Cover up synopsis

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

Herr Nilsson,

I see now what you wanted to say referencing the point 68.

Based on your reasoning above, I assume ( as obvious ) that you agree about points 17 and 19 being incorrect, ... since you are trying now to tell me that they do are incorrect but just like some other points being incorrect as well, ... referencing the point 68.

Well, I applaud at least your fairness here ...

It is more than obvious that not all the points contained into Adm Tovey dispatches had the same importance, some can determine an inquiry and a possible court martial ( risk that he was aware of ), ... or a recognition, ... depending on what you wrote, ... some are just a report with no much value associated with it, ... even you you write something incorrect.

In fact I do not only wrote that the points 17 and 19 are incorrect. I wrote that those have been written intentionally incorrectly, which makes a lot of difference as you can easily imagine.

In this case Adm Tovey July 5th, 1941 dispatches points 17 and 19 have been " ... read with great interest and satisfaction ... " by their Lordships ( Admiralty board ) and especially at point 13 ( directly related and responding to Adm Tovey point 19 ) on their September 1941 position response, they have expressed their views based on what was written in there, ... and we do know now it was intentionally incorrectly written, ... just like the point 17.

The October 1941 recognition have been authorized based on Their Lordships ( Admiralty ) September 1941 written position in response to Adm Tovey July 1941 dispatches.

The point 68 you used as example does not relate to any offense against the Articles of War, possible inquiry and consequent court martial risks.

Bye Antonio

Didn't "their Lordships ( Admiralty board )" have access to the original Action Reports and log?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you asked :

Didn't " Their Lordships ( Admiralty board ) " have access to the original Action Reports and log ?

Being " Their Lordships - Admiralty board " the Governing Authority of the British Navy:

http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205150926

I obviously assume that if required thay can access everything they wanted to in the Royal Navy.

Anyway, it is a fact, just as I anticipated you on my second post of this thread on page 1 exactly a year ago, on Wednesday September 16th, 2015 at 7:33 pm, that :

@ Dunmunro,

everything was defined with the document :

Home Fleet, 5th July, 1941 - No. 896/H.F. 1325
signed by :
I have the honor to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant, JACK C. TOVEY, Admiral Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet.

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 9tovey.htm

And you all know that in that document at point 17 and 19 the " Cover Up " is contained into the statements.

That is the formal document the Admiralty accepted and acknowledged on September 1941, being the report of the facts and based on which the rewarding and decorations were submitted to the King for the October 1941 formal event.

It does not matter that it was published on the London Gazette after the war end, because at that point everything that incorrect document was supposed to enable was already done.

This is the reason why after that we had more than 70 years of incorrect books written on the subject.

Now everything is very simple to be understood.

Just as I have explained to Herr Nilsson on my previous post, I have the evidence of the direct correlation between Adm Tovey point 19 incorrectly written statements and the Admiralty Official Board response to it with the point 13 on September 1941.

So even if " Their Lordships - Admiralty board " could look and verify the original Action Reports and log, they did not and only directly referred to Adm Tovey point 19 on his dispatches for their Official response.

It is too easy now for me to state that if all the " truth " one can find into the original Action Reports and log's was going to be carefully scrutinized and evaluated by " Their Lordships - Admiralty board " the Governing Authority of the British Navy, we were not going to see several recognitions on October 1941, ... we were going to discuss today about an inquiry and a possible court martial occurred, ... and we were not going to have read for almost 75 years an incorrect version of those events on the London Gazette and on books like " Pursuit " by Sir Ludovik Kennedy.

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio,

You have said

intentionally incorrectly written by Adm Tovey, where good for

and

intentionally incorrectly written by Adm Tovey, the rewarding

but merely repeating the incantation is not enough.

As Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz established you have click your heels together three times to slip between reality and fantasy worlds. Making the same baseless accusation only twice simply won't work.

It is immaterial and insignificant in the reality world whether PoW passed through the point where she was beam-on to Bismarck at 06:03 or not, for at about 06:24 she was heading back toward Bismarck. Is that "advancing"? If you advance 10 or 15 minutes after you turn away, can you be said to have retreated in first place? The obsession with calling some moment "the retreat" and attempting to tie it to whether PoW's guns were firing, or which direction her bows were pointing or whether the opening range was due to PoW's movements or Bismarck's or as happened a combination of both, and fabricating a Conspiracy Theory belongs firmly in the fantasy world.

It is unfortunate you have not fully appreciated the subtlety of the famous German sense of humour with Marc's example. He helpfully shows you there are three entirely valid times for an event and the use of any is equally acceptable.

Instead or constantly reiterating baseless assertions can we do something important and try to establish where the destroyers were when W-W received the message from Icarus? You can then choose to assert whether W-W could psychically realise that BC1 was no longer with them. Is there a position plotted on some part of the Norfolk plots you have not yet shown us?

BTW did you notice whose feet are comfortably under the table in your photo of the Admiralty Board?

All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

I am sorry for you Sean, but what you called " baseless assertions " is one of the most shameful page of a navy I have ever read in my life, given that not only :

I have the motive, a possible due Inquiry and consequent Court Martial.

I have the evidence Adm Tovey knew the truth long before writing his dispatches, since he wrote the truth ( 2 minutes retreat of PoW ) on a previous document he personally signed.

I have the evidence of the direct correlation between Adm Tovey point 19 incorrectly written statements and Admiralty Official Board response to it with the point 13.

But I have also as you well know the Official confirmation provided by the Admiralty Battle Summary Nr 5 on 1948 that it was an incorrect information the one used on 1941 by that Admiralty Board, confirming Adm Tovey responsibility.

As you can see the case is CLOSED, just using ONLY official Royal Navy documentation available to everybody.

Addittionally you wrote :

BTW did you notice whose feet are comfortably under the table in your photo of the Admiralty Board ?

Do you think that my Admiralty Board photo selection was so superficial ?

I am glad you are the first one to realize and declare it, ... because it allows me, just as I planned, to underline once again one of the important reasons for this shameful occurrence, ... one reason that you know better than me, ... the career of that Officer, ... that nothing and nobody can put in trouble on 1941 and after ( I invite everybody to realize this point too ).

This photo I have used, looking at position 11, just confirm this.

http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205150926

The only difference between you and me at this point ,... is that I do not care to tell the historical truth ,... while you still want to hide it, ... against all possible evidence.

So read my closing signature here down below, ... and you will realize the reason why I will continue until the final publication of the whole truth.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Antonio thinks there was a conspiracy and cover-up and then decides that any discrepancy between any account (whether before, during, or decades after the event) is proof of said alleged cover-up/conspiracy.

The UFO believers use the same type of reasoning to prove that UFOs exist; They think that earth is being visited by space aliens.
If there is a 'UFO' sighting and there's any supposed discrepancy between an official account and the participant accounts, then that's proof that it had to be a space alien UFO despite the incredible violation of causal probability (Occam's razor).

The problem with this type of circular reasoning is the lack of causal connection between the discrepancy and the ascribed origin (Tovey's criminal conspiracy or Space Alien Visitation) of the event in question.

The same logic is used to prove that NASA faked the moon landings.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Casual discrpancies ? Alleged cover-up ? Circular reasoning ?

Tovey had already reported that PoW was under fire of Bismarck for just 2 minutes before disengaging but (as well as for W-W at the second board for the Norfolk distance.....) he "changed his mind" writing a shameful point 19 in his final dispatch.

Please read carefully the list of damages sustained by PoW BEFORE disengaging from the same point 19 (here an extract):

Point19.jpg (83.03 KiB) Viewed 1226 times

Apart from the minor errors (e.g. the 4 hits from BS instead of 3) and apart from the very well known 6:13 as retreat time (instead of 6:01:30), plus other misleading statements, what is really intentional (and changing the whole situation/evaluation) is the "innocent drowning" of the quadruple turret jam between the other damages received by PoW BEFORE the turn away. and not as a consequence of the hard turn, as the jam occurred 3 minutes later than the disengagement decision.

Can someone explain how could Tovey have invented this detail, as not even Leach in his final report was able to write such an incorrect statement and could not mention the Y turret jam as a reason for his disengagement ?

This is not a detail and cannot be a casual discrepancy, as this jam (together with the 6:13 retreat time) is justifying the disengagement as being a fairly correct decision and not an "improper withdrawn from the fight" as foreseen by the RN Articles of War (Naval Discipline Act, article 2.3).

If not a Cover-Up, this is for sure an intentional embellishment ( sugar-coating ) of the truth, to allow their Lordships to approve what happened (that deserved instead a serious scrutiny) and to later allow the King to distribute decorations.


Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,


@ Dunmunro,

Duncan, let me explain a key point here.

The PoW disengagement/retreat " advance of 10-15 minutes " ( ref. point 19 for Capt Leach ) or the adding up of " some more " sea miles from 10 to around 15 sea miles ( Point 17 for RearAdm Wake-Walker and failure to engage ) made the difference for those Officers between an inquiry and consequent logic Court Martial and a NOT deserved recognition enabling also future career advance steps, like the one we are able to verify on the above Admiralty Board photo of July 1943.

This is the reason for the evident and well demostrated " Cover Up " occurred on the summer of 1941.

Assuming what you and Wadinga are trying to say, that it did not matter one way or the other, please tell me why Adm Tovey invented those statements, why " The Plot " was created, why the Hood First board distances have been changed in order to sustain Adm Tovey point 17 statement and avoid any further scrutiny need. Why ?

There were first hand released accounts, signed Official documents with correct timing, events and distances, everything already declared and signed on Official documents.
If, like you are trying to convince me, it did not matter one data or the other, please tell me : why Adm Tovey changed them ?

Why Adm Tovey invented those new data and statements for his dispatches and why the Admiralty used only those dispatches carefully evaluating every single statement contained on it (ref. point 19 ) to decide if ask for further scrutiny or to enable the recognition proposal for those Officers.

Let me briefly make it clear for you, so hopefully you will realize that if Adm Tovey was writing to Their Lordships that :

1) Prince of Wales disengagement/retreat, occurred after only 2 minutes from Hood explosion, immediately after having received only 1 enemy shell and with the battleship still on full fighting efficiency, there was a sure inquiry and a Court Martial for Capt Leach.

NOTE : This is what Adm Tovey wrote Officially on May 1941.

2) Norfolk was at 11 sea miles from the enemy, like the Hood First board by Adm Blake stated and showed with Diagram B, like Wake-Walker himself signed on his declaration to the board, being at gun range during a battle, but just doing Flank Marking waiting for a favourable opportunity to engage the enemy, there was a sure inquiry and a Court Martial for RearAdm Wake-Walker.

NOTE : Their Lordships carefully evaluated and expressed their opinion on the failure to re-engage by RearAdm Wake-WAlker too on their written response to Adm Tovey, now try to imagine if they had to add to it and evaluate also this one on his battle conduct.

Adm Tovey changed all the evaluation parameters ( event sequence, timing, data and distances ) submitted thru his dispatches to Their Lordships and by " enlarging " by 12 minutes PoW retreat time, introduced BEFORE that event all the damages sustained including the jamming of a turret with loss of many main guns, etc etc ... supporting that decision by a reduced fighting efficiency of PoW after an engagement sustained against the enemy, ... and this did not correspond to the reality. But that is what Their Lordships evaluated and approved with their point 13 response.

Adm Tovey invented Wake-Walker unawareness for the beginning of the battle, charged ViceAdm Holland for this ( What a shame ! ), and " enlarged " the Norfolk distance to the enemy from 11 to " around 15 " sea miles, and by doing this avoided a more careful scrutiny need by Their Lodships about this situation and in fact Their Lordships evaluated only the immediate failure of re-engagement after the Hood exploded for RearAm Wake-Waker on their response at point 13.

Now you should be able to realize why Adm Tovey did it, and why it did matter if was written one way ( the truth ) or the other ( the invented version contained on his dispatches points 17 and 19).

Now it is all clear about this " Cover Up ", thanking many original Official documents still available that do demonstrate what has been done and by whom.

This is a very shameful occurrence, surely not in the highest traditions of any Navy in this world.

@ Alberto Virtuani,

I see you have clearly understood the logic by reading your perfect description of the invented point 19 by Adm Tovey.

The same logic do apply for the point 17 for the Norfolk distance, with the use of " The Plot " and the shameful Hood second board declaration by RearAdm Wake-Walker using it to cancel his proevious Hood First board declarations, in conjunction with Adm Tovey point 17 incorrect declaration on his dispatches to Their Lordships.

Adm Tovey just invented a different battle with enlarged battlefield and distances and adding up 10-15 minutes to the events.

As you wrote :

If not a Cover-Up, this is for sure an intentional embellishment ( sugar-coating ) of the truth, to allow Their Lordships to approve what happened (that deserved instead a serious scrutiny) and to later allow the King to distribute decorations.

Here unfortunately I have a different opinion, since Adm Tovey involved in a negative way ( point 17 ) another Officer on all this inventions, an Officer who died in action doing his duty with honor and courage ( ViceAdm Holland ), consequently I cannot accept the " sugar coating " embellishment defnition only according to Sir Winston Churchill reccomendations :

Good news was made to seem better; bad news was toned down, delayed or sometimes suppressed.

This has been a shameful " Cover Up " if one thinks about the Royal Navy highest traditions that only ViceAdm Lancelot Holland showed that day.

Bye Antonio

[Cag]

Hi All

Hi Antonio I read your request for opinions and out of respect for yourself I will give you mine, unfortunately it can't be brief as it is in reality not that simple.

I fully respect your opinion that Tovey was not making mistakes but that it was intentional and shaped other events. I must again advise against promoting it as fact it is at the moment only conjecture.

The first important factor is timeline. Blake's inquiry was presented on the 7th June I believe, and Tovey's report presented on the 5th July. Interviews of the 2nd Board of the crews of Norfolk Suffolk and PoW were conducted on the 12th 13th 29th of August and the 'Plot' of Pinching on the 12th August and Rowell's map on the 20th August.

With these dates in mind and as I have pointed out before the only evidence Tovey had as regards point 19 would have been the ships logs of the surviving ships written at the time of the action.

Norfolk 06.14 PoW broke off action.
Suffolk 06.12 firing ceased on both sides.
PoW 06.14 ceased fire 14inch.

The average time would be 06.13, this is incorrect and pure conjecture to state it was done with intent.

The wording of point 17 is very important "it was the intention of VA BCS that the Hood and PoW should engage the BS leaving the PG to the cruisers but the RA CS1 was not aware that the battlecruiser force was so near the Norfolk and Suffolk therefore shadowing from the eastwards and northwards respectively at a range of about 15 miles were not in a position to engage Prinz Eugen who was now stationed ahead of BS on a course of 240 degrees".

Therefore Tovey was not laying blame on Holland nor is he intentionally defending Wake-Walker as both of which has been asserted he is explaining why Hollands intention to engage PG was not possible to have been carried out.

I fully understand that Suffolk, relying on lady luck, fired on BS from 29000yds and agree but maybe this is explained further on. If we read on in Tovey's report in his explanation as to why he did not re engage BS with PoW after the Admiralty message of 1445 Wake-Walker states that if the Norfolk together with Suffolk and PoW had engaged BS he would have had to "press the action to a range at which the 8 inch cruiser fire would be effective and could be spotted namely 20000 yds or less".

A far far more intelligent person than I Mr Cadogan has previously pointed out the numerous mistakes contained in point 18 of Tovey's report, was this an intended defence of the reputation of the mighty Hood or just mistakes by Tovey as at the time of writing as he did not know the full facts?

I think we can find the true reason for the 2nd inquiry in the words of VCNS Tom Phillips on the 18th July, the guy if there had been a courts martial would have been instrumental in carrying it out, "it may be that in years to come in the light of further action in connection with other ships our successors may wish to look back at the records of the loss of the Hood, and it is in the words of those who actually saw the event than in conclusions drawn by any committee that they would be likely to find matter of real value".

I am happy to accept an opinion I'm afraid I can't accept conjecture as fact.

Thank you for reading my post
Best wishes
Cag

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ CAG,

unfortunately your way to read and justify the events is far away from the reality I have explained many times above.

As I wrote above it is proven that Adm Tovey knew, wrote and signed on May 30th, 1941 that PoW disengaged and retreated after 2 minutes only.

We do know what he wrote on July 5th, 1941 on his dispatches at point 19 adding up 10-15 minutes and adding incorrectly all the damages PoW received after her retreat as for Alberto perfect explanation here above I invite you to read again.

Their Lordships ONLY took Adm Tovey July 5th, 1941 dispatches to respond with their approval on September 10th, 1941, and this is well explained and proven too.

The Admiralty itself confirmed on 1948 that Adm Tovey dispatches point 19 inputs were incorrect by 10 minutes.

I am NOT going to go again into Wake-Walker and Norfolk distance for point 17 and I invite you to read it above again.

There are no doubts left, ... everything is clear and well documented, ... at least it is for me now.

I do not need nor I want to convince everybody, I am sure there will be still persons that will not understand it nor they will be willing to believe it, ... for various reasons, ... but this is what happened on the summer of 1941.

Bye Antonio

[Cag]

Hi All

Dear Antonio you did ask for my opinion, also I think you missed my point.

Your premis is that Tovey influenced others by inserting lies. I accept your opinion, but do note that after Tovey's report the 2nd Boards conclusions (With the aid of Rowell's map and despite a slow watch Mr Hunter- Terry's evidence etc) still state PoW retired around 06.02 not 06.13.

I agree as regards your position of 30th May but on that date did Tovey have the 3 ships logs to work to? What exact detail was known? In a court of law these are such questions that would require an answer. Take a look at cabinet meeting records where Churchill was informed that PoW had Y Turret disabled due to a hit by Bismarck IIRC in a meeting on May 27th. Was this Dudley Pound defending Leach?

What is your opinion as regards point 18?

I understand your position, I accept your opinion, I remain open minded but as Herr Nilsson correctly states definite proof is required, I am not against you I have tried time and again unsuccessfully to push you toward finding definative proof. I am lucky to have a cousin who is a psychiatry expert and as she states thought is not fact.

I have retired from this debate but out of respect for yourself Antonio I posted again and gave my opinion and wish you all the best with your work.

Best wishes
Cag.

[wadinga]

Hi All,

Tovey observation was,

but the RA CS1 was not aware that the battlecruiser force was so near the Norfolk and Suffolk

There is nothing to dispute this. Neither Norfolk nor Suffolk can be expected to work themselves into a position to flank mark for an action which cannot possibly happen. Norfolk's deck log only identifies the BCF at 05:50 and not before. Is this supposed to be falsified? We have heard the opinons of those who would like to imagine W-W knew long long before this in order to further their character assasination, but they must explain one simple point. Why did not W-W signal that joyous news to Suffolk that the cavalry had arrived, when he first identified the BCF. Because he never did until after PoW signal was received.

Prior to this CS1 has no idea they they are in the vicinity. The only evidence he has is the referenced, but apparently lost, Icarus message, indicating that the screening ships and therefore the BCF is at sea. We do not know the content, but the fact that the destroyers arrive at the scene of Hood's sinking 90 minutes after it happens, allows us to realise that W-W genuinely thought, right up until the PoW "Enemy in Sight" was placed in his hand, that the BCF was maybe 45 miles astern of him in the chase. And travelling slower than the chase.

I have found new information about Vaughn (Short Sunderland in WWII by Andrew Hendrie) that Suffolk was so far behind the enemy she asked him by Aldis lamp, "What is bearing of enemy?" after he signalled by this method, "Can direct you to survivors". This shows how inaccurate Ellis' memoirs are in their brief treatment of the action. He was never within 18,000 yds of the enemy.

All the best

wadinga

[paulcadogan]

Hi all!

Been a while, having long "retired" from commenting on this topic, but am just sticking my nose in.

To Antonio: Are you saying that the honours conferred on Leach an WW were based entirely on the DS battle?

Or are you suggesting that had 10+ miles and 6:03 been quoted in the report, it would have wiped away all other considerations:

1) PoW's performance as a brand new ship, her handling during the action - keeping station, firing in GIC with Hood for the first few minutes, hitting in Bismarck and thereby contributing to her eventual demise - her crew having been trained under Leach - the protection afforded to the cruisers, including re-engaging Bismarck and possibly saving Suffolk in the process,

2) WW's tenacity from Norfolk's near death experience on the 23rd to the final battle on the 27th with his ship running on fumes, with everything in between - from his squadron guiding Holland to a successful interception despite whatever shortcomings, to maintaining contact in the aftermath of the DS engagement allowing Victorious to attack and almost allowing Tovey to intercept,

and instead both officers would have been left off the award list and an inquiry/court martial held instead?

The former would make no sense to me, and I'm uncertain if the latter would have been the case.

I can't recall if you posted the text of this Point 13 of the Admiralty Board's statement. Whether or not, is it possible for you to post it again, or give a link to where it was posted? Thanks!

My thoughts on Point 17 – This one is tricky. What time period is Tovey referring to for the cruisers to have been some 15 miles astern? We know the distance changed somewhat over time and the German course change to port shortly before they were sighted helped to reduce, bringing them closer to Norfolk, allowing her to sight Bismarck at 0541. But I do believe that at some point in the hour before the action, that range was applicable – plus or minus. In fact, in the signals document posted by Duncan on P 10 of this thread, the ranges to the enemy signaled by the two cruisers in the run-up was 15 – 16 miles.

Also, WW’s knowledge of BC1’s proximity also went through phases in that hour – from learning that they were in the general area at 0445, to sighting smoke that might be them at 0516, to the 0537 sighting report from PoW, to confirming it and logging it at 0550. Whatever the case may be, neither British cruiser was indeed in a position to engage Prinz Eugen at 0552 even if they were 10 miles astern of Bismarck.

(Question about Icarus’ signal: If Icarus had been WITH Hood & PoW, would she have made the signal given the strict radio silence Holland was observing? The fact that she did suggests she could not have been with the big ships at the time, but certainly indicated they were at sea somewhere.)

On the 27th, Norfolk was on the scene before KGV and Rodney arrived and had plenty of time to position herself, yet she took 7 minutes to open fire after Rodney did. What if Rodney had been heavily hit and disabled by Bismarck and KGV taken under fire and hit in those 7 minutes? Would we be saying Wake Walker was negligent not to have opened fire immediately when he could very well have?

Remember too that an important factor in the whole DS action was its brevity - had disaster not befallen BC1 and a longer duel developed , Norfolk and later Suffolk would have caught up and joined in and there would be no debate.

So on Point 17 – maybe Tovey could have worded it better. We do not and will not be able to know his intentions. That is a matter of opinion. Though it is not impossible for him to have been trying to cover for WW, in my book it is not proven beyond "reasonable doubt" as there are clear and viable alternative explanations.

You have indeed built a good circumstantial case on the face of it, but the problem is there is so much that can be argued to the contrary, whether each individual accepts it or not, that "reasonable doubt" will persist and you are ending up with a hung jury! I for one, cannot vote to convict Tovey on his intentions, but on making statements that were erroneous to some shape or form (e.g. 18 and 19) however...that he certainly did.

I do wholeheartedly agree however that V-Adm Holland deserves MUCH better.

And to Cag: I thank you for your very kind words but you give me FAR more credit than I deserve and yourself FAR less than you deserve!!

All the best to everyone!

Paul

[Alberto Virtuani]

Paul Cadogan wrote: "are you suggesting that had 10+ miles and 6:03 been quoted in the report, it would have wiped away all other considerations:"

Hi Paul,
welcome back with your moderation to our discussion here ! Coming to your 2 points:

1) As opposed to your fair considerations, let's say that if the real disengagement time of 6:01:30 (and not 6:03 as it is evident from the Rowell and McMullen maps) was known, someone would have noticed that PoW did not keep on fighting alone against BS for more than 1 minute (and including the time for BS to switch fire and the delay for PoW to answer her rudder, I would say not more than 15-30 seconds.....).
Someone would have noticed that, in this very short time-frame, only one 15" salvo could have come on-board, and adding this to the fact that the ship only had "superficial damages" even after receiving other shells while disengaging, I wonder if all the good things done by Leach (I fully agree on the ship preparation BTW) could have compensated a clear infringement of the article 2.3 of the Naval Discipline Act ("improper withdrawal from the fight")......

2) The fact of being potentially from 10 to 12 sm from the enemy, just applying the fighting instructions and not firing in such a situation is not IMHO a very commendable behavior, especially when, on the other side, Lutjens boldly used PG against capital ships, going against the German rules, scoring damaging hits and contributing to the final victory.
I don't think the decorations could be delivered under those circumstances, especially when added to W-W decision not to re-engage later in the day (after being solicited) and to the loss of contact during the night...... especially in case BS was lost forever and could safely get to St.Nazaire......


Of course things went differently, changing the overall evaluation criteria, both for Leach and for W-W, and the BS final sinking was a great achievement that needed to be celebrated......

you wrote: "On the 27th, Norfolk was on the scene before KGV and Rodney arrived and had plenty of time to position herself, yet she took 7 minutes to open fire after Rodney did. What if Rodney had been heavily hit and disabled by Bismarck and KGV taken under fire and hit in those 7 minutes? Would we be saying Wake Walker was negligent not to have opened fire immediately when he could very well have? "

Great example ! If on 27 Bismarck could defeat both British ships in the first minutes (Rodney disabled and KGV "forced" to retreat, like PoW was....), then yes, I do think the same criticism could apply to W-W as per May 24, because a good rain of 8" shells could have contributed to avoid such defeat...... For sure no decoration would have been granted to anybody if such a defeat was to be added to the May 24 one......

This proves that (unfortunately and pretty unfairly in the case of Adm.Holland) the final outcome of a battle influences the judgement of the involved officers/soldiers behavior.


Bye, Alberto

[Francis Marliere]

Remember too that an important factor in the whole DS action was its brevity - had disaster not befallen BC1 and a longer duel developed , Norfolk and later Suffolk would have caught up and joined in and there would be no debate.

Paul, while I am not convinced by the 'cover up' theory, I am not sure that Norfolk and Suffolk would have join the fight. Our Italian friends think that RAdm Walke-Walker was in fault because he was in range, but didn't engage Bismarck. I don't know if he was indeed n range or not, but I'm pretty sure that, if he was, he was right not to engage.

Antonio and Alberto rightly point out that while a 8" shell cannot penetrate Bismarck's armor, it can damage unarmored parts of the ships such as aerials or fire controls. However, the chances that a cruiser mission-kills the german battleship with a lucky hit on a director are rather low, very low. First, because hitting the target at this range is unlikely (battles such as Java Sea or Komandorsky Islands tell us how ineffictive cruiser gunfire was at long range). Then, in case of a hit, the chances that the shell damages something worth of interest is very low. So IMHO, Norfolk and Suffolk would likely achieve nothing.

In final analysis, all what the cruisers would achieve would be to interfere with Hood and PoW's own gunfire. The two battleships would have difficulties to spot the fall of shots and adjust their fire. Hence, it makes sense for W-W to stay out of the fight.

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Francis Marliere:
hi Francis,
while I agree it's unlikely that heavy cruisers fire can decisively damage a battleship, I do think their fire from effective range can well contribute to the enemy defeat, as it certainly did Prinz Eugen at Denmark Strait (and she did not apparently disturbed at all Bismarck fire in the first critical minutes of the battle....).

Suffolk fired and straddled Bismarck shortly after 18:30 the same day from 21000 yards and fired from 29000 yards to Prinz Eugen,
A 8" shell destroyed the main Bismarck gunnery director on May 27, thus contributing heavily to Bismarck inability to hit her opponents during her final battle.


Bye, Alberto