Wadinga wrote (my underlined): "W-W had only the inaccurate positions sent by Suffolk to work on, single limited accuracy D/F bearings do not provide positions. This is basic navigation theory. "
Hi Sean,
NO, this is NOT what W-W himself stated. According to him he could stay out of sight but still knowing enemy and Suffolk position through Suffolk enemy reports and Suffolk most valuable RDF bearing
s from Norfolk with which he COULD estimate Suffolk position, and thus enemy position too.
- W_Wreport_point 5.jpg (11.7 KiB) Viewed 910 times
This is basic navigation theory, as confirmed by W-W himself.
you wrote: "Both Norfolk and Suffolk were out of range"
When? Around 5:30 we all know Ellis was at 9 miles from enemy, not only from cross bearings (DoD) that you still refuse to accept (without providing any alternative...) but also from Ellis autobiography (18.000 yards) and F.O.Busch PG observation of enemy bearing and range (176 hectometers). Then there was the "unfortunate" mirage and turn to north that put Suffolk out of range.
Norfolk was intentionally kept out of range by W-W who knowing at 5:16 that the smoke "
must be Hood and PoW", did not ordered full speed to close range and even steered his ship away after he saw the Bismarck.
They were both out of effective range due solely to their choice.
you wrote: "can you date this reference for me? Was it before W-W was appointed Captain of HMS Revenge in 1939. I expect so.... "
Your expectation is wrong....It's related to Wake-Walker as Captain of Revenge and dated 10th April, 1938..... A most interesting evaluation of a senior Captain described by the C-in C Home Fleet as a poor commanding officer.
He fully demonstrated all his limitations during the shadowing 23/24 (when he left Suffolk alone to shadow even during daylight), during the preparation to the battle (when he kept Norfolk away and did not ordered anything to Ellis), when Hood exploded (when he did not take the lead for 20 minutes) and finally when he lost Bismarck (putting all his ships close one to the other on the port side of the enemy).
you wrote: "both Lutjens and Brinkman.......forgot doctrine saying the cruiser should avoid combat with heavy ships......Brinkmann panicked over a spurious torpedo warning....."
I do consider you a friend, Sean, but I must tell you that I don't like your attitude to misrepresent bravery as a mistake, without any proof, when it comes from the enemy side. I admire bravery from both sides.
Doctrine was forgotten by Cunningham at Matapan too, when he directed his battlefleet in the dark against an unknown enemy instead of turning away and sending destroyers to "do the job", as suggested by his entire staff and by the fighting instructions.
In both cases Lutjens and Cunningham played against doctrine and won beyond any expectation. Whether Lutjens did it on purpose or not it's purely a speculation, based on nothing. When JD was raised for PG, on board Bismarck they had already identified the Hood. Lutjens sent even a clear message already at 5:53 saying that he was engaged by 2 battleships (full awareness of the situation.....). Therefore, keeping PG in the line was indeed a deliberated choice from his side.
Brinkmann may possibly have panicked (but this again is just your personal opinion, we will never know for sure) but at least he panicked under fire, like Leach may have panicked being under fire.
Wake-Walker, instead, kept intentionally out of range, that is much, much worse.
Bye, Alberto