Lutjens' Intentions
Posted: Thu Jun 27, 2013 1:36 am
Studying signals between Bismarck and Group West regarding enemy shadowing and the intention to take the ship to France, I am beginning to form a slightly different opinion of Lutjen's intentions.
At 2056 on the evening of the 24th, Lutjens signallled group West as follows; "Impossible to shake off enemy owing to radar. Proceediing directly to Brest owing to fuel situation."
Bismarck was definitely not short of fuel at this time. After steaming from Gotenhafen and breaking out into the Atlantic, she still had 4,800 tons remaining, more than half her normal full load. It is thought possible that the ship had been carrying additional tonnage in the trimming voids fore and aft, making it possible that she started out with more than 9,000 tons. Further research may eventually reveal the truth about this.
4,800 tons is enough to steam at 28 knots for 96 hours, or to cover 2880 nm. Bismarck suffered damage during the battle with Hood and afterwards she was seen to be losing oil. Study of the ship's drawings however revealed that the loss was not likely to be more than 500 tons, if that and any oil isolated in the bow was later recovered, as could be expected. Had Lutjens chosen to head directly to France after shaking off the cruisers in the early hours of the 25th, the distance covered between sinking Hood and her arrival will have been 1625 nautical miles. This would leave a full 1255 tons of fuel spare, more than enough to cover that lost during the battle.
If Bismarck was not short of fuel, then the only meaning we can attach to Lutjens' signal is that with the enemy following in his wake, he would never be able to bunker, so he would have to break off the operation and make for France. Complete repairs would also be possible in a French dockyard. The altered situation in the Atlantic would mean that lengthy operations there would no longer be possible and that ships would in future be limited to sorties governed by their individual endurance.
At 0401 on the morning of the 25th Lutjens sent a detailed message to Group West outlining the action with Hood and shadowing operations against Bismarck. He made particular reference to enemy radar, which interfered to a considerable extent with operations in the Atlantic. He stated that it was impossible to shake off the shadowers and therefore he would not be able to refuel, unless he managed to shake off the enemy using superior speed. Since Wake Walker's cruisers were both capable of matching Bismarck's speed, it is likely that he thought that battering his way through the worst weather at top speed would eventually leave the enemy astern, as the more lightly constructed cruisers would suffer structural damage from pounding at high speed in a heavy sea.
Between 0306 and 0406 on the 25th, Lutjens managed to shake off his shadowers, something he had not thought possible earlier. Now the ship was alone and perhaps during the morning he concluded that he would be able to remain at sea and refuel. Preparations were being made to alter Bismarck's profile to resemble an American Battleship by the use of a dummy stack. This could only be of use if the ship was to remain at sea and would be intended for the eyes of passing neutral merchantmen, who would no doubt report the sighting. This ruse would not work with aircraft as experience with Luftwaffe observers showed they could not tell a battleship from a poorly made decoy. At altitude an extra stack would go unnoticed.
Group West signaled Lutjens at 0846 that morning, that the enemy had ceased sending sighting reports, so this would confirm to the Fleet Commander that a new situation now prevailed. Lutjens remained silent, though Group West continued to signal him with information as to the assets detailed to assist his arrival in France. At 2344 that evening Group signaled that they assumed he would still be making for France as outlined earlier.
Bismarck remained silent until at 1145 on the morning of the 26th she signaled, " Enemy Shadowing aircraft. Land plane."
In Bismarck Lutjens would know he had been spotted, but this was limited to aircraft and as yet there was no clear indication of shadowing surface ships. Warships could shadow under all weather conditions, aircraft could not, so the game was not up by a long shot, even though the presence of an aircraft carrier was indicated.
Not until 1800 did a surface ship in the form of Sheffield appear and she continued to shadow, by visual only. She did not have the new 284 set which had dogged Bismarck through the Denmark Strait and until contact was broken, so the worry about the new radar was not present at this time. The 284 set of Suffolk was identified in Bismarck and was not present now, so contact could more easily be broken during the night.
At 1903 that evening Lutjens signaled Group West, "Fuel situation Urgent. When can I count on replenishment." Very clearly, Bismarck would not be able to refuel under the gaze of enemy aircraft, so it seems obvious, if the signal was a genuine request for oil, that at that hour Lutjens still thought he could lose the enemy during the night, make for a prepositioned oiler and bunker before deciding whether to continue the operation or make for France. At any rate, if he managed to oil, it would be better to wait a few days and then move toward France. It seems in hindsight that this signal was simply advising Group West that the fuel situation could become urgent.
At Group West this seemingly urgent demand for oil caused some confusion, as it was thought that Bismarck was heading directly to France. They were not aware that Bismarck was short of fuel. In fact, had she been short, tonnage-lost figures would have been transmitted. Commodore Ruge sailed an oiler just in case it could be used, though how it could be used is far from clear.
The life and death of the Bismarck has been documented in detail many times and it is all too easy to fall into the trap of seeing that train of events mapped out as if written in stone, yet at the time the operation was being fought to a conclusion, a great many options presented themselves to the German Fleet Commander from time to time and it was his response to each of them which kept Tovey guessing. Even after the disastrous hit in the rudder compartment, Lutjens was seeking ways to gather his forces so as to make Tovey's job as difficult as possible. He was searching for the U-Boat patrol lines, which might intervene and take out one or possibly two major enemy assets, even though Bismarck would probably be lost. Some, not least the survivors of Bismarck, have interpreted this as fatalism. It was far from that. To the last, Lutjens was on the offensive. Steaming at just 3 knots during the final battle when the ship was capable of 12 knots, was a way of acting as decoy so his U-Boats might get into position for attack.
In the event it all came to nothing as do many well laid plans, but that should stop no one from recognising the possible underlying intentions.
At 2056 on the evening of the 24th, Lutjens signallled group West as follows; "Impossible to shake off enemy owing to radar. Proceediing directly to Brest owing to fuel situation."
Bismarck was definitely not short of fuel at this time. After steaming from Gotenhafen and breaking out into the Atlantic, she still had 4,800 tons remaining, more than half her normal full load. It is thought possible that the ship had been carrying additional tonnage in the trimming voids fore and aft, making it possible that she started out with more than 9,000 tons. Further research may eventually reveal the truth about this.
4,800 tons is enough to steam at 28 knots for 96 hours, or to cover 2880 nm. Bismarck suffered damage during the battle with Hood and afterwards she was seen to be losing oil. Study of the ship's drawings however revealed that the loss was not likely to be more than 500 tons, if that and any oil isolated in the bow was later recovered, as could be expected. Had Lutjens chosen to head directly to France after shaking off the cruisers in the early hours of the 25th, the distance covered between sinking Hood and her arrival will have been 1625 nautical miles. This would leave a full 1255 tons of fuel spare, more than enough to cover that lost during the battle.
If Bismarck was not short of fuel, then the only meaning we can attach to Lutjens' signal is that with the enemy following in his wake, he would never be able to bunker, so he would have to break off the operation and make for France. Complete repairs would also be possible in a French dockyard. The altered situation in the Atlantic would mean that lengthy operations there would no longer be possible and that ships would in future be limited to sorties governed by their individual endurance.
At 0401 on the morning of the 25th Lutjens sent a detailed message to Group West outlining the action with Hood and shadowing operations against Bismarck. He made particular reference to enemy radar, which interfered to a considerable extent with operations in the Atlantic. He stated that it was impossible to shake off the shadowers and therefore he would not be able to refuel, unless he managed to shake off the enemy using superior speed. Since Wake Walker's cruisers were both capable of matching Bismarck's speed, it is likely that he thought that battering his way through the worst weather at top speed would eventually leave the enemy astern, as the more lightly constructed cruisers would suffer structural damage from pounding at high speed in a heavy sea.
Between 0306 and 0406 on the 25th, Lutjens managed to shake off his shadowers, something he had not thought possible earlier. Now the ship was alone and perhaps during the morning he concluded that he would be able to remain at sea and refuel. Preparations were being made to alter Bismarck's profile to resemble an American Battleship by the use of a dummy stack. This could only be of use if the ship was to remain at sea and would be intended for the eyes of passing neutral merchantmen, who would no doubt report the sighting. This ruse would not work with aircraft as experience with Luftwaffe observers showed they could not tell a battleship from a poorly made decoy. At altitude an extra stack would go unnoticed.
Group West signaled Lutjens at 0846 that morning, that the enemy had ceased sending sighting reports, so this would confirm to the Fleet Commander that a new situation now prevailed. Lutjens remained silent, though Group West continued to signal him with information as to the assets detailed to assist his arrival in France. At 2344 that evening Group signaled that they assumed he would still be making for France as outlined earlier.
Bismarck remained silent until at 1145 on the morning of the 26th she signaled, " Enemy Shadowing aircraft. Land plane."
In Bismarck Lutjens would know he had been spotted, but this was limited to aircraft and as yet there was no clear indication of shadowing surface ships. Warships could shadow under all weather conditions, aircraft could not, so the game was not up by a long shot, even though the presence of an aircraft carrier was indicated.
Not until 1800 did a surface ship in the form of Sheffield appear and she continued to shadow, by visual only. She did not have the new 284 set which had dogged Bismarck through the Denmark Strait and until contact was broken, so the worry about the new radar was not present at this time. The 284 set of Suffolk was identified in Bismarck and was not present now, so contact could more easily be broken during the night.
At 1903 that evening Lutjens signaled Group West, "Fuel situation Urgent. When can I count on replenishment." Very clearly, Bismarck would not be able to refuel under the gaze of enemy aircraft, so it seems obvious, if the signal was a genuine request for oil, that at that hour Lutjens still thought he could lose the enemy during the night, make for a prepositioned oiler and bunker before deciding whether to continue the operation or make for France. At any rate, if he managed to oil, it would be better to wait a few days and then move toward France. It seems in hindsight that this signal was simply advising Group West that the fuel situation could become urgent.
At Group West this seemingly urgent demand for oil caused some confusion, as it was thought that Bismarck was heading directly to France. They were not aware that Bismarck was short of fuel. In fact, had she been short, tonnage-lost figures would have been transmitted. Commodore Ruge sailed an oiler just in case it could be used, though how it could be used is far from clear.
The life and death of the Bismarck has been documented in detail many times and it is all too easy to fall into the trap of seeing that train of events mapped out as if written in stone, yet at the time the operation was being fought to a conclusion, a great many options presented themselves to the German Fleet Commander from time to time and it was his response to each of them which kept Tovey guessing. Even after the disastrous hit in the rudder compartment, Lutjens was seeking ways to gather his forces so as to make Tovey's job as difficult as possible. He was searching for the U-Boat patrol lines, which might intervene and take out one or possibly two major enemy assets, even though Bismarck would probably be lost. Some, not least the survivors of Bismarck, have interpreted this as fatalism. It was far from that. To the last, Lutjens was on the offensive. Steaming at just 3 knots during the final battle when the ship was capable of 12 knots, was a way of acting as decoy so his U-Boats might get into position for attack.
In the event it all came to nothing as do many well laid plans, but that should stop no one from recognising the possible underlying intentions.