Tirpitz sails on part of Rheinubung

[alecsandros]

I just speed read the AVKS-700 but didn't see this conclusion.

... They don't do conclusions... They make recomendations, indicate courses of actions, and sometimes mention faults.
The problem with training on the rangefinders appears on pages 51 and 52 of AVKS report as it is saved on Kbismarck.com

[alecsandros]

Tirpitz sailed on war operations during Sept 1941.

She had a few days mission in the Baltic, along with several other heavy ships, in order to blockade a possible (but unlikely) sortie by the RUssian fleet.

Trials were continued in Oct 1941, with the famous Hessen trials included.

Ship fully operational on January 1942...

[alecsandros]

... PoW first fired her main armament on Jan 28th 1941

but it seems unlikely as that was the day she sailed out of Birkenhead. Opening fire on the town that launched you seems a bit extreme.

All the best

wadinga

It seems more likely that PoW had some trial firings of her 5.25in guns on Jan 28.

IIRC from another discussion,
she fired 6 (subcaliber) main gun shots on Jan 28th.

[dunmunro]

It seems more likely that PoW had some trial firings of her 5.25in guns on Jan 28.

IIRC from another discussion,
she fired 6 (subcaliber) main gun shots on Jan 28th.[/quote]

OK, that makes sense. Sub calibre rounds were typically 6pdr (57mm) and these were used to exercise the FC team and test the FC circuits. Basically a 57mm barrel was inserted into the 14in breech, allowing the use of subcalibre ammo.

[wadinga]

All,

According to David Brown's Tirpitz Floating Fortress Tirpitz' successful gunnery trials were completed 20th September allowing her to lead the Baltic Fleet out against possible Soviet movements 26th to 29th September.

Combat ready 26th September 1941, since if you go to sea expecting to meet Russian battleships, you must be ready.

As I thought, Dave's summary, based on the AVKS is a little................ "sweeping".

P51-52 seems to have lost something in translation. There is nothing here to support

Bismarck's crew did not know how to operate its fire control equipment including radar equipment. That was as late as April 1941! Those that did have some understanding had not obtained the required skill level to operate these equipment properly.

Another German reader might be able to do something with "position-finding". Excellent Ulrich has done his best but it doesn't make a lot of sense.

Geoffrey Brooke who was a gunnery officer in PoW makes no mention of sub-calibre firing (or any other kind) on 28th January 1941, he says they were en route to Rosyth where they loaded ammunition. Why would they have ammunition having sailed from a civilian dockyard? Unlike Bismarck which the KTB records as firing 105mm ammunition in defence of the B & V dockyard in mid September 1940! In fact he doesn't mention anything to do with gunnery or firing PoW's guns until arrival Scapa c 26th March.

Interestingly, R A Burt in his excellent British Battleships 1919-1945 says two of PoW's turrets were only accepted for operation on 27th April.

Looks like "seven weeks" of gunnery practice, comes down to three weeks of actual availability of PoW's main turrets. Unlike AVKS excellent Cag does do conclusions, looks at the logs first, then will draw conclusions and he has already dismissed seven weeks. Geoffrey Brooke and the others were kept busy for the first four weeks with the systems, but until the turrets are made available there can be no firing.

All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,


from Peter Hodges : The Big Guns on page 104 about the KGV class quadruple turrets

... the Royal Navy had problems enough in 1941 without being saddled with a new gun mounting of questionable efficiency.

The expectation of " teething troubles " was in itself an indictment of the design philosophy of the day; and statements to the effect that more was learned of the mountings weaknesses in the few days of Bismarck sortie than would have been revealed by years of peace time trials were hardly even mitigating, let alone a reasonable defense.

There was a Royal Navy Director of Naval Ordnance that knew about all those quadruple turret problems, and spent months discussing with Vickers-Armstrong about it, long time before becoming the Captain of HMS Prince of Wales.

It is enough to read his biography to realize it, ... if one wants to learn about real facts.

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio,

Can I just check, are you same Antonio Bonomi who has been accusing Leach of a panicked, cowardly, illogical, decision to run away from combat with Bismarck for the last two/three years? And then falsifying reports and evidence to cover this up?

Or another one who accepts it was logical, rational to make a temporary turn away and based on a deep understanding of the level of training of his crew and the quad mount's potential reliability (based on specialist knowledge), despite Leach having just been blown up in a charnel house of dead and wounded?

Hodge spends several pages on the 14" mounts but since he is only concerned with guns and mounts he suggests the RN was jealous of the French quads or being stuck under Treaty with the 14" decided to have as many guns as feasible. Those authors considering the KG V design as a whole, understood designers trying to put heavy armour on 35,000 total displacement with a 14" maximum Treaty gun wanted only three mounts to minimise belt length.

Hodge details many ingenious features of the design for instance, allowing 40 degree elevation (much more than Bismarck) in a 1500 ton training mass (the biggest in RN service)

Nowhere does he use the term "shit".

He says "The service somewhat resignedly accepted that an installation of this complexity would go through a series of teething troubles following its introduction. The troubles indeed occured, as they had with the 16" and 8", but whereas these mountings had been built and modified in time of peace, the Second World War......"

Interestingly both those other named mounts had attempted to achieve significantly higher elevations than previously normal. Extra elevation for the 14" meant extra range.

Because Hodge considers guns and mounts in isolation, he does not identify the problem other authors mention. The shell ring problem at DS PoW suffered is identified as failing to understand how much the hull would distort by several inches derailing the shell ring. Say during violent manoeuvres like hard a port to unmask Y turret, then hard a starboard to avoid Hood's wreck, then hard a port again.

All the best

wadinga

[Dave Saxton]

It is reported that the AVKS consistently observed that operating personal did not understand the various modes of operation of the traversing system, nor the interdependence of individual modes. They did not know how to operate it. It's as simple as that. Part, but only part, of the problem was because the indicators guiding them were poorly designed. Elsewhere, it states that the operation of the controls required a sensitive touch or acquired skill through trial and error, or a lot of practice. If the traversing system can not be operated proficiently then the radars can not accurately be employed either. By May 19th they most likely were better at it and some improvements to the equipment made, but I doubt they were anywhere close to highly proficient.

[alecsandros]

... Can somebody explain the 4 months longer comissioning time for Tirpitz than Bismarck ? ( Bismarck 14th Fev 1939 - 24th Aug 1940 , Tirpitz Arpil 1st 1939 - Fev 25th 1941 )

[alecsandros]

Combat ready 26th September 1941, since if you go to sea expecting to meet Russian battleships, you must be ready.

What Russian battleships ?
Here is what Wiki has:

"A temporary Baltic Fleet was created to prevent the possible break-out of the Soviet fleet based in Leningrad. Tirpitz was briefly made the flagship of the squadron, which consisted of the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer, the light cruisers Köln, Nürnberg, Leipzig, and Emden, several destroyers, and two flotillas of minesweepers.[8] The Baltic Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax,[7] patrolled off the Aaland Islands from 23 to 26 September 1941, after which the unit disbanded and Tirpitz resumed training.[13] During the training period, Tirpitz tested her primary and secondary guns on the old pre-dreadnought battleship Hessen,[14] which had been converted into a radio-controlled target ship.[15] "

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Alecsandros,

since this thread is about Tirpitz, ... you are the first priority ...

Tirpitz commissioning took longer than Bismarck because in Wilhelmshaven bauhafen they had to do Adm Scheer modification and some works on Schanhorst too, ... while in Hamburg at Blohm und Voss they only had to work on the Bismarck.

More, all critical parts have been prioritized on Bismarck readiness at first, consequetly slowing down Tirpitz construction time anyway. Remember that Tirpitz had to give 4 A/A 105 mm guns and a crane to Bismarck ...

More on my first 2 books on Tirpitz :

http://bismarck-tirpitz.com/

@ Wadinga,

be relaxed, I am the same one, ... the non biased and " Super Partes " one.

Now you have to start putting together the reasoning elements I have provided you about all this, ... but please avoid to add your errors, ... like the turn to port ( to open Y aft turret arcs ) than to starboard and than port again.

PoW opened a arcs long before, ... the Hood wreck avoidance turn did not cause any turret jamming and PoW was still firing with all turrets.

Leach lost a good part of his confidence when Hood exploded, ... and the remaining part completely disappeared when Bismarck shell went thru his compass platform.

At that point he decided what he did, ... despite the guns and turrets still being OK.

After he tried to justify himself on several ways, ... ending up to load the major responsibility to the crew unpreparedness.

Given what he knew about all this and his decision, ... a more fair explanation was needed, .. since in my personal opinion the PoW crew just did what England was expecting : their duty !

He was allowed to go away with this fact version simply because as Peter Hodges correctly wrote : the Royal Navy had problems enough in 1941 without being saddled with a new gun mounting of questionable efficiency.

Bye Antonio

[alecsandros]

Ah, thanks Antonio !

Insofar as Leach's diengagement goes, I realy don't know why there is still disagreement, as Leech wrote HIMSELF that he disengaged immediately after Hood's sinking .

"22. The Commanding Officer of Prince of Wales in his report says:

"Some explanation remains to be made as to my decision to break off the engagement after the sinking of H.M.S. Hood - a decision which clearly invites most critical examination. Prior to the disaster to the Hood I felt that, together, we could deal adequately with the Bismarck and her consort. The sinking of the Hood obviously changed the immediate situation, and there were three other considerations requiring to be weighed up, of which the first two had been in my mind before the action was joined namely:-

a. The practical certainty that owing to mechanical "teething troubles" a full output from the main armament could not be expected.

b. The working up of the ship after commissioning had only just reached a stage where I felt able to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that I considered her reasonably fit to take part in service operations. This was the first occasion on which she had done so. From the gunnery point of view the personnel was immensely keen, but inexperienced.

c. The likelihood of a decisive concentration being effected at a later stage

In all the circumstances I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single-handed the engagement with two German ships, both of whom might be expected to be at the peak of their efficiency. Accordingly I turned away and broke off the action pending a more favourable opportunity."
"

[Cag]

Hi All,
Just a quick update, sorry for delay and for small amount of info but as with you all finding 'spare' time is difficult.
Have trawled through PoW's logs for January,February and the beginning of March and here's what I've found so far,
On the 20th January PoW was pulled by tugs onto bomb craters in Cammell Laird fitting out basin and went aground under P4 5.25 turret, she remained in the basin lightening the ship until the 27th when she was pulled into the stream and anchored alongsied the Princess stage where she took on oil. On the 28th an Admiralty/ Vickers gun trial party was taken aboard and she proceeded down the Mersey with Cammell Laird workers still on board with two of her props lashed to the quarterdeck. At around 20 past one her port engine was stopped due to hot bearings buttwo hours later she could resume half ahead power on both engines, during the 28th and the 29th the gun trials party tested her Hotchkiss 3pdr's pom poms and 5.25 inch turrets (Number of which is unspecified) at no point during this time was her main armament fired either full or half charge or full or sub calibre. She arrived at Rosyth on the 30th and was docked down by a quarter to five in No 1 dock and the gun trials party left the ship.
No armament drills or trials were carried out during February as the full ships complement was still not present, Captain Leach arrived on the 14th February and replaced Rear Admiral Hamilton. Whilst completion work was being carried out on the main armament a fire occurred in B turret shell room and extinguished. On the 21st a Commander Brown and Lieutenant-Commander Ross arrived on board to prepare to commence her armament proceedures and on the 25th the Princess Royal visited the ship, she had launched PoW in May 1939.
On the 1st March the final draft of her crew arrived by train from various sites in and around Devonport making PoW a 'Guz' ship (So named because of the locals of Devonport eating, or 'Guzzling' Cornish Pasties or 'Tiddley Oggies'). On the 2nd March the dock was flooded to allow her 14, 5.25 inch and pom pom armament to be 'Tilt tested' (To basically ensure that all armament was on the same level)this lasted over 5hrs and continued into the 3rd March when her crew was mustered on the forecastle deck to alot them their special parties. On the 4th the 14 inch TS crew (Transmitting Station) was mustered for 40 minutes and a gunnery officers divisional rounds took place which took an hour. Between five and six o clock the ship was undocked and secured to the west wall of the basin. On the 5th the colours were hoisted and on the 6th King George VI visited the ship as well as a second fire in B turret shell room! Between the 7th and the 8th the port and stb 5.25's had director rangefinder, fire control and operational trials and the 14 inch had turret to TS communications tests and work.
hope this helps will post more as time permits,
Cag.

[pgollin]

.

Antonio,

Almost every time you start a new "idea" you show your ignorance.

Do you know that in ALL (except very minor) respects the centre two guns of the quadruple turrets were EXACTLY the same as the twin turret mounting ?

Do you know that the real problem (as opposed to "expected" operational problems) were specific parts of the interlocks ?

And do you know that the mounts (quad and twin) had a very good reputation (and actual performance) by early 1942 (indeed KGV's performance against the Bismarck was as good as late war USN battleships).

TRY learning some facts instead of spouting nonsense.

[wadinga]

Hi Cag,

Outstanding work on detailing PoW's work up period. Thanks for fitting this research into other activities for our benefit. I guess even as early as 28th January it was useful to have AA protection of some sort.

Hello Alecsandros,

Until they were confirmed knocked out by the Luftwaffe Tirpitz could have been facing a Russian force comprising Marat, Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsia, Kirov and Maxim Gorky. So Tirpitz was already to be deployed operationally when Rudel and the dive-bombers blew up Marat's forward magazine on 23rd September and damaged Okt Rev on 21st. All pilots "overclaim" so better to be safe than sorry.

Antonio has provided plenty of reasons why Tirpitz' completion was delayed beyond the normal at Wilhelmshaven, so suggesting Bismarck's work was rushed and truncated simply because Tirpitz took longer is clearly unfounded. At least Tirpitz was completed in one yard unlike PoW, dragged out of Cammell-Laird's with probably hundreds of individual jobs underway, most of which had to be finished off by different people in a completely different shipyard, a recipe for delay and confusion.

All the best

wadinga