PoW readiness for active service
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Re: PoW readiness for active service
Duncan,
the Baron intermingled the terms 'sub-calibre firing' with 'full calibre firing'. In one phrase he mentions the economical aspects of firing sub-calibre shots, and in the next he is at awe about firing full caliibre shots...
In the reconstructed warlog, the November practice is written in full as subcalibre shoot.
@HVSMF
as written numerous times, Bismarck's training was a painfull one, punctuated by mechanical failures and time locked in the harbor.
One survivor testimony descriibes that , during her entire training, the ship fired only one (1) full calibre salvo, from a range of 15000 meters or so.
the Baron intermingled the terms 'sub-calibre firing' with 'full calibre firing'. In one phrase he mentions the economical aspects of firing sub-calibre shots, and in the next he is at awe about firing full caliibre shots...
In the reconstructed warlog, the November practice is written in full as subcalibre shoot.
@HVSMF
as written numerous times, Bismarck's training was a painfull one, punctuated by mechanical failures and time locked in the harbor.
One survivor testimony descriibes that , during her entire training, the ship fired only one (1) full calibre salvo, from a range of 15000 meters or so.
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Re: PoW readiness for active service
@all
'was that a misfire ?', 'that realy ate into him',
can also be explained by a double hit from salvo5 against HMS Hood.
(Because Schneider wasn't counting hits, but waterspouts.)
'was that a misfire ?', 'that realy ate into him',
can also be explained by a double hit from salvo5 against HMS Hood.
(Because Schneider wasn't counting hits, but waterspouts.)
Last edited by alecsandros on Thu Apr 25, 2019 4:35 am, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: PoW readiness for active service
Many people don't understand the position in which Lindemann and Luetjens were put by Raeder's orders.
First radio telegram to Lindemann, concerning the operation Rheinubung, scheduled to begin on Apr 26th , was received aboard the battleship some time between March 15th and 20th. At that time, the Bismarck was only starting her AVKS trials (which were programmed to start on Fev 1st...), trials that revealed a multitude of failures.
Luetjens , freshly returned from Op. Berlin, tried hard to dissuade Raeder from issuing the orders for Rheinubung, during a face to face meeting which was held in early April (based on the unfavourable daylength, and on the absence of Tirpitz, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau), but to no avail.
The (anxiously awaited) orders finally arrived on board the battleship in late April.
The rapid deployment which was telegraphed in mid-March (Raeder wanted a departure near the date of Apr 26th) obliged Lindemann to cut short AVKS, by 2 weeks, adding to his already 'cut' training of 6 weeks, that he mentions in the warlog (several times). [he acquired more time for training though, owing to Prinz Eugen's mine damage, and later to Bismarck's faulty crane, giving him some 2 weeks of training past the initial - tentative - date for Rheinubung]
First radio telegram to Lindemann, concerning the operation Rheinubung, scheduled to begin on Apr 26th , was received aboard the battleship some time between March 15th and 20th. At that time, the Bismarck was only starting her AVKS trials (which were programmed to start on Fev 1st...), trials that revealed a multitude of failures.
Luetjens , freshly returned from Op. Berlin, tried hard to dissuade Raeder from issuing the orders for Rheinubung, during a face to face meeting which was held in early April (based on the unfavourable daylength, and on the absence of Tirpitz, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau), but to no avail.
The (anxiously awaited) orders finally arrived on board the battleship in late April.
The rapid deployment which was telegraphed in mid-March (Raeder wanted a departure near the date of Apr 26th) obliged Lindemann to cut short AVKS, by 2 weeks, adding to his already 'cut' training of 6 weeks, that he mentions in the warlog (several times). [he acquired more time for training though, owing to Prinz Eugen's mine damage, and later to Bismarck's faulty crane, giving him some 2 weeks of training past the initial - tentative - date for Rheinubung]
Last edited by alecsandros on Thu Apr 25, 2019 6:00 am, edited 7 times in total.
Re: PoW readiness for active service
This i a very valid point, but again, the german original version is unambigously in that regard. I'm not saying that Schneider really has uttered exactly these words (after all, it is the recollection of one individual only). But the meaning of the statement in german language is exactly what I"ve described, and there is no way to twist it. E.g. " but it was the Baron's comment "That really ate into him!" meaning Schneider's reaction at not getting a shell away. " is an impossible explanation.
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Re: PoW readiness for active service
I see, thank you for the hint. I assume you're referring to this quote:alecsandros wrote: ↑Wed Apr 24, 2019 3:23 pmKapitänleutnant Junack, after being rescued by the British.
and don't forget Adm. Schiewind's positition statement dated June 1941.
"Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) Junack stated that it would be of importance for him and von Müllenheim-Rechberg to return to Germany in order to report their experiences, not on account of any breakdown due to faulty construction, but to stress the failures resulting from lack of training and experience of the ship's company.
In connection with:
"Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) (Lieutenant-Commander) (E.)) Junack, the only surviving Engineer Officer, was a turbine specialist; having been previously employed by the Gestapo, he was found to be extremely reticent and warned survivors, even whilst in the water, to "Keep their mouths shut!""
we should be very sceptical. And if we take the quote at face value why do we discuss the AVKS report at all?
Concerning Adm. Schiewind's positition statement in regards to Prinz Eugen's warlog I'm wondering where he got any information about Bismarck. Since yesterday I've skimmed over all German reports, all foreign press clippings, all british radio program transkripts, all survivor reports and so on to which Schniewind had access to and I couldn't found any hint. The only "failure" I could found was the torpedo affair on Prinz Eugen ... what makes sense, because it was a statement in regards to Prinz Eugen's warlog as mentioned before.
Regards
Marc
"Thank God we blow up and sink more easily." (unknown officer from HMS Norfolk)
Marc
"Thank God we blow up and sink more easily." (unknown officer from HMS Norfolk)
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Re: PoW readiness for active service
Yes, I know we should be sceptical, but we should not disregard this statement purely on the basis of his prior (if there is such a thing as 'priorly' Gestapo employed, and he wasn't in connection with them continuously...) employer. The breakdown of crew morale , coming after Luetjens's speech (May 25th) is described by all the survivors who were rescued by German ships. This hints at a crew who did not have the inner cohesion, strength, and discipline required for such enormous undertakings. The complete melt-down of discipline and morale, which came later (May 27th during British final charge) can be explained by the immediate situation, but being depressed on May 25th is another matter.Herr Nilsson wrote: ↑Thu Apr 25, 2019 10:03 am "Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) Junack stated that it would be of importance for him and von Müllenheim-Rechberg to return to Germany in order to report their experiences, not on account of any breakdown due to faulty construction, but to stress the failures resulting from lack of training and experience of the ship's company.
In connection with:
"Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) (Lieutenant-Commander) (E.)) Junack, the only surviving Engineer Officer, was a turbine specialist; having been previously employed by the Gestapo, he was found to be extremely reticent and warned survivors, even whilst in the water, to "Keep their mouths shut!""
we should be very sceptical. And if we take the quote at face value why do we discuss the AVKS report at all?
Concerning Adm. Schiewind's positition statement in regards to Prinz Eugen's warlog I'm wondering where he got any information about Bismarck. Since yesterday I've skimmed over all German reports, all foreign press clippings, all british radio program transkripts, all survivor reports and so on to which Schniewind had access to and I couldn't found any hint. The only "failure" I could found was the torpedo affair on Prinz Eugen ... what makes sense, because it was a statement in regards to Prinz Eugen's warlog as mentioned before.
Same document that contains Junack's statement also contains the following: ' It was generally agreed, by prisoners, that the "Bismarck" had an exceptionally young and inexperienced ship's company. For many of the men "Bismarck" was their first ship, which they had joined after doing a few months' naval training. Prisoners, on the whole, disliked serving in a battleship, stating that they would have felt more independent in a smaller ship. Many had been in the "Hitlerjugend" (Hitler Youth Organisation) and had then had civil occupations such as: miner, farm labourer, clerk, barber, plumber, cook, electrician, mechanic and so on and had been drawn from all parts of Germany and some Austria and Czechoslovakia. ' (C.B 4051 (24) pg. 7)
Schniewind wrote in June 1941, probably without contact with survivors (or perhaps with some intel from Lorenzen, Maus, etc, that wrote about the poor morale on May 25th). My opinion is that he wrote the letter based on knowledge he had on the situation of the battleship prior to her departure, and not knowledge obtained by him after the loss.
Some further survivor reports (from the men rescued by the British, names not given) said that the battleship only fired one full salvo from March to May 1941, until departing for Rheinubung. This fits in the same area of limited state of training that I have the feeling the battleship's crew was in. [' According to prisoners, "Bismarck" and "Prinz Eugen" put to sea together at least three, possibly four, times, between the end of March and early May, for exercises in the Baltic. The principal joint exercises were firing practice at targets and manoeuvres in formation. During the gun trials, it was stated, only one full broadside (from main and secondary armament) was fired at 15,000 metres (16,404 yards). Sub-calibre and A/A firing was also carried out. C.B. 4051 (24) pg. 38] (From what I recall, AVKS records several curtailments of artillery training, including immediate stoppage of heavy battery firing , after grave failures in the primary cartridge. Not clear if the firing type was resumed after the problem was corrected , or if the problem was corrected at all. In fact, it's not clear to me if the 380mm, 150mm or 105mm guns were calibrated or not during AVKS mission, or after it, anytime in the short lifespan of the mighty Bismarck).
And yes, I know all this is conjunctural, and that it can be adressed in more ways then one, but , in the context of Bismarck's repeated shortening of training time , and with Lindemann declaring the ship 'combat ready' exactly on the date required by the initial date imposed by Raeder (although he had 6weeks of lost time in harbour, and 2 weeks cut short of AVKS) , makes me very sceptical about the crew's state of training, especially in terms of discipline and morale.
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Re: PoW readiness for active service
Junack's Gestapo connection isn't very important in my opinion. Much more important is his intention to keep things secret. So we don't know if this is a deliberately misinformation or not or if this is just a attempt to be taken into account of an exchange of prisoners.
The depression on May 25th was Lütjens' fault. I doubt that any of us would be so hard-boiled that it wouldn't have negative effects on our morals.
Schniewind doesn't say that Bismarck or Prinz Eugen wasn't combat ready. Schniewind basically just says that combat readiness is well and good, but "the highest combat readiness one can think of" is better. The only way to reach it (aside from real combat experience) is to make a ...let's say..."dress rehearsal" simulating all kinds of possible/expected situations including other ships, airplanes, enemy bombers, enemy torpedo airplanes, enemy submarine attacks and protected convoys. That means he just asks for (more) additional training of the particular task...."within the bounds of possibility"...of course.
The depression on May 25th was Lütjens' fault. I doubt that any of us would be so hard-boiled that it wouldn't have negative effects on our morals.
Schniewind doesn't say that Bismarck or Prinz Eugen wasn't combat ready. Schniewind basically just says that combat readiness is well and good, but "the highest combat readiness one can think of" is better. The only way to reach it (aside from real combat experience) is to make a ...let's say..."dress rehearsal" simulating all kinds of possible/expected situations including other ships, airplanes, enemy bombers, enemy torpedo airplanes, enemy submarine attacks and protected convoys. That means he just asks for (more) additional training of the particular task...."within the bounds of possibility"...of course.
Regards
Marc
"Thank God we blow up and sink more easily." (unknown officer from HMS Norfolk)
Marc
"Thank God we blow up and sink more easily." (unknown officer from HMS Norfolk)
Re: PoW readiness for active service
Fellow Contributors,
Are we now playing Reverse Top Trumps on battleships where faced with the recently exposed original 1941 evidence that PoW fired only 6 shots per gun in trials in May we have an attempt to claim Bismarck fired only one? This information about PoW was suppressed successfully for several years, but now it is out.
The AVKS document specifically says full salvoes are not recommended, so they only tried it once.
AVKS report page 12
On page 17 tests on the ammunition transport subsystem revealed it could deliver 6 shells per minute to each gunhouse . That sounds like a fully functional and very efficient system with a well-trained crew. There were problems with cartridge lids coming loose, but the average performance was clearly satisfactory.
The preliminary introduction makes it clear that the AVKS procedures dropped for operational reasons were not considered critical by the Ship's staff.
.
There is even a whinge about the ship's command being told the additional scientific/engineering studies would have to wait, and the AVKS personnel had to find out second-hand. They wanted a battleship to play with, Lindemann had a job to do.
Whether Bismarck's crew morale collapsed or not is irrelevant here. The savage battering they took was perhaps more than any man could bear. We know both ships had large numbers, 80-90% of crew numbers with only months of training and for whom the combatants were their first ships.
Bismarck had far longer to train, and her weapons were available to test and train with long before PoW's.
All the best
wadinga
Are we now playing Reverse Top Trumps on battleships where faced with the recently exposed original 1941 evidence that PoW fired only 6 shots per gun in trials in May we have an attempt to claim Bismarck fired only one? This information about PoW was suppressed successfully for several years, but now it is out.
Only one full broadside.During the gun trials, it was stated, only one full broadside (from main and secondary armament) was fired at 15,000 metres (16,404 yards).
The AVKS document specifically says full salvoes are not recommended, so they only tried it once.
AVKS report page 12
On page 14 there is a discussion that the unequal shock to the mounting of firing a single gun in a turret the measurement of which would be pointless without a full charge effect. A subsidiary report dated 9/5/41 was apparently produced.The firing of full salvoes during fire-for-effect is, therefore to be used only in special situations.
On page 17 tests on the ammunition transport subsystem revealed it could deliver 6 shells per minute to each gunhouse . That sounds like a fully functional and very efficient system with a well-trained crew. There were problems with cartridge lids coming loose, but the average performance was clearly satisfactory.
The preliminary introduction makes it clear that the AVKS procedures dropped for operational reasons were not considered critical by the Ship's staff.
.
And later the area where all the full charge firings is described off Kahlberg.More or less, only the conduct of those firing exercises remained intact that had immediate relevance for the training of the ship and the establishment of the physical readiness of the artillery installations
There is even a whinge about the ship's command being told the additional scientific/engineering studies would have to wait, and the AVKS personnel had to find out second-hand. They wanted a battleship to play with, Lindemann had a job to do.
Whether Bismarck's crew morale collapsed or not is irrelevant here. The savage battering they took was perhaps more than any man could bear. We know both ships had large numbers, 80-90% of crew numbers with only months of training and for whom the combatants were their first ships.
Bismarck had far longer to train, and her weapons were available to test and train with long before PoW's.
All the best
wadinga
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Re: PoW readiness for active service
Hello everybody,
I do agree: the speech was just realistic, not pessimistic. The Hood was the pride of the RN and the British would have used any ship to try to vindicate her. The final comments (the gun barrel glow red , the last shell and "victory or death" were part of the propaganda style in vigor not only in Germany and they should not have had such an effect on a trained, more senior and battle used crew.
I think no one got "depressed" on Acasta when Glasfurd said that after Ardent ha gone it was now Acasta that should "make her show", nor on board Rawalpindi when E.C.Kennedy said "we will fight them both (the twins), they will sink us and that will be that".
Bye, Alberto
H Alec,Alecsandros wrote: " The breakdown of crew morale , coming after Luetjens's speech (May 25th) is described by all the survivors who were rescued by German ships. This hints at a crew who did not have the inner cohesion, strength, and discipline required for such enormous undertakings"
I do agree: the speech was just realistic, not pessimistic. The Hood was the pride of the RN and the British would have used any ship to try to vindicate her. The final comments (the gun barrel glow red , the last shell and "victory or death" were part of the propaganda style in vigor not only in Germany and they should not have had such an effect on a trained, more senior and battle used crew.
I think no one got "depressed" on Acasta when Glasfurd said that after Ardent ha gone it was now Acasta that should "make her show", nor on board Rawalpindi when E.C.Kennedy said "we will fight them both (the twins), they will sink us and that will be that".
Bye, Alberto
Last edited by Alberto Virtuani on Thu Apr 25, 2019 4:29 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: PoW readiness for active service
Gentlemen,
Which ever way we look at it, it would appear that Bismarck was actually more combat ready than PoW -as
the battle proved.
Regarding the points made about the reliability of the 14"guns and quad turrets of the KGV class ships, here is a quote from Tarrant's book on the North Cape battle against Scharnhorst under the heading The Gunnery factor and Evaluation:(P 212)
n total DoY fired 450 14" shells in 77 broadsides plus 600 rounds of 5.25" and 155 starshell. her offensive power would have been much greater -by a factor of 200 14" -if she had not suffered from the difficulties that had dogged PoW and KGV during the Bismarck action: namely the constant mechanical breakdowns in the over complex loading arrangements in the heavy turrets.
A shell cage defect in A turret compounded by poor loading drill resulted in one of the four guns A3 being unable to fire in 71 of the 77 broadsides while the three guns inY turret were unable to fire for a 15 minute period missing 17 broadsides, In fact, breakdowns in the loading arrangements affected every single 14" gun during the action. The least affected was B1 gun in B turret which was unable to fire on only three occasions. In total, DoY's heavy guns only achieved 69% of maximum output.
So it would appear gentlemen that far from the problems being fixed they remained and while not condemning the ship herself or her crew in any way
three failures in three battles with three different ships of the same class cannot be seen as a triumph for the gun designers.
Which ever way we look at it, it would appear that Bismarck was actually more combat ready than PoW -as
the battle proved.
Regarding the points made about the reliability of the 14"guns and quad turrets of the KGV class ships, here is a quote from Tarrant's book on the North Cape battle against Scharnhorst under the heading The Gunnery factor and Evaluation:(P 212)
n total DoY fired 450 14" shells in 77 broadsides plus 600 rounds of 5.25" and 155 starshell. her offensive power would have been much greater -by a factor of 200 14" -if she had not suffered from the difficulties that had dogged PoW and KGV during the Bismarck action: namely the constant mechanical breakdowns in the over complex loading arrangements in the heavy turrets.
A shell cage defect in A turret compounded by poor loading drill resulted in one of the four guns A3 being unable to fire in 71 of the 77 broadsides while the three guns inY turret were unable to fire for a 15 minute period missing 17 broadsides, In fact, breakdowns in the loading arrangements affected every single 14" gun during the action. The least affected was B1 gun in B turret which was unable to fire on only three occasions. In total, DoY's heavy guns only achieved 69% of maximum output.
So it would appear gentlemen that far from the problems being fixed they remained and while not condemning the ship herself or her crew in any way
three failures in three battles with three different ships of the same class cannot be seen as a triumph for the gun designers.
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Re: PoW readiness for active service
Junack's intentions are unknown to us, but that doesn't mean , with necessity, that his statement should be disregarded.Herr Nilsson wrote: ↑Thu Apr 25, 2019 1:21 pm Junack's Gestapo connection isn't very important in my opinion. Much more important is his intention to keep things secret. So we don't know if this is a deliberately misinformation or not or if this is just a attempt to be taken into account of an exchange of prisoners.
The depression on May 25th was Lütjens' fault. I doubt that any of us would be so hard-boiled that it wouldn't have negative effects on our morals.
Schniewind doesn't say that Bismarck or Prinz Eugen wasn't combat ready. Schniewind basically just says that combat readiness is well and good, but "the highest combat readiness one can think of" is better. The only way to reach it (aside from real combat experience) is to make a ...let's say..."dress rehearsal" simulating all kinds of possible/expected situations including other ships, airplanes, enemy bombers, enemy torpedo airplanes, enemy submarine attacks and protected convoys. That means he just asks for (more) additional training of the particular task...."within the bounds of possibility"...of course.
(After all, why would anybody try to return to their home country by tipping off his capturers about future plans to warn his comrades of the need to increase combat training ? That seems counter to his tentative motive to me. Something like the need to reunite with his family or to start a new peacefull life would be far more normal in that regard)
Luetjens had a poor relationship with Lindemann, and the officers amongst them apparently had poor connections , especially after the destruction of the Hood (when some officers wanted to go back to Norway, while others pressed on for France). This was probably badly felt amongst the highly inexperienced crew (the phrase from the British interrogation of survivors is "exceptionally inexperienced crew").
Schniewind makes recommandations for future breakouts based on the events that happened during Rheinubung. The longest paragraphs are dedicated to training and morale strengthenening... with only two words in the entire letter being underlined - "combat readiness". That doesn't prove or disprove anything in itself, but it adds to the context that the ship , or ships, was/were somewhat unprepared for the task.
Lindemann had 6 weeks of training curtailed, after which he was struck with the telegram or telegrams, informing him of rapid departure into Rheinbung. He was probably still repairing damage from the Kiel canal impact when he received the first news... That came after 3 weeks of staying locked by ice, which came after 3 weeks of damage repair owing to faulty insulation of the steam pipes, which came after 5 weeks of stay in the dockyard in Hamburg, doing the modifications and adding various equipment which wasn't previously on board. The only training done with a more-or-less complete ship, and with a more-or-less complete crew was during AVKS (2 weeks in March), and during the weeks that he had at his disposal in April and May (about 4 weeks in total) .
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Re: PoW readiness for active service
USS Idaho practiced firing 800 shells in Oct 1942, in good seas and good visibility. She obtained a 75% output.paul.mercer wrote: ↑Thu Apr 25, 2019 4:03 pm The least affected was B1 gun in B turret which was unable to fire on only three occasions. In total, DoY's heavy guns only achieved 69% of maximum output.
So it would appear gentlemen that far from the problems being fixed they remained and while not condemning the ship herself or her crew in any way
three failures in three battles with three different ships of the same class cannot be seen as a triumph for the gun designers.
With that in mind, Duke of York's performance of Dec 1943, in a full storm, suddenly appears as a great achievement.
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Re: PoW readiness for active service
"exceptionally inexperienced crew" stuck in my mind... Why use that adverb ? Inexperienced is strong enough in itself.Alberto Virtuani wrote: ↑Thu Apr 25, 2019 3:42 pm H Alec,
I do agree: the speech was just realistic, not pessimistic. The Hood was the pride of the RN and the British would have used any ship to try to vindicate her. The final comments (the gun barrel glow red , the last shell and "victory or death" were part of the propaganda style in vigor not only in Germany and they should not have had such an effect on a trained, mpore senior and battle used crew.
I think no one got "depressed" on Acasta when Glasfurd said that after Ardent ha gone it was now Acasta that should "make her show", nor on board Rawalpindi when E.C.Kennedy said "we will fight them both (the twins), they will sink us and that will be that".
Bye, Alberto
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Re: PoW readiness for active service
Hello everybody,
Please post the source for the "only ones" statement that is not present in the unduly "recently exposed original"...
Mr.Barben accounts for a "night and dawn sheet" to his boss. Mr.Wilkinson, who had just left PoW after the extensive trials ("with all guns firing the allotted rounds") run with the Admiralty representatives onboard, that he himself accounts for at page 10 of the report (as you may notice on the right top of the page, this is page 12, out of a total of 20, as the friends who have received the full report know very well) and based on which a detailed document was prepared for the Admiralty, as final PoW gunnery trials results report.
[Personal commentary redacted WJJ]
Bye, Alberto
[Commentary redacted WJJ] nowhere it is written that the 6 shells per gun fired in the last trials on May 15 were the only ones fired by PoW.Wadinga wrote: " the recently exposed original 1941 evidence that PoW fired only 6 shots per gun in trials in May "
Please post the source for the "only ones" statement that is not present in the unduly "recently exposed original"...
Mr.Barben accounts for a "night and dawn sheet" to his boss. Mr.Wilkinson, who had just left PoW after the extensive trials ("with all guns firing the allotted rounds") run with the Admiralty representatives onboard, that he himself accounts for at page 10 of the report (as you may notice on the right top of the page, this is page 12, out of a total of 20, as the friends who have received the full report know very well) and based on which a detailed document was prepared for the Admiralty, as final PoW gunnery trials results report.
[Personal commentary redacted WJJ]
Bye, Alberto
Last edited by Alberto Virtuani on Thu Apr 25, 2019 4:42 pm, edited 1 time in total.
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)
"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: PoW readiness for active service
Hi Alecandrosalecsandros wrote: ↑Thu Apr 25, 2019 4:17 pmUSS Idaho practiced firing 800 shells in Oct 1942, in good seas and good visibility. She obtained a 75% output.paul.mercer wrote: ↑Thu Apr 25, 2019 4:03 pm The least affected was B1 gun in B turret which was unable to fire on only three occasions. In total, DoY's heavy guns only achieved 69% of maximum output.
So it would appear gentlemen that far from the problems being fixed they remained and while not condemning the ship herself or her crew in any way
three failures in three battles with three different ships of the same class cannot be seen as a triumph for the gun designers.
With that in mind, Duke of York's performance of Dec 1943, in a full storm, suddenly appears as a great achievement.
With the greatest respect, USS Idaho was not in a battle, as i have posted before, had those failures occurred against Tirpitz and without the surrounding British cruisers the result could have been quite different. Although some of this seems to have gone 'off topic' to include Bismarck's readiness, I stand by what I wrote in my last post, regarding the reliability (or not!) of the 14" gun mechanisms which do not appear to have been solved by the time that they were last used in a ship to ship combat.