Marschall instead of Lutjens

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Vic Dale
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Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens

Post by Vic Dale »

iankw wrote:I've read the twists and turns of this thread with interest, and observed the changes (or evolution?) of people's opinions along the way. A lot has been made of the threat of Glorious' aircraft to the German ships, and the obvious need to attack once they had been spotted. Obviously D'Oyly Hughes was unaware of the weapon he had under his command, but would Marschall be any more aware of the threat at this stage of the war? If not it can hardly be argued that he had no choice but to attack! I don't have a strong opinion either way, perhaps leaning towards the view that attacking the enemy wherever you meet him can't be wrong. I am interested though - this was before Taranto, which was carried out against moored ships, so what experience was there that aircraft were so dangerous to moving ships?

regards

Ian
Hi Ian.

You make a good point, the full potential of carriers as fleet flagships and tactical centres had not fully developed at the time of this action. However, Germany and Britain had both developed the torpedo bomber and their respective High Commands were well aware of the threat to surface ships from this weapon. In fact, the Luftwaffe is the sole reason the British fleet could not get near to the Norwegian coast during that campaign and the C-in-Cs of both side will have been aware of this. It was no accident that the Germans deployed aircraft to attack the British Fleet and criticism of Marschall is due for his not being aware of what was going on in the theatre he was controlling.

Understnding of the carrier's full potential may have been limited at the time, but it would hardly take any imagination at all to gauge how quickly planes carrying the deadly torpedo could be got into the air and I believe it was known just how many planes each carried. 72 and 48 respectively for Ark Royal and Glorious, so deliberately apporaching the waters where they were known to be operating was to invite an exciting time.

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Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens

Post by RF »

Vic Dale wrote:

You make a good point, the full potential of carriers as fleet flagships and tactical centres had not fully developed at the time of this action. However, Germany and Britain had both developed the torpedo bomber and their respective High Commands were well aware of the threat to surface ships from this weapon.

Understnding of the carrier's full potential may have been limited at the time, but it would hardly take any imagination at all to gauge how quickly planes carrying the deadly torpedo could be got into the air and I believe it was known just how many planes each carried. 72 and 48 respectively for Ark Royal and Glorious, so deliberately apporaching the waters where they were known to be operating was to invite an exciting time.

Vic
Here we go again, greatly overestimating the perceived threat value of a carrier at that time - June 1940. The full capabilities of torpedo carrying aircraft at sea was not really demonstrated against mobile targets at sea until Crete and the crippling of Bismarck in May 1941, against ships at anchor six months earlier at Taranto.
We seem to be obssessed with Ark Royal and Glorious with full aircraft and strike capability. That was not what Marschall was facing at the time and Idon't think Marschall was any the less aware of the risks of air attack than any other commander at the time.
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Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens

Post by RF »

Vic Dale wrote:
Hillcrest wrote: Marschall spots the RN Force, has to assume they've seen him...Okay, it's a Carrier and escort, he had to have thought there were planes (CAP) in the air at least, and would be certain that a full deckload must be launched at him at any minute. To my thinking, there is only one proper response, try to get them before they get you.
If that was the way it happened, Marschall would have been right to attack for his own safety, but that isn't how it happened. He deliberately went after Glorious and Ark Royal, having failed to get at the evacuation convoys. That is the basis of criticsim of his actions. That is what Raeder had him for, plus the fact that having received Luftwaffe reports that Narvik appeared to have been evacuated, he decided to leave it at that, leaving his Chief in the dark and having to continue to rely on Luftwaffe reports alone.
Marschall acted on his own initiative after the general orders he was given were rendered out of date by events. What evidence is there he was after two specific ships? Nowhere is this mentioned by authors such as Garret - the Glorious when sighted initially puzzled the German lookouts because they had never seen a carrier before and couldn't identify what ship it was. Only after a decision to close with a view to attack was the flight deck on the target ship identified and reported. Also no planes in the air were reported.
Marschall was sacked because in Raeder's own words ''he did not see eye to eye with my views'' in other words he disagreed with Raeder's criticism and believed his course of action which went against general orders was right. That is my view too.
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Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens

Post by RF »

Vic Dale wrote:
Marschall is hailed as a hero, because he took a bold decsion to go after the carriers, if he was given a fait acompli by spotting the Glorious when well within her striking capabilities, he would have earned no greater regard than Lutjens at the Battle of Denmark Strait, though we could still expect the anti-Lutjens-brigade to praise the one and denigrate the other.

To justify what Marschall did requires a monstrous rewrite of history. He knew where Glorious and Ark Royal were and he deliberately went after them. Full marks for fighting spirit, but minus several hundred for lack of foresight. As Raeder said, he was lucky not to get sunk, and Scharnhorst very nearly was.

Vic
References to ''the anti-Lutjens brigade to praise one and denigrate the other'' is an untrue and unnecessary polarisation, presenting one as very good, the other very bad, again seeing things in holoistic terms. I have no doubt that Gunther Lutjens was a very capable naval officer, just as Rommel was a very good Panzer commander. But neither were infallible, and both ended up beaten in battle.

As for Scharnhorst ''very nearly being sunk'' - the ship took one torpedo hit and was in no danger of sinking. This really is politician's hyperbole.
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Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens

Post by VeenenbergR »

RF.

That they both ended up beaten is a little unfair. They fought against overwhelming odds and could impossible win. Rommel in France lost because of overwhelming Allied airpower and endless replenishments while his own army weakened because of lack of any new material, menpower aso.
Normandy & El alamein were both attrition battles with a sure outcome.
Quote: in the 11 weeks in Normandy almost 300.000 soldiers where lost on both sides (roughly 50% of the German manpower). That is why Falaise could be created and the Germans lost because those 300.000 lossses were NOT compensated by anything.
El Alamein was only some days before the same happened on a lesser scale.
(Stalingrad was another example with about the same stats as Normandy).
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Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens

Post by Hillcrest »

Hi Vic,

Since I don't know how to isolate a quote; "If that was the way it happened, then Marschall acted....but that isn't how it happened'
I have not been able to find anything stating that Marschall had knowledge of the British Carriers location, or that there were carriers in the vicinty at all...I'm not challenging your expertise here, I just have not seen anything that says " Let's go get those Carriers..."
I will also say, if he did know where they (the carriers) were, and he detatched his escorts and went after them...Well, I may have to change my opinion, as that would look far more like foolishness than Fighting Spirit.

Cheers, Dave
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Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens

Post by Bgile »

Hillcrest wrote:Hi Vic,

Since I don't know how to isolate a quote; "If that was the way it happened, then Marschall acted....but that isn't how it happened'
I have not been able to find anything stating that Marschall had knowledge of the British Carriers location, or that there were carriers in the vicinty at all...I'm not challenging your expertise here, I just have not seen anything that says " Let's go get those Carriers..."
I will also say, if he did know where they (the carriers) were, and he detatched his escorts and went after them...Well, I may have to change my opinion, as that would look far more like foolishness than Fighting Spirit.

Cheers, Dave
It's certainly true that if Marschall hadn't detached the destroyers, Scharnhorst would almost certainly not have been torpedoed.
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Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens

Post by wadinga »

All
Once again, despite several individuals quizzing him about sources, Vic has been banging on about Marschall foolishly going off to hunt carriers. None of the sources I have on Juno: Bekker, Van Der Porten, Garrett, Mordal, Roskill or Koope & Schmolke supports this. According to Bekker the B-Dienst intercepts mentioned the carriers along with various other vessels, but the Luftwaffe announced at 19:00 on the 7th June that the air reconnaissance of Harstad was cancelled. Using his own float planes identified the Oil Pioneer etc groups, but for whatever reason they did not spot the other vunerable convoys or Glorious herself before Marschall ran into her. Without adequate reconnaissance charging into Harstad would be suicide.

Hipper and the destroyers were not detached on a whim, but because they needed to refuel again, and they needed to be hundreds of miles away protecting Force Feurstein moving up the coastal road to relieve Dietl. Bekker quotes "Marschall observed drily, "We now have two jobs, which although far apart operationally and geographically, co-incided in time"".""
Great humour eh? :lol:

Hipper and the destroyers turned back to assist Marschall as soon as the "Enemy in sight was sounded but they were too far away by then.

I would advise anybody to challenge unsupported assertions like this carrier hunt business or
His ship's dedicated pilots and more importantly, observers who would have been trained in aerial recognition to the point they could report accurately on a tactical situation, where an ordinary Luftwaffe pilot, ignorant of the navy's needs might not.
According to Bekker, Marschall spent some time hunting a force reported by his spotter aircraft only to ruefully conclude that it was his own ships that had been reported. There will be (and have been) many wildly more speculative points stated firmly (and at length) as fact, with absolutely no evidence.:wink:
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Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens

Post by VeenenbergR »

To Wadinga. Group Feurstein (Valentin) must be the group of (famous) of the 2nd Gebirgsjäger Division.
I first thought it had yo be Feuerstein but it is following Andris Kursietis really Feurstein.
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Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens

Post by ufo »

wadinga wrote:...
UFO, I tried Cajus Bekker Hitler's Naval War and Edward Van Der Porten The German Navy in WWII. This what I posted another time but it still holds up. I can find no reference to a bigger raiding mission anywhere. Marschall was ordered to go to North Norway and save Dietl. Taking risks if necessary.
I have been studying Richard Garett's Elusive Sisters, Jacques Mordal's Battleship Scharnhorst and the excellent Hitler's Naval War by Cajus Bekker.

The latter uses conversations with veterans, official documents and other sources in a very detailed analysis of the planning and execution of Operation Juno, and Marschall's dismissal which he describes as "disgraceful". He mentions the original desire to save General Dietl's troops in Narvik, which originally led Hitler to draft orders for him to surrender in neutral Sweden. The next army plan was for giant liners Europa and Bremen to sail to Tromso (despite the RN) and land a 6,000 man rescue force who would fight their way up the coast. Luckily for them this suicide plan was scrapped.

Raeder ordered Marschall "To relieve Force Dietl by effective engagement of British naval and transport in the Narvik-Harstad area." He implied in conversation this allowed the Fleet Commander some freedom of action but Saalwachter of Group West said "the first and main objective....is a surprise penetration of the And and Vaags fjords and the destruction of enemy warships and transports there encountered, as well as of his beach-head installations...". Still further instructions came from the Fuerher HQ who instructed that he was supposed to support Force Feurstein marching across hundreds of miles from Trondheim and still further from Harstad. Raeder confirmed equal priority between the original order and being hundreds of miles away supporting Force Feustein.

Fuelling from Dithmarschen on the 7th a long way offshore from Harstad Marschall had waited for details from air reconnaissance but none came before nightfall. He held a council of war with his Senior officers, and there was agreement that charging into the potential defences of Harstad without recon would be madness. Further submarine reports detailled several groups of Allied ships all moving away from the coast. The following day, the 8th he reported his success against Oil Pioneer etc whilst Saalwachter kept on reminding him about attacking Harstad. Since nobody had cancelled the instruction to support Force Feurstein as well he sent Hipper and the destroyers off towards Trondheim.

What Marschall didn't know was that at 13:00 Dietl was on the phone to General Von Falkenhorst in Trondheim telling him that the Allies had withdrawn, news which reached Kapitan Theodore Krancke (local naval liaison) soon after, but got no further. By 17:10 Marschall knew he was in visual range of a carrier. Relying on sneaking away at that point was not an option since a patrolling aircraft could still bring down doom on him even if he ran off a hundred further 50 or 80 miles. At that point there was only one choice- attack. This decision cost him his post- his next role was Head of the Navy's Educational Department, and forced him to suffer the ignominy of having a circulated Admiralty document list his perceived shortcomings. When he submitted a defence of actions, which had cost the RN a valuable carrier, two fine destroyers and over a thousand men, Raeder's written comment was Marschall "lacked the strength of purpose of a great leader....Consequently as an operational commander he was, generally speaking, a failure."
According to Bekker it was Lutjens who took Gneisenau out on the 20th of June and got torpedoed, not Marschall.

In summer 1942 Raeder appointed the man he had described as a failure to C in C Navy Group West. Obviously he had changed his mind.

All the Best
wadinga
Well, well – I am afraid, I shall have to disagree strongly.

Apologies here for time constraints. I will not be much around for the next seven days. And I do not have the time to translate more than just some key paragraphs out of two major documents on this issue. Sorry!

First for Garretts interpretation of Raeders order of May 23rd 1940. I do think the order can only be understood in a greater context. Yes – it is an wholly aggressive piece, asking for action and risk.
But is that the kind of risk Marschall was taking? I am not sure that Garrett got the whole spirit of the order.

Raeder starts with a statement of intention:

“It occurred to me that there are differences in opinion between me and other divisions within the navy, here especially fleet command, about the general conduct of naval operations”

So is seems there were things to be straightened out.
He goes on a bit and then he praises the new order under his command:

“in clinging to orthodox rules of combat, the Kriegsmarine would never have gained the successes or the opportunities for success, that in fact we got. Let me only remind you of the various skilled destroyer actions along the enemies eastern cost or the battleships separate sorties in distant areas.
Compared to the last war, we see how revolutionary the dismissal of once proven battle plans was. This is especially true for the sorties of the cruisers and battleships.”

Now he goes on for quite a while how wonderful this novel aggressive style was and what a success!
But I think it is telling how much importance he puts on the ‘new’ use of the battleships and how he talks about that in one line with the cruiser operations. I see this as very much a order of vindication for his strategy of long term deployment in distant waters .. his very own diversion strategy.

He comes back to the deployment of the heavy units:

“It is not necessary that operations in distant areas are always conducted by both battleships, the heavy cruiser and the destroyers. The battleships, when out of home waters, are the heavies and toughest units. They combine the advantages of the battleship, the cruiser and the destroyer. The must be used accordingly.”

Now that sound to me as if he wants someone to take his battleships out raiding. The order goes on for quite some paragraphs but I do think that I have to the best of my knowledge picked the key bits and translated them properly.

Looking at the order I think Raeder had some creases to iron out. First there was the very, very undesirable situation Admiral Graf Spee had sailed herself into earlier. And if you look at the Fuehrer conferences on Naval Affairs it becomes clear that Reader got his feathers ruffled by the Fuehrer for this awful catch 22 the Admiral Graf Spee got herself in. There she was trapped in shallow waters with enough ammunition to EITHER properly scuttle or to fight. Not both!
From the conference recordings it seems clear that both Raeder and Hitler expected her to fight. She scuttled.

I think this decision between Scylla and Charybdis was one Raeder was not prepared to see again. A German ship had to fight it out.
That does not mean that necessarily any ship should sink. I am of the opinion that the order meant fight till you regain operational freedom. The order did not ever justify for example going after a wounded battleship to try and sink it just for good measure. But the order asked for the commander to make sure that after the battle he had free choice of options.

Firther I think that Raeder on the 23rd of May hat to justify the horrendous losses the Kriegsmarine had endured during ‘Weseruebung’.

These two points are where the aggressive tone from this order stems from. But I do think it never lifted the rules of Readers greater strategy.



And I think that becomes much more clear when one looks at a second key document: His assessment of the “use of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Hipper in the first year of war” of 16th July 1940.

This is in fact a key document to understand Raeders ideas and strategy as a whole. I have not seen an English translation anywhere. I do not know if one exists.

Raeder starts again with a statement of intent:
“Regarding the deployment of the battleships and the cruiser Hipper in the first year of the war. No specific issue:
The current yard period for the two battleships is likely to prohibit any further operation in the first year of the war. Havin captured the French Atlantic ports provides new possibilities for our heavy units. So this is the right time to look at the use of the battleships and the heavy cruiser Hipper in the first year of the war:
[…]
It was my intend to move from a hit and run tactic to a sustained campaigning against opportune targets.

Raeder then assesses the operations of the sisters in detail and he was not a happy man here!

Raeder points out that the operation completely failed to achieve the second aim, to fake a breakthrough into the Atlantic and to round up weaker British forces that were deployed in the gaps to prevent the return of a Panzership at the time. He is especially unhappy that the retreat seemes rather timid and hurried.

As for the second operation during February 1940, Raeder is not impressed either. He would have understood sending the rather short legged Hipper and the unreliable destroyers away but then … then there should have been a long campaign of the battleships.

For both operations Raeder points out how well the German intelligence had assessed the deployment of enemy forces and their activity. Nowhere Raeder detects any substantial British reaction. He sees chances wasted and breathing time dished out to the Brits for free.

Along comes ‘Juno’; Raeder:

“The operation yielded the well known successes. But it would be wrong to overlook the errors and the missed opportunities and not to learn for future operations.
In my orders regarding the operation as well as in the orders by the Group and the sea command the penetration of the Harstadt Fjord was the main aim.
I want to make clear that I have never excluded operations against Vags Fjord or Vestfjord. This possibilities were included in the vague form of the order. But I have only detailed the Harstadt / Narvik area, because the detailed conduct should be to the Group and the sea command because the exact area would only become clear during the last phase of the operation.
I have made my view perfectly clear during my meeting with the commander when we met in Berlin.

There was no new intelligence when the sea commander disbanded the operational order at the 8th of June. So when he communicated his intend to operate against an enemy convoy early on the 8th, the shore command emphasized the importance of the operation against Harstadt. Since the reasons for the sea commanders decision could not be assessed at shore finaly the division of the force was reluctantly suggested. So Hipper and the destroyers could operate against the convoy and the battleships could press on to Harstadt. The sea commander did nevertheless abandon the operational order.

It is fine that there were successes and that is probably due to the working of the intelligence on board Gneisenau. So one could think that is was an overall success. But I do think that a deviation from a carefully decided operational plan can not be justified. I am under the impression that the sea commander did not fully grasp the intention of the operation.

The dismissal of Hipper and the destroyers on the 8th of June was not justified. There were possibilities for oiling at sea and the intention was a long campaign in the open sea. Especially because of the excellent positioning of the fleet oilers and the weather, but also in view of the expected battles around the Harstad / Narvik area or in the open sea participation of the cruiser and the destroyers would have been very useful.”

Reader goes on how the dismissal of the Hipper and the destroyers has only made possible the torpedo hit on Scharnhorst.

Then he complains about this hit that should not have happened in the first place.

He goes on:

“Even though the bringing in Scharnhorst safely was paramount, a sustained operation of Gneisenau and Hipper would have been very much part of the operation. This much more because the enemy had not grasped the extend of the operation. Since the enemy was withdrawing from Norway, Intelligence could still point out possible targets.”

He rants on that the ships should have gone out to sea, venturing towards their oilers and operate on further targets.

Marschall got it wrong.

Yes! Then Luetjens gets his share of the blame:
He should not have tried to get Gneisenau and Scharnhorst out together. That split the anti submarine forces and allowed the Brits to score on Gneisenau.

But much more – he should have gone on campaigning with Hipper! The oilers were still out there. He did not. Raeder was not happy.

Now - that is not some author. That is by the chap who run the German navy for decades.




No – I am afraid I do disagree! Raeder wanted a campaign! He did not understand why Marschall did not go into the Fjords but he did much less approve of just calling it a day after little sailing around and having one out of three heavy units disabled. That left Marschall with two ships and … nothing. Subsequently handing one of the remaining ships to the British on a silver tray.

This I think is why Marschall was out. And I have to say this is why I think that Marschall would have never managed to operate on a long and sustained campaign. He never did it. No way!
One might argue parts of Raeders strategy were no-burnersin the first place. But Marschall as the one, who knew better? No!

Luetjens got kicked for his conduct here as well. This will have influenced his later operations. Where Marschall operated timidly, Luetjens probably operated far to entangled in the net of Readers making, tied to operational orders that were deliberately vague to leave the sea commander freedom of action. A lose-lose situation.





As for literature:

Cajus Bekker … hmmm – I think he is ok(ish) on operational facts: How many shells fired, how fast, which course. Where it comes to behind the scenes. Hm. No! If anything goes wrong it is usually the meddling of the Fueher, if anything goes to plan it is the brilliant Kriegsmarine. A rather apologetic author.

Anyhow - I do think books focusing on operational issues do not quite yield here. This is much more about the behind the scenes.

I think Michael Salewski, “Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung” is unsurpassed on just that: the running of Skl; what did they want, how did they try.

Secondly there is Schuur in “Fuehrungsprobleme der Marine in Zweiten Weltkrieg”. Again – this is about the (conflicting) orders and the sometime clear, sometimes not so clear intend of the various layers of German command during operation 'Juno'.

Hansens great article “Raeder versus Wegener” is a must-read on Readers thinking and working. (... and in English and thanks to good old google these days for free!)

Bidlingmayer in “Zufuhrkrieg” makes clear how the Germans tried on sustained campaigns and why the sorties of Scheer and the Sisters at ‘Berlin’ where their finest hour.

Garrett, I have to admit, I do not know.



Sorry – little time!

Greetings to “The South”

Ufo
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Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens

Post by tommy303 »

UFO,

In past readings, it seems to me that, whatever the operational necessity, the Norwegian campaign was looked upon by Raeder and other senior KM officials as an unwelcome delay in the implementation of Raeder's operational plan as you have so nicely detailed.

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Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens

Post by ufo »

@tommy 303

Good point and true to some extend, I think.

Carl Axel Gemzell in his groundbreaking work "Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien" has made it perfectly clear that the Germans were not just 'racing the Brits to Norway'.
The attack was planned amongst others by Reader over decades and it is a bit ironic that it became (at least from the point of German heavy units) superfluous through the successes of the army in France. Something the navy never dared to even plan for. In fact – it became to some extend a liability as Norway had to be defended when now there were all these wonderful French bases.

So I would say 'Weseruebung' was very much Readers plan. He literally bullied Hitler into doing it.

But it becomes clear from the war diary of the Seekriegsleitung and from the Fuehrer conferences that Reader did not plan to use units that were set aside for diversion raids.

He very, very much regretted throwing Bluecher in the bin through sheer stupidity and he much more regretted having given in to Hitler's pressure in committing Luetzow in the campaign (where she found herself knocked out.). She had the next slot to venture out into the Atlantic.

So I think your assessment here is correct. Norway was a side show. The strategy of diversion that had started even before the war broke out with the sending out of the Panzerships should have gone on uninterrupted.

This is why for example 'Juno' was part of both strategies. 'Juno' served the Norway campaign but is should have also been part of the grand strategy.


And due to the multi layered German command structure you can find all sorts of different interpretations of what Marschall should have done.

Gruppen command focused on Norway and wanted the job in Harstadt done. They put little emphasis in raiding and drawing British ships into the North Atlantic. Raeder in turn wanted the job in Norway done as quickly as possible so that the ships could go north, refuel and then harass British shipping in the Arctic and the North Atlantic approaches.

Marschall was ground down between different expectations and conflicting orders and he was not the man to stand up to that sort of pressure.

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Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens

Post by Vic Dale »

RF wrote:
References to ''the anti-Lutjens brigade to praise one and denigrate the other'' is an untrue and unnecessary polarisation, presenting one as very good, the other very bad, again seeing things in holoistic terms. I have no doubt that Gunther Lutjens was a very capable naval officer, just as Rommel was a very good Panzer commander. But neither were infallible, and both ended up beaten in battle.

As for Scharnhorst ''very nearly being sunk'' - the ship took one torpedo hit and was in no danger of sinking. This really is politician's hyperbole.
Hi RF

You should read some of the guff that has been presented elsewere and on the flimsiest of evidence, and concocted half-truths and insinuations, to blacken the character of this officer.

The delay in opening fire at DS for example, which will have been Lindemann's responsibility alone. The supposed row over the delay and Lindemann's retort which simply does not add up, in terms of Lindemann's character nor in the logic of events before the ship fired. The "long (30 minute ) signal" which it turns out never existed. A detailed report sent by radio, was broken down into small parts which never broke the Enigma 250 character protocol. The signals were intercepted by Bletchley Park who put them back together into a single message and this caused some to make the error of thinking that the signal had been sent as a single signal - even then it would not have amounted to 30 minutes air-time. The times of DF fixes on this signal apparently located the ship, but the times of these "fixes" do not match the times at which Group west received the radio segments and at least one of these "fixes" was on a U-Boat, the other 3 being on a ship which was 'thought' to be Bismarck transmitting shortly after the torpedo attack on the night of the 24th, when in fact Bismarck never transmitted at all. Lutjens is blamed for running Bismarck out of fuel, when detailed calculations show the ship had more than enough oil at 1700 on the 24th to get her to France at 27 knots - Lutjens' chosen battle speed for the operation - even with a loss of 1000 tons (not proven) due to the damage incurred in the battle.

The "Stern and inflexible" Lutjens, who sank Ludovik Kennedy's father's ship Rawalpindi is credited with nothing, yet he shook off Wake-Walker's cruisers and but for that torpedo in the rudders, probably would have made Brest. Nothing but air attack or a chance shot from a submarine could now stop him.

The opportunity to show Marschall as the bold hero and Lutjens the failure has even penetrated to this disussion.

I personally have no love of officers and I do not delight in hero-worship, however I am a serious student of naval history and have a burning desire to get at the truth and the truth cannot be found in denigrating an officer, who by the time of Exercise Rhine was well on top of the job, whereas in all fairness, both Lutjens and Marschall were relatively new to the war at sea as C-in-Cs. Marschall made a serious error of judgement and paid for it, though as I said in one of my first posts on this thread, I do not think Marschall would have done anything greatly different to Lutjens, had he been C-in-C of Exercise Rhine.

Finally, Scharnhorst took serious damage from that torpedo, two engines damaged 2500 tons of water in the ship and her after turret out of action. Speed of the squardon reduced to that of the slowest ship at 20 knots. That the force did not encounter further trouble is down to luck

Vic
Vic Dale
Senior Member
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Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens

Post by Vic Dale »

Hillcrest wrote:Hi Vic,

Since I don't know how to isolate a quote; "If that was the way it happened, then Marschall acted....but that isn't how it happened'
I have not been able to find anything stating that Marschall had knowledge of the British Carriers location, or that there were carriers in the vicinty at all...I'm not challenging your expertise here, I just have not seen anything that says " Let's go get those Carriers..."
I will also say, if he did know where they (the carriers) were, and he detatched his escorts and went after them...Well, I may have to change my opinion, as that would look far more like foolishness than Fighting Spirit.

Cheers, Dave
Hi Dave.

To isolate a quote, simply rub out the bits you don't want Between the "quote" marks as they appear in the reply bay.

I have located 3 references this moring which show that finding and attacking Glorious and Ark Royal were conscious decisions by Marschall;

1. The Man Who Hit The Scharnhorst. Austen - Corgi. P. 22 & 23.

"....the positions of the Ark Royal and Glorious were brought to the admiral and he gave orders to his commanders."

AND;

"Where were Ark Royal and Glorious? He had been told they were operatiing off the Norwegian coast beteen Tromso and Lofoten and he should have sighted them in the forenoon after the sinking of Orama.

2. Hitler's naval War - Bekker - Macdonald P. 154;

Marschall's B-dienst team had intercepted radio massages from Southampton, Ark Royal and Glorious;

"The bearings of the transmissions indicated that the ships were further north, and Marschall decided to act upon this evidence , though only with his two battleships:....."

Naval Battles of World War II - Bennet - Batsford. P106.;

"...since Marschall could not expect his presence in the area to remain a secret for much longer, he decided to use only the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to hunt for the most valuable prizes which the Luftwaffe had now reported, the aircraft carriers Ark Royal and Glorious....."

I am sure there are more, but time is pressing.

Vic
Vic Dale
Senior Member
Posts: 903
Joined: Fri Jul 04, 2008 7:53 pm

Re: Marschall instead of Lutjens

Post by Vic Dale »

I forgot to say, that Lujens took Gneisenau to sea with Hipper on June 29th in order to distract British attention away from Scharnhorst, as she limped her way home, having had temporary repairs done in Norway. Gneisenau was torpedoed and she too was out of acton for many months. So there is no exaggeration in saying that Marschall's action robbed Germany of her heavy punch at sea and for a ship whose best defence against British heavy units would be her speed, at 20 knots was rendered most vulnerable.

When in Norway undergoing temporary repairs, the ship sustained constant air attacks from carrier-born aircraft, If they had found her at sea limping along as she was, there is every possibility that they would have got to her rudders, or the other screw and then where would she have been. As it was, damage control was not easy to acheive and keeping ingress of water down to 2500 tons was quite an acheivement, had heavy weather set in there is no telling what effects it would have had on the damaged ship. Her plight was extremely serious.

The shock of that torpedo which took the centre and starboard engines out, would undubtedly have cause strain and minor fractures to pipes and equipment associated with the port engine, so with just one engine which could fail at anytime, Scharnhorst's position was very precaious. In the event that that engine had failed, her only chance of salvation would be a tow and then only if calm weather maintained. She could easily have been lost.

Vic
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