Bismarck original KTB still existing ?

[Herr Nilsson]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

YES, 16 sea miles is my current estimate, ... Pinchin on " The Plot " puts them much closer at 05:20 and 05:30 as you can verify easily yourself.

Wake-Walker declared he knew who they were, ... so having identified them or not it is not so important, ... what is important is that he was aware of their presence from that moment onward.

Speeding up and running straight on his course he would have close on the enemy at a much faster rate and being on firing range earlier, ... with the manoeuvre he did he delayed that moment,... leaving temporarily the battlefield to Holland warships, ... just as the Baron wrote on his book.

Wake-Walker declared he knew who they were, so he was fully aware since soon after 05:00, ... Adm Tovey declared he was unaware of their presence so near at the described beginning of the action, ... you do not see anything incorrect on point 17, ... only because that statement is referred to a time much earlier than 05:35 am of point 18 start time, ... and after 03:40 of point 16 end, ... as we all know now thanking you, ... still for 19 minutes, ... between 05:16 and 05:35, ... is clearly incorrect anyway.

Bye Antonio

Antonio,

IIRC the Germans had a lot of trouble to identify BC1 even at closer range . It seems both CS1 and the Germans were not able to identify BC1 without fail until Hood and PoW turned and revealed their silhouettes.

What means "much faster rate"?

At least in German there is a difference between "must be" and "were".
I still don't understand why point 17 should be incorrect.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

I agree that a final ship identification was something that took a longer time, ... but the point is about the full awareness of who they " must be " or " were " ... which for that situation was almost the same ... because for sure they were not the enemy, ... but most likely the warships the Icarus was mentioning on his 04:45 radio message.

Anyway, Wake-Walker statement is clear : " ... soon after 5 am, in the morning of the 24th of May, smoke was seen fine on the port bow of the Norfolk. This we knew must be the Hood and the PoW ... "

We knew must be, ... in my personal opinion means full awareness and consciousness ... about it on that precise moment.

At a " faster closing " rate simply means that you are getting closer to your enemy in a shorter time.

Point 17 by Tovey does not tell what WW stated above, ... just the opposite.

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi all,
it's really funny to see here people, who have based their "defense" of Wake-Walker passive behavior during the DS battle on the incorrect Tovey's statement of the "unawareness" of the vicinity of BC1, now refusing to accept W-W own words that already at 5:16 he "knew" that the smoke fine on the port bow "must be the Hood and the PoW", or even trying to say that, even knowing at 5:16 that BC1 was coming, nothing would have changed and asking what he should have done to engage....

I have already said what he should have done and DID NOT: 1) alert immediately Ellis (who only realized this after 5:41 enemy in sight message) of BC1 proximity, 2) order to both cruisers to raise to full speed, close range and engage as soon as Holland would have opened fire (this would have avoided the "unfortunate" Ellis turn to north) and 3) simply steer his ship on a course 240° (as he did BTW until he saw the enemy...), without maneuvering with the "arc" (that enlarged the range) and the turn to 270° (that together with the arc, just made Norfolk loosing range, with an "S" shape course).

It should be very easy to realize that on a straight course at 31 / 32 knots (let's not forget that all ships were running in those waters at a speed consistently higher than their max normal speed, due to exceptional circumstances and needs) since 5:16, Norfolk could have been far closer to Bismarck at 6:00 and well within the famous 8" "effective range".

Taking a detail of the battle map published in "Storia Militare" n.281 February article (that is, the evolution of Antonio's 2005 map, updated with the last years discoveries) where, at Hood explosion time, the distance of Norfolk from Bismarck after all the maneuvers is around 11,6 sm, Norfolk would have been at around 8,7 sm from the enemy at the same time, just sailing full speed on 240°as said above.

Norfolk_straight_course_1.jpg (91.3 KiB) Viewed 971 times

Of course now the "deniers" will try to start questioning every single detail in this map, being themselves UNABLE to produce a different, better, map.


Bye, Alberto

[Herr Nilsson]

Antonio,

"must be" is an educated guess without proof. "Were" is (proven) knowledge.

What was Norfolk's top speed?

Tovey simply stated that CS1 was not aware that BC1 was so near and the enemy was on a course of 240°. IMHO it just says CS1 didn't know anything about the intentions of BC1 (and therefore couldn't make dispositions) and he didn't know that BC1 was so near and so he continued shadowing when the Germans were on course of 240°. The statement is correct.


@Alberto

Nice drawing. I'm just missing the "fine on the port bow of the Norfolk".

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

Norfolk top speed was 31,5 knots.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Norfolk_(78)

If you listen again to WW recorded interview you will notice that he declared is awareness of the BC1 presence ( we knew they must be ) and also to know their intentions, ... only he did not know when the BC1 warships were going to close on the enemy.

So, he was aware of them and their intentions, ... and this is not what Adm Tovey stated on point 17.

Please confirm ...

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Antonio Bonomi wrote: "...So, he was aware of them and their intentions"

Hi Antonio,
I'm not so categorically sure that he, alone, would have been able to realize the whole situation, not being a "broadminded" officer (as per Adm.R.Backhouse).
However, on board Norfolk, there were of course other officers and his staff that could help him to understand the situation and he fairly declared "we knew this must be the Hood and the PoW"....


Bye, Alberto

[Herr Nilsson]

Antonio,

that means Norfolk could be 3.5 knots faster than Bismarck at best, assuming Bismarck doesn't accelerate as well. Right?

Well, more and more it seems to me your point 17 is another one than the point 17 I know. When were the Germans sailing at 240°? And where can I find that CS1 was aware of BC1's intention that Norfolk and Suffolk should deal with PG?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr NIlsson,

you are right about the Norfolk speed evaluation.

Point 17. - It was the intention of the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron, that the Hood and Prince of Wales should engage the Bismarck, leaving the Prinz Eugen to the cruisers, but the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, was not aware that the battlecruiser force was so near; the Norfolk and Suffolk, therefore, shadowing from the eastward and northward respectively at a range of about 15 miles, were not in a position to engage the Prinz Eugen who was now stationed ahead of the Bismarck on a course of 240°.

You wrote :

... more and more it seems to me your point 17 is another one than the point 17 I know.

Please explain me the way your read point 17 differently than me, ... between 03:40 ( end of point 16 ) ... and 05:35 ( start of point 18 ).

Thanks, ...

Bye Antonio

[Herr Nilsson]

... more and more it seems to me your point 17 is another one than the point 17 I know.

Please explain me the way your read point 17 differently than me, ... between 03:40 ( end of point 16 ) ... and 05:35 ( start of point 18 ).

Thanks, ...

I'd love to. Unfortunately I have to work now so I have to ask for your patience till tomorrow.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

no problem at all, ... I have to work too, ... so take it easy, ... tomorrow is OK.

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello All,

Leaving aside what W-W should have done, based apparently on advanced psychic abilities, can I bring us back to fact not supposition:

but most likely the warships the Icarus was mentioning on his 04:45 radio message.

Has anybody found the Icarus message yet? I did not find any material on it at the PRO. W-W report says "At 04:45 a report was received from Icarus giving the position of herself and Achates which was some distance astern of us. This was the first intimation of the battlecruiser force being in the vicinity."

I have previously observed that the arrival time of these destroyers at Hood's wreck site c.07:30 shows they were at least 45 miles NE of it at 06:00 . Moreover there are only two destroyers mentioned. Since Norfolk has been proceeding SW at top speed these ships would have still been c.45 miles astern at 04:45, at 05:15 and at 06:00. Why would W-W associate smoke 16 miles ahead of him with these vessels?

Additionally W-W makes an unguarded retrospective assumption just as he did in the verbal interview. "The battlecruiser force" The message refers to two destroyers only not the battlecruiser force . W-W uses the BCF wording when at the time he knew only about two destroyers, retrospectively he expected the BCF might be with them. If he knew he were on trial, his counsel would have advised him to be more precise in explaining what he knew at the time, and not add information he discovered later. He knew nothing of Holland's decision to split up his force, and it would be logical to assume the BCF was in the vicinity of the destroyers ie 45 miles astern. In fact these destroyers could be an advanced scouting vanguard of the BCF and the capital ships even further astern.

Hello Alberto,

are you seriously saying that it was just good that Bismarck could reach (absolutely undamaged, as Leach and Wake-Walker could be able to know at 6:00 on May 24)

Do you not understand the difference between Holland's and W-W's tactical objectives? Holland could destroy Bismarck, W-W could not. Holland had to close decisively, W-W could not afford to. The further west Lutjens went in the Atlantic the more likely a successful interception became. Based on Brinkmann's later aimless wandering about, the Kriegsmarine had no up-to-date information on convoy routeing. Bismarck loose in the North Atlantic is a dreadful risk, but Bismarck can be killed in the open sea. Hiding in Wilhelmshaven or the Baltic she cannot.

If Wake-Walker cannot sink or significantly injure Bismarck, he just has to keep track of her. As Marc has kindly pointed out he does not know where Bismarck actually is until Ship's Log: 1) 05:41 - Enemy in sight 276° Suffolk's information was wrong.

Please can we forget about Norfolk torpedoing anything. It is utterly unrealistic. Firstly, W-W has no speed advantage (trial speeds 10 years ago mean nothing) to overhaul Bismarck and attack in a 10,000 ton cruiser from the 3,000 yd position on the bow of the target which is necessary to even have a chance of a hit. His tinclad cruiser would have been smashed to pulp long before. Vian's destroyers fired many more torpedoes at a wallowing speed-crippled Bismarck and could not get a hit. W-W's mission was to keep track of Bismarck and not get close enough to chance his own destruction (or speed loss).

From Tovey's report: "The enemy ships were first sighted by Norfolk at 20:32 on the 23rd of May. They were shadowed by Norfolk and Suffolk from this time until 03:06 on the 25th May. in difficult conditions of variable visibility, with great skill and ability. The loss of touch after this was a great misfortune which in no way detracts from the merit of this performance; the subsequent attempts to regain contact were efficiently designed and quickly put into operation."

This was the opinion of the C-in C Home Fleet a sailor of many years experience . That you do not agree does not detract one iota. W-W gained his promotion to full Admiral 1945 after his supervision of landing craft provision which made the liberation of Europe possible.

All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote: "Bismarck loose in the North Atlantic is a dreadful risk, but Bismarck can be killed in the open sea"

Hi Sean,
she can be killed in the open sea, but she can heavily kill as well, and I think Churchill and Pound wouldn't have shared your optimistic view on May 24.... Anyway, after the "enemy in sight" from PoW, there was NO difference between BC1 and CS1 mission: that is killing the 2 German ships BEFORE they become a danger in the Atlantic. This would have been the mission of the detached destroyers as well, had they been with BC1.

you wrote "Please can we forget about Norfolk torpedoing anything"

Sure, I'm not very fond of the idea of torpedoes, at least until a favorable opportunity develops. In the initial stage of the battle it was IMO much better for CS1 to try to engage with both his ships and use his 8", that could not sink Bismarck but could severely damage her superstructures and equipment (as Norfolk apparently did on May 27, BTW).

you wrote: "he (Wake-Walker) does not know where Bismarck actually is"

Even after having given up his shadowing (as you confirm), he had Suffolk positions of Bismarck and several precious (W-W words) RDF bearings to correct the position errors, he should have acted based on this estimated positions, but he did not, preferring to do nothing and just waiting the outcome of the battle.

you wrote: "His (Wake-Walker) tinclad cruiser would have been smashed to pulp long before."

No, she "could have been smashed", as well as Brinkmann's ship confronted to 2 British battlewagons, but Prinz Eugen was decisive in the confrontation and the comparison of PG with the poor British cruisers behavior is embarrassing. In addition, while PG was actually targeted, do you think that Lutjens, with BC1 approaching, would have split his main battery (already inferior in number to the British ones) just for trying to hit Norfolk and Suffolk ? Was possibly W-W fearful even of the Bismarck secondary armament ?

you wrote: "This was the opinion of the C-in C Home Fleet a sailor of many years experience. That you do not agree does not detract one iota. W-W gained his promotion to full Admiral 1945 after his supervision of landing craft provision which made the liberation of Europe possible. "

My opinion (as well as yours..... ) is irrelevant. However the opinion of another experienced sailor, Adm.Roger Backhouse, at the time C in C Home Fleet , was quite different regarding Capt.Wake-Walker, a poor commanding officer "strongly self-opinated but not broadminded", that is exactly what he demonstrated to be during this mission (and even more with his subsequent, quite comic, declarations/contradictions).


Bye, Alberto

[wadinga]

Hello All,

So nobody has the Icarus message then. Pity.

Hello Alberto,

W-W had only the inaccurate positions sent by Suffolk to work on, single limited accuracy D/F bearings do not provide positions. This is basic navigation theory. Antonio mapped the situation where Suffolk was claiming to be 10 miles on Norfolk's beam, when she was nowhere to be seen.

Norfolk had little or no speed advantage over Bismarck and as you are unable to accept, Wake-Walker did not know where to charge at before 05:41 (Ship's Log and Action Report) , as he had no idea where the enemy was.

with BC1 approaching, would have split his main battery (already inferior in number to the British ones) just for trying to hit Norfolk and Suffolk ?

Both Norfolk and Suffolk were out of range , c 30,000yds. That is why the Baron was unconcerned with them. I have read Ellis' typescript report in the PRO. His fuzzy recollections in an unpublished autobiography written years later do not match his detailed report written at the time, simply because they are wrong.

a poor commanding officer "strongly self-opinated but not broadminded"

can you date this reference for me? Was it before W-W was appointed Captain of HMS Revenge in 1939. I expect so, as Backhouse died in July 1939. It was obviously before W-W was promoted to Rear Admiral, later the same year. Obviously Backhouse's opinion was not shared by anybody else (with two notable modern exceptions ) On a special mission, W-W discharged his duties in charge of all vessels involved with the Dunkirk evacuation with great success and personal bravery, despite having his flagship HMS Keith sunk under him, and received further awards for this service.

At last we can agree on the ridiculousness of Norfolk getting close enough to torpedo anything. PG spent seconds under the fire purely because both Lutjens and Brinkman first failed to identify their enemies, and then forgot doctrine saying the cruiser should avoid combat with heavy ships. These failures cannot be misrepresented as bravery or tactical genius, especially when Brinkmann panicked over a spurious torpedo warning and swerved out of the formation.

All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote (my underlined): "W-W had only the inaccurate positions sent by Suffolk to work on, single limited accuracy D/F bearings do not provide positions. This is basic navigation theory. "

Hi Sean,
NO, this is NOT what W-W himself stated. According to him he could stay out of sight but still knowing enemy and Suffolk position through Suffolk enemy reports and Suffolk most valuable RDF bearings from Norfolk with which he COULD estimate Suffolk position, and thus enemy position too.

W_Wreport_point 5.jpg (11.7 KiB) Viewed 900 times

This is basic navigation theory, as confirmed by W-W himself.

you wrote: "Both Norfolk and Suffolk were out of range"

When? Around 5:30 we all know Ellis was at 9 miles from enemy, not only from cross bearings (DoD) that you still refuse to accept (without providing any alternative...) but also from Ellis autobiography (18.000 yards) and F.O.Busch PG observation of enemy bearing and range (176 hectometers). Then there was the "unfortunate" mirage and turn to north that put Suffolk out of range.
Norfolk was intentionally kept out of range by W-W who knowing at 5:16 that the smoke "must be Hood and PoW", did not ordered full speed to close range and even steered his ship away after he saw the Bismarck.
They were both out of effective range due solely to their choice.

you wrote: "can you date this reference for me? Was it before W-W was appointed Captain of HMS Revenge in 1939. I expect so.... "

Your expectation is wrong....It's related to Wake-Walker as Captain of Revenge and dated 10th April, 1938..... A most interesting evaluation of a senior Captain described by the C-in C Home Fleet as a poor commanding officer.
He fully demonstrated all his limitations during the shadowing 23/24 (when he left Suffolk alone to shadow even during daylight), during the preparation to the battle (when he kept Norfolk away and did not ordered anything to Ellis), when Hood exploded (when he did not take the lead for 20 minutes) and finally when he lost Bismarck (putting all his ships close one to the other on the port side of the enemy).

you wrote: "both Lutjens and Brinkman.......forgot doctrine saying the cruiser should avoid combat with heavy ships......Brinkmann panicked over a spurious torpedo warning....."

I do consider you a friend, Sean, but I must tell you that I don't like your attitude to misrepresent bravery as a mistake, without any proof, when it comes from the enemy side. I admire bravery from both sides.
Doctrine was forgotten by Cunningham at Matapan too, when he directed his battlefleet in the dark against an unknown enemy instead of turning away and sending destroyers to "do the job", as suggested by his entire staff and by the fighting instructions.
In both cases Lutjens and Cunningham played against doctrine and won beyond any expectation. Whether Lutjens did it on purpose or not it's purely a speculation, based on nothing. When JD was raised for PG, on board Bismarck they had already identified the Hood. Lutjens sent even a clear message already at 5:53 saying that he was engaged by 2 battleships (full awareness of the situation.....). Therefore, keeping PG in the line was indeed a deliberated choice from his side.
Brinkmann may possibly have panicked (but this again is just your personal opinion, we will never know for sure) but at least he panicked under fire, like Leach may have panicked being under fire.

Wake-Walker, instead, kept intentionally out of range, that is much, much worse.


Bye, Alberto

[Herr Nilsson]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr NIlsson,

you are right about the Norfolk speed evaluation.

Point 17. - It was the intention of the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron, that the Hood and Prince of Wales should engage the Bismarck, leaving the Prinz Eugen to the cruisers, but the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, was not aware that the battlecruiser force was so near; the Norfolk and Suffolk, therefore, shadowing from the eastward and northward respectively at a range of about 15 miles, were not in a position to engage the Prinz Eugen who was now stationed ahead of the Bismarck on a course of 240°.

You wrote :

... more and more it seems to me your point 17 is another one than the point 17 I know.

Please explain me the way your read point 17 differently than me, ... between 03:40 ( end of point 16 ) ... and 05:35 ( start of point 18 ).

Thanks, ...

Bye Antonio

@Antonio,

you wrote:

If you listen again to WW recorded interview you will notice that he declared is awareness of the BC1 presence ( we knew they must be ) and also to know their intentions, ... only he did not know when the BC1 warships were going to close on the enemy.

So, he was aware of them and their intentions, ... and this is not what Adm Tovey stated on point 17.

My read of point 17:

CS1 wasn't aware that BC1 was so near during the night (before (or when) the Germans sailed on course of 240°), because nobody told him. That implies that he also wasn't aware of the intention of BC1 that his cruisers had to deal with PG. He continued shadowing from the distance and was not in position to engage PG who was covered by Bismarck (and sailed now on a course of 240°).
Point 17 does not relate to the times in point 18 because there is a jump cut between them.

@Sean

a poor commanding officer "strongly self-opinated but not broadminded"

can you date this reference for me? Was it before W-W was appointed Captain of HMS Revenge in 1939. I expect so, as Backhouse died in July 1939. It was obviously before W-W was promoted to Rear Admiral, later the same year. Obviously Backhouse's opinion was not shared by anybody else (with two notable modern exceptions ) On a special mission, W-W discharged his duties in charge of all vessels involved with the Dunkirk evacuation with great success and personal bravery, despite having his flagship HMS Keith sunk under him, and received further awards for this service.

It's from April 10th 1938. W-W served under Blackhouse from January 3rd 1938 until March 30th 1938. Quite a long time. If you wish, I can send you W-W's complete service record. I think your CCG address doesn't longer work, doesn't it? You can send me your new email address via private message.

...the quote is not exact by the way. It's:

"I do not think he is broadminded, but he is apt to be strongly self-opiniated[sic]."