Wadinga wrote: "We have argued long and hard over whether the first twitch of PoW's rudder in response to Holland's unsent signal for a turn to port constitutes the start of withdrawal, or merely a course change. Until PoW achieved a course of 220 or even McMullen's incorrect estimate of enemy course 240 PoW was still closing the enemy. That is not "withdrawing". You cannot withdraw by getting closer to your enemy. Even opening the range is not withdrawing. Withdrawing is when a commander decides that continuing an engagement is no longer to his advantage. Leach decided that around 06:14. It was obvious to Norfolk, that PoW was withdrawing at 06:14. If an enemy chooses to pursue a withdrawing enemy, and the latter has insufficient speed to escape he is not effectively withdrawing, because he is still in action. However, Lutjens did not pursue because he too was withdrawing, having turned to starboard to avoid an imaginary torpedo attack. "
Hi Sean,
I see you don't give up with this pathetic attempt to question Leach decision to run away at 6:00, just after Hood exploded. Please read again Capt. Leach narrative here:
SECRET - H.M.S."PRINCE OF WALES" - 4th June 1941 - No. 001.B.
Sir,
I have the honor to submit the following account of operations between 22nd May and 27th May, 1941, in which H.M.Ship under my command took part.
2. Throughout the operations, and in particularly during and immediately after the morning engagement on Saturday, 24th May, the behavior of my officers and ship's company was in all respects admirable, and the morale throughout the Ship was unquestionably high. The sinking of the "Hood" produced no noticeable adverse effect. It is intended to submit, as soon as is practicable, a list of those officers and ratings who are considered deserving of special mention for outstanding devotion to duty.
3. Some explanation remains to be made as to my decision to break off the engagement after the sinking of H.M.S. "Hood" - a decision which clearly invites most critical examination. Prior to the disaster to the "Hood" I felt confident that together we could deal adequately with "Bismarck" and her consort. The sinking of "Hood" obviously changed the immediate situation, and there were three further considerations requiring to be weighed up, of which the first two had been in my mind before action was joined.
Namely:
(a). The practical certainty that owing to mechanical "teething troubles" a full output from the main armament was not to be expected.
(b). The working up of the Ship after commissioning had only just reached a stage where I felt able to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that I considered her reasonably fit to take part in service operations. This was the first occasion on which she had done so. From the gunnery point of view the personnel was (sic) immensely keen and well drilled, but inexperienced.
(c). The likelihood of a decisive concentration being effected at a later stage.
In all circumstances I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single handed the engagement with the two German ships, both of whom might be expected to be at the peak of their efficiency.
Accordingly I turned away and broke off the action pending a more favorable opportunity.
4. A detailed narrative is attached as an appendix, and tracks charts are forwarded under separate cover.
I have the honor to be, Sir, your obedient servant,
Signed : J.C.Leach Captain, Royal Navy
To : The Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. (Copy to Rear Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron).
and finally accept that Capt.Leach decision was to withdraw from the fight just after Hood exploded, for his own admission. We can debate endlessly whether it was a good or bad decision (IMHO it was the perfect decision with hindsight but a very bad decision from a military (especially from a Royal Navy) perspective).
Please don't say that PoW was not retreating until she reached 220° course, this is simply a nonsense as you should know that a battleship is not your car and that it can't turn immediately (although this was exactly the hope of Capt.Leach, sorry for you). The fact that PoW still closed the enemy was the effect of pure inertia and not of a deliberated intention to fight. In any case, course 220° was reached already, in response to the hard rudder turn, at around 6:02; after that time distance from BS was only increasing....
Please don't say again that PoW was just opening range, as the smoke screen ordered at around the same time (see photos) is a clear indication of the intention to just.....run away. Again, please read Leach narrative above and don't invent that Leach decided to withdraw at 6:14. At that time PoW was running away since 12 minutes already.....
I know you would like to be able to say that PoW heroically fought for 10 or even 14 minutes alone
: unfortunately for you, it was not the case, the turn to port to disengage was already effective on her course at 6:01:30, that means the rudder was put hard to port at 6:01:10 maximum, following Leach decision (for his own admission).
Finally please don't try to say that at 6:24 Leach heroically "reconsidered his decision to dis-engage"
. At that time, he just took station behind his superior. Would he had run away to Scapa, the Court Martial would have been simply a "waste of time" (to use Lord Fisher words from another thread)...
These are facts, please don't became ridiculous trying to demonstrate that this officer heroically fought alone against BS. He said clearly he did not (please see narrative above) and he even explained why. We can debate if he was right or wrong, not the facts.
I hope it's the last time we come back (after 2 years discussion, albeit very funny) to the retreat time of PoW and the reasons of Capt.Leach......
Bye, Alberto