Message Traffic heard by RODNEY 24 May 1941

[HMSVF]

Therefore all accounts ascribe the hits to Prince of Wales and thus indirectly criticize Hood's gunnery, with the more-informed ones identifying the ancient and unmodernised fire control system as a major factor. Lord Chatfield pointed out in 1941 Hood had fought a ship 25 years younger than herself and since speed, guns and armour remained pretty much viable, the archaic Dumaresq/Dreyer table slated for replacement over 20 years previously and thus obsolete when installed, must be singled out.

Hello,
HMS Hood executed gunnery trials in 1938, 1939, in poor visibility and at medium to long range - about 15000y to 19000y IIRC, and fired her guns in anger - with excellent results - in 1940 at Mers-el-Kebir , from 17.500y to 18500y (range was increasing with time), against ships at anchor, and later against a fleeing battlecruiser (Strasbourg) and escort destroyers (http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 34-317.htm) (she fired about 36 semi-salvos at Mers-el-Kebyr, in about 15 minutes - but a critical aspect is that she had her aft turrets un-masked...).

In all accounts that I have read about those events, her gunnery team - and gunnery results - were reportedly good to very good.

And yes, I know she was scheduled for an upgrade in 1941, but it is a stretch to say she did poorly at DS because of "obsolescent" fire control, because the same "obsolescent" FC produced good results in other gunnery shoots (and IIRC, other RN battleships , equipped with the same FC , did good and very good against the enemy as well).

No one knows which of PoW's salvoes hit,[...]

Yes, we do know which salvos hit, because we know which salvos straddled. And yes, I know there is a possibility that some non-straddling salvos did produce hits, but based on Prince of Wales gunnery report, and salvo plot, that possibility is very remote .

Bismarck is supposed in the revisionist version to have switched targets and hit PoW in 50 seconds, including time of flight.

Yes, that is easily explained by battle geometry.

although the same promoters say there were minimal manoeuvres around Hood, when they need to explain away their ridiculously short speculative timeframe and recorded angle of shell passage through the Compass Platform.

Capt Leach's account explains this , as his decision of turn away was taken after the demise of the Hood, and therefore manouvred hard to exit the battle area. His manouvre to avoid Hood is superimposed on the same trajectory of the "exit".

Think the quoting system has gone awry as that wasn't me!

Tagging on.

Another point possibly worth considering is that Germany used stereoscopic range finding and the British coincidence. In almost all the texts I have read the Germans invariably would get the range quicker with their system but the British system was better at holding the range once they had it (which makes sense as from what I can gather the stereoscopic system demanded excellent eyesight and concentration, if the gunnery officer tired then the accuracy would fall off). Hood has the best of the WW1 Dreyer tables (? IV ? -was this the mk that "borrowed" from Pollens "Argo clock)" but still relies on a coincidence range finder (although admittedly a big 30 footer).

So you you have an older ship with an older system where the results take a little longer to come than the german equivalent. Unfortunately time isn't on Hoods side as the battle lasts only 6 (?) minutes and the problems are exacerbated by time being wasted firing at the wrong vessel (and she didn't have the weather gauge from what I can gather). If luck had been on her side and she had blown up when she did I would have thought that once found the range she would probably have held it reasonably well (if like previous actions/battles).Whether she would of held together or rapidly become hors de combat is another issue. Unfortunately she never got the chance, she was a older, glass jawed ship, with a fire control that was known to take a while to get into its stride.Time was definitely not on her side.



best wishes HMSVF

[dunmunro]

Think the quoting system has gone awry as that wasn't me!

Tagging on.

Another point possibly worth considering is that Germany used stereoscopic range finding and the British coincidence. In almost all the texts I have read the Germans invariably would get the range quicker with their system but the British system was better at holding the range once they had it (which makes sense as from what I can gather the stereoscopic system demanded excellent eyesight and concentration, if the gunnery officer tired then the accuracy would fall off). Hood has the best of the WW1 Dreyer tables (? IV ? -was this the mk that "borrowed" from Pollens "Argo clock)" but still relies on a coincidence range finder (although admittedly a big 30 footer).

So you you have an older ship with an older system where the results take a little longer to come than the german equivalent. Unfortunately time isn't on Hoods side as the battle lasts only 6 (?) minutes and the problems are exacerbated by time being wasted firing at the wrong vessel (and she didn't have the weather gauge from what I can gather). If luck had been on her side and she had blown up when she did I would have thought that once found the range she would probably have held it reasonably well (if like previous actions/battles).Whether she would of held together or rapidly become hors de combat is another issue. Unfortunately she never got the chance, she was a older, glass jawed ship, with a fire control that was known to take a while to get into its stride.Time was definitely not on her side.



best wishes HMSVF

The KM began using FC radar before the RN and both KM ships had FC radar which was far more accurate than any optical RF and far more reliable (when it worked). The PE War Diary states that Hood got on target quickly and straddled or near missed PE several times and Hood may have been using her type 284 radar to find the range. RN reports state that Hood was hit by 0555 while PoW, hampered by the failure of her FC radars did not straddle Bismarck until her 6th salvo:

During the approach "Hood" made - "G.I.C." - followed by - "G.O.B.1" - just before opening fire at 0552 1/2. Range approx. 25,000 yards. "Prince of Wales" opened fire at 0553. "Bismarck" replied with extreme accuracy on "Hood". 2nd or 3rd salvo straddled and fire broke out in "Hood" in the vicinity of the port after 4" gunmounting.
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... #P391Leach

which is exactly what you'd expect from Bismarck using FC radar versus purely optical spotting by PoW. This is from Rowell's letter written a few days after the events transpired:

6. The usual gun control signals were made but it was not until
the range had dropped to 25,000 yards that the HOOD opened fire, followed
half a minute later by the PRINCE OF WALES in accordance with the
concentration rules.
BISMARCK opened fire half a minute after the PRINCE OF WALES, before
doing so turning to open her "A" arcs.
The "A" arcs fo the HOOD and PRINCE OF WALES remained closed by the
two turns of 40° and 20° made towards the enemy.

7. The first salvo of BISMARCK was only a few hundred yards short
and the second just over, the spread being very small. - With the close
formation adopted by HOOD and PRINCE OF WALES it was difficult to take
avoiding action.

Salvoes, 4 and 5 from BISMARCK started a cordite fire on the HOOD's
boat deck. - After this the Admiral ordered 20° turn away together, thus
opening the PRINCE OFP WALES! "A" arcs after the eighth salvo. - The turn
away was never executed as a few seconds later HOOD was hit near the
mainmast by at least one 15" shell and a huge column of flame shot up.
The ship sank at once.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

"Unfortunately time isn't on Hoods side as the battle lasts only 6 (?) minutes"

I agree time was not on Hood side, but Hood opened fire at 5:52:30 and exploded at 6:00: thus 7.5 minutes, in this timeframe PoW (using (small) coincidence rangefinders) was able to hit 3 times, Hood not a single one.

I think Alecsandros is right saying that Hood had performed well from gunenry viewpoint. She was considered in some way a gunnery "cock of the fleet" and her poor performance on May 24 is worth some reflections...

"RN reports state that Hood was hit by 0555"

No. We know from Jasper report (open fire at 05:55, 2 Vollsalve + 2 semi-salvos + flight times and observations http://www.kbismarck.com/archives/pg-ktb.zip , pag.39) and from Hunter-Terry timings (very reliable and "taken on the spot", as per Hood Board http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... .htm#Terry) that Hood was hit at minute 5:57 by PG on the boat deck. Any other timing can't cope with the PG GAR and is therefore simply wrong.

Clearly PoW hit before and from a longer distance than Bismarck: PG was even better.


Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

"Unfortunately time isn't on Hoods side as the battle lasts only 6 (?) minutes"

I agree time was not on Hood side, but Hood opened fire at 5:52:30 and exploded at 6:00: thus 7.5 minutes, in this timeframe PoW (using (small) coincidence rangefinders) was able to hit 3 times, Hood not a single one.

I think Alecsandros is right saying that Hood had performed well from gunenry viewpoint. She was considered in some way a gunnery "cock of the fleet" and her poor performance on May 24 is worth some reflections...

"RN reports state that Hood was hit by 0555"

No. We know from Jasper report (open fire at 05:55, 2 Vollsalve + 2 semi-salvos + flight times and observations http://www.kbismarck.com/archives/pg-ktb.zip , pag.39) and from Hunter-Terry timings (very reliable and "taken on the spot", as per Hood Board http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... .htm#Terry) that Hood was hit at minute 5:57 by PG on the boat deck. Any other timing can't cope with the PG GAR and is therefore simply wrong.

Clearly PoW hit before and from a longer distance than Bismarck: PG was even better.


Bye, Alberto

As we've discussed PE's War Diary states that Bismarck opened fire before PE and the reference above states that Bismarck's salvos were on target before PE's. We have no idea how PE's timing varied from other ships, but Suffolk noted that she opened fire at ~0556:30 versus ~0553:30 for Bismarck.

[dunmunro]

Let's look at what H-T actually stated:

53. Will you describe what you saw of the action particularly with reference to the "Hood", from the time "Hood" opened fire?

"Hood" opened fire with foremost turrets, that is "A" and "B", at 0552. "Prince of Wales" opened fire with "A" and "B" turrets shortly afterwards. "Bismarck's" first salvo straddled the "Hood", apparently no hits. One or two more salvos fell close to the "Hood". One salvo which fell astern of "Hood" I took to be 8" H.E. The splashes were considerably smaller than the previous ones and apparently burst on striking the water. There was a flash and black smoke when it burst.
At 0557 "Hood" was hit amidships by "Bismarck's third or fourth salvo. A big fire started just before the main-mast and a lot of black smoke was given off. The fire appeared to die down slowly and then increase again, flames were a dull red colour. The flames did not reach high but appeared but appeared (sic) to be burning just forward, around the foot of the main-mast. "Hood" continued to fire and fired one salvo from the after group on the foremost bearing. At 0600 there was a heavy explosion at the after end of the "Hood", no actual fall of shot was observed at that time. A column of smoke rose above the ship and completely enveloped her. It formed into a mushroom at the top. I thought she had blown up completely but shortly afterwards the smoke cleared sufficiently for me to see her. She was apparently still moving ahead and turning to port. She was down at the stern and listing heavily to port and the after part of the ship appeared to be a mass of twisted framework, as though the plates of the side had been blown out leaving only the frame. The part of the ship which I saw was just forward of "X" turret. At this time we were turning to port between the "Hood" and the enemy and I observed debris falling towards "Prince of Wales", in particular one large piece that looked like the main-mast or a derrick. 0601, "Prince of Wales" was hit by a shell in the after funnel and this obstructed my attention. Shortly after this I observed "Hood's" bows sticking vertically out of the water and sinking rapidly, I think on an even keel. This was about 0603 and after that I saw nothing but black smoke hanging over the scene of the wreck.

H-T's timing does not coincide with the PoW's salvo chart and there is still room for considerable error. He does, however, state that Bismarck straddled Hood with her first salvo and hit with her 3rd or 4th salvo. He implies that Bismarck's first salvo fell shortly after PoW's first salvo was fired. He implies that Bismarck has fired at least 3 salvos prior to PE's first observed salvo.

H-T was being blasted by PoW's own 14 salvos, from 0557 onward which would have caused a considerable shockwave in his open topped Port, aft HADT.

[HMSVF]

Hello everybody,

"Unfortunately time isn't on Hoods side as the battle lasts only 6 (?) minutes"

I agree time was not on Hood side, but Hood opened fire at 5:52:30 and exploded at 6:00: thus 7.5 minutes, in this timeframe PoW (using (small) coincidence rangefinders) was able to hit 3 times, Hood not a single one.

I think Alecsandros is right saying that Hood had performed well from gunenry viewpoint. She was considered in some way a gunnery "cock of the fleet" and her poor performance on May 24 is worth some reflections...

"RN reports state that Hood was hit by 0555"

No. We know from Jasper report (open fire at 05:55, 2 Vollsalve + 2 semi-salvos + flight times and observations http://www.kbismarck.com/archives/pg-ktb.zip , pag.39) and from Hunter-Terry timings (very reliable and "taken on the spot", as per Hood Board http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... .htm#Terry) that Hood was hit at minute 5:57 by PG on the boat deck. Any other timing can't cope with the PG GAR and is therefore simply wrong.

Clearly PoW hit before and from a longer distance than Bismarck: PG was even better.


Bye, Alberto

I agree time was not on Hood side, but Hood opened fire at 5:52:30 and exploded at 6:00: thus 7.5 minutes, in this timeframe PoW (using (small) coincidence rangefinders) was able to hit 3 times, Hood not a single one.

I think Alecsandros is right saying that Hood had performed well from gunenry viewpoint. She was considered in some way a gunnery "cock of the fleet" and her poor performance on May 24 is worth some reflections...

Forgive if I am wrong but didn't Hood lose her 15 inch optical rangefinder/director capability on her spotting top when her radar was fitted? Wouldn't that leave her with just the rangefinder on top of the conning tower? HMS Prince of Wales optical FCS was right on top of her [substantial] bridge structure and behind the compass platform. I would have thought that the lower position of Hoods conning tower would have made her more susceptible to spray than POW.

That and 25 years of improvement in optical fire control (? better prisms etc)



Best wishes HMSVF

[Byron Angel]

“No. We know from Jasper report (open fire at 05:55, 2 Vollsalve + 2 semi-salvos + flight times and observations http://www.kbismarck.com/archives/pg-ktb.zip , pag.39) and from Hunter-Terry timings (very reliable and "taken on the spot", as per Hood Board http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... .htm#Terry) that Hood was hit at minute 5:57 by PG on the boat deck. Any other timing can't cope with the PG GAR and is therefore simply wrong.”

- - -

The above statement regarding the testimony of Lt Cdr Hunter Terry is very confusing to me. Hunter Terry (see below) states the following –

[ 1 ] ”Bismarck's" first salvo straddled the "Hood", apparently no hits”.
Byron note – IMO, Hunter Terry was probably describning the fall of Bismarck’s initial 400 meter forking group of two 4 gun salvoes, which Mullenheim-Rechberg describes as having “straddled” Hood – one salvo short, one salvo just over.

[ 2 ] ”One or two more salvos fell close to the "Hood". One salvo which fell astern of "Hood" I took to be 8" H.E. The splashes were considerably smaller than the previous ones and apparently burst on striking the water. There was a flash and black smoke when it burst.”
Byron note – Hunter Terry does not say that the salvo featuring the smaller splashes struck Hood, only that the salvo fell astern of Hood and the shells, which he took to be “8” H.E.”, burst upon striking the water.

[ 3 ] “At 0557 "Hood" was hit amidships by "Bismarck's third or fourth salvo. A big fire started just before the main-mast and a lot of black smoke was given off. The fire appeared to die down slowly and then increase again, flames were a dull red colour. The flames did not reach high but appeared but appeared (sic) to be burning just forward, around the foot of the main-mast.”
Byron note – Hunter Terry clearly states here that the hit amidships upon Hood came from a Bismarck salvo landing at 0557.

[ 4 ] “At 0600 there was a heavy explosion at the after end of the "Hood", no actual fall of shot was observed at that time. A column of smoke rose above the ship and completely enveloped her. It formed into a mushroom at the top.”
Byron note – Hunter Terry here states that he observed a heavy explosion aboard Hood at 0600, not a hit by Bismarck. He clearly states that he observed no fall of shot around Hood at that moment.

This leaves two possible explanations:
A - the explosion was a delayed reaction from the hit he says that he observed at 0557 (by no means an unreasonable possibility based upon cordite explosions that occurred at Jutland); or ...
B - all the shells of a salvo landing at 0600 in fact struck Hood (very unlikely IMO).

- The testimony of Hunter Terry, a witness deemed highly reliable by the Board of Inquiry, leads to the impression that Bismarck actually appears to have hit Hood at 0557, two minutes after opening fire, rather than at 0600. Regrettably, Hunter Terry's account is silent as to any follo-on salvoes fired by Bismarck during the intervening period between 0557 and 0600.


Byron

[alecsandros]

I think Alecsandros is right saying that Hood had performed well from gunenry viewpoint. She was considered in some way a gunnery "cock of the fleet" and her poor performance on May 24 is worth some reflections...

For clarity, let me explain : I don't know how well HMS Hood fired at DS, what I know is that she fired well in other situations , 1 or 2 years before. I do not favor the "25 year old ship" phrase - the RN successfully used 20 to 30 year old ships throughout the war , many times with excellent results (see Rodney, Warspite, Repulse, Renown)

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

"Hunter Terry, a witness deemed highly reliable by the Board of Inquiry"

...reliable for the precise timings he took, with written annotations at the time of action, he was not very good at distinguishing between 15" and 8" salvos (that he counted aproximately) and not for his observations of the enemy salvos results (for this Rowell and Leach are more precise (especially Rowell) and reliable, IMO).
We have anyway Jasper stating it was PG to hit Hood first and Leach saying that a 15" salvo sunk the Hood.

"I would have thought that the lower position of Hoods conning tower would have made her more susceptible to spray than POW."

According to McMullen, the DCT rangefinder did not provide reliable ranges anyway and he had to estimate the range manually (with "cards"), overestimating it by far, but correcting very quickly.


I don't comment intentionally about the repeated fantasy about BS open fire time, we have the German official documents for that...

"H-T was being blasted by PoW's own 14 salvos, from 0557 onward which would have caused a considerable shockwave"

Another speculation... Source, please ? H-T just says he heard no Hood explosion as PoW guns were firing...


Bye, Alberto

[Byron Angel]

Hello everybody,

"Hunter Terry, a witness deemed highly reliable by the Board of Inquiry"

...reliable for the precise timings he took, with written annotations at the time of action, he was not very good at distinguishing between 15" and 8" salvos (that he counted aproximately) and not for his observations of the enemy salvos results (for this Rowell and Leach are more precise (especially Rowell) and reliable, IMO).

>>>>> To suggest that Hunter Terry was "not very good at distinguishing between 15" and 8" salvos" is quite interesting. Lt Cdr Hunter Terry had been in RN service for about fifteen years. His prior service record included - HMS Emperor of India, HMS Sussex (8in cruiser), HMS Keith (flotilla leader), HMS Renown (Home Fleet), HMS Royal Oak. On that basis, I am forced to be rather skeptical of your claim that he could not distinguish a medium caliber from a heavy caliber fall of shot.

>>>>> Did Hunter Terry count "approximately"? What does that mean exactly? Are you referring to his "3rd or 4th salvo" comment? Captain Leach made the very same sort of comment in his own testimony.

Here is Leach's testimony before the board -
"Before the action started I was in station on "Hood's" starboard quarter at a distance of about four cables. We had had a concentration signal and waited to open fire in our proper time sector after "Hood" had opened fire. The "Hood" opened fire first and in between the time she opened fire and the time it was due for me to open fire the German ships opened fire. I saw the first salvo from the German ships arrive near the "Hood" and about the second or third salvo I looked toward the "Hood" and saw a fire burning on the superstructure deck on the port side right aft. I did not actually see the fire start but I saw it a few seconds after it started. From that time onwards I looked at the "Hood" occasionally but I noticed that the fire spread quickly from the port after superstructure deck till it was extended from the after superstructure deck to about the mainmast. (Witness was given a model of the "Hood" which he placed at the correct inclination, which was 40° to the right.)"

Here is Rowell's testimony before the board -
The "Hood" opened fire with her foremost turrets with the enemy about 40 deg. on the starboard bow and "Prince of Wales" opened fire with her foremost turrets about half a minute later. Shortly after "Prince of Wales" first salvo "Bismarck" opened fire with all four turrets. The Bismarck's opening salvo fell very close to the "Hood." I think, but I am not sure, that it was just over. The spread was extremely small, I think it was the third salvo from the "Bismarck" which first hit the "Hood" and a fierce fire started on the "Hood" boat deck abaft the mainmast. My impression is that this fire was on the portside. "Prince of Wales" at this time was fine on the "Hood's" starboard quarter."

>>>>> Rowell's testimony differs from that of Hunter Terry in that he says that he witnessed further fall of shot about Hood and a later hit around 0600 which he observed to have caused the fatal explosion some few seconds later. Was Hunter Terry distracted at the time? We do not know. Nevertheless, as the Germans are fond of saying .... "macht's nichts" .... it makes no difference. Hunter Terry, Leach and Rowell all testified as having seen a hit upon Hood on or about Bismarck's third or fourth salvo, which would place Bismarck's first hit on or about 0557.

- - -

We have anyway Jasper stating it was PG to hit Hood first and Leach saying that a 15" salvo sunk the Hood.

>>>>> Jasper was 20,000+ yards away. Leach, Rowell and Hunter Terry were 800 yards away. Neither Leach nor Rowell mention anything specific about 8in fall of shot. Why might that have been?
Possibility 1 - Neither Leach nor Rowell could tell the difference between an 8in and a 15in fall of shot.
Possibility 2 - They saw none (unlikely IMO).
Possibility 3 - They observed 8in fall of shot, but considered it inconsequential.

I have made the comment more than once before: this is a 78 year old cold case, wherein all the witnesses are dead and their surviving testimonies and recollections frequently conflict. It is possible to pick and choose, select and discard this or that information and data to assemble a plausible account, but it is IMO rather a step too far to assert that such a construct can ever be represented as a faultlessly perfect, true and factual account.

- - -

Taking this opportunity to present my OPINION - I think that there is a strong case to be made, based upon testimony of competent nearby witnesses, that the first hit upon Hood was made by Bismarck on/about 0557.


B

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

"I think that there is a strong case to be made, based upon testimony of competent nearby witnesses, that the first hit upon Hood was made by Bismarck on/about 0557"

1) Jasper is clear enough that his 4th salvo was the one that hit Hood and started the fire, I don't see any reason why he should be wrong as his account of the PG opening salvos is precise and he even explains how he could ditinguish between the 15", the 8" and the 6" splashes... He was far away, but his job was to look at the fall of shells and evaluate them: Leach, Rowell and Hunter-Terry were doing other things (and from their viewpoint they could not see all the falling salvos), but H-T at least could write down some timings, and this is key to confirm what happened.

2) The PG 8" HE shells are very likely to have exploded at contact with the boat deck and to start a fire there, the BS AP 15" shells would have penetrated all Hood horizontal decks before exploding, causing severe internal damages (at machinery level, in that position) never reported by anyone on board Hood), not a "superficial" fire...

3) All the investigations conclusions point to PG to have hit first. The first BS hit came later (if we trust the spotting top story from Briggs, only at around 05:58 / 05:59).


Bye, Alberto

[paul.mercer]

Gentlemen,
A quick question, why was Hood's gunnery considered to be OK, she was firing at the wrong ship and according to some points of view, did not actually get near Bismarck before she blew up? What she did in the past regarding gunnery has no bearing on what happened at Denmark Strait.

[Byron Angel]

Gentlemen,
A quick question, why was Hood's gunnery considered to be OK, she was firing at the wrong ship and according to some points of view, did not actually get near Bismarck before she blew up? What she did in the past regarding gunnery has no bearing on what happened at Denmark Strait.

Hi Paul
If Hood indeed fired only three or four salvos before her destruction, that likely represented, at best, two double-salvoes with the first presumably spread for deflection. To my mind, it is possible that both of these double-salvoes had been directed at her initial target Prinz Eugen and Hood was still in process of shifting target when she was fatally hit.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

- - -

FWIW, the following item of peripheral interest comes from an account of a Hood pre-war 1938 battle practice (contained in ADM186/349). A comment in the report stated as follows -

"Conditions for the practice
7. Visibility was good, but the horizon to the south-westward was hazy.
8. Although rangefinders had been trained on the target for approximately 3 minutes before opening fire, no ranges were obtained, due to vibration and spray.
9. A wind of 60 miles per hour blowing through the foretop, together with excessive vibration, made conditions for the control exceedingly difficult."

Hood was making 28 knots in the above-referenced practice. At another practice, with Hood making 26 knots, the report only mentioned vibration as a problem in connection with the Y turret range-finder, while the other range-finders were said to have provided "excellent results" (range found on second double-salvo).


B

[Byron Angel]

1) Jasper is clear enough that his 4th salvo was the one that hit Hood and started the fire, I don't see any reason why he should be wrong as his account of the PG opening salvos is precise and he even explains how he could ditinguish between the 15", the 8" and the 6" splashes... He was far away, but his job was to look at the fall of shells and evaluate them: Leach, Rowell and Hunter-Terry were doing other things (and from their viewpoint they could not see all the falling salvos), but H-T at least could write down some timings, and this is key to confirm what happened.

>>>>> Jasper was about 20 kilometers away. Prinz Eugen was not the only ship firing at Hood. Jasper could not possibly distinguish HITS at that distance, especially from an AP round. I'm frankly rather bemused by your suggestion that Leach, Hunter Terry and Rowell are now to be considered as distracted and unreliable witnesses. Did not you yourself use Rowell and Hunter Terry to support your own arguments? How does one go about now dismissing their largely consistent testimony regarding the first salvoes from Bismarck? How did Hunter Terry fool the board into believing that he was a highly competent and reliable witness? I'm sorry, but I am having a great deal of difficulty with your counter-argument here.

2) The PG 8" HE shells are very likely to have exploded at contact with the boat deck and to start a fire there, the BS AP 15" shells would have penetrated all Hood horizontal decks before exploding, causing severe internal damages (at machinery level, in that position) never reported by anyone on board Hood), not a "superficial" fire...

>>>>> Not to put too fine a point on this issue, but the noteworthy lack of survivors from the crew of Hood makes any "failure to report damage in the machinery spaces" rather moot; we will never know one way or another. The comment about the behavior of Prinz Eugen's HE shells is interesting, but as I understand it, HE was only fired in the initial ranging fork and was followed thereafter by base-fuzed SAP. In toto, while bearing a sense of plausibility, it is still far from convincing factual evidence - there is nothing preventing a heavy caliber strike setting off a ready-use ammunition locker by impact shock. Once again, the truth here is ultimately unknowable.

3) All the investigations conclusions point to PG to have hit first. The first BS hit came later (if we trust the spotting top story from Briggs, only at around 05:58 / 05:59).

Must again disagree, particularly when the weight of witness testimony is compared. With respect to Briggs, here is his testimony in his own words:

87. Where were you at the time of the action?
On the Compass Platform

88. Was the Compass Platform in the Hood still covered in?
Yes, Sir.

89. Tell us what you know from the time the HOOD opened fire.
The HOOD opened fire with the forward turrets 17 miles range, and the BISMARCK and the PRINCE EUGEN we about 30° on the starboard bow and when the HOOD opened fore the PRINCE EUGEN definitely turned away and the BISMARCK was thought to turn away. This I gathered from conversation between the Admiral and the Captain. We altered course 40° to starboard bringing the BISMARCK right ahead, 40° together and we closed in to 12 miles range. We hit the BISMARCK with our second salvo right amidships and the BISMARCK did not open fire until we had fired about 4 or 5 salvos and she hit us, according to the Squadron Gunnery Officer "on the starboard side of the boat deck aft, causing a fire in the 4" ready use lockers".

90. Can you remember what the S.G.O. actually said?
Yes, he said "She has hit us on the boat deck and there is a fire in the ready use lockers".

91. Did the Gunnery Officer say 4" ready use lockers?
No, Sir.

93. Did you see this hit?
No, Sir, I did not see it.

105. Could you see any of HOOD's boat deck from where you were on the Compass Platform?
No, I was at the back and could only see forward.


B

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

Byron Angel wrote: "If Hood indeed fired only three or four salvos before her destruction, that likely represented, at best, two double-salvoes..:"

The most reliable accounts here are from Schmalenbach (PG KTB http://www.kbismarck.com/archives/pg-ktb.zip , pag.44), stating that 4 to 5 salvos were fired by Hood against PG already before BS and PG answered fire and from Tedd Briggs, who counted 6 salvos before BS replied to British fire at 05:55 (http://www.hmshood.com/crew/remember/te ... p.htm#Ch20).
These point to Hood having fired at least a dozen salvos (6 doubles) by the time she exploded (06:00), as well as PoW.

"Jasper was about 20 kilometers away.... Jasper could not possibly distinguish HITS at that distance, especially from an AP round"

...but he was looking at the fall of shells, knowing exactly when his shells were going to land, while PoW crewmen were doing their job and not looking continuously at Hood or counting salvos... The hit from PG is confirmed by Brinkmann in the same KTB (pag.20).
Jasper was able to distinguish his splashes from Bismarck's ones (his report).
If the PG Captain and the PG G.O. are sure they hit at minute 05:57, I don't see any reason to doubt about their statement, although it is only logical that British attributed such a successful shot to the mighty Bismarck.
I am having a great deal of difficulty with your counter-argument here...

"as I understand it, HE was only fired in the initial ranging fork... "

The same shells were fired during the whole engagement (HE base fused shells): please read Jasper report. Never heard of SAP shells for the German 203 gun. A 203 HE shell could never penetrate the 2" deck of Hood, while BS AP shell would have easily.

"With respect to Briggs..."

...he told (see above excerpt) that he couldn't look behind, only fore, thus no way he (as well as the other in the bridge) could determine whether PG of BS hit them, igniting the fire.
According to Briggs (in his book http://www.hmshood.com/crew/remember/te ... p.htm#Ch20) :

'Tiny' Gregson walked almost sedately out to the starboard wing of the platform to find out what had happened. 'We've been hit at the base of the mainmast, sir, and we're on fire,' he reported, almost as if we were on manoeuvres.

Therefore Gregson possibly reported what he interpreted to have been a BS hit: we know from Jasper it was not this way.

Briggs does not account any other damage report coming to the bridge from the engine rooms (where a BS AP shell hitting the boat deck would have easily penetrated), despite he accounts for the voices and the boat deck fire status: had an engine room been destroyed, someone would have reported it to the bridge: instead Briggs speaks only about the fire.


Bye, Alberto