May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio,

I think there is a mistaken belief that Norfolk made a separate visual contact at 02:55. I read it differently.

Different is the situation with the 02.55 vessel spotted by Norfolk, ... since still it cannot be the Suffolk ( as incorrectly assumed and transmitted by RearAdm Wake-Walker ) ... it cannot be anymore one of the 4 destroyers ... way to the north on that moment ... so it remain only the PoW possibility, due to the Norfolk and PoW relative course and speed.

The TOO 02:55 radio message clearly refers back to the unidentified contact from 02: 29 and clarifies it by saying after reflection they decided it was probably Suffolk. There was only one unidentified, very brief contact that disappeared in the mist, at 02:29, with no course or speed. Suddenly there is Suffolk's 02:47 radar contact bearing 180T 10 miles, which Norfolk might consider is them. This shows how far out Norfolk's estimate of where Suffolk actually was.

If Norfolk really thought Suffolk was 8-10 miles away to starboard, the visibility is variable 1-8 miles, and they take in the Suffolk's 02:56 two enemy ships bearing 192T 9 miles they must think they are right on top of them in poor visibility and no wonder they jink to port.

On your latest map there is still a very significant distance travelled by Norfolk to the SE depicted with no justification. The Plan 8 does not show 10 miles sailing away to the SE. Just a 90 port followed shortly afterwards by an aggressive turn of more than 90 to starboard to bring Suffolk's supposed targets right ahead where the Type 286 might give them warning, before they collide with the enemy in appalling visibility. except there is still nothing there and Norfolk will sight nothing for hours.

You say

Into this evolving situation there was also the Norfolk, ... a good 10 sea miles west compared to her own geographical transmitted position

can you clarify what transfer you are actually using and where you derive it from? You have previously moved Norfolk down a bearing of 230-240 degrees to a "real" position instead of directly west ie 270.

All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

well, ... you are saying that the Norfolk 02.29 and 02.55 messages refers to a single occurrence, ... ... and now it is my turn to ask you from where you are taking this assumption from ?

Norfolk position and her navigational error are very easy to realize, ... it is enough to take their geographical positioning at 05.41 transmitted on their own radio message, ... and compare it with the real position they were in relation to Hood and PoW on that moment ... or just 2 minutes after at 05.43 when Commander Warrand nailed down precisely where Hood was, ... with a very minimum error as David Mearns demonstrated 75 years after.

If you think that the exact 05.43 Commander Warrand geographical position of Hood, ... was later communicated by Norfolk being the exact sinking place of the HMS Hood, ... ... you have a rough idea of how much Norfolk was incorrect on positioning herself geographically, ... which is more or less what I am using to correct her geographical positioning ....

Please always remember that in any case the relative positioning errors one to another was keep on changing as they sailed thru the ocean changing course and speed ... even if Norfolk was always trying to adjust her course and have the Suffolk between 300° and 320° true bearing from her ... at around 20 sea miles ( obviously it was their assumption based on Suffolk communicated geographical position which was incorrect as we know today ).

To confirm this you can see the 03.20 and 05.41 confirmation on Norfolk strategical map showing the Suffolk on 320° true bearing from her track ... and you know that the 05.41 is the D/6 ( or D/C ) bearing showed partially on " The Plot " by Pinchin, ... the one he left on the sea ...

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio,

Because the message starts with "My 0229B." In other words this new message modifies/amplifies my 0229B. "With reference to my 0229. Vessel possibly Suffolk. Lost touch immediately in mist. Norfolk 0255B/24

If this was a new sighting there would be no need to refer to something that happened half an hour earlier and there would be a range and bearing.

Aha! So you think you know the spatial relationship of Hood and Norfolk at 05:41? Based on your requirement for them to be 10 miles apart at 06:00 and nothing else?

You are not using using Norfolk's estimate of Hood's sinking position versus David Mearn's wreck position- yes, I know they are not likely to be exactly the same. But at least you are comparing position and position. You know what this distance and bearing are, don't you? M/F D/F bearings are only bearings. And not very accurate unlike visual bearings.

At the time Norfolk repeated Hood's position they had no idea whose position was more accurate. Theirs or Hood's. So they sent both. Norfolk's log says they got a sun sight at 14:50 to correct their position. But it doesn't say by how much and neither does Plan 8.

All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

Sean, you should realize that basically ALL the radio messages by every Royal Navy warship started referring to their last message sent with : " My 00.00. ( new message text ) Ship Name( sender)/Time "

This message is NOT different from every other message before and after, ... that way to connect one message to the previous one only provided continuity and probably the possibility to verify to have received them all.

Just look the Suffolk doing the same between the 02.30 one referring to her previous 01.31 sent before as an example.

So, this is not the solution for Norfolk 02.29 and 02.55 vessels being spotted, and we still need to evaluate 2 different occurrences, ... in fact I can agree with you on the fact that RearAdm Wake-Walker probably was not such a " fast brain ", ... but to take 26 minutes to realize what ship that could have been ... is really a " slow " mental process ... to say the least, ... given the situation he was into.

Not to talk about the fact that the 2 geographical positions radio transmitted by Norfolk ( 02.29 -> 64°28'N-28°36'W ) and Suffolk ( 02.30 -> 64°47'N-29°02'W) were not that close as communicated ( Suffolk was around 23 sea miles distant from Norfolk to NW when plotted as communicated ), so somebody should have done something about it ... and it did not happen, ... while I can just imagine the faces on board the Hood and the Admiralty war room in London on that moment.

We still need to find a solution there ... for that 02.55 occurrence ...

I know the relationship between Norfolk and Suffolk all the way thru ... from 19.23 of May 23rd, .... until 08.00 of May 24th, ... when Rear Adm Wake-Walker told the Suffolk to correct their geographical positioning as you very well know.

Do not under estimate the 03.20 and 05.41 bearings between Norfolk and Suffolk on her strategical plan.

Yes, consequently I know precisely also the relationship between Norfolk and Hood all the way thru, ... and also with the Germans of course, ... both ways.

I know like David Mearns himself that relative positioning on his book, ... and on his personal map too, ... the one he used to find the Hood wreck, ... were everything is more defined ...

I do not care if Norfolk will end up being 10, 12 or 14 sea miles from the enemy or Hood at a given time, ... why do I have to care at all ? ... since I do know " The Plot " is an intentionally made false document and the distances are much closer compared to what it shows. We have already demonstrated this ... like the overall " Cover Up " occurred ... so now lets just go for the most precise technical map re-construction we can realize.

I am just working out some more precise details ... but the overall scenario is very well defined already, ... with main bearings, speed, course alteration and relative bearings ...

I know you do not like the " PoW Polygon at 05.35/05.41 ", ... but it is correct, ... trust me, ... I knew Suffolk was there long before we found Capt Ellis autobiography, ... simply because there was no other place she could go, ... and the same apply to Norfolk of course.

It is only when you put down all the data on a real map that you start realizing what could have been compared to what cannot be real ... and it has been in that way that I have realized what was the real reason for ViceAdm Holland to go there at 02.00 for the interception ... ... and why the Plan 3 in not correct ... having put together erroneously all the strategical plots without a deep study of them and all the radio messages, ... and all the bearings ...

But if you or anybody else can provide a better Norfolk track to refer to the Hood/PoW and the Suffolk/enemy ones, ... I can sure compare them and evaluate all the inputs ...

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio,

I'm afraid I recognise nothing of the sort

you should realize that basically ALL the radio messages by every Royal Navy warship

Please check before shooting from the hip. Only those messages modifying or amplifying previous messages start with the "My xxxx" prefix. Where contact has been continuous between reports it makes sense to link them together, so no-one thinks the second contact is something different.

What would be the point of sending "Vessel possibly Suffolk. Lost touch immediately in mist. Norfolk 0255B/24" with no range or bearing? What vessel and where is probably Suffolk?

You have said:

so it remain only the PoW possibility, due to the Norfolk and PoW relative course and speed.

you are desperate to tie PoW and Norfolk together visually, so as to get Norfolk close enough for "10 miles" later on and have latched onto 02:55 as the last hope since you have excluded all other opportunities. However there is no sighting at 02:55 merely the realisation aboard Norfolk that with Suffolk reporting a contact ten miles South of her, it could be them she is seeing. But this can bear little relation to a shadow they saw on 298T. On this occasion in very poor visibility it might be possible Suffolk is ten miles N of Norfolk, but when she is reporting the same thing several hours shortly before 05:41 in excellent visibility and Suffolk and Bismarck are both invisible, the navigational bust is proven.

BTW is Wake-Walker a diabolical schemer or the possessor of a

a " slow " mental process ... to say the least, ... given the situation he was into.

All the best

wadinga

[paulcadogan]

Hello Antonio,

Because the message starts with "My 0229B." In other words this new message modifies/amplifies my 0229B. "With reference to my 0229. Vessel possibly Suffolk. Lost touch immediately in mist. Norfolk 0255B/24

If this was a new sighting there would be no need to refer to something that happened half an hour earlier and there would be a range and bearing.

Sean you beat me to this! Antonio - Sean is absolutely correct in this interpretation of the signals. Signals beginning with "My XXXXb" indicate a reference to a signal previously made. If it is an "all new" signal, then there is no "My" before it.

"1 large vessel unknown bearing 298 distance 8 miles course unknown my position....." from Norfolk at 0229 - note no "My".

Then we have Suffolk giving 2 signals at 0230 and 0247 respectively giving her position (with a "My" because it follows up 2 previous signals) and radar detection info (no "my" as it has no previous reference) in response to both of which it seems Norfolk deduces:

"My 0229B. Vessel probably Suffolk. Lost touch immediately in mist." at 0255.

Note the inclusion of the same word - "vessel" - and the explanation as to why no course was able to be determined.

There was no second sighting by Norfolk at 0255.

Paul

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga & Paul Cadogan ,

Sean and Paul, I hope you are realizing what you are trying to say to me now.

By stating that RearAdm Wake-Walker at 02.55 just corrected his previous radio message sent out at 02.29 you are stating that not only he was incorrect, ... but he was also intentionally providing incorrect information after, ... unless you want to state that he was totally unable to realize the basic of navigation and plotting the ship positions at sea .

In fact, at 02.29 Norfolk was at 02.29 -> 64°28'N-28°36'W

On same time the Suffolk at 02.30 communicated to him his position being : 02.30 -> 64°47'N-29°02'W

Here they are:

Norfolk_Suffolk_msg_0229_0256_02.jpg (88.67 KiB) Viewed 1024 times

Between the 2 geographical positions there are 22/23 sea miles on true bearing 328°, please double check yourself.

Now you are trying to tell me that a Royal Navy Rear Admiral, ... a Flag Officer ... with his own Navigating Officer on board, ... 26 minutes after was sending out another message referencing the above communications occurred between 2 cruisers under his command, ... and was telling both ViceAdm Holland and the Admiralty War Room in London that despite the 2 plotting positions he had in front of him on his control board on Norfolk, ... and with Pinchin helping him, ... he was assuming that the " large vessel " he saw 26 minutes before at 8 sea miles from his ship on true bearing 298°, ...
... according to him was the HMS Suffolk ...

Here it is in graphic format for everybody to realize easily what you think RearAdm Wake-Walker did :

Norfolk_0229_0255_messages.jpg (55.94 KiB) Viewed 1020 times

He had the 2 plotted positions ( Norfolk at 02.29 and Suffolk at 02.30 ) available to him ( in RED on my example ), and after 26 minutes ( at 02.55 ) he told everybody that the ship he spotted at 02.29 ( in BLUE on my example ) was the Suffolk

Do you realize what this means ?

Please explain it to me ... and confirm me that you really want to state this from your side ...

Bye Antonio

[paulcadogan]

Do you realize what this means ?

Please explain it to me ... and confirm me that you really want to state this from your side ...

Well Antonio, as far as I can figure - as as been discussed at length, the positions given by Suffolk and Norfolk for themselves - DR positions - were both incorrect - independently incorrect (i.e. each ship accumulating its individual DR error). I'm sure WW and his navigator would consider that DR errors could mean that the two cruisers were a lot closer than their respective DR positions suggested. Just like we have deduced that VAdm Holland realized after his foray due north, that the positions given by Suffolk were probably wrong and turned back to the SSW sending out his destroyers to make sure....

What else could it be? The second signal gives no bearing or range estimate. It is simply a follow up to the first. Note the signal says "possibly" Suffolk. If the contact was indeed Suffolk, I think it would be important for WW to let her know.

At that point there was no way for either ship to amend their position estimates without being able to get a proper fix.

Had it been a different sighting of what might have been the same vessel the signal should have read: "My 0229B. Unknown vessel again sighted bearing XXX y miles my position...."

Make sense?

Paul

[Alberto Virtuani]

Paul Cadogan wrote:" If the contact was indeed Suffolk, I think it would be important for WW to let her know.
At that point there was no way for either ship to amend their position estimates without being able to get a proper fix."

Hi Paul,
sorry, here I think you haven't got the gravity of W-W behavior following your interpretation of the 2 above signals.

If he though that the positions were wrong, he was obliged to amend Suffolk one aligning his squadron to a single position (right or wrong, it doesn't matter than for BC1) ordering Suffolk to change his plotted position to avoid other misunderstandings (as he did after the battle)..... Failing to do so, is a serious negligence of his duty as CS1.

If he though that positions were reliable, then the conclusion is even worse, having sent an (intentionally) misleading message, as at 2:47 he should have been sure that the contact on 298° could be no other than..... the enemy.....(see Antonio's chart + Suffolk 2:47 message).


You know that I consider W-W as the worst officer present during the whole operation (on both sides), but I don't dare to think that he behaved so bad also in this circumstance. I honestly prefer to think that the 2 sightings are not related and that W-W was just acting in a "dull" way, not checking what he saw and not providing useful info to BC1, as during the whole night.....


Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ All,

I am surprised and a bit shocked for what I am realizing here now ...

Those 2 ( 02.29 and 02.55 ) occurrences ( +1 at 04.50 ) have been a lot understimated from my side until recently, ... for a valid logic reason I am going to explain you later on this post .

Lets assume that Paul Cadogan and Wadinga ( Sean ) are correct about the 02.55 Norfolk message being a communication intended just to add up to the 02.29 message providing a more clear explanation of a single spotting occurrence at 02.29.

I this case I think that Alberto Virtuani already explained above well enough how serious this situation will be when evaluating RearAdm Wake-Walker behaviour, ... why ? ... it is very, very simple and even worst than above mentioned ...

At 02.29 the enemy was still LOST !

Since the Suffolk lost the enemy at around 00.40 ... so close to 2 hours before, ... nobody knew where Bismarck and Prinz Eugen really where ... and consequently a 02.29 " large vessel "spotting was very, very important.

In fact Suffolk got again the enemy only at 02.47 !

Now, in this situation, what RearAdm Wake-Walker did at 02.29 having spotted a " large vessel " at 8 sea miles bearing 298° from his warship and having realized after 1 minute ( at 02.30 ) that it was NOT the Suffolk ( at 23 sea miles from him and on bearing 328°) ?

He did simply, ... nothing !

But he wrote he was patrolling/shadowing to eastward in order to prevent the enemy to escape on that direction, ... isnt it ?

So why he did NOT go for the verification of who that ship was ?

No actions, until 02.55 when 8 minutes after having received the 02.47 Suffolk message telling him where the enemy was and where Suffolk was, ... he sent out at 02.55 message telling everybody that he assumed that the previous spotting was " possibly the Suffolk " according to him, ...

But it is even worst than this of course, ... because at 04.50 ... after another 2 hours of doing nothing depending only on Suffolk shadowing efforts and radio communications, ... he asked if they still had contact with the enemy, ... clearly demonstrating his overall control of the situation, ... being not there at all.

Now back on why I was caught by surprise about this situation, ... well it is quite simple, ... because RearAdm Wake-Walker, when submitting to his superiors his report and attaching the :

- Appendix I - Extract from Signal logs covering the operations - Page 14 of Doc. Nr. 856/189 of 5th June 1941, ... signed by RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker Commanding First ( 1st) Cruiser Squadron

... he took the freedom to REMOVE the 02.29, 02.55 and 04.50 messages sent by himself from the HMS Norfolk ...

In fact there is the Norfolk at 01.45, ... after only Suffolk massages ... and Norfolk at 05.41 ( the enemy report ).

The messages sent by Norfolk at 02.29, 02.55 and the 04.50 have been intentionally removed from RearAdm Wake-Walker submitted report.

We can read and see them on their complete form just because we have it from the Admiralty Operation report ( Most Secret ) that Dunmunro ( Duncan ) kindly provided us some time ago.

I just let you take your own conclusions here ... I already did it ...

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ All,

WW_signal_report.jpg (77.12 KiB) Viewed 954 times

WW_signal_report_02.jpg (93.47 KiB) Viewed 954 times

By " Extracting the signal log " ... you REMOVE here and there .... both Suffolk as well as Norfolk messages ... especially the ones you DO NOT LIKE to be seen ...

In GREEN the 2 messages form Norfolk radio log ( 01.45 and 05.41 ) kept in the " Extract from Signal log ... " and in RED the 3 messages from the Norfolk radio log ( 02.29, 02.55 and 04.50 ) being REMOVED from the report.

Norfolk_messages_0145_0541_03.jpg (98.05 KiB) Viewed 949 times

Just " pick and choose " ... as you never know what can happen after ...

Bye Antonio

[Cag]

Hi All

Hi Antonio I can appreciate what you are saying and are trying to demonstrate and it is a good spot.

Again it is a little difficult to know as with the admiralty already being in receipt of all messages transmitted by all participating ships plus the message logs of Suffolk wouldn't trying to cover up anything be a little pointless?

But it does mean this again asks more questions than gives answers.

Did Wake-Walker remove these messages or did a subordinate?

If it was a subordinate was it his decision or was it an order from above?

If it was Wake-Walker or a subordinate was it to cover up ineptitude in identifying a vessel as friend or foe? Or because they were thought not relevant as they were regarding an unidentified vessel thought at the time to be Suffolk etc?

I realise it ends up again as a matter of opinion which will have those who support it and those who denigrate it. We have gone from Wake-Walkers creation of an alibi to his cover up for his ineptitude.

I suppose it also does not alter the fact that at the time the vessel that was unidentified was thought by Wake-Walker to possibly be Suffolk and anyone who read that message when received could make their own decision and have their own opinion as to it being ineptitude or confusion.

Of course as in every navy there are officers who are better or more experienced or more talented but I'm not sure we are the ones who have the right to condemn.

Did Wake-Walker do his job to the best of his ability and with the tools available to him? (Note I said to his ability not to Hollands ability or Lütjens ability)

Did the efforts of both Norfolk and Suffolk allow Holland to intercept Bismarck and Prinz Eugen?

Was Wake-Walker in any way to blame for the loss of the Hood?

Again it seems in error to try to ruin a reputation to make restitution for anothers. Wake-Walker made errors as did Ellis, turning away at least twice because of erroneous thoughts of Bismarck turning back on him. Lütjens Holland Leach Tovey all made errors but we are not witch hunting Tovey for thinking Bismarck was heading North instead of West.

Finding the truth is very noble but truth is relative, on the 24th both sides thought the truth was that their sides cause was justified, and that God was on their side. I'm afraid opinion is exactly the same, we are allowed to have one but it does not necessarily mean it is a fact or even the truth and I include myself in that.

Best wishes
Cag.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Cag wrote:"I suppose it also does not alter the fact that at the time the vessel that was unidentified was thought by Wake-Walker to possibly be Suffolk"

Hi Mr. Cag,
I do appreciate your fairness in your above post.
However, if the above was the case, why W-W did not amend the positions within his squadron ?

you wrote:"Of course as in every navy there are officers who are better or more experienced or more talented, but I'm not sure we are the ones who have the right to condemn."

I 100% agree with your first sentence. History will condemn anyway the less good ones (e.g. see Tsushima where the Russian admirals were IMHO even over-criticized) and Antonio is just trying to write the correct history of the shadowing phase.

you wrote: "Did the efforts of both Norfolk and Suffolk allow Holland to intercept Bismarck and Prinz Eugen?"

sorry, here I disagree. Only Suffolk efforts allowed the interception. Norfolk just covered a possible scenario that never developed and never helped BC1 via her messages.....


Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ CAG,

I think you are getting exactly what I think is the right way to see those historical facts 75 years after.

The truth can be definitive, ... or just a matter of opinions, ... what is important for an history researcher like I try to be, ... is to be able to provide as much as possible the evidence we can still find, ... and after let the readers make up their own opinion, ... either definitive and conclusive ... or not.

On doing so I have always found 2 main difficulties, ... try to stay away influencing with my personal opinion the way I propose the available evidence I find, ... and remove from everybody perception the " historical " way to see and evaluate those events that was written and sold thru the various books for 75 years.

Now, on this thread we have hopefully been able to better realize what was ViceAdm Holland approach to the 02.00 missed interception.

Currently we are focusing on the different performances between Capt Ellis on Suffolk and RearAdm Wake-Walker on Norfolk, ... always sold being similar all the way thru the night, ... like the summary of the battle Summary Nr 5 describes ( see the very first post on this thread on page 1 ), ... but now being evidently a lot different as we can easily realize thru the various messages evaluations.

Very few statements and pages being written about all those night events, ... a lot being simply disregarded as we can see.

Going thru them is learning how things really went that night, ... who did what, ... when and why, ... under which circumstances, ... what was the result, ... what could have been, ... this is history research.

The exercise I am trying personally to make on this moment is to put myself on ViceAdm Holland and Commander Warrand positions, ... or into the Admiralty War Room in London following this thru, ... or even being in the Norfolk Command bridge into Capt Phillips position, ... going thru all this on real time from 00.30 until 03.00 am ( more or less the enemy lost contact period ) ... this way I think many other evaluations can be made.

Now we know about those messages from RearAdm Wake-Walker and the Norfolk Gunnery Officer spot of what he assumed being the enemy ( Bismarck ) that night, ... and you do not find anything about those evidence in any book I have read so far.

Bye Antonio

[Cag]

Hi All

I think that it would be fair to say that Norfolk did transmit positional reports as did Suffolk. This must have given at least some information to BC1 if as is suggested those messages gave Holland the chance to reverse course and intercept Bismarck.

Both Norfolk's and Suffolks position reports were erroneous, both ships logs record DR positions at their 0800 1200 and 2000 entries during parts of the chase. Both ships no doubt accepted that their relative positions were in error and later amended them but any position report is better than none at all.

I am just a little confused as to the intentional or unintentional witch hunt of Wake-Walker as I'm not sure this aids Vice Admiral Holland or honours his memory?

Hollands interception was due in great part to the cruisers of CS1 and Hollands good use of them. Like it or not Wake-Walker commanded those cruisers, Norfolk was, if you don't like the word shadowing but essentially amounts to the same thing, following Bismarck more closely than any other ship apart from Suffolk.

I, like others are grateful for Antonios work and to all those that contribute, it all helps to understand the events. I'm just unsure when we say A) happened then B) happened which in my opinion means C) must be the reason. All fish swim, some fish swim in the sea. This does not mean all fish swim in the sea.

Best wishes
Cag.