Prinz Eugen's change of target order

[paulcadogan]

Hi all,

In the RN Articles of War thread, Wadinga made a very interesting observation that got me thinking. Not in the direction you intended Sean, and might be a bit crazy, but what the heck..... I'm on a "crazy" tip right now .... so let's see what you all think.

Shortly after Prinz Eugen hit Hood she received a signal from Lutjens ordering her to "Engage opponent furthest to the left" (as translated in her KTB).

We know there were three British ships to port of the Germans (from right to left) - Hood leading PoW close together and some distance further to the left we have Norfolk. According to the discussions in the Articles thread, it appears Norfolk was not engaged - at least we know for sure not at that stage.

We know that Jasper, PG's First Artillery Officer switched target to PoW and continued the engagement and very shortly thereafter, Hood blew up. Up to that point, PG had been under fire from Hood and therefore in grave danger of a crippling hit.

We know that Bismarck had accelerated and was closing the gap between her and PG.

"Engage opponent furthest to the left" - not "Engage opponent to the left" but furthest to the left.

Here is my question: What if Lutjens INTENDED PG to remove herself from the line of battleship gunfire and take on her opposite number??!! BUT within a moment or two Hood blew up, removing the immediate capital ship threat to Prinz Eugen...

We know that in the German evaluation of the battle there was criticism of Lutjens for not ordering PG out of the line of fire. We also have much evidence that Lutjens was a stickler for following protocol. So...

What if Lutjens DID want PG to turn and engage Norfolk which at 0555 (from her plot) had made a sharp turn towards the German line which could have been interpreted as an aggressive move. He accelerated Bismarck and closed with PG but yet did not order PG to increase speed. Why?

I am now very suspicious that Lutjens may actually have been playing by the German rules of engagement and was preparing to face Hood and Prince of Wales single-handed, allowing Prinz Eugen to engage her opposite number that was becoming an immediate threat. (Suffolk was still too far behind to be an immediate threat.) The destruction of Hood and the rapid retreat of PoW, with the concurrent withdrawal of Norfolk quickly eliminated any need for PG to make a move....

"Engage opponent furthest to the left".

Please don't wash me and hang me out to dry just yet...but there it is.

Paul

[tommy303]

That is an interesting thought, particularly as the order to engage farthest left was followed by a supplementary order not to fire over the flagship.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everyody,

well done Paul !

You are right Tommy, ... Prinz Eugen could surely NOT fire over the flagship, ... but what about the opposite ? ... Bismarck was suprassing Prinz Eugen on her starboard side at 30+ knots leaving Prinz Eugen at 28 knots behind within few more minutes ...

Think about what you, ... in the shoes of Admiral Lutjens ... would have done given the situation ... but now knowing the real situation ... since you have Norfolk at 12 sea miles ( 220 hectometers ) on your port side and she was able of 32 knots and equipped with torpedoes, ... but currently at 28 knots making an " arc " away, ... while 2 battleships are cutting your way ahead at 28 knots.

Lets see if we arrive at the same conclusion here and we would have given the same orders that Adm Lutjens did ... and in my opinion Paul corrected understood ... even if I am not so sur ehe intended immediately for Prinz Eugen to shift to Norfolk ... or he was thinking to do it after a while ... ( wechsel auf linken gegner = change to left opponent ).

Norfolk was NOT yet an opponent, ... was closing in but NOT firing nor coming fast for a torpedo attack ( the Baron was instructed to look for that since Adm Lutjens was afraid for that for the Bismarck back ... ), ... Norfolk at 05.55 was just slowly closing in ...

... now a lot of other pieces are going on the right place ... now that we know that Norfolk was there ... and was a factor in the battle ... at least it was for Adm Lutjens.

Question for you Paul :

What caused the change of course from 170 degrees back to 220 degrees at 05.33-37 by the Germans ?

Bye Antonio

[tommy303]

To me it appears that Lütjens' intention had been to surge forward so Bismarck could take the lead and place Prinz Eugen in her lee as far as the enemy battleships were concerned--in effect executing a numbers change. I think he did not order her out of line and to make a run for it since he did not wish to have her isolated without possibility of support from Bismarck. It would therefore make sense for him to issue the shift to furthest left, i.e., Norfolk and at the same time caution Prinz Eugen not to fire over the flagship as she came up. In any event, Prinz Eugen could usefully engage Norfolk and had a much better chance of damaging her or causing her to turn away than she had against Prince of Wales.

[paulcadogan]

That is an interesting thought, particularly as the order to engage farthest left was followed by a supplementary order not to fire over the flagship.

But that order came over 10 minutes later when, during the torpedo avoidance maneuvers, Bismarck came between Prinz Eugen and PoW....but she would have been between the Prinz and Norfolk too.

I'm glad you think my idea is "thoughtworthy" - but again it is based on the war diary translation, but the German is "Auf den Gegner am weitesten links". But Jasper reports that his ship's command instructed him to "Change target to the left" ("Zeilwechsel links") - so if there WAS an error in interpreting Lujtens' intentions it was Brinkmann's not Jasper's.

Question for you Paul :

What caused the change of course from 170 degrees back to 220 degrees at 05.33-37 by the Germans ?

I'm actually a little puzzled by this. PG's KTB notes the GHG picked up noises bearing 286 degrees from 0407 with nothing visible, then torpedo noises at 0425, but its not til almost an hour later (0521) that they make a hard turn to 170 deg, then back to 220 at 0532. The move actually brought on the interception by the British....AND WAIT A MINUTE!!

That change of course for 11 minutes would have significantly reduced the range to Norfolk, who was not maintaining contact with radar. Grenfell states Norfolk got visual contact with Bismarck & PG at about the same time as she sighted Hood & PoW at about 0515, so she should have been aware of their course change. If the Germans were at 16 miles at 0515, altered 50 degrees to port to 170 at 0521 and kept that course for 11 minutes AND Norfolk didn't alter away - we have an explanation as to why at 0535, the distance between her and the Germans was down to only 11 miles!

Here it is mathematically: If the Germans were doing 27 knots - that's 0.45 sea miles per minute - for 11 minutes that's 4.95 sea miles!! 16 minus 11 = 5 sea miles!! IT MATCHES!!

Wow....

[tommy303]

It's rather difficult to speculate on why the Germans altered course towards the sounds of Holland's on coming ships, thus bringing on the interception. The only reasonable thought I can come up with is, unlike the traditional view of Luetjens being hesitant, Luetjens may have been attempting to force an action. Group North had advised him that all enemy heavy units were still in port and the only ships he was likely to encounter would be cruisers patrolling the waters to the east and west of Iceland. He might have presumed that the approaching ships were more cruisers summoned to reinforce Norfolk and Suffolk. Perhaps he had it in mind to ambush the oncoming enemy ships before they could join up with Wake-Walker and form a coordinated squadron.

[Tom17]

Could the course change have been to get as much sea room as possible from Greenland?

[alecsandros]

The only reasonable thought I can come up with is, unlike the traditional view of Luetjens being hesitant, Luetjens may have been attempting to force an action.

But if he was trying to force an action, why did Bismarck opened fire so late ? Clearly, she opened fire very near to her guns optimal firing range, but why risk so much by leaving the enemy un-answered for a good 3 minutes ? [and if it weren't for Lindemann's classic commentary "I will not let my ship be blown from undr my ass", maybe the guns would have remained silent for even longer ?]

If he was hoping for a battle, then he took quite some risks, by exposing Bismarck to 38cm and 35.6cm artillery (which could easily bring heavy damage at that range).

On the other hand, perhaps he was hoping of out-running the enemy, and the manouvre which brought him on a steepr intercept course was done to avoid ice packs which would have hindered a full-power , maximum speed escape to the south...

[paulcadogan]

Could the course change have been to get as much sea room as possible from Greenland?

I don't think we have any references as to the proximity of Greenland ice. the only mention in PG's KTB is just after 1200 on the 23rd when there was an "evasion maneuver" at the ice limit. But if Lutjens was anticipating a possible confrontation with British ships, getting further from the pack ice would be a sensible move.

But if he was trying to force an action, why did Bismarck opened fire so late ? Clearly, she opened fire very near to her guns optimal firing range, but why risk so much by leaving the enemy un-answered for a good 3 minutes ? [and if it weren't for Lindemann's classic commentary "I will not let my ship be blown from undr my ass", maybe the guns would have remained silent for even longer ?]

If he was hoping for a battle, then he took quite some risks, by exposing Bismarck to 38cm and 35.6cm artillery (which could easily bring heavy damage at that range).

On the other hand, perhaps he was hoping of out-running the enemy, and the manouvre which brought him on a steepr intercept course was done to avoid ice packs which would have hindered a full-power , maximum speed escape to the south...

But at that point Lutjens wasn't anticipating British heavy units - Intelligence was telling him they were still at Scapa - so the pack ice theory or an intimidatory move versus suspected cruisers might be a better explanation.

[alecsandros]

But at that point Lutjens wasn't anticipating British heavy units - Intelligence was telling him they were still at Scapa - so the pack ice theory or an intimidatory move versus suspected cruisers might be a better explanation.

Yes Paul,
but at 5:45 there could have been very very little doubt about the identity of the 2 British ships, and at 5:52 already heavy caliber geisers erupted around the German ships - so it was clear that capital ships were on the move to intercept. So, why hold fire until 5:55, and even then only after a frustrated captain Lindemann apparently took charge over Lutjens ? If it were for Lutjens, perhaps the decisiion to open fire would have come later, or maybe it wouldnt't have come at all...

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

at Paul Cadogan

I'm actually a little puzzled by this. PG's KTB notes the GHG picked up noises bearing 286 degrees from 0407 with nothing visible, then torpedo noises at 0425, but its not til almost an hour later (0521) that they make a hard turn to 170 deg, then back to 220 at 0532. The move actually brought on the interception by the British....AND WAIT A MINUTE!!

That change of course for 11 minutes would have significantly reduced the range to Norfolk, who was not maintaining contact with radar. Grenfell states Norfolk got visual contact with Bismarck & PG at about the same time as she sighted Hood & PoW at about 0515, so she should have been aware of their course change. If the Germans were at 16 miles at 0515, altered 50 degrees to port to 170 at 0521 and kept that course for 11 minutes AND Norfolk didn't alter away - we have an explanation as to why at 0535, the distance between her and the Germans was down to only 11 miles!

Here it is mathematically: If the Germans were doing 27 knots - that's 0.45 sea miles per minute - for 11 minutes that's 4.95 sea miles!! 16 minus 11 = 5 sea miles!! IT MATCHES!!

Now that you understood what caused the German to close rapidly and unexpectedly to Norfolk,... please add to it the fact that Norfolk was placing himself some miles east ( WRONGLY !!! reference D. Mearns book ) of the position Suffolk was communicating he was and also were the Germans where. You correctly said that they WERE NOT under his radar control.
Now you can understand the surprise by both Norfolk and the Germans to face themselves at that distance .

We know how they reacted, the Germans altering course back on 220 degrees, ...the Norfolk doing the " arc " away, waiting the " BIG GUNS " to come in.
The German were MORE afraid of the coming 2 warships ahead closing in fastly.
Admiral Lutjens ...went on ALARM, ... made orders for the Baron ... kept Prinz Eugen at 28 knots, ... and increased Bismarck at 30+ knots, ... so a 32 knots torpedo attack from behind by Norfolk would have had less chances ... Bismarck was planning to surpass Prinz Eugen on the starboard side .... than Hood exploded ....

Please remember that German used 1 hour time set before the English on some documents

Bye Antonio

[tommy303]

but at 5:45 there could have been very very little doubt about the identity of the 2 British ships, and at 5:52 already heavy caliber geisers erupted around the German ships - so it was clear that capital ships were on the move to intercept. So, why hold fire until 5:55, and even then only after a frustrated captain Lindemann apparently took charge over Lutjens ? If it were for Lutjens, perhaps the decisiion to open fire would have come later, or maybe it wouldnt't have come at all...alecsandros

The Germans initially identified Holland's force as a pair of cruisers when they first came into sight. It was, afterall, what they expected to encounter. It was not, until moments before Hood opened fire that Albrecht in the forward fire control station voiced his opinion quite emphatically that the lead enemy ship was the Hood, that all doubts were dispelled. Luetjens had already hoisted JD, the preparatory signal to open fire, and this indicates that he was accepting battle. The realization they were facing capital ships required a change in ammunition orders. Initially, orders had been for base fuzed HE, ideal for fighting cruisers, and it would take a few minutes to remove base fuzed shells from the hoists and substitute AP (the guns were already loaded with base fuzed HE and so the first salvo or salvos were committed to this type). This accounts in part for the delay in opening fire. Although the Baron does not mention the ammunition order change, it did indeed take place since that is what Bismarck fired during the battle after the initial ranging salvos.

I doubt that Luetjens was hesitating as he had already given the order to engage by hoisting JD. The decision was Lindemann's, and he was a leading gunnery expert and would know when Bismarck and Prinz Eugen would be able to open fire with the best chances of scoring early hits. Most likely Lindemann's comment that he would not let his ship be shot out from under his ass as he gave the order Feuerlaubnis was meant as a humorus tension reliever rather than as a sign of frustration. Schneider in the foretop had been requesting permission to fire from Lindemann, and was probably the one with frustration.

[paulcadogan]

Thanks Thomas - that's the best explanation I've seen so far for the apparent hesitation. And permission to fire signaled to Prinz Eugen MUST have come from Lutjens - especially since she is supposed to have fired first.


But even Jasper clung to the belief he was facing cruisers until he saw Hood's unmistakable bow upright and sinking (much to the disdain of Admiral Scmundt in the aftermath). But then Jasper, intent on his targets, was not really watching the towering shell splashes that drenched his ship!

@ Antonio: The times I quoted are all from the KTB - 0407,0425 then 0521 - so should be consistent.

[alecsandros]

This accounts in part for the delay in opening fire. Although the Baron does not mention the ammunition order change, it did indeed take place since that is what Bismarck fired during the battle after the initial ranging salvos.

... The ammunition transfer , if it was needed, could have been done during the ranging salvos, so again I don't see a real reason for the delay. According to AVKS report of Bismarck, the ship's elevators could lift about 24 shells/minute to the main turrets, so about 3/gun/minute. Thus, even if the ready use ammo was entirely HE, there was still plenty of time to transfer AP ammo to the turrets. 3 minutes leaving the enemy un-answered is a big deal in naval combat - look at what happened to the Hood in 5 minutes (5:55 - 6:00), and to the Prince of Wales in the space of 3 minutes (6:00 - 6:03).

[tommy303]

It was a bit more complicated than that. Once the ammunition type was ordered, shells would be taken from shell bins using an overhead rail system and clamps to raise the shells and move them to a conveyer on which they would be placed so as to form a continuous train from shell room to shell handling room. In the handling room shells, as needed were taken from the conveyor and loaded onto ring cars which were then rotated and locked to the revolving hoist so the shells in the ring cars could be transferred to the shell hoist cars. One could therefore have six or so shells per gun in the transport train between shell bins and hoist.

If a change of ammunition was ordered, it was necessary to reverse the process and send the shells in train back to bins in the shell rooms, and this would take a few minutes at least with the crews working feverishly to make the change over and begin delivering the right type of shell to the hoists. One could use ready use shells from the stowage in the gun house, but these were of mixed types, and while the shells were so designed so as to use the same range tables, there were sufficient variations due to different shell lengths within the same weight class as to effect dispersion patterns and created distinctly different splashes. The Germans felt the APC to be the most accurate of the three types typically carried. For the sake of moving the mean point of impact onto the target, it was best to be consistent and fire the same type of shell for ranging and firing for effect.

If one were already firing on the enemy and had acquired the target, it would be more expedient to order the change and keep firing until the correct type began reaching the guns rather than cease fire until the change over could be effected and have to reacquire the target all over again. However, on Bismarck firing had not begun yet and it would have been worth waiting a few minutes to effect a change over from base fuzed HE to APC. In any event, it was actually a little faster to use the regular hoist system rather than have the gunhouse crew move shells from the ready-use bins and load them onto the loading trays, and speed was essential given the German practice of firing rapid bracket groups to find the range after the initial defelection salvo.