released in England. I am not sure why it has taken so long to release it elsewhere, but the the publishers -- Seaforth and the U. S. Naval Institute Press -- can hardly be characterized as 'inept'. My sense of it is that they are a bit frustrated with the situation, too. In any case, this is not some sort of 'vanity publishing' job.

I can only hope readers find it worth waiting for....

Bill Jurens

[Byron Angel]

Hello everybody,

"...One rpmpg was the average output expected by the RN for a battleship in WW1...."

When a British WWII ship fired with a better RoF in anger ? Answer please, not generic statements.

Would the performance of a WW1 RN battlecruiser and a US battleship be satisfactory? The shots in question were properly fired in anger.

HMS Lion - Jutland, Run to the South
16 salvoes fired between 3:47:30 and 3:58:30 inclusive (11 minutes)
Firing upon Lutzow as part of two ship concentration in cooperation with Princess Royal
1.45 salvoes per minute.

- - -

USS Washington - 2nd Guadalcanal.

1st engagement - range 18,500 yards
0016 - 0019 (3 minutes)
42 rounds fired from 9 main battery guns
1.56 rpgpm

2nd engagement - range 8400 - 12650 yards
0100 - 0107 (inclusive of momentary 1.5 minute cease fire)
2m 39s - 39 rounds fired from 9 main battery guns
1m 30s - cease fire
2m 45s - 36 rounds fired from 9 main battery guns
1.54 rpgpm

- - -

B

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

Byron Angel wrote: "HMS Lion - Jutland....1.45 salvoes per minute."

Therefore much less than the 2 salvoes per minute of PoW (at least if they were salvos and not broadsides...). Range, please ?


US ships were firing with another method than Bristish doubles semi-salvos...


"USS Washington - 2nd Guadalcanal. 1st engagement - range 18,500 yards ....0016 - 0019 (3 minutes)....1.56 rpgpm"
A much shorter duration. Were salvos or broadsides fired, please ? Radar range ?
Was fire opened at 0016:00 and ceased at 0019:00 or ceased at 0019:59 (4 minutes fire action that would reduce to 1,16 rpgpm ?


"2nd engagement - range 8400 - 12650 yards....1.54 rpgpm"
Much shorter range, were salvos or broadsides fired ?


Under similar conditions than at DS (distance between 26500 and 14000 yards, huge range reduction rate, no radar initial range), no ship fired much faster than PoW.


Bye, Alberto

[pgollin]

.

Again I would point out that IF we are trying to get a "rate of fire" rather than just number of rounds fired over a period, then the first rounds should be ignored.

With the first rounds the guns have been been loaded and aimed, only after those first rounds have been fired can the firing cycle start. Take a single gun firing every 29.9 seconds. over a 2 minute period the gun will fire 5 times, which if you divided 2 minutes by 5 will give a (false) firing cycle of 24 seconds, not 29.9 seconds.

RPGPM might, or might not, be affected by such issues depending on how the fire was carried out. In a few cases battleships basically carried out "rapid fire" and the RPGPM might mean something, but in most engagements there will be reasons for delays, holds, casualties, etc.... without knowing what those various delays were and their causes RPGPM is only a very coarse guide.

.

[paul.mercer]

"That is if her personnel and equipment had been as good as Cunningham's revitalised antiques at Matapan".
Ooh, that's a it unkind, (but no doubt true, I'm a it of QE fan as my dad served in one), I would guess that the three ships at Matapan were thoroughly worked up with an experienced crew and of course the twin 15" was a tried and tested weapon.
Surely, with all this info we are actually coming to the conclusion that the practical rate of fire for most capital ships was around 1.5 -2 rounds a minute and whether it was actually 1.5 or 1.8 (or whatever)makes very little difference in the great scheme of things?
Going a it off topic here, it was stated earlier on that the three ships fired 20 broadsides between them, that's 160 15" shells at point blank range, surely there should have been nothing left of the 3 Italian cruisers?

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

"IF we are trying to get a "rate of fire" rather than just number of rounds fired over a period, then the first rounds should be ignored."

...again, this is what McMullen did in his table (http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 09guns.htm) and why I have always applied his methodology (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8491&start=165#p82455), complex as it can be for someone...

Paul Mercer wrote: "...with all this info we are actually coming to the conclusion that the practical rate of fire for most capital ships was around 1.5 -2 rounds a minute..."

Hi Paul,
well, no, I have not yet seen any example of such a high RoF in a practical battle action iunder comparable conditions, pending Byron answer to my questions re. USS Washington.
What I have seen in all actions in the Mediterranean at long/average range in daylight (e.g. Gaudo. Matapan cannot be compared, as broadsides were fired at night at point-blank range) is 1 to 2 salvos per minute (0.5 - 1 rpgpm), never more, putting PoW on May 24 (2 salvos per minute) at the top of the classment, as per Santarini judgement, with KGV at 1.7 on May 27.


Bye, Alberto

[Byron Angel]

Byron Angel wrote: "HMS Lion - Jutland....1.45 salvoes per minute."

Therefore much less than the 2 salvoes per minute of PoW (at least if they were salvos and not broadsides...). Range, please ?

You missed the bit about firing in pair concentration with Princess Royal; nevertheless, probably a poor example, given the complication of the concentration fire. Ranges, btw - 18,500 vds closing to 15,000 yds.

Here are two better examples, also from the "Run to the South" -
> HMS New Zealand - 20 salvoes fired between 3:57:00 and 4:07:00 (10m).
> HMS Tiger - 22 salvoes fired between 4:05:15 and 4:14:50 (9m 35s)

I repeat the point that 1 rpmpg (or two salvoes per minute) was more or less unremarkable in WW1, hence cannot possibly be considered as excellent performance 25 years later.

- - -

US ships were firing with another method than Bristish doubles semi-salvos...

Correct. Firing, in so far as I understand the documents, was by turret salvoes. So what? We are talking about rpgpm, are we not?

- - -

"USS Washington - 2nd Guadalcanal. 1st engagement - range 18,500 yards ....0016 - 0019 (3 minutes)....1.56 rpgpm"
A much shorter duration. Were salvos or broadsides fired, please ? Radar range ?
Was fire opened at 0016:00 and ceased at 0019:00 or ceased at 0019:59 (4 minutes fire action that would reduce to 1,16 rpgpm ?

Correct. Radar ranging was employed. Re duration of firing, the "0016-0019" duration of this firing period was taken verbatimn from the gunnery report of USS Washington. If you have doubts about its veracity, I cannot help you there.

- - -

"2nd engagement - range 8400 - 12650 yards....1.54 rpgpm"
Much shorter range, were salvos or broadsides fired ?

Turret salvoes once again. Shorter range indeed. So what? Rpgpm was, for all intents and purposes exactly the same as that achieved at 18,500 yards.

- - -

Under similar conditions than at DS (distance between 26500 and 14000 yards, huge range reduction rate, no radar initial range), no ship fired much faster than PoW.

See the "Run to the South" data above - two salvoes per minute was an unremarkable achievement for RN capital ships 25 years earlier. It is worth pointing out that Prince of Wales did in fact have FC radar; it just was not operative. Whose fault was that?

- - -

I would not dispute an argument that McMullen did an excellent job grappling with the all the problems and shortcoming that confronted him, but the ultimate gunnery performance of the ship as an integrated weapon system simply fell far short of "excellent". What puzzles me no end is why it is so important that Prince of Wales be portrayed as having delivered a top notch, first-class gunnery performance on 24 May.

B

[wadinga]

Fellow Contributors,

What puzzles me no end is why it is so important that Prince of Wales be portrayed as having delivered a top notch, first-class gunnery performance on 24 May.

Is your puzzlement actually ironic or truly Byronic?

All the best

wadinga

[northcape]

What puzzles me no end is why it is so important that Prince of Wales be portrayed as having delivered a top notch, first-class gunnery performance on 24 May.

B

Well, I guess your question is a rhetoric one. This whole new thematic subset which might be summarized as "RoF speculations" or simply "counting shells vs. time" is yet another attempt to fabricate evidence to support a certain theory, we all know this.

Why I think that the RoF is meaningless for the purpose to qualify "good fighting efficiency" of a ship:

1) As pointed out by others, you can define a broad range of rates, and each will provide a different figure.
2) As pointed out by others, any "RoF" (which in the simplest form falls back on a number of shells over a given time) is dependent on so many other factors not related to the "fighting efficiency" of a ship. In particular the designated shooting time periods are not known for some or most of the participants (and no, assuming them from a hypothetical battle map reconstruction is not a goood idea).
3) As always, looking at on individual event with a small sample (a battle lasting a couple of minutes, comprisingnot even a handful of ships) is not a valid statistic approach to test and compare "figthing efficiency" of ships.

If anybody is interested, here is my take: Both PoW and Bismarck and Prinz Eugen performed very well in terms of shooting and hitting. Why? Simply because they hit the enemy after a very short time, in case of PoW in non-favourable conditions, and hit several times. Was there luck involved? Yes, also, but definitely all three ships demonstrated good fighting efficiency. Any assessment beyond this statement is, in my view, pure speculation.

[HMSVF]

Byron Angel wrote: "HMS Lion - Jutland....1.45 salvoes per minute."

Therefore much less than the 2 salvoes per minute of PoW (at least if they were salvos and not broadsides...). Range, please ?

You missed the bit about firing in pair concentration with Princess Royal; nevertheless, probably a poor example, given the complication of the concentration fire. Ranges, btw - 18,500 vds closing to 15,000 yds.

Here are two better examples, also from the "Run to the South" -
> HMS New Zealand - 20 salvoes fired between 3:57:00 and 4:07:00 (10m).
> HMS Tiger - 22 salvoes fired between 4:05:15 and 4:14:50 (9m 35s)

I repeat the point that 1 rpmpg (or two salvoes per minute) was more or less unremarkable in WW1, hence cannot possibly be considered as excellent performance 25 years later.

- - -

US ships were firing with another method than Bristish doubles semi-salvos...

Correct. Firing, in so far as I understand the documents, was by turret salvoes. So what? We are talking about rpgpm, are we not?

- - -

"USS Washington - 2nd Guadalcanal. 1st engagement - range 18,500 yards ....0016 - 0019 (3 minutes)....1.56 rpgpm"
A much shorter duration. Were salvos or broadsides fired, please ? Radar range ?
Was fire opened at 0016:00 and ceased at 0019:00 or ceased at 0019:59 (4 minutes fire action that would reduce to 1,16 rpgpm ?

Correct. Radar ranging was employed. Re duration of firing, the "0016-0019" duration of this firing period was taken verbatimn from the gunnery report of USS Washington. If you have doubts about its veracity, I cannot help you there.

- - -

"2nd engagement - range 8400 - 12650 yards....1.54 rpgpm"
Much shorter range, were salvos or broadsides fired ?

Turret salvoes once again. Shorter range indeed. So what? Rpgpm was, for all intents and purposes exactly the same as that achieved at 18,500 yards.

- - -

Under similar conditions than at DS (distance between 26500 and 14000 yards, huge range reduction rate, no radar initial range), no ship fired much faster than PoW.

See the "Run to the South" data above - two salvoes per minute was an unremarkable achievement for RN capital ships 25 years earlier. It is worth pointing out that Prince of Wales did in fact have FC radar; it just was not operative. Whose fault was that?

- - -

I would not dispute an argument that McMullen did an excellent job grappling with the all the problems and shortcoming that confronted him, but the ultimate gunnery performance of the ship as an integrated weapon system simply fell far short of "excellent". What puzzles me no end is why it is so important that Prince of Wales be portrayed as having delivered a top notch, first-class gunnery performance on 24 May.

B

Rapid firing was the BCF's mantra after the Battle of Dogger Bank and supposedly the solution to the problems they experienced (in regards to the perceived lack of hits). It was almost certainly the reason as to why 3 battlecruisers suffered catastrophic deflagration as in order achieve the rate of fire they stored cordite in volumes it shouldn't have in places that it wasn't meant to be. So your right ,the British with their twin mounts had no issues in maintaining high (for large calibre guns) rates of fire. Incidentally HMS New Zealand fired more shells than any other vessel but couldn't hit a cows arse with a banjo ! From memory she only made a couple of hits (it might have only been 1)!

Another thought. Although hydraulically powered the gun turrets of battleships relied still on human input. The longer the action, the more fatigued the crews became and the more errors occurred. If the crews were having to constantly remedy faults at the same time as carrying out the necessary drills the workload has surely increased? And if the workload has increased then so has the fatigue levels, which then has a knock on effect on the firing drill?


Best wishes



HMSVF

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

Byron Angel wrote"You missed the bit about firing in pair concentration with Princess Royal...probably a poor example,"

I beg pardon for my ignorance, please explain...I thought Hood and PoW were firing in concentration against Bismarck too...

What's your source for your reported Jutland data during the "Run to South" ?

According to John Campbell (Jutland - an analysis of the fighting), Lion first 5 salvos (fired from 18000 yards, not 26500...) were fired in 2.5 minutes, exactly 2 salvos per minute. Then RoF decreased, as the 9th salvo was fired 5.5 minutes after open fire and 20th salvo after 14.5 minutes.
At the end, Lion opened fire at 15:48 and ceased fire at 16:34 after 48 salvos, thus an extremely unremarkable 1.1 salvos per minute compared to the 2 salvos/minute of PoW.
Princess Royal fired her first 5 salvos in 3 minutes 40 seconds from open fire... thus much slower than Lion and (apparently) without any coordination with Lion fire.
Beatty was so unhappy about the British battlecruisers RoF that, at 15:55, after 8 minutes fire, he made a signal to the other ships of his squadron asking to increase the RoF....

According to Campbell, no British ship exceeded 2.1 salvos per minute at any battle stage as well as no German ship did better at Jutland. The expenditure of shells per each ship confirms his analysis pointing to Lion as the faster firing British battlecruiser (only New Zealand exceeded Lion shells expenditure, but Lion almost immediately lost her Q turret).

"the "0016-0019" duration of this firing period was taken verbatimn from the gunnery report of USS Washington"

I have no doubt at all, I just say that we don't know whether the duration to be calculated was 3 or 4 minutes, except if we have something like the PoW salvo plot, as minute 0019 may be easily 0019:00 or 0019:59....In case it's 0019:59 then it means

"Shorter range indeed. So what? Rpgpm was, for all intents and purposes exactly the same as that achieved at 18,500 yard"

In a night battle, radar "directed", you don't have to correct gunnery by spotting the fall of shells and you can fire more quickly even using broadsides (as at Matapan).



In all the Mediterranean Sea battles of WWII I have studied, the RoF was never significantly more than 1 rpgpm, AFAIK.


Bye, Alberto

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,


I repeat the point that no similar battle (complex geometry with fast range closure rate, average long range, no initial radar ranging) was fought with a higher RoF than at DS, AFAIK.

The fact that Bismarck fired 93 shells in 14 minutes means she fired 0.83 rpgpm in average.
If we trust the Baron, it took 5 minutes to fire 40 shells, therefore a slightly higher 1 rpgpm in the first 5 minutes.
Only in the PG film (thus after 6:04, despite there is still some unsupported reluctance to accept this proven viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8491&p=82759&hilit=railings#p82759 timing) we see 24 ordered shots in 2 minutes or 1.5 rpmpg, but the film is most probably quite significantly "accelerated" (33% to 50%, as discussed, that would mean this figure should be brought back to around 1 rpgpm).

PoW performance was absolutely comparable, thus it can be defined "excellent" compared to a ship considered as "at the peak of her efficiency".

Byron Angel wrote: "What puzzles me no end is why it is so important that Prince of Wales be portrayed as having delivered a top notch, first-class gunnery performance on 24 May."

"What puzzles me no end" is why the stubborn refusal of someone to recognize the good PoW gunnery performance (at least Mr.northcape did a step forward saying "Both PoW and Bismarck and Prinz Eugen performed very well in terms of shooting and hitting")...

Oh, I should not be really puzzled: Adm Santarini (first among all authors, afaik) lucidly and logically explained this attitude, due to a very obvious reason (download/file.php?id=3420).


Bye, Alberto

[Bill Jurens]

The reason is not entirely obvious to me.

I have read the Santarini quote very carefully, and must admit that I find it very difficult to understand – too many double negatives, etc. In any case it appears to deal not with gunnery issue per se, but with how the British might have afterwards might have interpreted the action.
This, while interesting as representing a personal point of view, would seem to be best seen as somewhat conjectural and speculative. He does describe Leach’s decision as ‘hard and objectively valid’, and I certainly cannot disagree with that interpretation at all.

Bill Jurens

[dunmunro]

Salvo rates are determined by visibility, seastate, range, and gunnery coordination. The greater the number of ships firing at a target, then necessarily the RoF will fall to allow for identification of FoS. The shorter the range, the faster the reload cycle. Poor seastates will slow the RoF to allow the guns to be fired accurately despite the roll, yaw and pitch of the ship. Good Visibility allows for continuous observation of the target and FoS.

PoW had all these factors in her favour.

Let's look at some other single RN battleship actions:

Renown fired 100 salvos and 5 broadsides during her action at Northcape, in appalling weather and extremely poor visibility from 0405 to 0557, with firing being checked 4 times within this time period. Her first 23 salvos were fired in 15 minutes. She suffered no loss of output until salvo 48 when trouble occurred with the loading cage of A2 gun which then ceased fire for about 15 minutes and this was her sole gunnery casualty.

DoY fought Scharnhorst in similar seastate conditions, but in full darkness although she had the considerable advantage of radar ranging with a FC radar that also had good bearing accuracy. DoY's peak RoF occurred at the end of the battle when she fired 18 broadsides in 18 minutes.

[Bill Jurens]

For what it's worth, the USN typically conducted two separate main battery exercises. In Short Range Battle Practice, guns were fired as rapidly as possible, which essentially measured the efficiency of the gun crews and the mechanical equipment in the turrets. In contrast, Long Range Battle Practice placed less emphasis on speed and more on getting on target and hitting thereafter. This tested fire control issues.

Bill Jurens