The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

[wadinga]

Hello Alberto,

I have seen only 1961 and 1962 letters mentioning it.

Thank you for this clear information. There is no therefore documentary evidence that Tovey mentioned this matter to Roskill until 1961. I believe the ROOF and Shores of France misrememberings were in the 1954 era letters?

Do you have an evidence whatsoever that Roskill put in doubt the Court Martial story ? "Straight answer", please.

None whatsoever except that he sat on it for over twenty yea........no hang on, we have no evidence that Tovey told Roskill about CMDS until 1961, so he only kept the secret for maybe 14 years then gave it to Kennedy. Then he absolved himself from responsibility with:

"Kennedy op. cit., p. 226"

Despite Roskill's further information in this footnote there is no correspondence between WSC, Pound and Alexander about a "Court Martial" in 205/10, just some very belated memos about a report the Secretary of the War Cabinet wasn't sure he was due, either 2 months or 4 months previously. Documents 331-4 are not signed by WSC, Pound or Alexander. A green ink comment on one appears to be Pound's handwritten input.



All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

thanks Alberto, but on top of me and you and everybody that helped us in the past to understand what you described above, we do have to thank also some British book writers like Russel Grenfell, ... the intention to make the journalistic scoop of Sir Kennedy, ... of course Stephen Roskill soon after for his clarifications, ... and recently Graham Rhys- Jones for having confirmed what we are summarizing here.

Now we are providing in addition the overall explanation and all the related supporting evidence in full details.

Cag, here your answers :

1) No
2) YES but it is evidently a false one long delayed too
3) see above, due to Hood second board intentional false declaration of distances
4) See the Norfolk track thread I linked too.

A) Adm Tovey dispatches ( Despatch ) is the final C in C HF report, they are the same document.
B) In case on investigations ( Inquiry/CM ) Wake-Walker would have had to respond both for not having engaged at first with Norfolk being in condition to do it and after about the failure to re-engage with PoW and his two heavy cruisers too, not to forget about how he lost the Bismarck. All were very heavy charges in case of an investigation about them.
C) Just refer to the Articles of War and you will realize the duty of a Flag Officer in front of an enemy after the “ Enemy in Sight ! “ signal. Once you realize it you will also understand the risks he was running in case on an inquiry about his actions.
Here in on the article Nr. 2 ( Misconduct in the Presence of the Enemy )

http://www.pdavis.nl/NDA1866.htm

Read also the article 35, so you will know also why Leach did not do it, and what the others took the risk of doing it.
Roskill never really analyzed this battle in depth as far as I have realized, while Pitcairn-Jones did it.

Bye Antonio

[Cag]

Hi All,

Hi Alberto, thank you, to be fair if it's ok I'll address your point further on in this post.

Hi Antonio, thank you for your answers it's much appreciated. I can see your points and will read the references you have given thank you. Im sure you understand that there are evidences that still make me unsure. Perhaps you may be able to confirm my notes.

I know you have the Roskill papers, so please if you look in there you will find correspondance between Roskill and the TSD and Tactical dept regarding the questions of Hollands tactics and the possibility of the cruisers involvement.

It is very interesting and like Alberto I invite anyone to see it or it can be downloaded for a price. Holland is not condemned for his tactics, and discusses the procedures and co ordination req and more importantly the order required for the participation of the cruisers is also answered. Roskill also goes through Grenfells papers with various comments.

The other point is in the Roskill papers there is a couple of papers stating the documents used as reference in a chapter 19. The Bismarck operation references are in the then PRO cases 8144 and 8145.

These give the numbers of the various reports, e.g. M08524/41 C in C preliminary report. The one that sticks out is M 011222/41 C in C despatch and appendices, these appendices were part of the despatch and are as follows,

enclosure 1) report of CS1
enclosure 2) report of CS2 on Galetea
enclosure 3) report of 18th CD.
enclosure 4) report of PoW
enclosure 5) report of Rodney
enclosure 6) report of Vicorious
enclosure 7) report of Manchester
enclosure 8) report of KGV
enclosure 9) report of Suffolk

I may be wrong but Id say this was Toveys full despatch, if this is the case then the wording 'fully explained in the C in C despatch' makes more sense. The Board would have had all the neccessary information on which to make any decision. It would also satisfy the Secretary of the War Cabinet request.

Again Im sorry that it does not answer the questions raised etc, it does not help us decide if a cover up was a reality or not and I apologise I can't help with more info, but it may show that the despatch was not confined to the single document we previously thought? (Appendices seem to suggest added documents?)

That added to my thoughts on why other reports like the GAR, damage reports etc would have been essential for such a thourough investigation as mentioned in the Cabinet War papers.

Best wishes
Cag.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote: "There is no therefore documentary evidence that Tovey mentioned this matter to Roskill until 1961"

Hi Sean,
yet another wrong conclusion of yours.
I'm afraid I have however suggested you at least 3 times to wait to discuss about Roskill/Tovey until you actually HAVE in your hands the original letters and all Roskill material (there is much, much more in it.....)

Here the 1961 letter text (with a bit more info for you):

Tovey to Roskill on 1961:"There were two points in D.P.'s telephone conversation after I got back from the Bismarck outing which I think I mentioned to you.....".

Tovey had apparently already told Roskill about the Court martial threat when " he came in several times to discuss the Bismarck operation"..."between about 1952 and 1960": ...." (from Roskill letters to Kennedy on 1972 and 1973, the same letters in which Roskill explains to Kennedy that Pound was not new to threaten Court Martials and that Tovey was reliable).

For your and everybody convenience, here again the letters text:

Roskill to Kennedy 1972: "Tovey came in several times to discuss the Bismarck Operation with me, Certainly he felt very strongly about the towing signal and about the threat to Wake-Walker. But he was always in very cheerful, even high, spirits, and I would never have applied the verb "brood" to his reminiscences. I could actually tell you quite a number of other cases where Pound threatened to have senior officers court-martialled, and one or two cases where he actually did so. He was relentless about any failure."

Roskill to Kennedy on 1973: "About Paffard's memories referred to at page 8, I am sure he is only correct about the last years of Tovey's life. Between about 1952 and 1960 he often came to see me bringing letters and papers, and was enormously interested in my work, all of which he read in draft. It was only at the end of his life that he became what Paffard calls a 'hermit'"

Bye, Alberto

[Alberto Virtuani]

Cag wrote: "The one that sticks out is M 011222/41 C in C despatch and appendices, ..........enclosure 4) report of PoW......."

Hi Mr.Cag,
we have all understood that Tovey despatches were including many other reports...... Tovey even added at point 22 the extract of Leach report "word by word".

However he felt the need to add the intentionally incorrect point 19 because, in his view, both the PoW report and the point 22 were not enough to provide the needed "explanations" for the disengagement of a British battleship while fully in action against the enemy (or as per ADM 205/10 pag.331 "PoW breaking off the engagement with BS after the sinking of Hood")


Bye, Alberto

[Cag]

Hi All

Hi Alberto, thanks yes the points you make are very valid, the board consisted of quite a number of people who would have had to read the whole dispatch to make any judgement.

We are suggesting that the whole decision is based on two incorrect points. Both points are covered in other reports which we know were available. The Board consisted of 15 men, if we suggest Alexander, Pound and even Phillips the arch critic were complicit, that still leaves Whitworth Fraser Cunningham Harwood etc etc.

As I say we have no idea what was discussed in the boards meeting, and I am sorry the info I'm finding does not prove anything either way, but it does show why I'm unsure that with the info available in the dispatch, the info available from other reports, GAR, damage, DNC, reports interviews explanations between those involved and senior officers that it was only based on two incorrect points.

Best wishes
Cag.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

lets see who will be able to correctly identify those 4 persons ( the ones with a RED line on their arm ) :

Screen Shot 2017-11-30 at 18.57.44.png (99.99 KiB) Viewed 669 times

You can see them a lot better into this movie between minute 02:00 and minute 02:30.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78mFnfRnTas

Lets see who will get them right and how long it will take you to identify them and when it was taken that pic.

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Cag wrote: "......I am sorry the info I'm finding does not prove anything either way, but it does show why I'm unsure that with the info available in the dispatch, the info available from other reports, GAR, damage, DNC, reports interviews explanations between those involved and senior officers that it was only based on two incorrect points."

Hi Mr.Cag,
I'm really sorry for you, if you still don't see that, despite having all the info, Tovey felt the need to add some intentional embellishment in point 19, the "main" point re. PoW action, to make the disengagement "acceptable" in the light of RN "orthodoxy".


Bye, Alberto

[Herr Nilsson]

Hello everybody,

lets see who will be able to correctly identify those 4 persons ( the ones with a RED line on their arm ) :

Screen Shot 2017-11-30 at 18.57.44.png

You can see them a lot better into this movie between minute 02:00 and minute 02:30.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78mFnfRnTas

Lets see who will get them right and how long it will take you to identify them and when it was taken that pic.

Bye Antonio

That‘s easy: John, Paul, George and Ringo

[wadinga]

Hello Alberto,

Excellent new information

There were two points in D.P.'s telephone conversation after I got back from the Bismarck outing which I think I mentioned to you.....".

How useful to read what Tovey actually said, instead of relying on various authors' interpretations/filters. Now we know that those who said the CMDS threat came after careful analysis and some weeks are incorrect, like Rhys-Jones, and that it did indeed happen on arrival and presumably before Pound even had a chance to read Tovey's interim report. (One presumes the interim report cannot have reached London instantly.) Talk about going off at half-cock!

Interesting that Roskill, who should have been best informed, says:

"After Tovey had returned to harbour Pound apologized to him for the despatch of this signal [run out of fuel]; but he surely should not have allowed it to be sent. The post-mortem on the Bismarck operation showed Pound and Phillips in a very unfavourable light over the proposal to bring certain officers to trial by Court Martial for not re-engaging." Churchill and the Admirals p 125. By my interpretation this suggests Roskill thinks there was reasoned analysis, checking of track plots, identification of anomalies whereas now we know there wasn't.


Tovey was apparently less sensitive about Pound's reputation earlier- in the 20th November 1954 to Roskill letter he wrote of the ROOF signal:

"the stupidest and most ill-considered signal ever made"

Considering that competition includes Pound's instruction to PQ 17 "convoy is to Scatter" that is quite an accolade.

Cag you said

Roskill did receive a letter with a copy of the signal sent by the Admiralty on the 27th after Bismarck had sunk. Tovey does suggest that Pound decided to destroy the towing signal (to expunge it from the records) which Roskill found no evidence for either way. He could only find the 27th May signal that mentioned towing, which was in essence irrelevant as Bismarck had already been dispatched but obviously angered Tovey.

So now we agree that the CMDS threat was made during a conversation on 30th May, which after fulsome congratulations on success, then swung to Tovey's opinions on the "stupidest most ill-considered signal ever made", whereupon the 1st Sea Lord felt compelled to apologize for it and then decided to threaten Court Martials on some underlings. Hmmm

All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote:"now we agree that the CMDS threat was made during a conversation on 30th May"

Hi Sean,
ALLELUIA !
You now admit the Court Martial threat after having all of us loosing time and patience reading your denials, mostly full of sarcastic teasing....
I'm assuming now that ALL the "ones who deny all evidence at any cost" are in agreement about this point, being unable to counter with evidence (not only with their own speculations or with insinuations) Tovey recollections.

you wrote: "By my interpretation this suggests....."

In your shoes, I would be careful to hazard interpretations, after all the wrong ones you provided in the most recent posts.
I would accept Roskill interpretation of this "saga".....


Bye, Alberto

[Cag]

Hi All

Hi Alberto, there is no need to feels sorry, yourself and Antonio tell me that the decision came down to two incorrect points in a dispatch.

After having seen Roskills evidence that Toveys dispatch actually included 9 appendices which included all the relevant correct reports maps track charts etc it would be odd if the board members did not avail themselves of all the facts.

Best wishes
Cag.

[dunmunro]

Wadinga wrote:"now we agree that the CMDS threat was made during a conversation on 30th May"

Hi Sean,
ALLELUIA !
You now admit the Court Martial threat after having all of us loosing time and patience reading your denials, mostly full of sarcastic teasing....
I'm assuming now that ALL the "ones who deny all evidence at any cost" are in agreement about this point, being unable to counter with evidence (not only with their own speculations or with insinuations) Tovey recollections.

you wrote: "By my interpretation this suggests....."

In your shoes, I would be careful to hazard interpretations, after all the wrong ones you provided in the most recent posts.
I would accept Roskill interpretation of this "saga".....


Bye, Alberto

The supposed CMDS threat is still only according to Tovey; there's never been any doubt that Tovey stated there was a CMDS threat but there was doubt as to when he stated that the supposed threat occurred. We have no corroborating evidence of a CMDS threat from Admiralty sources or from any source other than Tovey.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Cag wrote: ".....it would be odd if the board members did not avail themselves of all the facts."

Hi Mr.Cag,
it would be odd, but Tovey did not present only "all the relevant correct reports maps track charts etc" (as you say). He added instead the intentionally incorrect point 19, the only one able to provide a solid justification to the retreat of the PoW, that had been questioned since the beginning by Churchill, Pound and the War Cabinet.

If you still refute to see that the "two incorrect points" (as per your minimizing definition.... ) were absolutely key ones in order to provide the needed explanations for the disengagement, 1) adding 10 minutes fight (100% of her total fight duration , 700% of her fight duration when left alone against Bismarck ) and depriving PoW gunnery of 4 guns (40% of her main armament ) astutely inserting "Y" turret jamming among the damages sustained before retreating, I really don't see how to convince you.


Bye, Alberto

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: "We have no corroborating evidence of a CMDS threat from Admiralty sources or from any source other than Tovey."

Hi Duncan,
who else could have heard the Court-Martial threat, in your opinion ?

Of course you don't consider Churchill comment "the worst thing since Troubridge turned away from the Goeben in 1914" that is a clear menace (even a promise) of a Court Martial.

However, to make the long story short, Roskill, being an historian, knowing the RN "orthodoxy" and having spoken to Tovey, believed the story, Dunmunro does not.


Bye, Alberto