Bismarck second hit on PoW : HACS Director

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Bill Jurens: thanks for explanation and the valuable data about the effect of the rudder on most ships !

Wadinga wrote: "The advance includes half the tactical diameter, so instead of

28 knots is 15.75 yds per second, so 885 yds travelled is 55 seconds assuming that extra speed does not reduce the advance distance or tactical diameter. PoW doesn't start turning away from Hood to starboard until after 06:01 and yet it is still claimed she is turning away from Bismarck at 06:01:30. There just isn't enough time!

We have 885 - (half of 930) = 420 yards before they actually start turning or 26 seconds.
All the best
wadinga"

Sean, aren't you still mixing up the time needed to COMPLETE a 90° turn with the time (and space) needed to START the turn ? Possibly I'm missing something in your point.....

From Bill post above, I understand that the "reaction space" of a ship when rudder is put hard to starboard (to avoid Hood remains) is just one third of ship length (745 ft), that means just 15 seconds (@15,75 yards/second) for PoW.

The "turn" to avoid Hood was possibly a very limited one due to this PoW "reaction time", and this explains why the aft turret was always able to fire during it and why the gunnery report doesn't show it at all.
As Bill explained, the effect of the rudder hard to starboard was possibly an initial roll to starboard (reverse action) followed by a roll to port and immediately after the counter-turn to port (roll to port and roll to starboard), therefore a lot of rolling but very, very limited effect on PoW overall course as all plots show clearly.
We should never forget that PoW was not following Hood in her wake but it was on her starboard quarter, therefore no big change of course was needed to "give more clearance" (as per Rowell account) from Hood wreck at that time.

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Brooke, in Alarm Starboard states that PoW began her turn to port, then turned hard to starboard and then back to port again:

Another salvo had just gone when I heard Guns warn his director layer 'Stand by to alter course to port'. This long-awaited move— presumably we were going back to the original heading so that 'Y' turret could bear for the first time—had begun to take place, in that we heeled to starboard and it became temporarily more difficult to hold the Bismarck steady in one's glasses, when the ship suddenly rolled upright again and then continued to heel over the opposite way; moreover, with the urgency and excessive vibration that comes only from violent rudder movement. We were going hard-a-starboard. Back towards the enemy again. What the hell was going on? There was a momentary lull. Probably the director gunner had been put off his aim, and in the comparative quiet I realised that hitherto there had been an intermittent background noise. The ship steadied up and there began to come back to port. Dick Beckworth said "my god! The Hood's gone!...
Brooke, p.55-56.

Brooke's account is pretty definite and he was certainly well placed to observe what was going on.

[wadinga]

Hi All,

The subject of the thread is the HA/DCT hit, and an attempt to determine when, and what sequence it and the other hits on PoW occurred. Simply accepting Antonio's contentious timeline with its "certainties" of what time individual photos were taken with no actual time stamping or contemporary corroboration and therefore assigning the timing to some moment when PoW passed back through 260T is not something I can accept.

Simply ignoring the Baron, Fritz Otto Busch, Geoffrey Brooke, Hunter-Terry (Debris from Hood still falling) and Coates who all said PoW was turning to port at the time Hood was hit, is not acceptable any more, especially when the disabling of the fore DCT (by the hit) is also established as well before 06:00. The DCT hit from PG was the first hit, before Woods was in a position to be blown up by the second hit on the Compass Platform.

Leach, Rowell and the signalman all said Hood's signal was not executed none of them said no turn was executed by PoW. They may have omitted it, they do not state it did not happen.

Hello Bill, once again a pleasure to have the benefit of your experience and knowledge.

I had actually spotted my error, before it was pointed out but a description like this one http://thenauticalsite.com/NauticalNote ... Circle.htm which is substantially the same as the Admiralty diagram makes it clear.

If you halve the Tactical diameter and subtract from the advance I believe you end up with the distance run before the ship begins to turn in the desired direction, which is where I ended with 420 yards and an estimate of 26 seconds. The idea that experienced seamen like Leach and Rowell committed the ship to an emergency turn to starboard, towards the deadly enemy who had just killed 1400 fellow seamen and then terminated it less than 26 seconds later, (apparently an unnecessary manouevre) so as to stay on 280T to receive incoming hit from Bismarck, now "occuring" only 38 seconds after the hit on Hood is completely unrealistic.

All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote: "Leach, Rowell and the signalman all said Hood's signal was not executed none of them said no turn was executed by PoW. They may have omitted it, they do not state it did not happen. "

Hi Sean,
are you saying that Leach committed a flagrant disobedience to his superior, turning his ship before Adm.Holland made the signal executive ?

Welcome to the prosecution side !
Thanks to you, we have now a new count of indictment for a Board of Inquiry in addition to the "improper withdrawn from the fight".....

Wadinga wrote: "The idea that experienced seamen like Leach and Rowell committed the ship to an emergency turn to starboard, towards the deadly enemy who had just killed 1400 fellow seamen and then terminated it less than 26 seconds later, (apparently an unnecessary manouevre) so as to stay on 280T to receive incoming hit from Bismarck, now "occuring" only 38 seconds after the hit on Hood is completely unrealistic. "

Please read Rowell statement: the turn to port was never executed (because the order had not yet made executive) and the turn to starboard, not strictly necessary, was ordered to give a greater clearance from the Hood wreck. This is not only realistic, but very understandable as you don't want to pass very close to a 50000 tons ship breaking in two with the bows pointing to the sky and hanging towards you.

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Wadinga wrote: "Leach, Rowell and the signalman all said Hood's signal was not executed none of them said no turn was executed by PoW. They may have omitted it, they do not state it did not happen. "

Hi Sean,
are you saying that Leach committed a flagrant disobedience to his superior, turning his ship before Adm.Holland made the signal executive ?

Welcome to the prosecution side ! Thanks to you, we have now a new count of indictment for the Board of Inquiry.....

Wadinga wrote: "The idea that experienced seamen like Leach and Rowell committed the ship to an emergency turn to starboard, towards the deadly enemy who had just killed 1400 fellow seamen and then terminated it less than 26 seconds later, (apparently an unnecessary manouevre) so as to stay on 280T to receive incoming hit from Bismarck, now "occuring" only 38 seconds after the hit on Hood is completely unrealistic. "

Please read Rowell statement: the turn to port was never executed and the turn to starboard, not strictly necessary, was ordered to give a greater clearance from the Hood wreck. This is not only realistic, but very understandable as you don't want to pass at few meters froma 50000 tons ship breaking in two with the bows pointing to the sky, hanging over you.

Bye, Alberto

Leach was ordered maintain station off Hood's starboard quarter - this means that PoW would turn to conform to Hood's movements regardless of whether Holland signalled a turn or not. The fact that Holland didn't signal to execute the turn doesn't mean much at all, except that there were possibly problems occurring in Hood's chain of command.

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Dunmunro: I simply can't believe that Rowell and Leach omitted such a "detail" in their narrative. They never mentioned a turn to port , Rowell just mentioned the signal never executed, so we must agree that such a turn never happened, don't you think so ?

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

@Dunmunro: I simply can't believe that Rowell and Leach omitted such a "detail" in their narrative. They never mentioned a turn to port , Rowell just mentioned the signal never executed, so we must agree that such a turn never happened, don't you think so ?

Bye, Alberto

Leach and Rowell were both pretty badly shaken up just after the turns were made so their memory might be faulty, or they just omitted what might have seemed a minor detail at the time.

Brooke seems to remember it quite clearly.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

I cannot believe what I am reading .

@ Wadinga and Dunmunro,

are you trying to say that Leach and Rowell which were in control of the PoW course and manoeuvres and declared in writing to Hood board of Inquiry ( Rowell on early June 1941 ) and after on a narrative ( Leach on June 4th, 1941 ) submitted to the Admiralty are BOTH less reliable of G. Brooke which was aft of PoW and only stated it on his book ( that does contain lots of valuable infos but also many errors also on the salvo sequences of his own ship ) so many years after the event ?

Duncan, they were all in good health/shape when they made their declarations

Are you than saying that the Admiralty was wrong too on stating after having made the interrogation of hundred of witnesses that PoW never turned from 280 to 260 ?

If you are in condition to do so, please provide us the evidences and reasons why Leach and Rowell declared an incorrect version and mostly the correct version you want to sustain with the official supporting evidences.

Obviously the ones listed above are far away to be enough to try to change the official version of the events.

Sean, Esmond Knight never mentioned 300 gallons of HOT water on his head on the ADO position before the shell on the compass platform made him blind, neither did it Sam Wood.

In Italy we say : " you guys are climbing a glass/mirror using your fingers " ...

Back on the subject of this thread, ...

This hit occurred well after the compass platform one, ... while PoW was turning away to port ... and for the first time on that engagement was on course 260 degrees, ... since she never was on that course before .... NO DOUBTS !

Now, the real question on the table is : Why Capt. Leach wanted to associate this hit to the first one on the Compass Platform, ... and why the damage report of PoW was " changed " to enable/satisfy this incorrect declaration of Capt J.C. Leach ?

Any idea ? Opinion ?

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

I cannot believe what I am reading .

@ Wadinga and Dunmunro,

are you trying to say that Leach and Rowell which were in control of the PoW course and manoeuvres and declared in writing to Hood board of Inquiry ( Rowell on early June 1941 ) and after on a narrative ( Leach on June 4th, 1941 ) submitted to the Admiralty are BOTH less reliable of G. Brooke which was aft of PoW and only stated it on his book ( that does contain lots of valuable infos but also many errors also on the salvo sequences of his own ship ) so many years after the event ?

Duncan, they were all in good health/shape when they made their declarations

Are you than saying that the Admiralty was wrong too on stating after having made the interrogation of hundred of witnesses that PoW never turned from 280 to 260 ?

If you are in condition to do so, please provide us the evidences and reasons why Leach and Rowell declared an incorrect version and mostly the correct version you want to sustain with the official supporting evidences.

Obviously the ones listed above are far away to be enough to try to change the official version of the events.

Sean, Esmond Knight never mentioned 300 gallons of HOT water on his head on the ADO position before the shell on the compass platform made him blind, neither did it Sam Wood.

In Italy we say : " you guys are climbing a glass/mirror using your fingers " ...

Back on the subject of this thread, ...

This hit occurred well after the compass platform one, ... while PoW was turning away to port ... and for the first time on that engagement was on course 260 degrees, ... since she never was on that course before .... NO DOUBTS !

Now, the real question on the table is : Why Capt. Leach wanted to associate this hit to the first one on the Compass Platform, ... and why the damage report of PoW was " changed " to enable/satisfy this incorrect declaration of Capt J.C. Leach ?

Any idea ? Opinion ?

Bye Antonio

I refer you to Santarini, p.73: "The risk of collision was high and Leach had to order an abrupt hard-a-starboard turn followed followed shortly thereafter by a similar turn to port to avoid wreckage off her stern (plate 6)."

In any event we know when the 5.25in guns opened fire and we know that they had to have ceased fire very shortly thereafter. My own opinion is that it was a 15cm hit that disabled the forward HADTs and that it happened within a couple of minutes of PoW opening fire with her 5.25in guns. I don't accept that the damage report could estimate the direction of the hit on the roof of the admiral's charthouse with absolute accuracy.

Again, the idea that Leach or anyone else on the RN side would falsify an official report is repugnant to me and a far more likely explanation is that in the heat of battle mistakes were made and/or approximations were made in damage reports.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: " I don't accept that the damage report could estimate the direction of the hit on the roof of the admiral's charthouse with absolute accuracy. "

As I said we have two info that are contradicting: the damage report with the shell bearing and the 5,25" battery account.
You can't just ignore the damage report as this is a factual, measured report written by experts. The real point is to understand how many shells were fired by the 5,25" battery and why apparently the 5,25" ceased fire before 6:0o (the gunnery report is very limited regarding the 5,25" fire).

Dunmunro wrote: "My own opinion is that it was a 15cm hit that disabled the forward HADTs "

Well, if it was a 15" it could only come on board AFTER 6:00 as BS was firing at Hood at least until 6:00, 6:00:20; therefore your statement above conflicts with your idea that the hit arrived at 5:59 as you say....

Bye, Alberto

[RF]

Dunmunro wrote: "My own opinion is that it was a 15cm hit that disabled the forward HADTs "

Well, if it was a 15" it could only come on board AFTER 6:00 as BS was firing at Hood at least until 6:00, 6:00:20; therefore your statement above conflicts with your idea that the hit arrived at 5:59 as you say....

But POW was under fire from the Bismarck's 5.9 inch guns prior to Hood's demise? So a hit at 5.59 AM is possible?

[alecsandros]

My own opinion is that it was a 15cm hit that disabled the forward HADTs and that it happened within a couple of minutes of PoW opening fire with her 5.25in guns.

... What are the arguments to support this opinion ?

[dunmunro]

Dunmunro wrote: " I don't accept that the damage report could estimate the direction of the hit on the roof of the admiral's charthouse with absolute accuracy. "

As I said we have two info that are contradicting: the damage report with the shell bearing and the 5,25" battery account.
You can't just ignore the damage report as this is a factual, measured report written by experts. The real point is to understand how many shells were fired by the 5,25" battery and why apparently the 5,25" ceased fire before 6:0o (the gunnery report is very limited regarding the 5,25" fire).

Dunmunro wrote: "My own opinion is that it was a 15cm hit that disabled the forward HADTs "

Well, if it was a 15" it could only come on board AFTER 6:00 as BS was firing at Hood at least until 6:00, 6:00:20; therefore your statement above conflicts with your idea that the hit arrived at 5:59 as you say....

Bye, Alberto

15cm = 5.9in not 15in. I'm not ignoring the damage report but I am saying that the nature of the hit makes a precise direction difficult to determine.

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Dunmunro: I beg your pardon, my mistake: I read too quickly your post and I misinterpreted 15cm as 15".......

Still the bearing of the shell looks very carefully calculated in the damage report (don't forget that the shell hit the port forward corner of the charthouse roof, passing through the hole in the support of the HACS directors, therefore the assessors could exclude the same bearing as the compass platform hit: in this case the shell would have hit the charthouse roof at its mid port side ).

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

@Dunmunro: I beg your pardon, my mistake: I read too quickly your post and I misinterpreted 15cm as 15".......

Still the bearing of the shell looks very carefully calculated in the damage report (don't forget that the shell hit the port forward corner of the charthouse roof, passing through the hole in the support of the HACS directors, therefore the assessors could exclude the same bearing as the compass platform hit: in this case the shell would have hit the charthouse roof at its mid port side ).

Bye, Alberto

We know that the 5.25in guns opened fire at ~557:30 yet the 5.25in guns only fired 3 salvos, so it is very improbable that the hit that disabled the forward HADTs was received 3 or 4 minutes later! We have a very neat explanation for the 5.25in gunnery problems; a hit (15cm?) at ~0559 disables the forward directors, while the 38cm hit on the after funnel disabled the after director. The 5.25in gunnery problems may, in fact, give us a valuable clue that Hood actually exploded at 0558-0559 so that PoW was making her emergency turns sooner, thus allowing for the 5.9in hit to disable the forward HADTs, but it may be that the geometry of the hit can still be explained without PoW making an emergency turn but I haven't looked at that in detail.