Totally agree, AFTER 0141/25 was received by Ellis, he should have done this way, getting read of W-W if he could not follow him during the maneuver. This was his major error.Wadinga wrote: "Ellis should have done what he was given freedom to do and move Suffolk to a position directly astern of Bismarck"
Come on, make up your mind. This is exactly what "your" admiral did the night before, he steamed blindly (in much worse visibility conditions) to cover a possible escape of Bismarck toward south-east, regulating (successfully) on the (inconvenient for you now.....) D/F bearings, with which he "was able to check my position relative to Suffolk by D/F bearings which were of utmost value throughout" (Wake-Walker official report words)....you wrote: "There would be no point in having ships steaming blindly along "somewhere" on the quarters incapable of seeing Bismarck until they were surprised by the arrival of the first salvoes."
Now, if he was right the night before, he SHOULD have done the same with 2 ships to cover even 2 different directions during the night between 24 and 25 May,. Else, he was WRONG the previous night.
As Ellis says in his autobiography (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8244#p77033), in no way he should have:
1) kept his 3 ships together at short distance on the WRONG port side of Bismarck, since the late afternoon of May 24 (IMO a severe error in disposing his force for the shadowing),
2) kept Norfolk in close vicinity of PoW ONLY for security (I call it blatant timidity) reasons: had he been worried of Suffolk security he could have left PoW with her and covered with Norfolk another direction.....
3) lost more than 1 hour after the loss of contact before taking any action with his squadron, while sleeping (IMO a serious negligence).
You speak about what was concluded at the time (with Bismarck sinking hindsight anyway....).
What would have been the judgement for this flag officer, in light of the above, had Bismarck escaped forever and sunk any merchant ship ?
Bye, Alberto