Hit on POW compass platform

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

from Hood board of Inquiry : EVIDENCE OF LIEUTENANT ESMOND KNIGHT, R.N.V.R., H.M.S PRINCE OF WALES. - 1st September, 1941.

197. Did you hear anything?
That was a very peculiar thing also - I don't remember even hearing the explosion at all. I remember listening for it and thinking it would be a most tremendous explosion, but I do not remember it, because practically immediately after that we altered course and the shell which came through the Compass Platform was the one that knocked me out. I don't remember much more after that.

Bye Antonio

[tommy303]

PG's HE should explode on water impact creating a bigger splash, possibly as big as Bismarck's non-exploding AP

Only the first two salvos from Prinz Eugen were loaded with HE nose fused shells (A+B and then C+D) as that was the type the guns were loaded with initially. Thereafter, if I recall Jasper's position paper regarding the action, HE with delayed action base fuses was fired throughout the rest of the action. The first ranging salvo landed astern and was the one commented upon in the court of inquiry into Hood's loss; the second was the one which scored the hit on the shelter deck near the ready use lockers.

Splashes from nose fused HE do not give a particularly good water column for spotting purposes in so far as it does not reach the height of an AP or SAP splash and is much more feathered or dispersed by the explosive action of the detonation, which explains in part the fact that the first salvo went unobserved by Jasper as it was masked both by Hood's bulk as well as by the first salvo fired from Bismarck.

Hits from 8 inch on PoW would have been by shells of the second type. Photographs of the exit hole through the plating around the AD position show considerable petaling, but in size is consistant with a 38cm shell rather than a 20,3 cm. It is probable that the British estimate of a 15inch shell causing the damage was based on the amount of destruction caused along the path of the shell through the compass platform and AD position as well as the exit holes caused by the shell.

[RNfanDan]

...the damage inside the compass platform was done by a 38cm shell's windscreen, which was knocked off during the initial impact.

The windscreen weighed 83kg, and it's metal fragments killed or injured most of the people inside.

This is what I read in most books and articles...

Fragments from the compass binnacle have been cited, as well--in some book I read back in 1972, IIRC....

The curtain panel and thin roof of the compass platform might have not have been "fragmented", but merely petaled outward (relevant to the shell's path of travel). 83Kg of shattered cap makes sense, as so much damage nowhere near the shell, itself was destroyed; it wasn't just a shock wave.

The entrance hole, as reported thoroughly in Garzke & Dulin's book, was rather large for an 8" or 5.9" shell.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

with this map piece and some latest determined references, I like to re-open the discussion we had on Hood forum years ago about the course alteration by PoW to avoid Hood remains, up until her turn away at 06.01 and 30 seconds.

So with the salvoes 15th, ... the hit on the compass platform and director by Bismarck, ... the salvo 16th, ... until the turn away visible on all PoW official maps starting at 06.01 and 30 seconds.

Bye Antonio

Course.jpg (108.63 KiB) Viewed 2460 times

[tommy303]

Just for the sake of clarity, follow the link to view photos of the shell hit through the compass platform:

http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarks ... amage1.htm

[RNfanDan]

Hello everybody,

with this map piece and some latest determined references, I like to re-open the discussion we had on Hood forum years ago about the course alteration by PoW to avoid Hood remains, up until her turn away at 06.01 and 30 seconds.

Bye Antonio

Course.jpg

This reopens an even bigger can of worms, because if the course of Prince of Wales had remained unaltered, as shown in the diagram just before Hood was struck by the fatal salvo, the ship seems sufficiently "clear" of Hood's starboard side to have avoided any "hard turn" to starboard to clear the wreck.

In the diagram Antonio posted above, the approaching track of the battleship suggests that she was in little danger of actually colliding with Hood's greater bulk. It has been argued endlessly that the 20°turn to port was never actually executed. Be that as it may, I have a problem "buying" the easy, slide-by path shown in that track chart. It follows NEITHER the "no turn" theory (i.e., no start of the port turn ordered by Holland), nor the more urgent, "emergency turn" theory (created by the initial progress toward port when PoW responded to its own port helm).

I won't dive back into THAT argument any further---but if we draw a black box around the event and look only at the before and after paths, some clock-time STILL needs to be accounted for. The track chart MUST emerge from that black box in a different way than it is currently shown.

I tend to side with Geoffrey Brooke's account. I place greater store in HIS words than many, because he was not only aboard the ship, but was in a prime position to know how hard the ship heeled-over. The turn upset the ship's gunnery, with which he was hands-on, eyes open involved. That's pretty hard to refute, especially as compared with someone off in another part of the ship---such as down below, in the boiler room.

Whether the ship had actually begun swinging to port (to follow Holland's "blue" signal) or not, Mr. Brooke's account supports the idea of a hard starboard turn made by his ship, initially. To me, it really doesn't matter; but the track, as drawn, cuts a compromise which is in need of attention. The problem then, at least for me, is that PoW must have swung out to starboard far more than what is being shown on the drawing. Out of that "black box" I described, the ship's path would start further north-west than is presently marked, resulting in a greater arc of compensating, port helm in order to reach its former course and bearing it was on, BEFORE Hood exploded.

If this can be fixed without re-opening the old "did-or-didn't" war, I'm all for it! I hope others here will agree.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ RNfanDan,

I fully agree on every single word you wrote

We need to evaluate a bit more accurately my track now, ... in light also of the recently found evidences by Thorsten on the film ...

Brooke narrative is very important as well as the PoW 4 official maps I attach here below for everybody convenience/analysis.

I like your approach of " black box " ... since we have a sure starting point, with time and course ... as well as a sure exit one with same details now ... so we just need to realize the best we can what happened in between that timeframe.

PoW_Hood_avoidance_01.jpg (99.21 KiB) Viewed 2400 times

Bye Antonio

[paulcadogan]

Hi all,

I support Dan's argument. In fact, I think, given the testimony of witnesses such as Brooks, there should be a single zig-zag in PoW's course to denote the hard turns to starboard then back to port to avoid Hood's wreck zone. It seems to me this turn was very brief and had little if any effect on McMullen's gunnery. In fact, he doesn't even mention it in his Gunnery Aspects Report and, if I am not mistaken, at no time does he state or imply that Y-turret was wooded during any salvo after 0557. He only states salvos 17 and 18 were "ragged" because the ship was under helm during the turnaway.

A brief zigzag-type starboard-port maneuver should not have disrupted her gunnery too much, and she resumed her 280 (or 260 as the case may be) course firing all turrets as shown in the battle film as she crossed in front of Hood. Then....on Leach's order when he recovered from the compass platform hit, she turned away to a 160 degree course.


But I've picked up on something else which could be significant : (From McMullen's report)

1.During the first action after firing salvo 12, a heavy hit was felt on the starboard side and the director setting mechanical pointer was seen to be oscillating violently. At the same time a fuze was noticed to blow at the panel in the 14-in. T.S. The director setting control trigger was used to move off the mechanical pointer. On release, the pointer settled in line with the indicator pointer and no further trouble was experienced.

Salvo 12?? A heavy hit was felt? This is well before PoW was under Bismarck's fire, but she was under Prinz Eugen's fire.

Then:

7. The 5.25-in. armament opened fire at a range of 18,600 yards. After firing a deflection triple, a 15-in. shell passed through the superstructure supporting the H.A. directors.

18,600 yards was well before Hood received her death blow. On the gunnery plot, this corresponds to just after 0557. The compass platform hit and the HACS hit supposedly both came in a approximately 0601. So the "deflection triple" took 4 minutes?? That does not compute!

Salvo 12, according to the plot was fired at around 0559 - then a "heavy hit" was felt. So STOP THE PRESSES.....do you see where I'm going here??

Is this evidence that Prinz Eugen scored the hit that disabled the HACS directors just after 0559 (rather than Bismarck at 0601) and in fact this was the first hit received by PoW??

What do you all think??

[tommy303]

Garzke and Dullin raised the same question regarding the hit which passed through the HACS support structure and disabled the directors. They felt that the damage did not correspond to a 38cm shell and it seems to have been too easily deflected from its flight path.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello Everybody,

@ Paul,

well done my friend ... you are getting close ... there is a lot more to say about this battle during those crucial minutes ... before ... and after ...

For so many years we have been reading what "somebody" wanted to be written at that time, ... and I fully understand the war and political strategical reasons ... what was written after accordingly, I can understand and accept a bit less ... it was only based on what was released ... almost nothing carefully researched, ... no historical deep investigation at all.

But no one can hide everything forever , ... even if they do not release what they still should have ... or intentionally delete the records.

So now please go and read KptLtnt P. Jasper report while he was changing the target from Hood to Prince of Wales at 05.59 after being ordered to do so by Admiral Lutjens.

You will read something interesting about Bismarck secondary 150 mm turret performances ...

@ Tommy303

YES, they were close too ... now we can correlate those evidences with the PoW official damage report ... after it has been released ...

@ all,

When I first started working on this battle, ... back on June 2003, ... this battle in summary was thought to be only 2 Hits received by Hood, ... and PoW disengaging at 06.13 after being hit 7 times well after Hood was sunk.

There was even a theory of reversed photos of Bismarck available online on the internet and printed on a book

The reality and the truth was thousands miles away ... and it has been a teamwork with many of you my friends that has allowed future generations to know a bit better what really happened ...

Bye Antonio

[Tom17]

Antonio,
Where could I find Jasper's report? or alternatively could you post the relevant parts.
Thanks
Tom

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

my pleasure to do it, translated in English by Ulrich Rudofsky for this website years ago.
You can find the original in German language into the PG KTB still on this website

The fire developed on the portside of the opponent ( Hood ), since the superstructures stood out as sharp silhouettes.
Immediately thereafter I received the order from the ship's command to "Change target (to the) left" toward the second opponent ( PoW ), whereby the fire of "Bismarck" and "Prinz Eugen" now crossed.
I was unable to observe "Bismarck's" decisive salvo because I was no longer in a position to do so.
I ordered the target officer (target giver) to acquire the second target ( PoW ) and thus lost the first (target) from the [range finder's] visual field of action ( HooD ).
Consequently, I did not perceive the detonation of the first target ( Hood ).
As was the case earlier, I commenced second firing with a full salvo followed by a ranging group (straddle ladder) which zeroed me in as of 05.59.
Firing for effect (rapid fire) was then initiated. The distance at that time was 160-170 hectometers.
During the completion of measuring fire effectiveness, I observed two well-placed strikes which again were fired simultaneously from the portside by the secondary artillery of the "Bismarck". At around the eighth salvo ( of Prinz Eugen new salvo counter havingr PoW as target ), the opponent turned hard toward (us=Prinz Eugen).
(Approximately 06.01 hours). Immediately thereafter, I saw the long bow section of a sinking ship ( Hood ) traversing behind the opponent ( PoW ), pointing about 45° skyward and extending far above the masts of the target ( PoW ).

So, once again observation from the enemy/opposite side ( the Germans ) do provide us precious information about the timing and the correct sequence of what was going on on-board the Hood and Prince of Wales. It is ONLY by carefully analize everything that we have the chance to properly correlate what happened in events sequence and timing.


In my personal opinion KptLtnt Paulus Jasper was one of the most precise writer about this battle on his battle report. He looked at the battle from a rangefinder, and not with naked eyes while doing something else, and Hood and PoW were his targets on the most important moment of his life. Unfortunately he did not write a book about it, but Fritz Otto Busch did it for him ... as he was with him up there

Bye Antonio

[paulcadogan]

Antonio & all,

I believe when Jasper refers to "strikes" he does NOT necessarily mean "hits" (it may be a translation thing!). I think he is referring to fall of shot - i.e. shell splashes. He actually states "portside strikes" i.e. these were "overs" landing on the opposite side of PoW - since her starboard side was facing the Germans (you omitted "portside" from your quote Antonio!)

Similarly the term "impacts" is also used in the translation for shell splashes.

But wouldn't a 15 cm HE shell from Bismarck have produced a shattering explosion on hitting the HACS structure which should have riddled the DCT (and McMullen & Skipwith!) with splinters (unless of course it failed to explode like some of the other German shells)?

[RF]

Course.jpg

Antomio,

Can I ask a question on this chart as there is a point I'm not clear on.

As I understand it from writers including Grenfell and Kennedy, Hood/POW went into action as one gunnery unit, with ships in line and Kennedy I think saying that POW was two cables astern of Hood.
On that basis then if Hood were to suddenly come to a dead stop without warning then POW must turn sharply to one side to avoid a collision.

The map here clearly shows that POW was not in line to Hood but on its starboard quarter. How is it established that the ships were not in line but on parallel courses? If POW was mean't to be in line and was offset then POW would make a correction to bring itself in line?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul,

I stand corrected my friend, ... as I do not know German and I trusted Ulrich translation, ... still it is interesting to know that Bismarck 150 mm port side 6 guns were doing the job exactly like Prinz Eugen 8 main 203 mm guns, ... and surely since 05.59 Prince of Wales was under a very rapid fire even before Bismarck turned her main guns to her. This has been one of the many very good decision of Admiral Gnther Lutjens ( or Netzband with him ). I think that if Jasper was not able thru his rangefinder view to see who hit between him and Bismarck 150 mm secondary ... no one can realize it now ...

Portside, ...Uhmmm... Jasper talks about portside 150 mm secondary artillery of Bismarck of course, that was exactly the side of Bismarck firing to PoW, the Bismarck portside secondary .... were he refers to portside shells landing or hits ??? can you explain it to me my friend ???

@ RF,

not in line, ... but slightly following on Hood starboard quarter 4 cables behind at 45 degrees.

Here the official drawing of the Hood board of inquiry showing their relative positions at 05.55, ... I have rotated it so everybody can see them on course 280 immediately before the ordered turn 20 degrees to port ( to go on course 260 ) was executed ( if it was ever started by them ) just when the Bismarck shell hit the Hood and PoW had to manoeuvre to avoid the possible collision with her wreckage still afloat, ... that first went down to the port side, ... than raised up sinking after 2 to 3 minutes.

Hood and PoW-ADM116-4351diagA.jpg (21.47 KiB) Viewed 2334 times

Bye Antonio