Lutjens' target directive to Prinz Eugen

[Herr Nilsson]

Orders regarding the distribution of fire are related to battle lines. The cruisers were not part of the british battle line.

So an enemy warship that has turned towards you during a battle, whether in range or not, is left alone and allowed to close in because it's not part of the battle line you are engaged with?

There were special signals for engaging ships which were separate from the enemy battle line.

So the word "weitesten" in the semaphore signal was not significant Marc? I ask very honestly because I have no knowledge of German language usage other than what I get from the online translator so I ask your guidance.

The wording of semaphore signals were predefined, therefore the word "weitesten" was simply there, but irrelevant in this context.

[paulcadogan]

Orders regarding the distribution of fire are related to battle lines. The cruisers were not part of the british battle line.

So an enemy warship that has turned towards you during a battle, whether in range or not, is left alone and allowed to close in because it's not part of the battle line you are engaged with?

There were special signals for engaging ships which were separate from the enemy battle line.

So the word "weitesten" in the semaphore signal was not significant Marc? I ask very honestly because I have no knowledge of German language usage other than what I get from the online translator so I ask your guidance.

The wording of semaphore signals were predefined, therefore the word "weitesten" was simply there, but irrelevant in this context.

Thanks Marc! That's all I needed. So much for that "brilliant" idea!

End of discussion!

(But hey.... at least we had a nice little diversion from "The Plot" !! )

[wadinga]

All,

This is a fairly transparent attempt to involve Norfolk in an action she wasn't at. The very sloppiness of the tracking of the British cruisers on German origin maps show they were considered irrelevant at Denmark Straits, because they were too far away.

PoW Gunnery report

The true range on opening was 25,000 yards. The true range on ceasing fire was 14,500 yards

Lutjens, master strategist that he was, waited until the range was even lower to open fire, with 15" and famously wonderful German FC systems and guns. Exasperating his captain and failing to tell PG which ship to fire at all- correcting this later when he belatedly realised he was being hit hard by a ship he had failed to target at all. "Two of us, two of them" - its not hard is it?.

Why would a cruiser 12-15 miles or always more than 26,000 yds (+ approx 3000m PG-BS) away be considered a viable 8" gun target when heavier artillery with flatter trajectory/ bigger hitting space/ easier to spot splashes didn't start firing until 25,000 yds or less?

These are the parameters to consider when assessing Norfolk's decision not to fire in the morning, not what happened in a different place and different time.

All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

since " The Plot " and where Norfolk really was is already pretty much defined now, ... as well as many other things, ... lets talk a bit about Adm Lutjens executed strategy than.

You are on a battleship with an escorting cruiser ahead of you, followed close by an enemy heavy cruiser since hours.

Suddenly on the horizon 3 new ships appear, one more heavy cruiser from east, and 2 battleships from south-east cutting at high speed your way.

You realize they are in theory 4 against 2, just twice as you are, 2 battleships and 2 heavy cruisers against one battleship and one heavy cruiser.

While you think what is going to come at you, what to do ... the 2 heavy cruisers do such manoeuvres that shows you they are not going to charge you at full speed opening fire.

Suddenly you have an help on deciding what to do, ... you only have to face the 2 battleships coming from south-east cutting your way.

Than you are only with one easy decision left to you, ... you have to open your way with any possibility you have.

Adm Lutjens decision was easy, and pretty fast.

You order an officer to keep an eye to the 2 heavy cruisers apparently not taking part to the engagement, guess who did it ?

Than he decided to take Hood with Bismarck and leave Prince of Wales to Prinz Eugen, than almost immediately he changed his decision and ordered the concentration of fire to the single leading target to create superiority and damages to one single opponent at time, and he choose Hood.

A courageous and desperate decision, taken despite the procedures using all you can, including the Prinz Eugen, to try to open your way to south.

We know how it went, ... and Adm Lutjens was the winner at Denmark Strait with that approach, ... no doubts about it.

In fact Bismarck and Prinz Eugen escaped the prepared trap, ... despite the initial Royal Navy superiority.
They sunk an enemy battleship and forced another battleship to leave the battlefield, ... and sailed away to the south.

Hope you agree about it ... those are the known facts.

Will you call it ... the " Lutjens touch " ...

Bye Antonio

[paulcadogan]

This is a fairly transparent attempt to involve Norfolk in an action she wasn't at.

No, Sean, that wasn't my motivation - that phrase "farthest to the left" had bothered me for some time, so just exploring the possibilities. I'm satisfied with the responses and will happily lay this one to rest!

[Steve Crandell]

While you think what is going to come at you, what to do ... the 2 heavy cruisers do such manoeuvres that shows you they are not going to charge you at full speed opening fire.

No. Both British cruisers attempted to engage Bismarck and were unable to do so. They were too far away and/or conditions were such that they were unable to spot their own fall of shot. If Bismarck had turned around they would have immediately become a serious threat with both gunnery and torpedoes.

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Steve:
Hi Steve, no, they DID NOT.
Suffolk was at 200 hectometers at 5:41, measured by PG radar. Then, due to a 'mirage' she DECIDED to get away.
Norfolk after 5:41 DID NOT manoeuvre in an aggressive way until 5:55 and at 6:00 she retired before PoW....
Bye, Alberto

[Steve Crandell]

If you want to continue the theory about British captains in a great conspiracy to avoid combat with the German navy, that is your prerogative. I don't subscribe to it.

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Steve: I did not re-start the discussion on this thread, but if you refuse to accept the facts, that is your prerogative.....

Both cruisers were in position to engage enemy at 5:37 being at 11 (Suffolk) and 14 sm (Norfolk) distance (fact) and they manoeuvred to avoid/delay the engagement (fact). Whether they did right or not, it's debatable, the facts are not.....

Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Steve Crandell,

you better read carefully Suffolk manoeuvres that morning.

It is his own Captain to write on his report and admit he turned backward ( northward ) away from the enemy at 05.42, after having received the enemy in sight from PoW (05.37) and Norfolk (05.41), just before the Hood one at 05.43.

It is a fact, not an opinion.

Here for you Captain Ellis of HMS Suffolk :

16. 0325 (B). Enemy appeared to be altering course to starboard, so circled to northward to open the range to 15 miles, and continued shadowing by sight from enemy's starboard quarter. (Norfolk known, and B.C.S. assumed to be to port of enemy).

and

17. 0542 (B). Received Norfolk's 0541 reporting sighting enemy, followed by Prince of Wales' 0537 and Hood's 0543. The mean of these placed the enemy some 280°, 14 miles from Suffolk's plot position, and sights obtained shortly afterwards confirmed this. As, however, the Battle Cruiser Squadron was now in touch with the enemy, no amending position report was made at this point.

Enemy appeared to be approaching, and in case he had reversed course at 0538 (being "turned" by the Battle Cruiser Squadron), Suffolk circled to keep northward of enemy. It was soon realised, however, that the enemy was not approaching, the appearance being due to mirage, which also explains the similar (false) appearances at 0325.

This Suffolk manoeuvre as well as the " Arc " started at 05.41 by HMS Norfolk, convinced Adm Lutjens that they were not so aggressive on that moment for his squadron and in fact he ordered the Baron Von Mullenheim-Rechberg just to keep an eye on them both.

The Baron reported that RearAdm Wake-Walker seemed to have left the battlefield to ViceAdm Holland battleships, keeping his cruisers between 12 to 15 sea miles from the Bismarck.

Those are well reported facts and not opinions.

Like it or not, that was a decisive strategical factor on that moment ( 05.45 - 05.52 ) and Adm Lutjens immediately caught it and took advantage from it ... and it has not been a small advantage at the end, since Prinz Eugen with his 203 mm guns was free to be used against another target ( Hood ) with devastating effects.

This is exactly what I wrote above.

Bye Antonio

[Steve Crandell]

Obviously if the enemy battleship has reversed course and is coming directly at you, you attempt to open the range asap. Your job is to attack him when he is otherwise engaged, not take him on yourself in a cruiser. Good grief.

[Alberto Virtuani]

"Steve Crasndell wrote: "No. Both British cruisers attempted to engage Bismarck and were unable to do so. "
and then
"Obviously if the enemy battleship has reversed course and is coming directly at you, you attempt to open the range asap"

Hi Steve, therefore you admit that your first statement was wrong ! They DID NOT .
Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Steve Crandell,

what you wrote makes a lot of common sense and I can only agree about it.

I think personally that most likely this has been the thought processes on both RearAdm Wake-Walker on Norfolk, which altered course keeping distance with an " ARC " at 05.41 and not closing in at full speed opening fire, as well as Capt Ellis on Suffolk turning away north and making a circle for precaution at 05.42.

This is exactly what happened on that moment and as said not knowing what was going to happen and having 2 battleships from your side soon engaging the enemy with only 1 battleship and 1 heavy cruiser they probably thought as you correctly wrote :

My job is to attack him when he is otherwise engaged, not take him on by myself in a cruiser.

Unfortunately that gave as I wrote above an immediate help on Adm Lutjens thought process and decisions to be taken, as I wrote.

Going by the books and if things were going to happen the way everybody was thinking on that moment due to the Royal Navy force superiority, most likely nothing negative was going to happen on the Royal Navy side.

Unfortunately things went on a different way, Adm Lutjens was fast on deciding and took needed and desperate risks with Prinz Eugen using her in line of battle, ... despite the existing KM procedures ... the Hood exploded, ... and PoW retreated, ... the 2 Royal Navy heavy cruisers were left only as spectators of that battle.

All happened so fast and so dramatically that probably like Alecsandros wrote even if in condition to open fire at extreme range like Norfolk was, ... since Suffolk with his manoeuvre took himself too far away on the short terms ... they were too shocked to do anything on that moment.

But you will agree with me now that this is NOT what for 74 years reports and books have been telling us ...

A correct description of the above event would have been : " They where there at the " Enemy in Sight ! " signal by PoW at 05.37 ... but delayed their initial involvement in battle waiting for the 2 RN battleships to engage the enemy and create damages and superiority, ... than taking advantage of that and running less risks, ... they were planning to join in probably for the kill with torpedoes (Norfolk), ... but things did not go as planned and the occasion was lost.

But on reports and books we are reading that they were too far away following the enemy at around 15 sea miles to do anything, ... and this does not correspond to the truth reference the above analysis, ... as simple as that.

With this aspect now clear in mind I invite you to make those simple evaluations, just as an exercise.

What were going to be the consequences if Suffolk and Norfolk were going to engage the enemy at the early stage of the battle soon after Holland battleships opened fire for example ? Just like probably ViceAdm Holland was expecting of course ...

Was than Adm Lutjens in condition to take the decision he took ?
I do not think so.

Was Prinz Eugen going to be used against the Suffolk and Norfolk and not against the Hood ?
Probably yes.

Were the 16 heavy cruiser guns going to damage in some way both Prinz Eugen as well as Bismarck ?
Probably yes.

Was Hood going to receive less damages at early stage that he received ?
Probably yes.

Was Bismarck going to be forced to try to engage both the opponents with her guns and not only 1 like she did ?
Probably yes.

Was the outcome of that battle going to develop a bit differently than happened ?
Probably yes.

Just some thoughts, ... since we now know that Suffolk took himself out of that possibility due to her circle northward, ... and Norfolk was keeping herself at extreme range ... but did nothing and turned away after Hood exploded.

Bye Antonio

[Steve Crandell]

Prinz Eugene was ahead of Bismarck and not in a position to engage the Britsh CAs. It would not have happened. Neither British CA believed they were capable of engaging Bismarck. They both attempted to do so and gave up for the time being because they either observed their salvo fall far short in the case of Suffolk and in the case of Norfolk couldn't even spot her fall of shot. She chose to close PoW instead, knowing that the latter was engaged with Bismarck and clearly Bismarck would be shooting at her unless she were able to isolate Norfolk and destroy her separately.

That is my line of thought. Lutjens did not intend or desire PG to be in the fight at all. I expect the British wanted to avoid damage to their cruisers if possible as well, since if they were damaged contact might be lost with Bismarck. There was no possibility at all of them engaging PG due to the geometry of the battle unless PG turned back to engage them. That would have been stupid.

I agree that any publication indicating the British cruisers were engaged with Bismarck was in error. I can understand not wanting to take on Bismarck alone in a cruiser. What I don't agree with is there was some plot to hide from the Germans and stay out of the fight at all costs. The cruisers both attempted to engage and determined that it wasn't possible at that moment.

[wadinga]

All,

Paul's original point was about Lutjen's belated instruction to engage the furthest left target. (Jasper complains and Brinkmann annotates agreement that PG received no targeting instructions from the Fleet Commander (tactical genius )

Since Norfolk was never closer than 26,000yds plus some part of the additional distance between PG and BS she was not a Target at all since she was obviously way out of range for PG. No warship has ever hit a moving target at more 27,000 odd yards.

all the best

wadinga