PoW readiness for active service

[alecsandros]

For the time being, we can leave him still trusting his beloved fairy-tale of the "poor green ship" that couldn't engage the "monster Bismarck".

I think we can look at the other KGVs movements, and see how and when were they first deployed in missions ?
I see Duke of York received her first assignemnt 3,5months after her commissioning (transport of W. Churchill to the USA), while King George Vth received her first assignement 4 months after her commissioning (another transport of a high profile official to the USA). Both of them continued working up their crews after returning from the said missions . The first combat missions happened 6 months and 5 months after their commissioning , respectively. None of the first combat missions were eventfull, though.

Keeping into consideration that Prince of Wales was not completed at the time of her commissioning (neither were DoY or KGV, but they were completed to a higher degree then the PoW was) , the 4 months period between Jan 19th and May 22nd should be taken into consideration , as comparatively similar timeframes (as her brothers). For the record, King George Vth manifested main armament troubles as well (in November 1940 and January 1941)* - but she was still sent into action to hunt for Scharnhorst/Gneisenau/Hipper on Fev 9th 1941.

I guess it's another way of saying that war doesn't wait for nobody. The Royal Navy was hard pressed to defend the trade routes, and was pressing hard on her modern war horses to stop the enemy.

Ex: January 1941:

At Scapa where working up continued along with trials and remedial work on her main armament.
8th - The CinC Home Fleet sent the results of KING GEORGE V's first main armament shoot to the Admiralty.
https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chron ... orge_V.htm

[alecsandros]

Hi Alecandros
With the greatest respect, USS Idaho was not in a battle, as i have posted before, had those failures occurred against Tirpitz and without the surrounding British cruisers the result could have been quite different. Although some of this seems to have gone 'off topic' to include Bismarck's readiness, I stand by what I wrote in my last post, regarding the reliability (or not!) of the 14" gun mechanisms which do not appear to have been solved by the time that they were last used in a ship to ship combat.

That is the problem that I am mentioning as well: Idaho was not in battle. Had she been in battle, and especially battling through a storm, her output would have been greatly diminished. Duke of York's output is a good one.
I think USS Massachussets exhibited a 70% output , when firing her entire set of projectiles at Casablanca (calculated when taking into consideration her jammed turret). The approx time was Nov 1942.

[Byron Angel]

The least affected was B1 gun in B turret which was unable to fire on only three occasions. In total, DoY's heavy guns only achieved 69% of maximum output.
So it would appear gentlemen that far from the problems being fixed they remained and while not condemning the ship herself or her crew in any way
three failures in three battles with three different ships of the same class cannot be seen as a triumph for the gun designers.

USS Idaho practiced firing 800 shells in Oct 1942, in good seas and good visibility. She obtained a 75% output.

With that in mind, Duke of York's performance of Dec 1943, in a full storm, suddenly appears as a great achievement.

With all due respect, let's not get too carried away here. USS Idaho was a 1915 design and about 25 years of age when the above-referenced test took place. Only two turrets participated in the test, which involved literally emptying the magazines and shell rooms into their farthest storage recesses. The exercise took approximately 3.5 hours to complete - a firing period about 17x longer than PoW's period of shooting at Denmark Strait.

Bill Jurens saw fit to provide some further perspective, as follows -
"The reliability of the guns always appears to have varied markedly from ship to ship. In 1942, USS Idaho undertook an exercise deliberately designed to determine ". . . the ability of battleships to maintain an adequate rate of fire under conditions simulating a protracted engagement," expending 597 rounds in 156 salvos. The average salvo interval was 1 minute, 24 seconds, but only 20 of these were full six-gun salvos; the average was 3.82. She suffered no fewer than 205 separate casualties during the firing, mostly requiring adjustment of the gas check pads or rammers. Powder handling, however, was flawless, 2,400 one-hundred pound bags of powder being handled without mishap.27

In contrast, Indiana's main battery performed almost flawlessly. Off Iwo Jima in 1945, she fired 203 16-inch rounds, with only eight guns missing a salvo. Seven failures were caused by problems with the powder or projectile hoists; only one gun misfired.28 Off El-Hank in 1942, Massachusetts suffered only fourteen casualties in 786 expended rounds. Only one of these was really serious; Turret I was placed out of commission for thirty-five minutes after her handling crew dropped a shell which jammed the rotating structure."


B

[northcape]

The complete melt-down of discipline and morale, which came later (May 27th during British final charge)

On which facts is this assessment ("complete melt-down of discipline and morale" during the final engagement) based on?

[alecsandros]

To remain balanced, I add the times of training for Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau:

Tirpitz was commissioned in late Fev 1941, and had her first combat mission (patrol in the Baltic) in late September (7 months after commissioning). After the mission (that lasted 3 days), she resumed training. She was earmarked for a raiding operation scheduled for November 1941 (9 months after commisioning), but the mission was never carried out. She was finally declared combat ready by her Captain in early Jan 1942 (approx 10 months after commissioning).

Gneisenau was commissioned on May 21st 1938, and declared combat ready in Sept 1939 (16 months after commissioning), due to her problems with the bow.

Scharnhorst was commissioned in early January 1939, and was declared fully operational in Nov 1939 (11 months after commissiong), again , because of problems with her bow (but the modifications probably were done faster owing to lessons learned while modifying Gneisenau's bow)

[alecsandros]

The complete melt-down of discipline and morale, which came later (May 27th during British final charge)

On which facts is this assessment ("complete melt-down of discipline and morale" during the final engagement) based on?

On British interrogation of German survivors:

"When interrogated in "Dorsetshire," Kapitänleutnant von Müllenheim-Rechberg volunteered the information that at one time he was in "C" (?) turret which was ordered to engage "Dorsetshire," but only fired one salvo at the ship. By this time the personnel in the turret were becoming demoralised and began vacating the turret, remarking: "why should we stay here for target practice." He also left the turret. Kapitänleutnant von Müllenheim-Rechberg has not again referred to this story, and it may be taken for granted that he was dazed and considerably shaken at the time of this interrogation.
Similar scenes do, however, appear to have taken place in many parts of the ship, for at this time "Bismarck" was taking severe punishment. According to one prisoner, one officer drew his revolver and shot down some of the crew when they refused to obey him. Another prisoner refers to officers committing suicide. Still another prisoner mentioned that members of the crew lost their nerve and jumped overboard long before action ceased. It is known that almost the entire 400 men of the "flak" became casualties. No special protection had been arranged for these men during surface action, they merely being ordered to shelter behind the superstructure on the disengaged side, and, huddling together for protection, groups of forty or more men were wiped out at a time. With the ship listing to port and rolling and seas coming inboard, there were washed over the side scores of bodies, both the killed and of the wounded, whose grasp had weakened on whatever object they had been able to clutch. "

http://www.uboatarchive.net/Int/BismarckINT.htm
[...]

""

[HMSVF]

For the time being, we can leave him still trusting his beloved fairy-tale of the "poor green ship" that couldn't engage the "monster Bismarck".

I think we can look at the other KGVs movements, and see how and when were they first deployed in missions ?
I see Duke of York received her first assignemnt 3,5months after her commissioning (transport of W. Churchill to the USA), while King George Vth received her first assignement 4 months after her commissioning (another transport of a high profile official to the USA). Both of them continued working up their crews after returning from the said missions . The first combat missions happened 6 months and 5 months after their commissioning , respectively. None of the first combat missions were eventfull, though.

Keeping into consideration that Prince of Wales was not completed at the time of her commissioning (neither were DoY or KGV, but they were completed to a higher degree then the PoW was) , the 4 months period between Jan 19th and May 22nd should be taken into consideration , as comparatively similar timeframes (as her brothers). For the record, King George Vth manifested main armament troubles as well (in November 1940 and January 1941)* - but she was still sent into action to hunt for Scharnhorst/Gneisenau/Hipper on Fev 9th 1941.

I guess it's another way of saying that war doesn't wait for nobody. The Royal Navy was hard pressed to defend the trade routes, and was pressing hard on her modern war horses to stop the enemy.

Ex: January 1941:

At Scapa where working up continued along with trials and remedial work on her main armament.
8th - The CinC Home Fleet sent the results of KING GEORGE V's first main armament shoot to the Admiralty.
https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chron ... orge_V.htm

Hi Alecandros,

I don't disagree really with any of the above. I would argue that both vessels (Bismarck and POW) were green,I would tentatively argue that POW was slightly greener than Bismarck and by definition of commissioning for trials earlier her Bismarcks crew were more familiar with their vessel than POW (as would be expected if you commission on an earlier date)even if there were faults. I bow to your superior knowledge in regards to Bismarcks trials and tribulations whilst running in,I don't doubt that there were issues. I absolutely agree with your comment

The problem the RN had was that the only ships capable of having the ability to force an action (due to chronic old age or a lack of speed) up till they had the KGV's was Hood,Renown and Repulse. Its not surprising that they pushed them into service before the paint was dry. They were also on the back foot from June 1940 and certainly the overstretch was considerable by 1941. I absolutely agree with your comment

I guess it's another way of saying that war doesn't wait for nobody

Rearmament commencing in 1936 was too late and the interwar decimation of British armament industries meant that there were too many bottlenecks and too few skilled draughtsmen and designers to repeat the efforts of pre 1914. I also don't think for a minute that the RN thought that they would lose France as an ally due to a catastrophic defeat and have so many additional commitments.


What I would say is that when it came to the formation of Force Z Dudley Pound was adamant that DOY, despite Churchill's wishes, would not be sent as she was considered too new and too inexperienced. Perhaps this was a result of lessons being learnt?


Best wishes


HMSVF

[alecsandros]

Hi HMSVF,
and thank you for your nice thoughts. However, I do not think I have any sort of specific knowledge, other then that already circulated on the naval forums that I have been a member of for some time now. My interest is purely as a naval enthusiast.

I think I agree with most of your comments, with the addition that , whatever labor shortages the RN faced, the KGM faced in even greater manner. The entire HSF had been lost in the wake of the First World War, and therefore the thousands of skilled laborers from the German shipyards were forced to reconverse and do something else. When the Nazi rearmament program started in early 1930s, there were few (as order of magnitude) skilled laborers left. This, I think, manifested in all areas and branches of the German Navy...

[northcape]

The complete melt-down of discipline and morale, which came later (May 27th during British final charge)

On which facts is this assessment ("complete melt-down of discipline and morale" during the final engagement) based on?

On British interrogation of German survivors:

"When interrogated in "Dorsetshire," Kapitänleutnant von Müllenheim-Rechberg volunteered the information that at one time he was in "C" (?) turret which was ordered to engage "Dorsetshire," but only fired one salvo at the ship. By this time the personnel in the turret were becoming demoralised and began vacating the turret, remarking: "why should we stay here for target practice." He also left the turret. Kapitänleutnant von Müllenheim-Rechberg has not again referred to this story, and it may be taken for granted that he was dazed and considerably shaken at the time of this interrogation.
Similar scenes do, however, appear to have taken place in many parts of the ship, for at this time "Bismarck" was taking severe punishment. According to one prisoner, one officer drew his revolver and shot down some of the crew when they refused to obey him. Another prisoner refers to officers committing suicide. Still another prisoner mentioned that members of the crew lost their nerve and jumped overboard long before action ceased.

http://www.uboatarchive.net/Int/BismarckINT.htm
[...]

""

Thank you! However, I think it is very speculative/manipulative to interpret a "complete melt-down of discipline and morale" during the final engagement)" based on the anecdotes of two prisoners. The Baron in turret C does not make any sense.

[Byron Angel]

See Johnston and Buxton's book "The Battleship Builders - Constructing and Arming British Capital Ships" for an insightful overview of the post-WW1 decline and parlous state the British naval armaments industry had been reduced to by the time of mid-30s re-armament program.

B

[alecsandros]

Thank you! However, I think it is very speculative/manipulative to interpret a "complete melt-down of discipline and morale" during the final engagement)" based on the anecdotes of two prisoners. The Baron in turret C does not make any sense.

There are at least four different prisoner accounts concatenated above, not two (the Baron, one prisoner, another prisoner, still another prisoner...).

And those aren't the only entries from C.B. 4051 (24) reffering to melt-down of morale and discipline... One paragraph writtes " In the last rush for the side, discipline was mainly thrown to the winds, but incidents were reported of some isolated parties standing stiffly to attention, saluting and shouting the German war slogan "Sieg Heil" (Hail Victory) before jumping. "
another "Each exit was now blocked by a struggling mass of men, whom officers could no longer control. Those below crying that they were being stifled, fought desperately with those near the exit, who still cowered under cover, afraid to run the gauntlet of fire sweeping the decks above. One prisoner who was caught in the middle of one of these blockages stated that behind him men were crying: "I am dying, I am dying.""

etc.

[dunmunro]

The least affected was B1 gun in B turret which was unable to fire on only three occasions. In total, DoY's heavy guns only achieved 69% of maximum output.
So it would appear gentlemen that far from the problems being fixed they remained and while not condemning the ship herself or her crew in any way
three failures in three battles with three different ships of the same class cannot be seen as a triumph for the gun designers.

USS Idaho practiced firing 800 shells in Oct 1942, in good seas and good visibility. She obtained a 75% output.

With that in mind, Duke of York's performance of Dec 1943, in a full storm, suddenly appears as a great achievement.

With all due respect, let's not get too carried away here. USS Idaho was a 1915 design and about 25 years of age when the above-referenced test took place. Only two turrets participated in the test, which involved literally emptying the magazines and shell rooms into their farthest storage recesses. The exercise took approximately 3.5 hours to complete - a firing period about 17x longer than PoW's period of shooting at Denmark Strait.

Bill Jurens saw fit to provide some further perspective, as follows -
"The reliability of the guns always appears to have varied markedly from ship to ship. In 1942, USS Idaho undertook an exercise deliberately designed to determine ". . . the ability of battleships to maintain an adequate rate of fire under conditions simulating a protracted engagement," expending 597 rounds in 156 salvos. The average salvo interval was 1 minute, 24 seconds, but only 20 of these were full six-gun salvos; the average was 3.82. She suffered no fewer than 205 separate casualties during the firing, mostly requiring adjustment of the gas check pads or rammers. Powder handling, however, was flawless, 2,400 one-hundred pound bags of powder being handled without mishap.27

In contrast, Indiana's main battery performed almost flawlessly. Off Iwo Jima in 1945, she fired 203 16-inch rounds, with only eight guns missing a salvo. Seven failures were caused by problems with the powder or projectile hoists; only one gun misfired.28 Off El-Hank in 1942, Massachusetts suffered only fourteen casualties in 786 expended rounds. Only one of these was really serious; Turret I was placed out of commission for thirty-five minutes after her handling crew dropped a shell which jammed the rotating structure."


B

I don't want to get sidetracked by output comparisons but I think it worthwhile to put things into perspective.

Idaho's gunnery trial on 10 Oct 1942:

0835 Idaho commenced firing.
0953 Idaho ceased firing due to poor visibility.
1551 Idaho resumed firing.
1758 Idaho completed firing.
War Diary of BatDiv2

Massachusetts' 14 casualties involved the loss of several hundred rounds since multiple rounds were lost per casualty. She actually suffered two turret jams and during one brief moment, had only one functioning 16in gun, IIRC. It is important to note that Massachusetts fired many salvos with several hundred rounds fired before encountering mechanical main armament (rather than FC) difficulties.

Indiana's ~96% output over 203 rnds fired was approximately the same as KGV's output during the first 32 minutes of her action against Bismarck. Howe and KGV conducted bombardment missions against Japan in 1945 as well and, IIRC, their output was similar to Indiana's.

All the USN battleship gunnery actions and exercises were conducted in ideal sea state conditions, IIRC.

However, if we compare PoW to Rodney, KGV and DoY, we can see that PoW's output during the first 9 mins was the poorest, and she actually had the best sea state conditions and Pow's output would look much worse if we extend the output calculation to cover ~11mins (all recorded output) or 21 minutes (open fire to cease fire) Massachusetts and Idaho would have had nearly 100% during the first 9 or 21 minutes of their shoots.

[wadinga]

Fellow Contributors,

It is very convenient to drift off into a general discussion about the horrors experienced by those aboard Bismarck in her final moments and ignore the jubilation of one who has the Wilkinson Report but refuses to divulge it.

I have no doubt similar scenes of horror and panic were present in Barham just before she turned turtle and exploded or Arizona or Oklahoma or Yamashiro etc. Standing in an orderly queue to go up a gangway with one's clothes on fire as the ship turns upside down is not a sign of superior discipline or experience. With all due respect reactions under such circumstances have nothing to do with the training of the gunnery department to operate their equipment or the reliability of that equipment either in Bismarck or Prince of Wales. Perhaps a new thread could be opened to discuss "complete melt-down of discipline and morale"

It has been said that the single period of 14" firing trials (60 rounds) referred to by Barben in his letter, and which correlates with a trip outside Scapa Flow on the 16th May was not the only occasion for such activity in May 1941. The commenter refuses to provide any more detail.

The excellent Byron has provided the following detail

01 May 41 - DG trials inside Scapa Flow.
02 May 41 - Gunnery exercises inside Scapa Flow.
05 May 41 - Gunnery exercises inside Scapa Flow.
06 May 41 - Gunnery exercises inside Scapa Flow.
07 May 41 - Unspecified exercises off Scapa Flow.
12 May 41 - Gunnery exercises inside Scapa Flow.
16 May 41 - Exercise outside Scapa Flow, including full caliber 5.25in shoot.
17 May 41 - Returns to Scapa Flow

The only day which offers much opportunity is 7th May and yet Cag's digest of the ship's log provides

From the 1stMay until she sailed on the 21st the crew carried out 2hrs 27mins of sub calibre and 1hr and 3mins of full calibre full charge main armament firing (Grand total 8hrs 33 mins), 12hrs 16mins of 5.25 firing 7mins of pom pom firing, and 40 mins of unspecified gunnery drill. They also carried out 20hrs 32mins of other trials including Demolition party trials, oiling destroyers, steering and turning, Walrus, De-Gaussing, Paravane, night action stations, they also did RiX exercises.

With only 1 hr 3 mins of full calibre full charge firing there is no time for any similar activities elsewhere in May.

In his Gunnery Notes appendix Tovey refers to a proposed 25 rounds per gun trial for KGV and notes that even that would have been inadequate to expose the problems his ship experienced through extended firing in the final action. If PoW had enjoyed four times as much practice as was recorded by Barben's letter, at the slooow rate it probably wouldn't have helped. Despite the "success" of the 60 round trial Vickers' men were still aboard at Denmark Strait.

One of the other interesting things excised from that part of Barben's letter when it was supplied some months ago was the "work around" Y turret used when the shell ring seized. He says the turret was rotated to match the location where shells were available:

It took some time to dismantle the trays, so in order to keep going, the mounting was trained back to the fore and aft centreline to reload.

Since the miraculous Claude Aylwin was supposed to be dropping his single shots close to a manoeuvring enemy whilst his own ship was constantly changing course, and his turret and hence sights were moving off the target to reload this has clearly passed the bounds of extreme impossibility.

All the best

wadinga

[HMSVF]

Thank you! However, I think it is very speculative/manipulative to interpret a "complete melt-down of discipline and morale" during the final engagement)" based on the anecdotes of two prisoners. The Baron in turret C does not make any sense.

There are at least four different prisoner accounts concatenated above, not two (the Baron, one prisoner, another prisoner, still another prisoner...).

And those aren't the only entries from C.B. 4051 (24) reffering to melt-down of morale and discipline... One paragraph writtes " In the last rush for the side, discipline was mainly thrown to the winds, but incidents were reported of some isolated parties standing stiffly to attention, saluting and shouting the German war slogan "Sieg Heil" (Hail Victory) before jumping. "
another "Each exit was now blocked by a struggling mass of men, whom officers could no longer control. Those below crying that they were being stifled, fought desperately with those near the exit, who still cowered under cover, afraid to run the gauntlet of fire sweeping the decks above. One prisoner who was caught in the middle of one of these blockages stated that behind him men were crying: "I am dying, I am dying.""

etc.

Horrific.

I was trying to think of an RN equivalent big ship remaining afloat for so long that they turned into a shell torn charnel house in modern times and to be honest I cannot.

Good Hope and Monmouth possibly? HMS Black Prince perhaps? HMS Warrior? Of course only the last example had any survivors...

Of the other "big" ships the RN lost in traditional battles the end was extremely quick. Flash followed by a huge deflagration and quick death (unless you were trapped below and unaffected by the massive shockwave).

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

following the "moderator" redactions I will rephrase my last post, eliminating personal commentary: I hope I will be answered this time, instead of changing topic when caught in error, protected by someone else...

Wadinga wrote: " the recently exposed original 1941 evidence that PoW fired only 6 shots per gun in trials in May "

Totally incorrect and very misleading statement. Nowhere it is written that the 6 shells per gun fired in the last trials on May 15 were the only ones fired by PoW.
Now , please post the source for the "only ones" statement that is not present in the unduly "recently exposed original"...


Mr.Barben accounts for a night and dawn shoot" to his boss. Mr.Wilkinson, who had just left PoW after the extensive trials run with the Admiralty representatives onboard, that he himself accounts for at page 10 of the report (as you may notice on the right top of the page, this is page 12, out of a total of 20, as the friends who have received the full report know very well) and based on which a detailed document was prepared for the Admiralty, as final PoW gunnery trials results report after tests done "with all guns firing the allotted rounds", pag.10 of the above report).

PoW_Gunnery_Trials_May15.jpg (51.13 KiB) Viewed 658 times

It looks like some "fellow contributors" have still difficulties looking at the truth. Fine, all these people will have to face it hard when all reports will be fully published (after having acquired the related license...).
For the time being they can still trust their beloved fairy-tale, sold to the world for so many years, of a poor green ship that could not engage the "monster Bismarck": in few years they will have to wake up anyway.


Bye, Alberto