Vic,
You keep mentioning what battleships were "built" for as though that is important, and it isn't. What is important is what they could be used for. For example, a US battleship pretty much saved the Pusan perimiter in Korea, and that wasn't at all what it was BUILT for. If it hadn't been there, all of Korea would probably belong to Kim Il Sung.
Marschall instead of Lutjens
Moderator: Bill Jurens
Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens
Big deal
If the whole Korean war hung on what an out of date ship did or did not do then clearly US naval dispositions were not what they should have been. A strike from a carrier would have acheived far greater destruction. The whole idea is laughable. So Granny gets pissed and does a knees-up at a family wedding - doesn't mean she can still tango.
The weaponry of the US carrier of the 1950s made the hardwear of the battleship look ridiculous and hyperbole in the international press about this smart looking ship's acheivement is more to do with justification for an adoring public than anything to do with naval strategy. They had to do something to justify her exisitence.
We are off topic.
History has shown the battleship to have been at very great risk when in the presence of the enemy's aircraft carriers. I don't like it any more than anyone else, because all my life I have been in awe of these fabulous ships, but let us not blind ourselves to the facts.
Admiral Marschall was at serious fault when he ignored the threat from Glorious and Ark Royal and if Glorious alone had been open for business, both of Germany's finest capital ships could have been sent to the bottom. At a time when Britain and France were seen to have made such a mess of the whole Norwegian campaign, wouldn't that have looked pretty. A major threat would have been lifted from the area of operations and who knows, with Marschall out of the way, German naval operations in the whole area might have come unravelled.
I have spoken of the fear factor contained in these two ships, which although they may not have been able to stand up to British heavy units, could sew panic among lesser craft, especially support units. They were being taken seriously by the British and if their threat had been lifted, focus may have been brought to bear on a weakness in the German situation.
The Luftwaffe were covering land operations and an area far out to sea, but at times when the weather was poor and the Luftwaffe could not fly, or see their targets, a well placed task force could do a lot of damage. The need to spread their naval forces so as to cover and protect vulnerable vessels will have been a major problem for the Admiralty and lifting the threat from one source would give relief to hard pressed British forces elsewhere.
By the Summer of 1940 nothing was certain about the Norwegian campaign and attempts by the British and French to capture Narvik, finally proved successful and from there an assault on Trondheim and even Begen might have worked. Action in Norway was cut short by Hitler's invasion of the Low Countries and France. If Hitler had encountered serious resistance in this new development of the war, continuing action in Norway could have been successful for allied forces ibecause they might not have had to withdraw to fight in France.
War is a matter of balance and battles are not always won simply by outright force. It is tactics and logistics which play the most important part, a failure of either can give victory where none might be expected from the simple balance of forces.
If Hitler had encountered stiff resitance in France then British and French forces might have been able to pursue objectives in Norway and in that event, Marschall and his task force could have played a vital role. He could have concentrated force around Narvik under Luftwaffe cover and shelled every vessel in the port, disrupting communications and the same could have been done at other concentrations of enemy force. He could have so disrupted enemy logistics that they would no longer have been able to continue.
That I believe was Raeder's plan, yet Marschall 'suspected' that Narvik had been evacuated from Luftwaffe reports. Supposing these reports had been wrong. His failure to make sure could have given a vital breathing space to a hard pressed enemy at a critical time and even if they were evacuating, how far had that progressed? Every ship which Marschall allowed to get away would eventually land troops in France.
Marschall decided to go haring off after Glorious and Ark Royal and even though his first target was asleep, he still managed to endanger his squadron and lost Scharnhorst as an effective unit. Even his own objective was only partially successful, because he did not bag Ark Royal. In attacking Glorious, Marschall gave a hostage to fortune - not only could he have been sunk, but with Scharnhorst having to limp back to Germany and out of the fight, when Gneisenau hit a mine shortly afterwards, the KM had no battlships in operation at all.
With Germany's lmited naval assets, the trade of one carrier for the loss of half Germany's battleships was simply not worth it. Raeder was right to sack him.
Even the German press and newsreels jumping for joy at this rare successful surface action, could not save Marschall and against this adulation it is clear that the SKL took a very dim view of his actions and decided to sack their firebreathing hero anyway. Because of his inability to properly assess risk. He could prove a liability.
Vic
If the whole Korean war hung on what an out of date ship did or did not do then clearly US naval dispositions were not what they should have been. A strike from a carrier would have acheived far greater destruction. The whole idea is laughable. So Granny gets pissed and does a knees-up at a family wedding - doesn't mean she can still tango.
The weaponry of the US carrier of the 1950s made the hardwear of the battleship look ridiculous and hyperbole in the international press about this smart looking ship's acheivement is more to do with justification for an adoring public than anything to do with naval strategy. They had to do something to justify her exisitence.
We are off topic.
History has shown the battleship to have been at very great risk when in the presence of the enemy's aircraft carriers. I don't like it any more than anyone else, because all my life I have been in awe of these fabulous ships, but let us not blind ourselves to the facts.
Admiral Marschall was at serious fault when he ignored the threat from Glorious and Ark Royal and if Glorious alone had been open for business, both of Germany's finest capital ships could have been sent to the bottom. At a time when Britain and France were seen to have made such a mess of the whole Norwegian campaign, wouldn't that have looked pretty. A major threat would have been lifted from the area of operations and who knows, with Marschall out of the way, German naval operations in the whole area might have come unravelled.
I have spoken of the fear factor contained in these two ships, which although they may not have been able to stand up to British heavy units, could sew panic among lesser craft, especially support units. They were being taken seriously by the British and if their threat had been lifted, focus may have been brought to bear on a weakness in the German situation.
The Luftwaffe were covering land operations and an area far out to sea, but at times when the weather was poor and the Luftwaffe could not fly, or see their targets, a well placed task force could do a lot of damage. The need to spread their naval forces so as to cover and protect vulnerable vessels will have been a major problem for the Admiralty and lifting the threat from one source would give relief to hard pressed British forces elsewhere.
By the Summer of 1940 nothing was certain about the Norwegian campaign and attempts by the British and French to capture Narvik, finally proved successful and from there an assault on Trondheim and even Begen might have worked. Action in Norway was cut short by Hitler's invasion of the Low Countries and France. If Hitler had encountered serious resistance in this new development of the war, continuing action in Norway could have been successful for allied forces ibecause they might not have had to withdraw to fight in France.
War is a matter of balance and battles are not always won simply by outright force. It is tactics and logistics which play the most important part, a failure of either can give victory where none might be expected from the simple balance of forces.
If Hitler had encountered stiff resitance in France then British and French forces might have been able to pursue objectives in Norway and in that event, Marschall and his task force could have played a vital role. He could have concentrated force around Narvik under Luftwaffe cover and shelled every vessel in the port, disrupting communications and the same could have been done at other concentrations of enemy force. He could have so disrupted enemy logistics that they would no longer have been able to continue.
That I believe was Raeder's plan, yet Marschall 'suspected' that Narvik had been evacuated from Luftwaffe reports. Supposing these reports had been wrong. His failure to make sure could have given a vital breathing space to a hard pressed enemy at a critical time and even if they were evacuating, how far had that progressed? Every ship which Marschall allowed to get away would eventually land troops in France.
Marschall decided to go haring off after Glorious and Ark Royal and even though his first target was asleep, he still managed to endanger his squadron and lost Scharnhorst as an effective unit. Even his own objective was only partially successful, because he did not bag Ark Royal. In attacking Glorious, Marschall gave a hostage to fortune - not only could he have been sunk, but with Scharnhorst having to limp back to Germany and out of the fight, when Gneisenau hit a mine shortly afterwards, the KM had no battlships in operation at all.
With Germany's lmited naval assets, the trade of one carrier for the loss of half Germany's battleships was simply not worth it. Raeder was right to sack him.
Even the German press and newsreels jumping for joy at this rare successful surface action, could not save Marschall and against this adulation it is clear that the SKL took a very dim view of his actions and decided to sack their firebreathing hero anyway. Because of his inability to properly assess risk. He could prove a liability.
Vic
Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens
Vic,
You keep saying this
UFO and yourself must admit the very instant he spotted, he had no alternative but to attack immediately, since he was well inside carrier attack range but on the limit of his gun range. Turning away meant he would move out of gun range.
The attacks on Glorious' commander are unfair in parts. He did threaten to shoot his officers,
but that was probably going a bit over the top, he was very keen to get at the enemy. Maybe somebody who had swum ashore towing a raft of explosives to attack an enemy bridge in WWI might not mellow into the administrator necessary to command a major warship. Reading and researching HMS Glorious by John Winton and the online Warship International article on the action would show that he was very "air minded". His Court Martial target was in trouble because he kept obstructing D'Oyly-Hughes' over enthusiastic plans for hopeless Swordfish attacks against German air superiority. All the other ferry trips Back to the UK by Glorious and Ark Royal were underescorted and casual, because nobody thought there was a German threat other than U Boats. They paid a heavy price for this complacency
All the Best
wadinga
You keep saying this
At no time was his mission to attack hunt down and attack carriers, he was after the convoys supporting the Allied forces ashore. Carriers were a possible risk, but one his orders meant he had to accept.Marschall decided to go haring off after Glorious and Ark Royal and even though his first target was asleep,
UFO and yourself must admit the very instant he spotted, he had no alternative but to attack immediately, since he was well inside carrier attack range but on the limit of his gun range. Turning away meant he would move out of gun range.
The attacks on Glorious' commander are unfair in parts. He did threaten to shoot his officers,
but that was probably going a bit over the top, he was very keen to get at the enemy. Maybe somebody who had swum ashore towing a raft of explosives to attack an enemy bridge in WWI might not mellow into the administrator necessary to command a major warship. Reading and researching HMS Glorious by John Winton and the online Warship International article on the action would show that he was very "air minded". His Court Martial target was in trouble because he kept obstructing D'Oyly-Hughes' over enthusiastic plans for hopeless Swordfish attacks against German air superiority. All the other ferry trips Back to the UK by Glorious and Ark Royal were underescorted and casual, because nobody thought there was a German threat other than U Boats. They paid a heavy price for this complacencyAll the Best
wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens
To Bgile,
I know submariners don't care which way the wind blows but it is very important to Carrier Jocks.
The Taffy 3(?) ships could sail east into the wind to lauch and recover and still keep a reasonable vector away from Kurita. Marschall spotted Glorious from near downwind (reverse weather gauge) meaning it would have been difficult to launch a strike even if aircraft were ready.
All the Best
wadinga
I know submariners don't care which way the wind blows but it is very important to Carrier Jocks.
The Taffy 3(?) ships could sail east into the wind to lauch and recover and still keep a reasonable vector away from Kurita. Marschall spotted Glorious from near downwind (reverse weather gauge) meaning it would have been difficult to launch a strike even if aircraft were ready.
All the Best
wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens
Ah, I didn't realize the wind was like that. That would make a difference. I do think that once he sighted Glorious he almost had to attack her because running away would give her time to ready aircraft.wadinga wrote:To Bgile,
I know submariners don't care which way the wind blows but it is very important to Carrier Jocks.
The Taffy 3(?) ships could sail east into the wind to lauch and recover and still keep a reasonable vector away from Kurita. Marschall spotted Glorious from near downwind (reverse weather gauge) meaning it would have been difficult to launch a strike even if aircraft were ready.
All the Best
wadinga
Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens
Bgile and All,
I had one of Vic's senior moments there.
Marschall was of course upwind of Glorious, so she would have had to head into wind and toward her pursuers to launch heavily loaded aircraft. Great article at http://www.warship.org/no11994.htm
These points were already made in viewtopic.php?f=9&t=661
Marschall absolutely had no choice but to attack--his bosses didn't understand that. Luckily for Freedom and Liberty the Nazis sacked a very able commander
All the Best
wadinga
I had one of Vic's senior moments there.
Marschall was of course upwind of Glorious, so she would have had to head into wind and toward her pursuers to launch heavily loaded aircraft. Great article at http://www.warship.org/no11994.htmThese points were already made in viewtopic.php?f=9&t=661
Marschall absolutely had no choice but to attack--his bosses didn't understand that. Luckily for Freedom and Liberty the Nazis sacked a very able commander
All the Best
wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens
@VeenenbergR
Well…
Well, well …
Is it worth the effort? One wonders?
OK – let us start at the beginning:
Since you waved good-by with so much pathos
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=1662&start=30#p16958
your behaviour has not improved. Pity!
No need for that here!
I simply write what I mean.
I do admit that there might be a language issue here. Well –apologies for my abysmal English then. But somehow I do have the itchy feeling that you do not read some peoples posts. It seems you read the initial line and then – well – hard to say, really – then you might well resort to reading in fish intestines what you want to read.
Just don’t do it. OK! It makes discussions in boards very painful if every single post needs an introduction where the contributor corrects false statements attributed to him.
Apart from that – I do applaud your effort in collecting all these encounters. I am not sure why you refer to the weather frequently. Both navies involved build blue water navies and both tended to encounter the same weather in the same spot at the same time.
But thank you for the list anyway.
1. Graf Spee: Encounters heavy cruiser plus two light cruisers. Mission over
2. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau against HMS Renown: Here I was admittedly wrong. In his analysis of 16. July 1940 (PG 32157a) Grandadmiral Raeder clearly states that this campaign was also cut short by the encounter. Mission over.
3. Hipper against HMS Berwick: Hipper heads home. Mission over.
4. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau NOT against HMS Ramilies, HMS Malaya or HMS Rodney: Operation Berlin continues for the planned duration. The British do not manage to cut it short.
5. Bismarck and Prinz against HMS Hood and HMS Prince: Both German ships head home without any attempt against enemy merchant shipping. Mission over.
Bismarck's second fight does not quite belong into this list. Bismarck had no real operational orders here other than to get home. That failed. That can happen. But after Denmark Straight Bismarck was not on a Raider mission any longer.
6. …
Do is yourself!
I did clearly write what I meant. It is not rocket science to continue the list.
I wrote:
"Not a single German heavy unit that encountered its equal during the war managed to continue its operation. They were all knocked out of their operation. All of them."
If your 'good-by' was more a symbolic gesture and you plan to continue contributing to this board, I would be very happy if you could in future refrain from interpreting anyone's words.
If you do not get the message: just ask!
Thank you!
Ufo
Well…
Well, well …
Is it worth the effort? One wonders?
OK – let us start at the beginning:
Since you waved good-by with so much pathos
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=1662&start=30#p16958
your behaviour has not improved. Pity!
Am I some sort of deity that it needs an augur to interpret my words? How do you tell what people ‘really’ want to say? Do you read from fish intestines or do you judge by the flight of the birds?VeenenbergR wrote:UFO tries to get an impression if every German heavy unit (there were 10 such units) was caught and sunk at each engagement it was opposed by equal strong Allied (British) ships. But his statement is only true in TWO cases: that of the Graf Spee and that of the battle in the Barents Sea.UFO wrote:
Apart from the kind of running away-battle between the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst against HMS Renown not a single German heavy unit that engaged its equal during the war managed to continue its operation. They were all knocked out of their operation; all of them.
Not one of them engaged its equal, escaped with battle damage and was able to continue its mission. Not one.
Now have a look what UFO tries to say:
...
No need for that here!
I simply write what I mean.
I do admit that there might be a language issue here. Well –apologies for my abysmal English then. But somehow I do have the itchy feeling that you do not read some peoples posts. It seems you read the initial line and then – well – hard to say, really – then you might well resort to reading in fish intestines what you want to read.
Just don’t do it. OK! It makes discussions in boards very painful if every single post needs an introduction where the contributor corrects false statements attributed to him.
Apart from that – I do applaud your effort in collecting all these encounters. I am not sure why you refer to the weather frequently. Both navies involved build blue water navies and both tended to encounter the same weather in the same spot at the same time.
But thank you for the list anyway.
1. Graf Spee: Encounters heavy cruiser plus two light cruisers. Mission over
2. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau against HMS Renown: Here I was admittedly wrong. In his analysis of 16. July 1940 (PG 32157a) Grandadmiral Raeder clearly states that this campaign was also cut short by the encounter. Mission over.
3. Hipper against HMS Berwick: Hipper heads home. Mission over.
4. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau NOT against HMS Ramilies, HMS Malaya or HMS Rodney: Operation Berlin continues for the planned duration. The British do not manage to cut it short.
5. Bismarck and Prinz against HMS Hood and HMS Prince: Both German ships head home without any attempt against enemy merchant shipping. Mission over.
Bismarck's second fight does not quite belong into this list. Bismarck had no real operational orders here other than to get home. That failed. That can happen. But after Denmark Straight Bismarck was not on a Raider mission any longer.
6. …
Do is yourself!
I did clearly write what I meant. It is not rocket science to continue the list.
I wrote:
"Not a single German heavy unit that encountered its equal during the war managed to continue its operation. They were all knocked out of their operation. All of them."
If your 'good-by' was more a symbolic gesture and you plan to continue contributing to this board, I would be very happy if you could in future refrain from interpreting anyone's words.
If you do not get the message: just ask!
Thank you!
Ufo
Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens
Since I do think the judgement between the abilities of Admiral Marschall and Admiral Luetjens does involve to a great extend the spirit of the campaign they were expected to deliver, I thought it might be useful if we have a quick look at Grandadmiral Raeders "Strategy of Diversion".
Descriptions of Raeders strategy can be found in the very fine article 'Raeder versus Wegener' by Hansen or in books like Bidlingmayer, 'Die Schweren Einheiten der Kriegsmarine im Zufuhrkrieg', where he describes just that; how should the German heavy units wage trade-warfare and how did it turn out in the end.
What Raeder had in mind was not just a re-enactment of the Jeune Ecole. He would never have needed that heavy units for that. In fact they were relatively unsuited for a Jeune Ecole type warfare, as they were too expensive in propagandistic, monetary and crew-value to be expendable.
Hellmuth Heye in his thesis about war against England had thought much more along the lines of the Jeune Ecole; Raeder together with other big-boat-enthusiasts in Seekriegsleitung had definitely not. Raeder – even had he had his complete Z-Plan fleet would never had numerical superiority over the Royal Navy. No second Jutland here then!
Raeders warfare had to work differently.
Cruiser warfare along the lines of the Jeune Ecole comes with risks. Raiders get lost, having to scuttle, seeking internment or just outright sink. But the idea is that loosing own units is more bearable for oneself than the effort in defeating them is for the enemy. Heavy enemy units are drawn into submarine traps, knocked out by mines or aeroplanes. No need for own heavy units here. At some stage the enemy forces are overstretched to an extend that the supply lines lie open for attack and the heavy enemy units are knocked out in chance encounters here, there and everywhere. Cruiser warfare is risky and comes with losses.
Diversion warfare lives from not taking risks! In fact not taking risks is an essential part of the strategy. Units A, B, C, … E draw out masses and masses of enemy shipping until at some stage in some (may be distant) theatre a situation arises where the enemy has overstretched his forces and oneself has a concentration of forces. Then and there one gives battle, loosing few, sinking many.
And then it is back to the careful dancing forward and backward until one manages to force the enemy into an under-strength situation elsewhere and can give battle.
May be two Panzerships and two H-Class battleships have drawn many RN battleships into the South Atlantic, leaving thinly protected convoys on the Gibraltar route. There and then another Raider pair of two H-classes could chase and sink a single King George and half a convoy. The Brits quickly rearrange forces, the Raiders melt into the sea mist and the game begins again,
… and again, … and again.
A heavy unit could get lost. They were not naïve at Seekriegsleitung but the idea was that it should make a safe return. One might be waylaid by a naughty submarine, stray into a mine or be overwhelmed by suddenly appearing superior force. That could happen. But even against that chance encounter with torpedo or mine the ships were build with excessive floating capabilities to allow return and repair. One did not take chances with ones ships. Not like in cruiser-warfare, where half of the ships are on kind of one-way-missions.
In Diversion warfare the units are not expendable. Battle is given when victory is certain. Only then. The whole strategy game of chasing and drawing units out of theatres is more important than a cheap tactical gain. Cheap gains are for the Luftwaffe or a stray U-Boat.
Now – when the war started there were no pairs of H-Classes. In fact there were just two (slightly unreliable) undergunned battleships. They were precious! Very precious! (Especially after just having lost half ones own cruiser fleet in the first days of 'Weseruebung!'). They were not to be messed with by a trigger-happy fleet commander.
There is an other major difference between Cruiser-warfare and Raeder's strategy of Diversion: While in Cruiser-warfare one delivers pinpricks to the enemy here and there and there, timing is secondary. Raeder's very idea was that of a carefully orchestrated war that lets the enemy never, never rest. One Raider comes in, the other goes out, one in the Indic, an other in the North Atlantic, … all with the precision of a Prussian train timetable. For that reason there was urgency in getting 'Rheinuebung' going. It was not Cruiser-warfare after all. The RN should be merely allowed time for refuelling, not more!
But that is an other point about the old debate why not wait for Tirpitz or the sisters to be ready.
The main point here is NO RISK. No seeking battle for idle glory, no chasing may-be-damaged enemy battleships. Ideas like "let's go and finish HMS Exeter", or "just put another few shells into HMS Prince of Wales", were not wanted. That is integral to Raeder's concept of war against the Royal Navy. The moment one allows for RISK being introduced into this plan the Royal Navy wins by necessity on point of chance through far greater numbers … just as they did.
Ufo
Descriptions of Raeders strategy can be found in the very fine article 'Raeder versus Wegener' by Hansen or in books like Bidlingmayer, 'Die Schweren Einheiten der Kriegsmarine im Zufuhrkrieg', where he describes just that; how should the German heavy units wage trade-warfare and how did it turn out in the end.
What Raeder had in mind was not just a re-enactment of the Jeune Ecole. He would never have needed that heavy units for that. In fact they were relatively unsuited for a Jeune Ecole type warfare, as they were too expensive in propagandistic, monetary and crew-value to be expendable.
Hellmuth Heye in his thesis about war against England had thought much more along the lines of the Jeune Ecole; Raeder together with other big-boat-enthusiasts in Seekriegsleitung had definitely not. Raeder – even had he had his complete Z-Plan fleet would never had numerical superiority over the Royal Navy. No second Jutland here then!
Raeders warfare had to work differently.
Cruiser warfare along the lines of the Jeune Ecole comes with risks. Raiders get lost, having to scuttle, seeking internment or just outright sink. But the idea is that loosing own units is more bearable for oneself than the effort in defeating them is for the enemy. Heavy enemy units are drawn into submarine traps, knocked out by mines or aeroplanes. No need for own heavy units here. At some stage the enemy forces are overstretched to an extend that the supply lines lie open for attack and the heavy enemy units are knocked out in chance encounters here, there and everywhere. Cruiser warfare is risky and comes with losses.
Diversion warfare lives from not taking risks! In fact not taking risks is an essential part of the strategy. Units A, B, C, … E draw out masses and masses of enemy shipping until at some stage in some (may be distant) theatre a situation arises where the enemy has overstretched his forces and oneself has a concentration of forces. Then and there one gives battle, loosing few, sinking many.
And then it is back to the careful dancing forward and backward until one manages to force the enemy into an under-strength situation elsewhere and can give battle.
May be two Panzerships and two H-Class battleships have drawn many RN battleships into the South Atlantic, leaving thinly protected convoys on the Gibraltar route. There and then another Raider pair of two H-classes could chase and sink a single King George and half a convoy. The Brits quickly rearrange forces, the Raiders melt into the sea mist and the game begins again,
… and again, … and again.
A heavy unit could get lost. They were not naïve at Seekriegsleitung but the idea was that it should make a safe return. One might be waylaid by a naughty submarine, stray into a mine or be overwhelmed by suddenly appearing superior force. That could happen. But even against that chance encounter with torpedo or mine the ships were build with excessive floating capabilities to allow return and repair. One did not take chances with ones ships. Not like in cruiser-warfare, where half of the ships are on kind of one-way-missions.
In Diversion warfare the units are not expendable. Battle is given when victory is certain. Only then. The whole strategy game of chasing and drawing units out of theatres is more important than a cheap tactical gain. Cheap gains are for the Luftwaffe or a stray U-Boat.
Now – when the war started there were no pairs of H-Classes. In fact there were just two (slightly unreliable) undergunned battleships. They were precious! Very precious! (Especially after just having lost half ones own cruiser fleet in the first days of 'Weseruebung!'). They were not to be messed with by a trigger-happy fleet commander.
There is an other major difference between Cruiser-warfare and Raeder's strategy of Diversion: While in Cruiser-warfare one delivers pinpricks to the enemy here and there and there, timing is secondary. Raeder's very idea was that of a carefully orchestrated war that lets the enemy never, never rest. One Raider comes in, the other goes out, one in the Indic, an other in the North Atlantic, … all with the precision of a Prussian train timetable. For that reason there was urgency in getting 'Rheinuebung' going. It was not Cruiser-warfare after all. The RN should be merely allowed time for refuelling, not more!
But that is an other point about the old debate why not wait for Tirpitz or the sisters to be ready.
The main point here is NO RISK. No seeking battle for idle glory, no chasing may-be-damaged enemy battleships. Ideas like "let's go and finish HMS Exeter", or "just put another few shells into HMS Prince of Wales", were not wanted. That is integral to Raeder's concept of war against the Royal Navy. The moment one allows for RISK being introduced into this plan the Royal Navy wins by necessity on point of chance through far greater numbers … just as they did.
Ufo
Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens
Ok – a corner well defended there!wadinga wrote:...
UFO and yourself must admit the very instant he spotted, he had no alternative but to attack immediately, since he was well inside carrier attack range but on the limit of his gun range. Turning away meant he would move out of gun range.
...
All the Best
wadinga
I take your point!
Let's sink the Glorious then. As it had been allowed to progress to this point it was probably the best possible action.
I am afraid though I will not follow you to the conclusion that we are looking at a very able commander here!
The way he gave battle was mediocre at best.
To start with - he had destroyers at his command. Yet when he would have needed them for scouting and screening he had send them away on a secondary mission. Questionable at least.
Raeder in his Orders of the day, 16. July 1940 (PG 32157a) goes in length and breadth about this encounter. His points of criticism are:
The torpedo hit on Scharnhorst is simply not understandable. A battleship should not receive a torpedo on 130 hm from a single destroyer.
Raeder then criticises Marschall for leaving the British sailors to drown. He states that the tactical situation did not warrant leaving the spot without making some effort to save the Brits.
But his main points then are about the conduct of the operation: Why on earth did Marschall turn home? Scharnhorst was well capable of looking after herself. Marschall had a heavy cruiser, a battleship and destroyers at his command and all he managed is to get home safely ?!?
That very critical time-lapse allowed for British countermeasures which then in turn got the torpedo into Gneisenau. Raeder was not impressed.
But even at that point he asks why, after Marschall had managed to get both his battleships knocked flat, Hipper did not venture out on her own, to uphold the pressure on the British. He points to the fleet oilers still available in the Arctic. Why were they not used? Was their presence not enough of a hint that a sustained operation was wanted?
Raeder wanted a campaign … he got a pinprick.
And he had made it very clear what he wanted!
In his Orders of the day, 23. Mai 1940 (PG 32157a), he describes his envisaged use of the battleships: The (German type) battleship includes all the main characteristics of the battleship, the cruiser and the destroyer. It is suited for sustained operations on its own.
In his orders 16. July 1940 he also strongly criticises the cutting short of Scharnhorsts and Gneisenaus earlier missions both after their encounters with HMS Renown as well as after their sinking of HMS Rawalpindi.
Now if one looks back at Marschalls article in 'Atlantische Welt' it is obvious that he judged the battlereadiness of his ships way lower than his superior. And his judgement was probably much closer to the truth! Raeders envisaged sorties for the sisters may well have been overambitious. Raeder seems to judge the two ships as well as the Hipper class cruisers as oversized Panzerships with the same reliability as them. That was obviously wrong. Their engines spelled trouble and the sea keeping of the sisters was lousy.
But Marschall completely failed to communicate this to Seekriegsleitung. Subsequently his actions were looked at as timid and overcautious; delivering pinpriks where campaigns were asked for.
And he either failed to grasp what Seekriegsleitung wanted (which would be not surprising looking at the various goals Flottenkommando, Gruppe West and Skl had in mind) or he was too timid to stand up to his superiors and make clear what his ships were capable of and what not.
Not an overly impressive commander!
Luetjens in turn fully embraced Raeders (questionable!) strategy. He made it work once and he paid for it second time round.
Ufo
Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens
The US economy was already well on the road to recovery before the US enter the war. I'm not at all sure that the statment about Stalin's economy being resuced by the war is any more accurate.Vic Dale wrote:...Stalin's economy like that of the USA had to be rescued by the advent of war and that is one hell of an indictment of either economic system...
Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens
Graf Spee's decision to head for a neutral port was hardly unnecessary. She had taken damage which would have prevented her from reaching Europe or any friendly port. The only major fault I can see in the handling of the battle was the early missidentification of the British ships. Spee shot very well inflicted signficant damage on her opponets but recieved significant damage in return and used up a lot of ammo in the process.RF wrote:...I don't think the Graf Spee is too relevant, that ship fled unnecessarily to a hostile neutral port on fairly minor battle damage arising from a battle that if fought properly would have been won.
Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens
I seam to recall reading of a few in 44. Combined arms has been the hallmark of good tactics for 1000 of years. The various ships in a fleet are mutually supporting. BB's added a significant capability through the end of WWII.Vic Dale wrote:...The last battleship action came in December 1943 after a very long wait for an opportunity when Scharnhorst was sunk. All other use of battleships after this was in support of other vessels using their AA, or in support of landings. The battleship had lost it's independent role.
But that's only true because their likely opponents were also limited. I think you are mistaking an effect for a cause.Ever wonderd why so few battleships were built after 1920? Yes the arms limitation treaties took their toll and made them targets for reduction, but those treaties were only agreed by the leading nations because the leading nations found them to be too heavy a burden on government money and the needs of the fleet could be covered by lighter less expensive vessels.
Just what period was this? If you are talking 1940 I believe the US had more than 4 BB's on order or under construction....At the same time as the US navy estimates included large numbers of carriers, only four battleships were ordered.
The point of the above was not to "do proper justice" to the contribution of the various ship types, indeed if it were you could argue as well for it taking place on the deck of a sub....The Japanese surrender was taken aboard a battleship, when to do proper justice it should have been taken on the flight deck of a carrier, since the battleship contributed little to the USA's victory in comparison to the carrier...
Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens
This discussion is really hotting up.
Firstly, Marschall having chosen to rely on Luftwaffe reports and suppose that Narvik was being evacuated, went after the British convoys of troop and support ships. He failed to find them, so he then went after Glorious and Ark Royal. You can read about this in Naval Battles of World War II by Geoffrey Bennet P. 106.
I would agree that once Glorious was spotted, Marschall had to pursue and sink, otherwise he would have invited attack. But the point is surely; how the hell does one get to within gun-range on a ship which has an attack range capablity of more than 100 miles? He must have been potty to even try it.
Ufo has really gone into this matter and has shown far more ways in which Marschall failed to measure up to his task, though to be fair, I think the whole SKL was on a massive learning curve due to their fleet's lack of strength.
Hitler was a complete dilletante, he boasted of his nation's military strength when he should have kept it quiet and if he was bent on war as some seem to think, he did a very poor job preparing for it. His performance at best was mediocre and like all other statesmen at the time was driven by events and was not the calculator which some have been led to believe. His territorial conquests smack of outright opportunism and when it came to decisive military action he was an unrivalled wet-pants. He cancelled the attack on France and the lowlands no less than 26 times before he finally let it go ahead. As his army acheived success he became over confident and bludered into campaigns with minimal preparation. He was an appalling military leader and the title; GRÖFAZ - Größter Feldherr Aller Zeiten (Greatest Military Leader of All Time) was entirely appropriate, as an ironical swipe at this inflated windbag.
Any military success at sea or on land is entirely due to the miltary genius of his generals and admirals, who adapted to a developing war with a navy with hardly any ships and an army which despite claims to the contrary was two-thirds horse-drawn.
Over all of this chaos, the Lutftwaffe had developed into an army support force, the likes of which had never been seen and which would only be imitated much later by nations who had observed their success. It is air cover which saved Hitler from early defeat and which provided his tank commanders with the ability to surge ahead of the main force, punch holes in the enemy line and advance to savage their softer units in the rear.
Without Panzer Leaders like Gudarian and Rommel and others, plus the planning abilities of Generals like Von Rundstet and Manstien. Hitler's attack on France and the lowlands would have stalled, or not come off at all, in which case Hitler would probably have been pushed out of Norway, since the alied force had begun to enjoy belated success, before having to hastily evacuate to bolster France against the Panzer assault.
It is the adaptation to which the High Command subjected their various arms of service, which enabled Germany to gain hegemony in Europe. It was not down to Hitler.
It is hardly surprising that Raeder had to adopt a very cautious strategy for the deployment of his largest assets - he would have been at fault to do otherwise. A few actions like those of Marschall in going after Glorious and Ark Royal could soon reduce the war at sea to a spectator sport for the men of Germany's surface fleet.
In so precarious a position with a fleet out of balance and which simply would not measure up, Raeder had to be very precise about how to handle the fleet, such as it was. In that situation he simply could not permit the fluidity and freedom of action which Doenitz was to allow his U-Boat captains. If Raeder gave an order he needed to be sure it would be carried out, otherwise there would be no over all strategy.
When he sent Lutjens to sea in Bismarck, Lutjens raised objections regarding risk to the fleet, but at that time, Raeder was aware of just how bad the situation had become for Britain under the U-Boat blockade and reasoned that the heavy units would have to add their measure to tip the scales, even though the risks were disproportionate to the value of the number of ships they were likely to score.
In Lutjens, Raeder knew he had found a fleet commander who would pursue SKL policy as aggressively as possible without taking unnecesary risks.
Incidentally, Lutjens did not think that Bisamrck would be able to draw the heavy escort away from a convoy, as per Raeder's plan for use of the Bismarck, since in following him, the escort would have to abandon it's task. He thought instead that a convoy might close ranks around the heavy unit for safety and in that event a different set of tactics would apply. Raeder felt sure that Lutjens could work around this problem with due regard to risk to the pride of the fleet. He would not have felt as secure with the likes of Marschall who might go barging in like a bull at a gate and get his flagship damaged or his cruiser disabled and sunk.
There have been remarks made in relation to Graf Spee which will need taking up, but I will open a separate thread for that.
Vic
Firstly, Marschall having chosen to rely on Luftwaffe reports and suppose that Narvik was being evacuated, went after the British convoys of troop and support ships. He failed to find them, so he then went after Glorious and Ark Royal. You can read about this in Naval Battles of World War II by Geoffrey Bennet P. 106.
I would agree that once Glorious was spotted, Marschall had to pursue and sink, otherwise he would have invited attack. But the point is surely; how the hell does one get to within gun-range on a ship which has an attack range capablity of more than 100 miles? He must have been potty to even try it.
Ufo has really gone into this matter and has shown far more ways in which Marschall failed to measure up to his task, though to be fair, I think the whole SKL was on a massive learning curve due to their fleet's lack of strength.
Hitler was a complete dilletante, he boasted of his nation's military strength when he should have kept it quiet and if he was bent on war as some seem to think, he did a very poor job preparing for it. His performance at best was mediocre and like all other statesmen at the time was driven by events and was not the calculator which some have been led to believe. His territorial conquests smack of outright opportunism and when it came to decisive military action he was an unrivalled wet-pants. He cancelled the attack on France and the lowlands no less than 26 times before he finally let it go ahead. As his army acheived success he became over confident and bludered into campaigns with minimal preparation. He was an appalling military leader and the title; GRÖFAZ - Größter Feldherr Aller Zeiten (Greatest Military Leader of All Time) was entirely appropriate, as an ironical swipe at this inflated windbag.
Any military success at sea or on land is entirely due to the miltary genius of his generals and admirals, who adapted to a developing war with a navy with hardly any ships and an army which despite claims to the contrary was two-thirds horse-drawn.
Over all of this chaos, the Lutftwaffe had developed into an army support force, the likes of which had never been seen and which would only be imitated much later by nations who had observed their success. It is air cover which saved Hitler from early defeat and which provided his tank commanders with the ability to surge ahead of the main force, punch holes in the enemy line and advance to savage their softer units in the rear.
Without Panzer Leaders like Gudarian and Rommel and others, plus the planning abilities of Generals like Von Rundstet and Manstien. Hitler's attack on France and the lowlands would have stalled, or not come off at all, in which case Hitler would probably have been pushed out of Norway, since the alied force had begun to enjoy belated success, before having to hastily evacuate to bolster France against the Panzer assault.
It is the adaptation to which the High Command subjected their various arms of service, which enabled Germany to gain hegemony in Europe. It was not down to Hitler.
It is hardly surprising that Raeder had to adopt a very cautious strategy for the deployment of his largest assets - he would have been at fault to do otherwise. A few actions like those of Marschall in going after Glorious and Ark Royal could soon reduce the war at sea to a spectator sport for the men of Germany's surface fleet.
In so precarious a position with a fleet out of balance and which simply would not measure up, Raeder had to be very precise about how to handle the fleet, such as it was. In that situation he simply could not permit the fluidity and freedom of action which Doenitz was to allow his U-Boat captains. If Raeder gave an order he needed to be sure it would be carried out, otherwise there would be no over all strategy.
When he sent Lutjens to sea in Bismarck, Lutjens raised objections regarding risk to the fleet, but at that time, Raeder was aware of just how bad the situation had become for Britain under the U-Boat blockade and reasoned that the heavy units would have to add their measure to tip the scales, even though the risks were disproportionate to the value of the number of ships they were likely to score.
In Lutjens, Raeder knew he had found a fleet commander who would pursue SKL policy as aggressively as possible without taking unnecesary risks.
Incidentally, Lutjens did not think that Bisamrck would be able to draw the heavy escort away from a convoy, as per Raeder's plan for use of the Bismarck, since in following him, the escort would have to abandon it's task. He thought instead that a convoy might close ranks around the heavy unit for safety and in that event a different set of tactics would apply. Raeder felt sure that Lutjens could work around this problem with due regard to risk to the pride of the fleet. He would not have felt as secure with the likes of Marschall who might go barging in like a bull at a gate and get his flagship damaged or his cruiser disabled and sunk.
There have been remarks made in relation to Graf Spee which will need taking up, but I will open a separate thread for that.
Vic
Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens
Apologies, I posted this in the wrong thread, please disregard!RNfanDan wrote:Next week:
A History of Seawater.
