May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

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dunmunro
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by dunmunro »

Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

there are no doubts that at 02.29 and 02.55 the Norfolk saw the BC1 warships, ... most likely the back of HMS Prince of Wales.

What he reported ... we can discuss about it .... since it was a lot confused on sending reports on that moment as you can easily realize yourself by looking the reality and compare it with her message content ... :shock:

Here the messages :
Norfolk_Suffolk_msg_0229_0256.jpg
Here the map :
Holland_decision_inputs_06.jpg
Between 02.29 and 02.55 the Norfolk was very close to the BC1 warships, ...and still very far away from the HMS Suffolk, ... especially at 02.55 when the real distance between the 2 heavy cruisers county class was around 40 sea miles.

Just plot and then ... after the " correction " factors ... measure yourself ... :wink:

Bye Antonio :D
Draw a bearing 298d from Norfolk at 0229. How can that bearing intersect BC1?
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you wrote :
Draw a bearing 298d from Norfolk at 0229. How can that bearing intersect BC1 ?
This is the reason why I wrote above :
What he reported ... we can discuss about it .... since it was a lot confused on sending reports on that moment as you can easily realize yourself by looking the reality and compare it with her message content ... :shock:

At 02.22 reference PoW Official map the bearing toward Norfolk was 68° and the opposite from Norfolk to PoW was 248°, ... and NOT the 298° contained into the message ... :wink:

The 298° can be the bearing toward the Suffolk real position from Norfolk real position at 02.29, ... but she was not at 8 sea miles ... but at 40 sea miles .... and was not a " LARGE " vessel ...

The only LARGE vessel the Norfolk could have seen at 8 sea miles from her at 02.29 was the PoW back ... :wink:

This is the reason why I wrote : " ... some confusion there ... " ... :think:

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Dunmunro wrote: "Norfolk took incredible (and unjustifiable) risks in making and reporting these two contacts."
Hi Duncan,
well, I disagree, her duty was to shadow, taking all inherent risks.
In any case, and forgetting who was the ships reported (they could only be BC1 in any case, because Suffolk and Germans were too far away to be seen), Norfolk was NOT "shadowing" the enemy.

Please read carefully the Norfolk messages and compare with Suffolk ones: Suffolk reported first a "surface craft" and then "2 enemy vessels" that means Ellis was searching the enemy, verifying its identity and finally reporting its position once reasonably sure it was Lutjens group, fulfilling his shadower duty.
Norfolk just reported "large vessel unknown" and "vessel possibly Suffolk" :shock: . She did not check the contacts, not even the supposed "Suffolk" friendly one. Therefore she never actually "shadowed" the enemy....... and I can only guess the mood of Adm.Holland when he realized (via D/F bearing)that Norfolk was actually behind him to the East, reporting his own battle group ships...... :think:
It would be very funny to read a potential Holland's message to Norfolk, had he not been in "radio silence" mode. :lol:


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by dunmunro »

Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you wrote :
Draw a bearing 298d from Norfolk at 0229. How can that bearing intersect BC1 ?
This is the reason why I wrote above :
What he reported ... we can discuss about it .... since it was a lot confused on sending reports on that moment as you can easily realize yourself by looking the reality and compare it with her message content ... :shock:

At 02.22 reference PoW Official map the bearing toward Norfolk was 68° and the opposite from Norfolk to PoW was 248°, ... and NOT the 298° contained into the message ... :wink:

The 298° can be the bearing toward the Suffolk real position from Norfolk real position at 02.29, ... but she was not at 8 sea miles ... but at 40 sea miles .... and was not a " LARGE " vessel ...

The only LARGE vessel the Norfolk could have seen at 8 sea miles from her at 02.29 was the PoW back ... :wink:

This is the reason why I wrote : " ... some confusion there ... " ... :think:

Bye Antonio :D
Antonio, you've always vociferously refused to countenance errors in radio messages... :negative: ...except, apparently, when convenient. The other possibility is that Norfolk was at 0248 from PoW and PoW gave the reciprocal (068) bearing by mistake. Again, RDF bearing are not that accurate, so the probability of a visual sighting and an RDF bearing matching exactly are remote.

The vessel sighted could have been Bismarck or PE. Also Suffolk was a "large vessel" being ~600ft long with a high freeboard. If it was Suffolk then W-W would have had to move quickly eastward to cover Lutjen's possible escape routes.
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Dave Saxton »

Never mind.
Entering a night sea battle is an awesome business.The enveloping darkness, hiding the enemy's.. seems a living thing, malignant and oppressive.Swishing water at the bow and stern mark an inexorable advance toward an unknown destiny.
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you are right Duncan, ... I have always refused to accept superficially the error explanation to justify what cannot be deeper analyzed, ... and same approach I used about this message evaluation too, ... I made no difference.

My approach is built on the fact that in war, in a military environment things do not occur superficially usually, especially in situations like the one we are evaluating here during this night chase.

Like all of you underlined correctly there was darkness, fog, snowstrorms, poor visibility, enemies around ready to suddendly shoot at you ... it was not easy and a lot stressful to say the least.

I think that every little input in that situation was carefully immediately analyzed by RearAdm Wake-Walker while being ready to take immediate actions based on it, ... this is what a good Commander must do in those circumstances, ... this is the reason why I will never accept that it took him 10 minutes to realize the 05.37 PoW enemy interception report that morning.

But, in this case I have some other inputs that mandatorely forced me to evaluate this possible explanation as I wrote and explained above.

Sorry, there is nothing " convinient " for me, ... because nothing I have to " gain " from all this, ... I just want to understand like I assume you all want too.

On that timeframe slot I have several other inputs before and after and from other warships, ... so the general situation is perfectly defined there, ... that is why I was forced to evaluate the error possibility due to stress and confusion and some other inputs coming on Norfolk compass Platform on the same moments.

Norfolk was not sure about what that shadow was, ... this is very evident by reading the message content, ... and was very carefully evaluating like always that night where Suffolk was to realize where the enemy was or can be, ... it was the only thing she was doing since 09.21 pm of May 23rd, ... while ready to enlarge the distance, ... and was not aware about the BC1 warships presence on that area.

Please read again in sequence those messages ( I removed a message among them that was erroneously placed there while it belong to May 25th, 1941, ... as you can see erreors do occur ... and when it happens you have to accept it ONLY after having clearly understood it ... :wink: ) :
Norfolk_Suffolk_msg_0229_0256_02.jpg
Norfolk_Suffolk_msg_0229_0256_02.jpg (88.67 KiB) Viewed 1000 times
Now follow my reasoning based on the above message sequence :

1) From Norfolk at 02.29 --> I got a ship on bearing 298° at 8 sm and I do not know who she is : here is where I am

2) From Suffolk at 02.30 --> Here is where I am, so you can check your distance and bearing between you to me

3) From Suffolk at 02.47 --> I got a ship, on bearing 180° from me at 11 sm, here again my position that is based on a fix at 11 pm

4) From Norfolk at 02.55 --> Again a vessel, that possibly is you ( Suffolk ) but I have lost you in the mist.

5) From Suffolk at 02.56 --> I have got 2 ENEMY SHIPS !!! on baring 192° from me at 9 sea miles and here again where I am with my speed and course.


Finally RearAdm Wake-Walker realized that the ship he got was NOT the Suffolk like he erroneously supposed and not being aware of BC1 warships presence assumed his position ( and probably Suffolk too ) was so incorrect geographically that cannot be taken as a reliable and sure reference to evaluate anything between them at that point ( and he was absolutely correct about it ) and correctly thought that it could have been ONLY the ENEMY !!!

What did he do ?

Immediately after having realized the meaning of the above 02.56 Suffolk message, ... and here again it was a matter of 1 minute only, ... the Norfolk turned South East in the opposite direction at full speed ( 30 knots ) and for 20 minutes enlarged his distance from that unknown vessel, ... adding 10 sea miles between her and that unknown ship.

Is my explanation logic and clear enough ?

What do you think ?

@ Dave Saxton,

in that moment the RD/F bearing between Norfolk and Suffolk was exactly 298°, ... and with PoW was surely 268°.
Do you think that an RD/F bearing during those years could have been confused, ... mixed, ... double echoed ...or what type of error can happen with those RD/F equipment on 1941 ?

I am sure you have realized that I am looking for a logic explanation about what happened on that moment on board HMS Norfolk, ... and I am open to any solution of course ... that is why I need your competent input here ... :wink:

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Antonio Bonomi wrote: "....Immediately after having realized the meaning of the above 02.56 Suffolk message, ... and here again it was a matter of 1 minute only, ... the Norfolk turned South East in the opposite direction at full speed ( 30 knots ) and for 20 minutes enlarged his distance from that unknown vessel....."
Hi Antonio,
Norfolk did this instead of verifying the identity of the contact, as a shadower should do. Had the contact been the enemy, it would have been extremely important to confirm and communicate its position, (or, had it been Suffolk, it would have been even more important to amend the positions......).
Suffolk did very differently after 2:47, going to check the identity of the "craft" and communicating it was "2 enemy ships". :clap:

This just confirms my statement that only Suffolk was shadowing that night, Norfolk simply was not...... :negative:


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Alberto Virtuani,

regarding the difference between the shadowing efforts executed that night by HMS Suffolk and HMS Norfolk you are bringing out a correct point underlining the difference in performances between the 2 County class heavy cruisers.

It is enough to look at the Battle Summary Nr 5 map that Dunmunro kindly made available online for us all to see that even if not so precise ( not at the level I will publish it on my future book :wink: ) can provide anyway a clear overall view of the tracks run that night by the Suffolk and Norfolk.

http://www.sfu.ca/~dmunro/images/DSchart2.jpg

Suffolk remained very close and on the tail of the enemy, ... like a dog following the fox, ... risking sometimes too and often enlarging the distance making circles to do it, ... only problem was her progressively incorrect geographical positioning that very soon reached the width of 25 sea miles.

Norfolk at 9 pm, ( 21.00 ) soon after having received the Bismarck guns attention, decided to enlarge her distance to east and cover that sector, and by doing so left the real shadowing effort only to Suffolk new radar and started acting just as an escorting safety option to the east, ... just in case of need, ... but she made progressive geographical position communication errors too up to 10-12 sea miles.

Consequently what has been written for 75 years about the 2 heavy cruisers shadowing effort should be differentiated by highlighting that the real shadower was the Suffolk only, ... the escort and safety option to east was Norfolk.

Anybody now can make his own evaluations about the difference on the radar on the 2 heavy cruisers, and on the fact that on Norfolk there was the CS1 Squadron Commander.

@ Dave Saxton,

regarding the radar, ... one question for you now, ... given the 2 radars available on board Suffolk and Norfolk, ... what was going to be for you the best utilization option to be used given the duty they performed ? ... since one was just following the enemy from behind and one was acting as option to east in case of a lost contact by the follower ?

Just for my curiosity at this point ... of course, ... as things went as we all better know now.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Dave Saxton »

I wrote a post last night but then deleted it because I had mistakenly attributed some of Suffolk's messages to the Norfolk's. The Norfolk's type 286 radar was not of much use, and this is made clear in the reports to the Admiralty following the operation. The Suffolk's type 284 radar on the other hand proved invaluable, and without it Luetjens likely would have broke contact, and broke out into the Atlantic uncontested. There would have probably been no Battle of Denmark Strait the next morning.

One thing to keep in mind is that the RN used R.D./F as a code word for radar, but it is also used for radio direction finding as well. This is the case in the messages posted in this thread. These specific messages allude to radar detection by Suffolk and not to Radio Direction Finding by Suffolk. Radio direction finding can not measure range, so when a message or report mentions range with an RDF detection, it has to be radio detection or radar, and not radio direction finding. Ranges given such as 10 miles, and 9 miles, indicate that it was radar. The bearing accuracy of type 284 radar using max signal (which was used during May 1941) is within about 1 degree.

As I recall the bearing accuracy of most ship board radio direction finding was 3 to 5 degrees at that time.
Entering a night sea battle is an awesome business.The enveloping darkness, hiding the enemy's.. seems a living thing, malignant and oppressive.Swishing water at the bow and stern mark an inexorable advance toward an unknown destiny.
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Dave Saxton »

Antonio Bonomi wrote:
Anybody now can make his own evaluations about the difference on the radar on the 2 heavy cruisers, and on the fact that on Norfolk there was the CS1 Squadron Commander.
The flag ship having the less capable radar, or no radar, was quite common during WW2, particularly early on. This was the case several times during USN operations in the Solomon Islands, for example. There was a learning curve on how to use the various aspects of radar at sea that could only be progressed through repeated practice and experience.

It was later reported that Norfolk's type 286 was really only useful for station keeping. Thus W-W had a rather limited situational awareness throughout the night leading up to the clash early on May 24th.
Entering a night sea battle is an awesome business.The enveloping darkness, hiding the enemy's.. seems a living thing, malignant and oppressive.Swishing water at the bow and stern mark an inexorable advance toward an unknown destiny.
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Dave Saxton,

you are just the best about all this Dave ... :clap:

To me now all is much more clear about radio versus radar direction finding and I hope it is the same for everybody after your very accurate explanation above.

It is very clear also your opinion about type 284 versus 286 performances, ... many thanks for that as well.

All is very clear about Suffolk using mainly the radar direction finding of the type 284 because of the measured distances communicated.

What about Norfolk in your opinion ? Were they using radar too with their type 286 ( was it technically possible with the type 286 ) or just the radio detection ?

What is your opinion of the 02.29 message by Norfolk providing a 298° bearing to the spotted vessel while sailing on course 220° ?

Was it a radar detection, ... or a radio detection ... or a visual spotting ( of PoW stern ) incorrectly associated to a simoultaneaous radio detection ( of the Suffolk transmitting ) at the same time on almost the same W-NW direction ? ... so an error made under the extreme stress conditions of that night ... :think:

I like to have your opinion about it ...

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

some radar inputs on the Type 284 ( Suffolk ) and Type 286 ( Norfolk ).

Type 284 on Suffolk :

http://www.hmshood.com/ship/radar.htm

viewtopic.php?f=36&t=5808

Type 286 on Norfolk :

http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/T/y/Type_286_radar.htm


Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by dunmunro »

From W-W's report:
R.D.F.

6. Norfolk had just been fitted with type 286M, which had given trouble; it was working during the operations, though it had to be carefully nursed as all spare valves had been used.

7. It failed to detect the enemy on 23rd May when first met by Norfolk. Range must have been less than 14,000 yards. It was useful for keeping in touch with Prince of Wales and Suffolk during the night of 24th/25th May, though these ships were never actually out of sight.

8. Should the enemy turn on his pursuers when being shadowed from the quarter by a ship using this set, the shadower must act at once, but in turning away he loses R.D.F. touch astern and is very liable to get caught or retire too far.
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 09norf.htm

I suspect that the 0229 sighting by Norfolk was visual.
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by wadinga »

Hello all,

Here we have
the Norfolk turned South East in the opposite direction at full speed ( 30 knots ) and for 20 minutes enlarged his distance from that unknown vessel, ... adding 10 sea miles between her and that unknown ship.
Unfortunately, for us who do not have access to Norfolk's log book, we are forced to rely on Antonio's description, not even a thumbnail, from Norfolk's small scale map created for Wake-Walker's report. We established some while ago this is perforce grossly simplified as it is produced at a scale to show the whole Eastern Atlantic. The idea that such a series of radical course changes would not be recorded in the log is,of course, unrealistic. Maybe Cag could provide some detail from this since Antonio is being coy. :D

Unfortunately we have now two Antonios to deal with :shock: : Antonio (1) desperately trying to shore-up the tottering ziggurat which is the Polygon of Perfidy where Norfolk has achieved 11 miles from Bismarck by 06:00 and another Antonio (2) suggesting that at 03:20 Norfolk had just added considerably to her range from Bismarck. This Antonio (2) definitely said
but in reality around 30 sea miles ( 15 base +15 delta error to Suffolk position ) from the enemy and the Suffolk, ... and not close to them at all.
and
and the Norfolk was NOT at 18 sea miles from the enemy as he estimated, ... but at 18+15= 33 sea miles from the enemy ...
and this is all long before an extra distance is added by sailing 105 degrees difference to Bismarck's course of 240T for 10 miles. If Norfolk had started from the same position as Bismarck, and they sailed at identical speeds on courses of 240T and 135T respectively, each for 10 miles they would be 15.867 miles apart and Norfolk would bear 97.5T from Bismarck. So this is the amount to add on to whatever the real distance was between Norfolk and Bismarck at 03:00. Maybe Antonio (1) can explain to Antonio (2) how Norfolk closes to only 11 miles in just 2 hours and 40 minutes. :angel:

In the meantime we can enjoy Alberto's comments on whether Wake-Walker's movements at night and in appalling weather with visibility down to 2,000 yds constitutes "shadowing" or not. Or whether closing to 2-6000 yds of Bismarck is more or less stupid than, say, Sir Robert K. Arbuthnot, Bart., C.B., M.V.O. throwing away his own life and HMS Defence and her entire crew as well as severe damage and loss of life in HMS Warrior at Jutland. :think: I believe it would actually be stupider, because the visibility might improve and W-W would be able to do a better job later, and his two ships were the only ones with even a general idea where the enemy was. Whereas Arbuthnot was just extremely "Heroic Tradition", bloody stupid. :cool:

All the best

wadinga
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "......whether Wake-Walker's movements at night and in appalling weather with visibility down to 2,000 yds constitutes "shadowing" or not...."
Hi Sean,
I have not understood from your above post if you consider as actually "shadowing" a ship that keeps out of sight and out of radar range from her shadowed enemy for the whole time.... :negative:
Also I have not understood if you consider "shadowing" someone who, seeing finally an "unknown vessel", turns away before identifying it as enemy or friend...... :negative:

Please share with us your personal interpretation of "shadowing" in the highest traditions of the Royal Navy, in order to support your W-W defense !


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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