PoW readiness for active service

[alecsandros]

Lindemann has another 2 months of intensive training before the mission, and this is one month before PoW even gets her last turret(s) accepted.

No,
Lindemann completed the curtailed version of AVKS on April 2nd (or 1st), after which he had to do overhauls, repairs, and remedy work to the battleship. From the warlog, it would seem that approx. 3 to 4 weeks were used for training in the Bay of Danzig, in the time period Apr 1st to May 18th.

[wadinga]

Fellow Contributors

do not touch upon the state of material readiness of the ship as a gunnery platform

No gross failures.

quite satisfactory.

In March!

perhaps 15 days between Apr 16th-30th, although it's curious that no individual days are described).

Je 2 Tageskaliberschießen der S.A. und M.A.

Twice a day every day? The schedule includes the ship resting at anchor most nights and some afternoons. Obviously they had sufficient practice already.

Battle training of all weapons 1st -4th & 6th-9th May

Contrasting with PoW haing maybe 2 days at sea outside Scapa.

All the best

wadinga

[Herr Nilsson]

@wadinga

2 daylight caliber firings of main artillery and 2 of the secondary artillery.

IIRC Kaliberschießen is full charge. Anyway, BS already had discharged the AVKS ammunition and had received the missing half of the combat ammunition.

@alecsandros

What survivor and when?

...and I didn't want to say that you distorted the meaning deliberately.

[alecsandros]

Battle training of all weapons 1st -4th

I don't have that entry in the copy I downloaded from Kbismarck.

In the version from kbismarck, I read: 1-4th of May: 'battle training, training of on-board flight crew, topping off of stores for 3 months of duty at sea for all divisions' (pg. 105)

May 6th-9th is as you write.

[alecsandros]

What survivor and when?

Kapitänleutnant Junack, after being rescued by the British.

and don't forget Adm. Schiewind's positition statement dated June 1941.

[alecsandros]

In March!



wadinga

Take the time and examine AVKS report,
dated April 1941. It has many descriptions of main armament failures exhibited during the AVKS mission (including failures of the main elevators, failures of the primary and secondary cartridge, etc).

I enclose an example here.

[wadinga]

Fellow Contributors,

I'm interested in Lindemann's report on his gunnery system and personnel in March.

You mean it took that long to write the report and come up with a list of minor problems to justify the boffins' existence?

Having been in charge of a high technology vessel, ie a seismic survey vessel, I know they can never be perfect and nothing is ever 100%, but you still have to go to sea, whatever is currently not working and get on with the job. Bismarck was not a glistening i-phone sitting in an immaculate white box, with protective covers on everything to enhance the consumer experience. She was rusty and grubby as she was being built. Every time she made full power, fittings would vibrate and shear, every time her guns roared stuff would be shocked and damaged. Hydraulics would leak, electrics would pack up. Stuff breaks down, wears out and gets fixed by the crew. She had over 2,000 crew on board to deal with such minor matters.

KTB:
24th March 10:30 Start of shot group [dispersion pattern] Sounds like gunfire.

Combat training 30th April,
1st May Ready to sail at 09:00 back at anchor by 14:00 Mayday holiday perhaps ? Obviously not too much stress about equipment. Three more days of battle training and then mainly painting and polishing stuff for when the Der Fuhrer comes aboard.

By the 15th all Lindemann has to complain about is the irrelevant port crane problems which will never be of any importance whatsoever. He has had many days of "combat training".

Cartridge lids falling off and jamming up the works didn't happen at Denmark Strait, only one shot was a misfire according to the Baron, and the gunnery team stood around drinking champagne and slapping each other on the back after the victory, not discussing the kind of wholesale failures that afflicted PoW.

We are drifting off PoW state of readiness, that evidence we have shows how unready she was.

[Text edited by the moderator team]

All the best

wadinga

[alecsandros]

Fellow Contributors,

I'm interested in Lindemann's report on his gunnery system and personnel in March.

You mean it took that long to write the report and come up with a list of minor problems to justify the boffins' existence?

AVKS stayed on board until April 1st or 2nd. The report was redacted afterwards.

You do not seem to grasp the problems discussed in the document. That does not concern me.


You also make interesting claims - such as lids not falling off during Denmark Strait battle, and the Baron reporting one misfire.
The first assertion is not provable, and the second is highly problematic, because the Baron only wrote about a question that Schneider posed over the loadspearker system 'was that a misfire ? that really ate into him...'. The actual number of misfires is unknown.

Agreed with the proposition to turn back to Prince of Wales's preparation.

Btw, did anyone else notice that, had Rheinubung had been effectuated according to her original schedule, there could probably be no interception by Prince of Wales or Victorious ?

[pgollin]

.

....... I hope it's clear for everybody (even for the most insisting ones...) that I will not provide any further info about the content nor the location of the "Vickers" report and of the Admiralty trials details report. .....

.

In which case you are breaking the conditions of usage of those archives - and according to your own "rules" cannot be trusted.

.

[dunmunro]

loadspearker system 'was that a misfire ? that really ate into him...'. The actual number of misfires is unknown.

My reading of that was that Schneider was commenting about what he observed on Hood since any misfire of the 38cm armament would not be coincidental to the hit on Hood:

Ever since the action began, I had been wondering whether I would be able to distinguish the sound of the enemy’s shells hitting us from the sound of our own firing— with all the noise that was going on, that might not always be easy. Then I heard Schneider again: “Wow, was that a misfire? That really ate into him.” Over the telephone I heard an ever louder and more excited babble of voices— it seemed as though something sensational was about to happen, if it hadn’t already. Convinced that the Suffolk and Norfolk would leave us in peace for at least a few minutes, I entrusted the temporary surveillance of the horizon astern through the starboard director to one of my petty officers and went to the port director. While I was still turning it toward the Hood, I heard a shout, “She’s blowing up!” “She”— that could only be the Hood! The sight I then saw is something I shall never forget. At first the Hood was nowhere to be seen; in her place was a colossal pillar of black smoke reaching into the sky. Gradually, at the foot of the pillar, I made out the bow of the battle cruiser projecting upwards at an angle, a sure sign that she had broken in two. Then I saw something I could hardly believe: a flash of orange coming from her forward guns! Although her fighting days had ended, the Hood was firing a last salvo. I felt great respect for those men over there.

IMHO, Schneider may have initially thought that Hood had suffered a bore premature or a turret conflagration due to a misfire occurring and the breech being opened allowing the cordite to ignite.

[dunmunro]

Lindemann has another 2 months of intensive training before the mission, and this is one month before PoW even gets her last turret(s) accepted.

No,
Lindemann completed the curtailed version of AVKS on April 2nd (or 1st), after which he had to do overhauls, repairs, and remedy work to the battleship. From the warlog, it would seem that approx. 3 to 4 weeks were used for training in the Bay of Danzig, in the time period Apr 1st to May 18th.

The Baron is a useful source for Bismarck's working up exercises. He states:

The second half of November was spent in more tests of the Bismarck and her engines. The only thing new was that gunnery drill was added to the routine. Not only were the brand-new guns tested for steadiness, the smooth working of their mechanisms, ballistic performance, and accuracy, but the resistance of the ship’s components to recoil was also tested. Practice firings served to train the gunlayers in the best way of keeping on target. These drills could be carried out satisfactorily at close range with 8.8- or 5-centimeter sub-caliber guns inserted into the barrels of the heavy and medium guns. Because the shells and powder charges used were relatively light, this kind of firing was economical. At the same time, it gave the gunnery officers practice in fire control. Full-caliber firing! Unforgettable was the day the Bismarck’s heavy guns fired their first full salvo. How far, how violently would the recoil cause the ship to heel over, how quickly would she right herself? Below, in the engine rooms, where steam pressure was fifty-six times that of the atmosphere, the seconds passed slowly. A single crack in the main steam line caused by the shock of firing could result in the death of everyone in the engine room. Boom! The ship seemed to be abruptly jarred sideways, a few loose objects came adrift, a few light bulbs shattered, but that was all. Topside and in the control centers, it was quite different. Up there, the sideways movement was scarcely noticeable...

At the end of her trials, the ship was scheduled to return to Blohm &. Voss in Hamburg so that the yard could give her the “finishing touches” it had not been able to complete by September. On 5 December, therefore, the Bismarck departed Rügen under escort of Sperrbrecher 6 and steamed for Kiel. Passage of the canal again took two days, and on 9 December we were back in Hamburg.

So unlike PoW, Bismarck was conducting full calibre shoots 7 months prior to combat. Also unlike PoW Bismarck was able to return to the builders for adjustment and repair of defects uncovered in training:

The final commissioning draft, which included
350 ordinary seamen and boys -- all handicapped by
the bare minimum of training - arrived on 1 March.
A week later King George VI toured the battleship and
inspected the ship's company drawn up in divisions
on the quarterdeck.

Such was the haste to bring the ship to opera-
tlonal status, that Prince of Wales, in company with
the battlecruiser Hood. weighed and proceeded from
Rosyth, bound for Scapa, on 24 March, even though
she was still uncompleted. With her went the small
army of Cammell Laird and Vickers-Armstrongs
technicians and tradesmen. all working against the
clock.

Officially Prince of Wales is classified as being
completed on 31 March 1941. but this was only
achieved by waiving the vital watertight compart-
ment air tests. ventilation tests, and a thorough
testing of the bilge. ballast and fuel-oil systems. It
was a dangerous expedient. Full power trials com-
menced on 8 May and, compared with Bismarck
which made frequent returns to the shipbuilders to
iron out deficiencies that had occurred during her
eight month working-up period, the Admiralty, in
their race against time, afforded no such niceties for
Prince of Wales.

Tarrant, KGV class.

[HMSVF]

loadspearker system 'was that a misfire ? that really ate into him...'. The actual number of misfires is unknown.

My reading of that was that Schneider was commenting about what he observed on Hood since any misfire of the 38cm armament would not be coincidental to the hit on Hood:

Ever since the action began, I had been wondering whether I would be able to distinguish the sound of the enemy’s shells hitting us from the sound of our own firing— with all the noise that was going on, that might not always be easy. Then I heard Schneider again: “Wow, was that a misfire? That really ate into him.” Over the telephone I heard an ever louder and more excited babble of voices— it seemed as though something sensational was about to happen, if it hadn’t already. Convinced that the Suffolk and Norfolk would leave us in peace for at least a few minutes, I entrusted the temporary surveillance of the horizon astern through the starboard director to one of my petty officers and went to the port director. While I was still turning it toward the Hood, I heard a shout, “She’s blowing up!” “She”— that could only be the Hood! The sight I then saw is something I shall never forget. At first the Hood was nowhere to be seen; in her place was a colossal pillar of black smoke reaching into the sky. Gradually, at the foot of the pillar, I made out the bow of the battle cruiser projecting upwards at an angle, a sure sign that she had broken in two. Then I saw something I could hardly believe: a flash of orange coming from her forward guns! Although her fighting days had ended, the Hood was firing a last salvo. I felt great respect for those men over there.

IMHO, Schneider may have initially thought that Hood had suffered a bore premature or a turret conflagration due to a misfire occurring and the breech being opened allowing the cordite to ignite.

IMHO, Schneider may have initially thought that Hood had suffered a bore premature or a turret conflagration due to a misfire occurring and the breech being opened allowing the cordite to ignite

That was always my interpretation of what Schneider was commenting on. I didn't realise that it was thought to be about anything else...





In regards to Bismarck/PO...


Wasn't Bismarck commissioned beginning trials from August 1940 and HMS Prince of Wales starting her very protracted trials from Jan 1941? Doesn't that mean that whilst Bismarcks evaluations (for whatever reason) may have been interrupted her crew would have had the benefit of an extra 6 months aboard their ship? They may have been new ships but in terms of being "green" its seems pretty obvious that there were definite differences in the shades of green between the 2 ships.What I would argue is that POW's birth was a more tortuous one, what with her damage from a near miss at Birkenhead and subsequent transfer to Rosyth to complete.


Best wishes


HMSVF

[northcape]

Then I heard Schneider again: “Wow, was that a misfire? That really ate into him.”

I'm not sure if I follow these discussions and there interpretations correctly. Anyway, the original german version is:

"Nanu, war das ein Blindgaenger? Der hat sich wohl reingefressen"

Which unambiguously would be translated to the effect that Schneider is asking himself if the shell fired from Bismarck did not explode on impact ("Blindgaenger"), and he further suggests that the shell did "get stuck" in Hood ("reingefressen") without exploding.

If your discussions suggest that Schneider thought to observe a misfire on Hood: This for sure is not supported by the original german version of the book.

[dunmunro]

Then I heard Schneider again: “Wow, was that a misfire? That really ate into him.”

I'm not sure if I follow these discussions and there interpretations correctly. Anyway, the original german version is:

"Nanu, war das ein Blindgaenger? Der hat sich wohl reingefressen"

Which unambiguously would be translated to the effect that Schneider is asking himself if the shell fired from Bismarck did not explode on impact ("Blindgaenger"), and he further suggests that the shell did "get stuck" in Hood ("reingefressen") without exploding.

If your discussions suggest that Schneider thought to observe a misfire on Hood: This for sure is not supported by the original german version of the book.

Thanks. The English translation makes it clear that Schneider was talking about the events he was observing on Hood but was unclear as to the meaning of "...was that a misfire..." since in English "misfire" typically refers to a malfunction within a gun but it makes sense when applied to the effect of a shell striking a target.

[wadinga]

Fellow Contributors,

We have often discussed that armour piercing shell hits are virtually invisible, McMullen didn't know he had hit Bismarck 2.5 times. How could Schneider know a hit had not detonated? None of his shells should "explode on impact".

To my mind it is far more likely it was called a "dud" because the gun didn't fire, and Schneider didn't say "That really ate into him!" The enemy, him, being Hood, but it was the Baron's comment "That really ate into him!" meaning Schneider's reaction at not getting a shell away.

If the german punctuation is "Nanu, war das ein Blindgaenger? Der hat sich wohl reingefressen" I guess not, in which case in the absence of any comments from gunnery officer Mullenheim-Rechberg about failures in Bismarck's gunnery system it is a strong likelihood there were none at all to be discussed over champagne in the Wardroom.

Dunmunro, well done for pointing out all the KTB material about Bismarck's lengthy gun practice. There are numerous references to weapons and combat training, It has been covered before and like Cag's PoW logs conveniently forgotten about.

All the best

wadinga