There seem to be a few problems with your post.
We have already established at the beginning of January:
Tarrant says KG V was completed and commissioned on the same day, 1st October 1940, but it was only on December 11th she was ready to undertake full power trials.
Tarrant says "On 1st April 1941 KG V having worked up to reasonable state of fighting efficiency, became flagship of the Home Fleet......"
Tovey had Nelson, Rodney and Repulse to engage Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in their Jan/Feb foray. Lutjen's Covering Force had run away to Iceland when faced by Renown alone, showing her a clean pair of heels, allowing Bonte's destroyers to be bottled up and exterminated. Washington's Cherry Trees hadn't got the speed to force an engagement on any German capital ship.
As Dave has observed the critical development was search radar in British ships. Fog and darkness could not so easily hide the Aggressive Hunter as he stalked his prey.
It is the business of aggressors to be ready when they strike, as Cag has intimated. Even when you are fully ready, going out to break things and hurt people is a risky business. The moment for assault is carefully chosen. RN crews gained their experience by being at sea on war service, protecting the convoys and Bismarck spent her months working up at sea in the safety of the Baltic, worried only by the occasional air dropped mine hazard.
After a bit of research I now see this whole business of "Bismarck wasn't Ready" originates in 2001 with an essay by a US librarian called Tim Mulligan who also allowed the minor problems outlined in the AVKS report and Lindemann's whinge about being "stuck in Hamburg" to dominate his thinking. He apparently didn't absorb Lindemann's confident logs about his readiness, or his Admiral's endorsement of the excellent job of preparation and work-up and didn't observe as I have, that a war vessel which spends most nights in harbour is not trying very hard. Bismarck's days at sea were often finished by 4 or 5 o'clock in the afternoon. A comfortable preparation indeed. More informed naval writers, especially those some sea time under their belts, like Kennedy, like Schofield, like Roskill knew the undisturbed time Bismarck had in the Baltic was perfectly adequate to get operational, that the cheating of Treaty Limits meant systems had the latitude to be designed to minimise complication and future problems. Bismarck and her crew were not worn out by vigilant war service, but trained during the day and got plenty of shut-eye at night, so they were at peak efficiency when they were unleashed.
Tirpitz' slow unhurried outfitting through the Summer of 1941, main guns firing when the top rangefinders were installed in May, and further gear installation in September meant she could not have gone with Bismarck.
Oil shortages? The oil shortages only really got bad when the trains of tank wagons carrying supplies from...guess where.........Russia..... dried up when Barbarossa was unleashed.
Lastly, apparently not only was Lindemann wrong about being ready, and the Admiral wrong about being ready, but now even Raeder is reckless in sending the Fuhrer's new toy out to fight.
during a period of almost perpetual daylight
Perpetual daylight?? On planet Earth in May 1941?
The passage through the Denmark Strait was done in darkness and snowshowers, and as the ships went further south the nights got longer. Have you got confused by the Swordfish attacking in "Twilight" after midnight? That is only because both sides were not using the correct time zone for their longitude. The nights were plenty long enough.
Bismarck was ready for action when she went out to attack convoys and play her part in forcing Britain to give the Fuhrer the negotiated peace with Britain he wanted.
Hey Djoser, that forum about Strippers sounds exciting. I'm not surprised people get a bit hot..........under the collar.
All the best