wadinga wrote:...
UFO, I tried Cajus Bekker Hitler's Naval War and Edward Van Der Porten The German Navy in WWII. This what I posted another time but it still holds up. I can find no reference to a bigger raiding mission anywhere. Marschall was ordered to go to North Norway and save Dietl. Taking risks if necessary.
I have been studying Richard Garett's Elusive Sisters, Jacques Mordal's Battleship Scharnhorst and the excellent Hitler's Naval War by Cajus Bekker.
The latter uses conversations with veterans, official documents and other sources in a very detailed analysis of the planning and execution of Operation Juno, and Marschall's dismissal which he describes as "disgraceful". He mentions the original desire to save General Dietl's troops in Narvik, which originally led Hitler to draft orders for him to surrender in neutral Sweden. The next army plan was for giant liners Europa and Bremen to sail to Tromso (despite the RN) and land a 6,000 man rescue force who would fight their way up the coast. Luckily for them this suicide plan was scrapped.
Raeder ordered Marschall "To relieve Force Dietl by effective engagement of British naval and transport in the Narvik-Harstad area." He implied in conversation this allowed the Fleet Commander some freedom of action but Saalwachter of Group West said "the first and main objective....is a surprise penetration of the And and Vaags fjords and the destruction of enemy warships and transports there encountered, as well as of his beach-head installations...". Still further instructions came from the Fuerher HQ who instructed that he was supposed to support Force Feurstein marching across hundreds of miles from Trondheim and still further from Harstad. Raeder confirmed equal priority between the original order and being hundreds of miles away supporting Force Feustein.
Fuelling from Dithmarschen on the 7th a long way offshore from Harstad Marschall had waited for details from air reconnaissance but none came before nightfall. He held a council of war with his Senior officers, and there was agreement that charging into the potential defences of Harstad without recon would be madness. Further submarine reports detailled several groups of Allied ships all moving away from the coast. The following day, the 8th he reported his success against Oil Pioneer etc whilst Saalwachter kept on reminding him about attacking Harstad. Since nobody had cancelled the instruction to support Force Feurstein as well he sent Hipper and the destroyers off towards Trondheim.
What Marschall didn't know was that at 13:00 Dietl was on the phone to General Von Falkenhorst in Trondheim telling him that the Allies had withdrawn, news which reached Kapitan Theodore Krancke (local naval liaison) soon after, but got no further. By 17:10 Marschall knew he was in visual range of a carrier. Relying on sneaking away at that point was not an option since a patrolling aircraft could still bring down doom on him even if he ran off a hundred further 50 or 80 miles. At that point there was only one choice- attack. This decision cost him his post- his next role was Head of the Navy's Educational Department, and forced him to suffer the ignominy of having a circulated Admiralty document list his perceived shortcomings. When he submitted a defence of actions, which had cost the RN a valuable carrier, two fine destroyers and over a thousand men, Raeder's written comment was Marschall "lacked the strength of purpose of a great leader....Consequently as an operational commander he was, generally speaking, a failure."
According to Bekker it was Lutjens who took Gneisenau out on the 20th of June and got torpedoed, not Marschall.
In summer 1942 Raeder appointed the man he had described as a failure to C in C Navy Group West. Obviously he had changed his mind.
All the Best
wadinga
Well, well – I am afraid, I shall have to disagree strongly.
Apologies here for time constraints. I will not be much around for the next seven days. And I do not have the time to translate more than just some key paragraphs out of two major documents on this issue. Sorry!
First for Garretts interpretation of Raeders order of May 23rd 1940. I do think the order can only be understood in a greater context. Yes – it is an wholly aggressive piece, asking for action and risk.
But is that the kind of risk Marschall was taking? I am not sure that Garrett got the whole spirit of the order.
Raeder starts with a statement of intention:
“It occurred to me that there are differences in opinion between me and other divisions within the navy, here especially fleet command, about the general conduct of naval operations”
So is seems there were things to be straightened out.
He goes on a bit and then he praises the new order under his command:
“in clinging to orthodox rules of combat, the Kriegsmarine would never have gained the successes or the opportunities for success, that in fact we got. Let me only remind you of the various skilled destroyer actions along the enemies eastern cost or the battleships separate sorties in distant areas.
Compared to the last war, we see how revolutionary the dismissal of once proven battle plans was. This is especially true for the sorties of the cruisers and battleships.”
Now he goes on for quite a while how wonderful this novel aggressive style was and what a success!
But I think it is telling how much importance he puts on the ‘new’ use of the battleships and how he talks about that in one line with the cruiser operations. I see this as very much a order of vindication for his strategy of long term deployment in distant waters .. his very own diversion strategy.
He comes back to the deployment of the heavy units:
“It is not necessary that operations in distant areas are always conducted by both battleships, the heavy cruiser and the destroyers. The battleships, when out of home waters, are the heavies and toughest units. They combine the advantages of the battleship, the cruiser and the destroyer. The must be used accordingly.”
Now that sound to me as if he wants someone to take his battleships out raiding. The order goes on for quite some paragraphs but I do think that I have to the best of my knowledge picked the key bits and translated them properly.
Looking at the order I think Raeder had some creases to iron out. First there was the very, very undesirable situation Admiral Graf Spee had sailed herself into earlier. And if you look at the Fuehrer conferences on Naval Affairs it becomes clear that Reader got his feathers ruffled by the Fuehrer for this awful catch 22 the Admiral Graf Spee got herself in. There she was trapped in shallow waters with enough ammunition to EITHER properly scuttle or to fight. Not both!
From the conference recordings it seems clear that both Raeder and Hitler expected her to fight. She scuttled.
I think this decision between Scylla and Charybdis was one Raeder was not prepared to see again. A German ship had to fight it out.
That does not mean that necessarily any ship should sink. I am of the opinion that the order meant fight till you regain operational freedom. The order did not ever justify for example going after a wounded battleship to try and sink it just for good measure. But the order asked for the commander to make sure that after the battle he had free choice of options.
Firther I think that Raeder on the 23rd of May hat to justify the horrendous losses the Kriegsmarine had endured during ‘Weseruebung’.
These two points are where the aggressive tone from this order stems from. But I do think it never lifted the rules of Readers greater strategy.
And I think that becomes much more clear when one looks at a second key document: His assessment of the “use of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Hipper in the first year of war” of 16th July 1940.
This is in fact a key document to understand Raeders ideas and strategy as a whole. I have not seen an English translation anywhere. I do not know if one exists.
Raeder starts again with a statement of intent:
“Regarding the deployment of the battleships and the cruiser Hipper in the first year of the war. No specific issue:
The current yard period for the two battleships is likely to prohibit any further operation in the first year of the war. Havin captured the French Atlantic ports provides new possibilities for our heavy units. So this is the right time to look at the use of the battleships and the heavy cruiser Hipper in the first year of the war:
[…]
It was my intend to move from a hit and run tactic to a sustained campaigning against opportune targets.
Raeder then assesses the operations of the sisters in detail and he was not a happy man here!
Raeder points out that the operation completely failed to achieve the second aim, to fake a breakthrough into the Atlantic and to round up weaker British forces that were deployed in the gaps to prevent the return of a Panzership at the time. He is especially unhappy that the retreat seemes rather timid and hurried.
As for the second operation during February 1940, Raeder is not impressed either. He would have understood sending the rather short legged Hipper and the unreliable destroyers away but then … then there should have been a long campaign of the battleships.
For both operations Raeder points out how well the German intelligence had assessed the deployment of enemy forces and their activity. Nowhere Raeder detects any substantial British reaction. He sees chances wasted and breathing time dished out to the Brits for free.
Along comes ‘Juno’; Raeder:
“The operation yielded the well known successes. But it would be wrong to overlook the errors and the missed opportunities and not to learn for future operations.
In my orders regarding the operation as well as in the orders by the Group and the sea command the penetration of the Harstadt Fjord was the main aim.
I want to make clear that I have never excluded operations against Vags Fjord or Vestfjord. This possibilities were included in the vague form of the order. But I have only detailed the Harstadt / Narvik area, because the detailed conduct should be to the Group and the sea command because the exact area would only become clear during the last phase of the operation.
I have made my view perfectly clear during my meeting with the commander when we met in Berlin.
There was no new intelligence when the sea commander disbanded the operational order at the 8th of June. So when he communicated his intend to operate against an enemy convoy early on the 8th, the shore command emphasized the importance of the operation against Harstadt. Since the reasons for the sea commanders decision could not be assessed at shore finaly the division of the force was reluctantly suggested. So Hipper and the destroyers could operate against the convoy and the battleships could press on to Harstadt. The sea commander did nevertheless abandon the operational order.
It is fine that there were successes and that is probably due to the working of the intelligence on board Gneisenau. So one could think that is was an overall success. But I do think that a deviation from a carefully decided operational plan can not be justified. I am under the impression that the sea commander did not fully grasp the intention of the operation.
The dismissal of Hipper and the destroyers on the 8th of June was not justified. There were possibilities for oiling at sea and the intention was a long campaign in the open sea. Especially because of the excellent positioning of the fleet oilers and the weather, but also in view of the expected battles around the Harstad / Narvik area or in the open sea participation of the cruiser and the destroyers would have been very useful.”
Reader goes on how the dismissal of the Hipper and the destroyers has only made possible the torpedo hit on Scharnhorst.
Then he complains about this hit that should not have happened in the first place.
He goes on:
“Even though the bringing in Scharnhorst safely was paramount, a sustained operation of Gneisenau and Hipper would have been very much part of the operation. This much more because the enemy had not grasped the extend of the operation. Since the enemy was withdrawing from Norway, Intelligence could still point out possible targets.”
He rants on that the ships should have gone out to sea, venturing towards their oilers and operate on further targets.
Marschall got it wrong.
Yes! Then Luetjens gets his share of the blame:
He should not have tried to get Gneisenau and Scharnhorst out together. That split the anti submarine forces and allowed the Brits to score on Gneisenau.
But much more – he should have gone on campaigning with Hipper! The oilers were still out there. He did not. Raeder was not happy.
Now - that is not some author. That is by the chap who run the German navy for decades.
No – I am afraid I do disagree! Raeder wanted a campaign! He did not understand why Marschall did not go into the Fjords but he did much less approve of just calling it a day after little sailing around and having one out of three heavy units disabled. That left Marschall with two ships and … nothing. Subsequently handing one of the remaining ships to the British on a silver tray.
This I think is why Marschall was out. And I have to say this is why I think that Marschall would have never managed to operate on a long and sustained campaign. He never did it. No way!
One might argue parts of Raeders strategy were no-burnersin the first place. But Marschall as the one, who knew better? No!
Luetjens got kicked for his conduct here as well. This will have influenced his later operations. Where Marschall operated timidly, Luetjens probably operated far to entangled in the net of Readers making, tied to operational orders that were deliberately vague to leave the sea commander freedom of action. A lose-lose situation.
As for literature:
Cajus Bekker … hmmm – I think he is ok(ish) on operational facts: How many shells fired, how fast, which course. Where it comes to behind the scenes. Hm. No! If anything goes wrong it is usually the meddling of the Fueher, if anything goes to plan it is the brilliant Kriegsmarine. A rather apologetic author.
Anyhow - I do think books focusing on operational issues do not quite yield here. This is much more about the behind the scenes.
I think Michael Salewski, “Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung” is unsurpassed on just that: the running of Skl; what did they want, how did they try.
Secondly there is Schuur in “Fuehrungsprobleme der Marine in Zweiten Weltkrieg”. Again – this is about the (conflicting) orders and the sometime clear, sometimes not so clear intend of the various layers of German command during operation 'Juno'.
Hansens great article “Raeder versus Wegener” is a must-read on Readers thinking and working. (... and in English and thanks to good old google these days for free!)
Bidlingmayer in “Zufuhrkrieg” makes clear how the Germans tried on sustained campaigns and why the sorties of Scheer and the Sisters at ‘Berlin’ where their finest hour.
Garrett, I have to admit, I do not know.
Sorry – little time!
Greetings to “The South”
Ufo