Radar and messages
Posted: Mon Oct 23, 2006 9:08 am
Ciao Rf and all,
I think you got exactly my 2 points
Suffolk radar could not tell the difference between the 2 German ships obviously, and since they lost the opportunity to 'observe' the change of positions they simply asssumed that the 2 German ships were still on the positions they left them before loosing the radar contact, so when they saw them with optics the night before.
So there are no ' direct' responsibilities to be assigned here to Suffolk, as they transmitted to Hood/Holland what they thought was the real situation, but unfortunately it was not anymore as accurate as they thougth.
But on board Hood, Adm Holland could only ' trust' what were the messages he was receiving, so one cannot blame him either for that.
As I have tryied to explain here everything happened so unexpectedly and un-noticed like a destiny already written.
A bit different between PoW and Hood, in that case I personally suppose that they went for the ' hunt and interception ' very well coordinated, with trasmissions between them well established as it must have been.
There are many good references to prove it, just as I was expecting been that the Royal Navy.
So, you are rigth, there was a very intense communication traffic on that crucial moment between the 2 British battleships, both ways, with radio, light signals and flags.
What I found 'strange' is that once PoW realized that on 300 course their Y turret was 'wooden' there is no mention of that been transmitted to Hood.
But it is a fact, that soon after the 300 course was ordered by Adm Holland and the 2 British battleships opened fire, they went back on course 280, so something must have happened, as this is not surely the best approach one can give to his artillery officers .
Similarly I find very unusual that on a crucial moment like that one, once a ship commander had realized that a target was wrongly assigned he did not communicate back the mistake and that he was doing something different, ..... but here reports are clear as Capt. Leach told that Hood itself communicate to him to switch target to the right hand ship even BEFORE opening fire, ..... so he is justified apparently by this, .. but still Hood was not hit yet and in full control of his gunnery, .. and even after they communicate this to PoW before 05.52, .... just as Capt Leach reported, ... they still opened fire to Prinz Eugen and kept on firing only to the German heavy cruiser all the way thru the engagement .
So it seems that Hood/Holland did realize that Bismarck was second in line before opening fire, ... on their own too.
But in this case something doesn't match here,.. very obviously, .. but nobody asked for an explanation and for many years the readers have been left on the wrong beleive that Hood could have fired or switched fire to Bismarck, .. while it was very easy to realize that never happened by photos and witness reports, .. like the PoW spotters for example.
I am sure your realize I am just putting togeter 'puzzle' pieces and highlight the mismatches and the things that to me do have some sort of logic explanations, .... hoping one day maybe new evidences will surface.
I suppose you have noticed also the fact that PoW tryied to take a lead position just before the engagement started.
Was that ordered ? Was it a Capt. Leach initiative ?
We will never know probably.
Very good discussion,... I like it.
Ciao Antonio
I think you got exactly my 2 points
Suffolk radar could not tell the difference between the 2 German ships obviously, and since they lost the opportunity to 'observe' the change of positions they simply asssumed that the 2 German ships were still on the positions they left them before loosing the radar contact, so when they saw them with optics the night before.
So there are no ' direct' responsibilities to be assigned here to Suffolk, as they transmitted to Hood/Holland what they thought was the real situation, but unfortunately it was not anymore as accurate as they thougth.
But on board Hood, Adm Holland could only ' trust' what were the messages he was receiving, so one cannot blame him either for that.
As I have tryied to explain here everything happened so unexpectedly and un-noticed like a destiny already written.
A bit different between PoW and Hood, in that case I personally suppose that they went for the ' hunt and interception ' very well coordinated, with trasmissions between them well established as it must have been.
There are many good references to prove it, just as I was expecting been that the Royal Navy.
So, you are rigth, there was a very intense communication traffic on that crucial moment between the 2 British battleships, both ways, with radio, light signals and flags.
What I found 'strange' is that once PoW realized that on 300 course their Y turret was 'wooden' there is no mention of that been transmitted to Hood.
But it is a fact, that soon after the 300 course was ordered by Adm Holland and the 2 British battleships opened fire, they went back on course 280, so something must have happened, as this is not surely the best approach one can give to his artillery officers .
Similarly I find very unusual that on a crucial moment like that one, once a ship commander had realized that a target was wrongly assigned he did not communicate back the mistake and that he was doing something different, ..... but here reports are clear as Capt. Leach told that Hood itself communicate to him to switch target to the right hand ship even BEFORE opening fire, ..... so he is justified apparently by this, .. but still Hood was not hit yet and in full control of his gunnery, .. and even after they communicate this to PoW before 05.52, .... just as Capt Leach reported, ... they still opened fire to Prinz Eugen and kept on firing only to the German heavy cruiser all the way thru the engagement .
So it seems that Hood/Holland did realize that Bismarck was second in line before opening fire, ... on their own too.
But in this case something doesn't match here,.. very obviously, .. but nobody asked for an explanation and for many years the readers have been left on the wrong beleive that Hood could have fired or switched fire to Bismarck, .. while it was very easy to realize that never happened by photos and witness reports, .. like the PoW spotters for example.
I am sure your realize I am just putting togeter 'puzzle' pieces and highlight the mismatches and the things that to me do have some sort of logic explanations, .... hoping one day maybe new evidences will surface.
I suppose you have noticed also the fact that PoW tryied to take a lead position just before the engagement started.
Was that ordered ? Was it a Capt. Leach initiative ?
We will never know probably.
Very good discussion,... I like it.
Ciao Antonio