Hi Antonio and everyone,
Antonio, I thank you for your very kind assessment of me. Maybe too kind! But I'll try to answer you the best way I can, having given things much thought. Please bear with me!
Antonio Bonomi wrote:1) have you tried to realize the real distances of Suffolk and Norfolk on a real scale map, compared to BC1 and the enemy all along those hours ?
Antonio, you know very well I have followed this discussion over the years that it has gone on. I am
fully aware and very appreciative of the work done by yourself and others. And yes, it has given a much clearer picture of what all the ships did. As for specific distances and bearings – as you often say, there are many tolerances. Paper measurements can approximate, but the reality, as it appeared to those on the spot, might be quite different.
Antonio Bonomi wrote:2) Did you realize that from 16 sea miles, even considering the different visibility on 2 different directions, in one case there was a direct enemy battleship vs cruiser perfect identification from 16 sea miles, ... in the other hand for more than half an hour somebody thinks he was unable to recognize BC1 warships from the same or less distance until 14 sea miles were reached ( even if we have now a direct WW admission he knew who they were since soon after 5 am, probably from 05:16 ).
Have you noticed that Norfolk ONLY reported seeing 1 enemy ship at 0541. She ASSUMED it was Bismarck “One battleship…..” No mention of PG at that point. Why? PG was not in sight, she was 3000 yards ahead of Bismarck and below the horizon. Again, the range was likely estimated based on what they saw of the ship plus what might have come from the DCT. BC1 was not visible at that time. Remember the Germans did not see Hood & PoW until 0545-0547 - 10 minutes after the latter sighted them – and even then Brinkmann records them as “smoke trails” that rapidly enlarged. That’s a similar discrepancy, isn’t it?
Antonio Bonomi wrote:3) Did you check Norfolk gunnery declared distances on a map with the Norfolk declared course and distances on " The Plot " and versus reality ?
I have a hypothesis regarding Norfolk’s GO’s major time discrepancy, recording the battle as starting at 0606. I suspect, being very human, in his excitement of the moment, he ‘joined the reciprocal club” in reading his time piece. Maybe it was his angle of view and what he read as “about 0606” was actually “about 0554”. Speculation, but there it is for what it’s worth.
Now I’m not very good at precise measurements on track charts, but I do suspect that the reduction in range from Norfolk to Bismarck between 0554 and 0610 based on her track on ‘The Plot”, and the German course alterations due to the torpedo alarms may be reasonably close to 3500 yards (30,700 – 27,200). Of course, those ranges may have been out by a significant amount given the optical conditions that morning, just like PoW’s opening range was. But the key factor is what the GO thought. He stated directly that fire was not opened due to the difficulty in spotting fall of shot.
But hey….what does THAT suggest to you?? He didn’t open fire because he could not spot the fall of shot…. IMHO, that suggests he had orders or permission to open fire when ready! If he didn’t have orders or permission to fire when ready, he could not have used FoS spotting as his excuse for not doing so!
Bottom line…even if his ranges were wrong, (and again, all the plotting and calculations done on paper NOW mean nothing to the man on the spot on May 24, 1941) his actions were based on his findings at the time. And his Admiral and Captain depended on him for that.
Antonio Bonomi wrote:4) Did you read and consider Capt Ellis biography and his own admission on where he was and what he could have done, ... in line with Busch and the Baron reports and ... not according to " The Plot " and his own signed 1941 Official report ?
My thoughts on Ellis? I do think his narrative of events written at the time or immediately after would be more accurate than recollections recorded months or worse years later – knowing how human memory works. PG reported a “mast” on Suffolk’s bearing – that doesn’t compute with seeing a heavy cruiser 9 miles away in reasonably clear conditions. It also means Suffolk was even closer to Bismarck which was a mile and a half astern of PG and that unless the Baron was asleep, he should have been letting loose at Suffolk even before Hood and PoW were sighted! It just doesn’t add up.
Antonio Bonomi wrote:5) Did you check the bearings of all warships during this timeframe ( provided many times from me on many threads ) between those warships, ... because as Sean and Duncan suggested me long time ago, ... distances can be wrong by a huge percentage ( like in this case estimate even using rangefinders ) but the bearings do have a much less error possibility, ... especially when double checked by the declarations on both directions.
As I said in my answer to Q1, whatever might be determined on paper by these methods, whatever the ranges were, the decisions and actions taken by those on the spot were determined by the situation as they saw it. My explanation of Norfolk’s actions speaks to that.
Antonio Bonomi wrote:6) Do you really think that a Royal Navy Rear Admiral in command of a squadron needed an order from a Vice Admiral before engaging the enemy in sight, ... when he realized that his shadowing duty was clearly over and a battle was going to start within few minutes ? What about when he saw that a similar heavy cruiser in the enemy formation was engaging superior warships by opening fire ? What about when Hood was sunk and PoW was alone being hammered by the enemy ? Why he did engage the Bismarck on the 27th of May without having received any order to do so from Adm Tovey on KGV ?
No he didn’t. And Holland didn’t need to give it. Don’t think for one minute that I think Holland was in any way at fault for not signaling the cruisers. His focus was on the enemy and his two capital ships were expected to be quite capable of facing one capital ship and one cruiser. BUT, there is the mistaken ID factor – Holland initially thought PG was astern of Bismarck and therefore the British cruisers coming up from astern would have unimpeded access to her once they got in range.
But still, as a CRUISER, in a capital ship action, with the superior officer on one of the capital ships (who had maintained radio silence during the hunt and approach), Norfolk was handled quite acceptably IMHO – to close with her flagship, before turning to get in the mix once the enemy was heavily engaged.
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One more point on Norfolk and what happened when and after Hood blew up – again from the standpoint of the view from Norfolk’s bridge:
Hood blows up and PoW is seen to pass her wreck, very quickly coming under heavy fire from the Germans. Numerous shell splashes, the flash of the crane/funnel hit and the resulting fire and the ship passing (stern on view) just to the right of the huge column of smoke from the sinking Hood would have been seen.
Then PoW turns away and disappears behind the smoke column, making smoke herself. Her gunfire had gone awry as she disappeared – last major salvoes with a wide spread, then they quickly petered out to silence.
All this time the Germans had kept up their assault, continuing for several minutes after PoW was no longer firing…. You hold your breath, wondering what had become of her, having seen what happened to Hood . Eventually, to your relief, she emerges to the left of the smoke cloud, withdrawing. From what you’ve seen you guess that she is heavily damaged. You are now the senior officer on the scene.
Your Gunnery Officer still
believes you’re not in effective gun range. Plus, you are on a cruiser with an important shadowing role, and you’ve just seen two of your side’s most powerful ships trounced in mere minutes.
What do you do?
Do you charge at the enemy, firing every gun that would bear until they turn on you too?
Or do you close with your wounded new charge, assess the situation and decide what to do next?
Long post, but I was trying to answer best I could.
Thanks for bearing with me!
Paul