Lutjens' Intentions

[wadinga]

Vic,

Try this for size:

Uhrzeitgruppe 15:35 Message from Lutjens "Destroyed Hood this morning at 0600hours within 5 minutes of an artillery battle."

Maybe even Lutjens didn't know what time it was.

All the best

wadinga

[Vic Dale]

When put against everything else it looks like an error, possibly in translation, or in recording, or in KTB preparation at Group west. Remember it is a reconstructed war diary and not the real thing. I believe the KTB was prepared from a host of scraps of information, so that could mean anything.

I will however look very carefully at anything I use from Group West in future, though happily most of what I have can be corroborated from other sources.

BTW Ulrich Rudolfsky who translated the KTB points out the same time discrepancy and certain difficulties with what is recorded in the KTB on page 139 in relation to a signal sent at 1722;
"Radio message from Group West to Fleet 5:...." (see point 3 and Ulrich's accompanying remarks)

[Herr Nilsson]

...

[Thorsten Wahl]

The Germans used german summertime as reference time.

So western european time and middle european summer time should have been identical values.
also the times were identical, when the first contact was made (Suffolk sighted Bismarck on radar and Bismarck spotted Suffolk visually).

[wadinga]

Vic,

You never give up do you

Arguably the greatest success scored by the Kriegsmarine in World War II and you are claiming its recorded at the wrong time in the reconstructed official record..........

BTW the only way Ulrich spotted the discrepancy with the message you mentioned is because the Uhrzeitgruppe time stamp time of origin has to be earlier than the time the message is recorded as transmitted/received.

All the best

wadinga

[Vic Dale]

The reconstructed record has obviously been adjusted to suit Group West time. There is no other explanation. It is not the original document.

The Baron did not alter the times to match British records for nothing. What other times could have been used? Why did they set the clocks back in Bismarck and PG if they were going to use the same time set as the British and Group West?

The signal in question was sent to both the Office of Naval Operations and to Group West and the Time Segment/Uhrzeitgruppe for transmission is clearly 1508 in the KTB. The log time in the KTB is 1536, which is probably a mistaken transcription of 1556.

The signal you have presented is logged at 1656 an hour later and with an Uhrzeitgruppe of 1524, so clearly there is no direct correlation between the two. What you have is a relayed signal sent at 1524 and it has probably already been adjusted, so it makes sense on the grand scheme of things ashore. It is not the signal taken direct from the teleprinter, which would have been in code. It has been typed onto a signal form after decryption.

Does the statement from the Baron and the entries in PG's and Bismarck's KTB making it clear that clocks in Bismarck had been turned back one hour on the 23rd mean nothing?

[Herr Nilsson]

[RNfanDan]

The reconstructed record has obviously been adjusted to suit Group West time. There is no other explanation. It is not the original document.

Ahh, NOW we have the acknowledgement of my earlier point re: "reconstructed" documents....

Dan

[Vic Dale]

It all looks very confusing, but clearly these documents have been prepared for the wash-up at Group West and are not the original track-charts as used in the ship. I believe the Fleet Chief of Cruisers bollocked the officers of PG rigid for their lack of effort in producing these charts and told them to go away and do it again.

Here are the diary entries for the first engagement in the Denmark Strait;

23.5.41
1900 Clear ship for action. One cruiser of the "London" class in sight. She proceeded on a parallel course at 24 knots. "Bismarck" overhauled her. The Gunnery Officer received permission to open fire and fired three salvos. The cruiser disappeared out of sight and later on four cruisers were in the vicinity and two cruisers opened fire on each other. Later on the cruisers were astern of us and a periscope was sighted. The submarine submerged and the cruisers disappeared out of sight.

This is what is being described; Clear ship for action, track and mark the target, overhaul her, all of which might easily take 30 minutes and open fire is given at about 1930. Whereas in Suffolk Bismarck opened fire at 2031

Here are the diary entries for the sinking of the Hood;

24.5.41
0443 Alarm and at 0440 the enemy opened fire. There were two battleships. "Bismarck" returned the fire. At the first salvo the "Hood" was struck and set on fire. After the second salvo the ship blew up and sank within six minutes. The second ship was also on fire and turned away.

Here is the entry from a separate diary kept in the ship;
0500 Alarm. Battle cruiser "Hood" sunk after six minutes. Range 18,000 to 20,000.
0507 Sunk off Iceland 42,100 B.R.T. Great jubilation.

Very clearly the clocks in Bismarck were 1 hour behind those in the British ships, as described by the Baron and ordered by the Fleet Commander.

Finally I found this and I wonder where those timings came from other than PG's unadjusted War Diary. It does have a fairly convincing track chart for PG.

56.JPEG (175.5 KiB) Viewed 2631 times

Anyone know which publication this is from?

[wadinga]

Vic,

It would be confusing perhaps for someone without your naval experience, but you are just playing dumb to cover your dismay over your colossal faux-pas.

For those who have never been to sea, but are interested:

From Wikipedia "Nautical Time"

In practice, nautical times are used only for radio communication, etc. Aboard the ship, e.g. for scheduling work and meal times, the ship may use a suitable time of its own choosing. The captain is permitted to change his or her clocks at a chosen time following the ship's entry into another time zone, typically at midnight. Ships on long-distance passages change time zone on board in this fashion.

The ordinary sailors' diaries may well be in error on timing because they are based on clocks on local time and as you well know, Schmalenbach's description of the Denmark Straits fight is confused because he starts off on local time from his wristwatch before to switching to the Ship's Log time as described by both Thorsten and Marc.

The diagram from De Erstern Gefecht quotes local clock time, the wartime non-specialist readers did not need not bother themselves about exactly when it happened.

We know the Official Time as logged at the the time, on board the ships was the same in both British and German vessels.

All the best

wadinga

[Vic Dale]

You guys here really amaze me. I would never for a second have thought you would not know that ship's clocks had been set back one hour in Bismarck.

So you want further proof? Here is the evidence from the Interrogation Report regarding contact between Suffolk and Norfolk and Lutjens' squadron;

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Interrogation Report p. 12

Course was again altered at 0100/23rd May, to 226, which was calculated to bring the two ships into position to pass through the Denmark Strait. At 0400 the speed had been increased to 27 knots, the position being then roughly, according to one diary, 180 miles north-east of Iceland. At 1030, when the position of the two ships was stated to have been 68° North and 15° 30' West, they commenced the passage of the Denmark Strait. At 1240 (ship's time - the clock having been put back one hour), course had again been altered to 250°, the speed being 24 knots.
At 1705 the first alarm was sounded and repeated at 1822.

Of the ensuing contact, the official Admiralty communiqué (No. 427, 27.5.41) states that on the evening of 23rd May, Admiral Wake-Walker reported sighting a main force of one battleship and one cruiser proceeding at high speed to the south-westward. Visibility in the Denmark Strait was, at this time, bad and extremely variable. The range of the enemy was only six miles when sighted, storms of snow sleet and patches of mist at times reducing visibility to one mile. Despite the difficulties of visibility "Norfolk" and "Suffolk" shadowed the enemy successfully throughout the night. Meanwhile other British units were taking up dispositions at high speed with a view to intercepting the enemy and bringing him to action with our heavy forces.

The German account of these preliminary contacts, according to the diaries and prisoners' statements, is that at 1900 "Bismarck" cleared ship for action, a cruiser of the "London" class having been sighted. This cruiser was proceeding on a parallel course at an estimated 24 knots. "Bismarck" proceeded to overhaul the cruiser and at 1928 the gunnery officer received permission to open fire. Three salvoes were fired from her primary armament. The cruiser then disappeared out of sight, but later four cruisers (some of which prisoners suggested may have been icebergs) were reported in the vicinity and it was observed that two cruisers had opened fire on each other. Later the cruisers fell astern and a periscope was sighted. The submarine and the cruisers then disappeared from view.

The cessation of this phase of the action at 2215 was apparently received with relief and some elation in "Bismarck." The general feeling was that a trap had been set and had been evaded. The remark of one prisoner in his diary was: "The British must have noticed what we wanted to do. They had laid a trap for us, into which we would have fallen had not our ship had such high speed; it would have fared ill with us."

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

As can be seen the action is accounted for by the German survivors a full hour earlier than it was by the British.

Now we come to the greatest event in German naval history and we can see again that the times given are a full hour behind the times given by the British;

But at 0415/24th May a message in morse was flashed from the "Prinz Eugen" to the "Bismarck" that wisps of smoke had been sighted to port. The alarm was sounded immediately and "action stations" ordered. Thus opened the action with H.M.S. "Hood."

We now come to the question of the holes in Bismarck's bow;

Oberleutnant (Ing.) Karl Ludwig Richter, second officer attached to the damage control centre, went forward to inspect the damage and took charge of repairs. The salvage pump room in Section XVII was flooded and so this pump could not be used. The salvage pumps in Section XVII were not very effective and only succeeded in pumping a little water from the three forward sections after the shell entry hole had been plugged and the exit hole had had a plate welded on to it from inside under water by a diver. All available portable salvage pumps were now carried forward and employed.

Incidentally, Mr Waddingham's attitude has been noted. It seems he cannot make an intelligent comment without being abrasive. I have been patient with him until now, despite my earlier warnings, because clearly there is something missing in his sad little life. Hopefully he will learn to make his points without acrimony or spiteful accusations, though going on past record I have to doubt.

[Vic Dale]

Since my timings are nearly all taken from the Survivor's diaries it makes sense to use them when calculating speeds and distances steamed after contact was lost.

It may well be that the War Diaries(KTBS) were reconstructed to suit Group West's times, and there is a possibility that the 0720 signal stating that the ship had entered AK55, is one hour ahead of the timings I have used, but that makes no difference, because I have allowed for that. I did not include the avoidance maneuver in the track chart, having concluded that an element of dead reckoning error had crept in by that time with the result that the maneuver could have taken a longer or shorter time than has been shown in the published charts. The important point is the distance steamed between the position at which contact was lost and the position of AK55. Since the heading between 0306 and 0700 is consistent with the heading maintained throughout the day, I see no need to quibble.

It appears that Bismarck's Reconstructed KTB is synchronised with Group West time, for the point at which the ship was relocated. It makes absolutely no difference to the ship's position, as I plotted it using the Lat' and Long' coordinates from British sources. The only adjustment necessary is to weed out the 0930 time correction.

These points could easily have been made much earlier and without the need to resort to abuse.

As regards time setting in ships, it is not just the decision of the Captain. He is subject to the orders of his Fleet Commander when on an operation, so as to coordinate tactics and to make rendezvous. Lutjens ordered a change of setting to one hour behind CET. That is a fact and it cannot be altered.

[Herr Nilsson]

Prinz Eugen's war diary was not reconstructed.

[wadinga]

Hi Marc,

Can you think of a reason why Lutjens would put the wrong time on his radio message that you reproduced? I can't?

BTW thank you for putting so much genuine factual material to enrich this site and counteract all the other guff.

All the best

wadinga

[RNfanDan]

The German account of these preliminary contacts, according to the diaries and prisoners' statements, is that at 1900 "Bismarck" cleared ship for action, a cruiser of the "London" class having been sighted. This cruiser was proceeding on a parallel course at an estimated 24 knots. "Bismarck" proceeded to overhaul the cruiser and at 1928 the gunnery officer received permission to open fire.

The only cruiser fired upon was Norfolk, when Wake-Walker barged out of the fog ahead of Bismarck, dangerously close at about six miles. Norfolk was not on "a parallel course", but a tangential, opposing one. Norfolk turned to starboard in order to get back into the cover of the fog bank, which was to port of Bismarck during passage.

Based on this, it seems clear that at least part of the information contained within the interrogation reports could be regarded as suspect, at best. To what extent is perhaps undetermined, but it seems as if a disproportionate amount of reliance on these interrogations has been used to underpin much of what has been "built" here.

Perhaps it was in contrast to the wartime RN, that Kriegsmarine commanders kept the men of the "lower decks" exceptionally well-advised and updated as to course changes, reasons for doing so, etc.?