should have the prinz eugen stayed with the bismarck ?

[Herr Nilsson]

... that communications are very direct and clear in their expression.

Exactly, that's why Lütjens said " ...halten weiter Fühlung"

[Lutscha]

It is beyond me how much time people like Vic Dale waste to write such excessive amounts of bullshit in forums. Now we're at a point where even native speakers are getting lectured about their own language...

Kickban please.

[Vic Dale]

I am not trying to translate German. Ulrich did a good enough job for me. What I was trying to get at was the possibility that the Kurzignal Code book may have had a different meaning. It seems clear that the U-Boat Kurzignal Code Book was not used, so Ulrich's translation stands. If anybody wants to take issue with what Ulrich translated, take it up with him not me. I have not read it from German, but from Ulrich's translation into ENGLISH. I have English as my first language and Ulrich wrote "maintains surveillance." Maintain surveillance in English means keep a look out.

The whole thing about Kurzigals is a bit cloudy. Example, 1154 on the 26th;

"Kurzignal Von Flottenchef: Fiendliches Flugzeug hält Fühlung (seit...) Radflugzeug! Flottenchef." Translates to Hostile aircraft maintains surveillance. Fixed wheeled plane!.

It says Kurzignal and there is no Uhrzeit Group, which should be there if it was an ordinary Radio Telegram.

Then at 1155; "Kurzignal Von Flottenchef: Gross quadrant BE 27! Flottenchef."

I can see how the second signal might figure as a three letter signal in the code book, but the first one might need some stitching together.

I have l just looked again at the KTB and Ulrich makes it clear that there was a short signal book with coded expressions. This may have been different from the U-Boat code book. Ulrich seems to think that the limitations imposed by the short signal code book made for a confusing signal sent at 1903 on the 26th; "Fuel situation urgent." Which seems to have meant "Fuel situation may become urgent." If the fuel signal was ambiguous due to the code book, then so too could the signal about the enemy maintaining surveillance.

I urge everyone to have another look at the KTB page 163.

[Vic Dale]

At 1348 on the 24th, Lutjens signaled Group West; ".....King George mit kreuzer hält fühlung....."

at 0727 on the 25th he used the term "....halten fühlung....."

Is there some hidden nuance between the use of the words halten fühlung and hält fühlung?

[Herr Nilsson]

The first is singular and just places emphasis on King George (PoW) the second is plural. There is no hidden nuance.

[Vic Dale]

I did wonder if the 'Umlaut' indicated plural, but how about the signal about the wheeled aircraft sent at 1144 on the 26th;

"Feindliches flugzeug hält Fühlung"

That should be singular as it was a single aircraft.

Do you have the short signal book as used by Lutjens? If you do, then there should be a signal with exactly that formulation.

[tommy303]

It says Kurzignal and there is no Uhrzeit Group, which should be there if it was an ordinary Radio Telegram

To the best of my knowledge, Kurzsignale were not transmitted with Uhrzeit Gruppen, at least I have not seen one that was. \

Do you have the short signal book as used by Lutjens? If you do, then there should be a signal with exactly that formulation.

There were several tactical short signal code books used at different times during the war, and most probably the one employed by Luetjens' staff was the 1941 edition of the Kurzsignalheft and the proceedure was the Alpha signal in which the body of the message was a single four letter group corresponding to a tactical phrase in the signal book. This would account for the second short signal you mention at 1155 giving the position grid. The Beta signal method which came into operation in 1942 was more complex and allowed for multiple four letter groups. Even so, the limitations imposed by the phrase books was such that a more complete one was introduced in 1944, and signals sent using it required less reading between the lines on the part of the recipient. There were also various editions of the short signal weather book, called the Wetterkurzschlussel.

[Vic Dale]

HI Tommy.

Many thanks for that, If anyone has that signal book for 1941, it might well show us what it all actually means.

As regards Uhrzeitgruppen (time segments), I have noticed that Group North transmitted wireless telegrams without time segments. I believe that Group West was subjected to intense jamming from British jamming stations and possibly Group North was spared this nuisance, when communicating with Bismarck up around Iceland. Possibly the short signals were transmitted so quickly there was not enough time to jam them and maybe this explains why they had no Uhrzeitgruppe. In that case, the Uhrzeitgruppen would be necessary to illustrate the time and tactical context of any signal.

I believe that jamming was a case of identifying enemy traffic on a particular wave length and then transmitting full power over it. If all wavelengths were permanently jammed, own traffic would not get through. If transmitters had been installed in Northern Norway, the enemy would not be able to jam signals to and from Group North with sufficient power.

[Nelson Ott]

It is beyond me how much time people like Vic Dale waste to write such excessive amounts of bullshit in forums.

It is a pity that some people take their time (and ours) posting such comments. I find Vic's posts most educational and I truly admire his ability to see things "out of the box" on so many naval subjects. I am not saying I agree with everything he writes, but we have to admit he has shed a new light on a lot of long-established "true" facts. Furthermore, having belonged to the RN, he has an authority on naval subjects that few on this forum can match.

Regards

Nelson

[Vic Dale]

Hi Nelson.

Many thanks for your supportive comments. To my mind, if history is not to be questioned, it is not worth bothering with. Those who post spiteful comments generally tell us more about themselves than anything else. I think they are a sorry bunch.

It is refreshing to read that a person like yourself can disagree without getting personal. I often wonder how many people are put off posting themselves by the personal attacks.

I would welcome your comments on any of my observations in support or otherwise.

Warmest regards

[sineatimorar]

Wow! This question has definitely generated a lot of interesting information to come out. I apologize if my last post offended as I was only trying to bring the conversation back to point. I will obviously have to run some navigational simulations to answer the interception question. So far I have not read any comments on the fact that the pg AA performance during the war as exemplary, no mention as yet that the 3d AA directors destined for the Bismarck were sold to the ruskys, so he was fitted with old 2d units. As I understand the situation after the victorious attack, the loss of top speed was do to the flooding of port boiler room (damaged earlier by 14 inch hit.) The torpedo hit opened the weakened rivet seams of the torpedo bulkhead.). Further before this attack the reduced speed of advance was to reduce flooding pressure on the damage control efforts in those zones. And yes I wrote 'rivets' ,from my extensive research in the Bismarck's design (and yes I get seriously irritated with 'Bayern'/Baden references) As we call these ship "Dreadnought" do we not? Therefore ALL battleships designs are linked to that earlier ship. Back to point, apparently the only "welded" armor was the 50mm sea deck.I wouldn't mind any clarification on that point as it comes under the heading of 'Design faults that sank the Bismarck.' if confirmed. Only have one sources so far.The rest seem to 'Assume' the Wh & Ww armor as been weldable therefore was.Something to do with the lack of raw materials to make the welding rods.

[RNfanDan]

... but we have to admit he has shed a new light on a lot of long-established "true" facts...

Mr. Dale is a fine advocate for revisionism to be sure, and there is no argument here that he has indeed taken many second looks at the "common knowledge" surrounding the Bismarck affair. But raising questions is far different than providing evidence to refute such "common knowledge". Changing historical understanding through campaign and committee, simply will not stand on its own merits.

It is first incumbent on the challenger to study the known facts, investigate suspected flaws/errors/non-truths, provide factual evidence to challenge those things (requires research, unless one is/was a first-person witness to the error), and present them in a "This is wrong, and here's why" format. Such is not the case, and has not been for a number of years now, with said advocate. This is by no means the first such attempt, nor the only forum used by Mr. Dale since 2005, and his rebuffs have been numerous.

I will refer you to the very fine book Shattered Sword by John Parshall and Anthony Tully, wherein a major re-set of the historical record of the Battle of Midway (1942) was achieved with resounding success. Thanks to that book, which was exceptionally well-researched and its corrections to the historical record presented in detail and clearly explained, the detailed accounting of that battle has now been established as the one much closer to reality than those which came before. Mr. Dale probably has good reason, as did Messrs. Parshall and Tully, to suspect that certain aspects of the accepted record are not as they should be.

It is fine to have such doubts/suspicions, but protesting and proselytizing only go so far--vague suspicions and anecdotal testimony, from a long-postwar experience in a peacetime RN, simply won't suffice for documentary, photographic, and fact-based research, such as that which successfully changed the known story of Midway just a few years ago.

I applaud Mr. Dale's zeal, but one can't repair broken history without the proper tools and the knowledge required to use them. Secondary sources and recruitment of supporters are very poor choices of establishing valid research. and this sort of "overloading of the circuits" has become almost a trademark, resulting in threads being closed and/or other moderator actions, both here at K-Bismarck and other forum discussion sites.

No ad hominem attacks intended, just my interpretation of matters present and past.

Dan

[tommy303]

no mention as yet that the 3d AA directors destined for the Bismarck were sold to the ruskys, so he was fitted with old 2d units.

Yes, as required by treaty, two of the triaxle Flak directors from Bismarck (the two aft ones) and two from Prinz Eugen (the two forward ones) were transferred to the USSR for installation on the ex-Luetzow. Prinz Eugen received replacement triaxle directors while at Brest, as would Bismarck had she made it to France safely. Another problem facing Bismarck's heavy Flak installation was half of the mounts were of an older, slower pattern and so not properly integrated into the fire control system which had been optimized for the newer mounts. Once more, it was planned to replace these with the proper mounts at the first opportunity.

[Vic Dale]

Well another long post from Dan about me and with nothing added to the discussion. I don't need a committee and will happily stand as a minority of one if I think I have a point to make.

There have been a great many "established facts" in world history and it is only when challenged that a more sound alternative emerges. I cite the Battle of the River Plate, which on the day was actually a German Victory. Commodore Harwood lost more than a third of his fighting force, trying to take Graf Spee on with guns, when in his arsenal he had the perfect weapons with which to sink the German, Torpedoes, but in a belated attempt to use them and with only two vessels under his command, having effectively lost Exeter, was driven off and was forced to open the range. The history books following the British propaganda line, maintained that Graf Spee had run away. How could a ship which could only make 24 knots (with a foul bottom) run away from two 32 knot cruisers, who were determined to fight?

Another long held belief is that Bismarck ran out of fuel. More detailed analysis, using fuel consumption graphs and the war diaries of PG and Bismarck to establish time steamed at various speeds until separation, shows that she did not and this explains Group West's extreme concern at learning that this might indeed be the case. This in turn has led to the re-examination of the KTB in which the signals sent by Lutjens are shown. The signal pertaining to fuel sent on the evening of the 26th no longer speaks of current urgency over fuel, but of future shortage unless oiling can be arranged. The signal sent saying the ship would have to make for France due to fuel, turns out to be a warning that due to radar and the impossibility of bunkering with hostile ships in the vicinity, the operation could not continue as planned. When it has been categorically stated and with authority that Bismarck could only hold 7400 tons of fuel, my challenge to this assertion establishes that she could carry at least 8250 tons, though with only 90% useable. Bismarck had fuel enough and more.

The 30 minute signal sent by Lutjens now turns out to be four much shorter signals, each likely to account for no more than 15 seconds of transmission time and the time of that first transmission is now firmly established as 0401 instead of the mistaken 0852, due to misinterpretation of the ships War Diary (KTB). We now know that Bismarck was not subjected to accurate DF fixing and that she was rediscovered on the 26th by long range aircraft patrolling along lines predicted to be her heading. Predicted by an astute RAF officer from Coastal Command who made an informed guess. Doesn't he deserve recognition for this feat?

This is all history which has had to be rewritten, once the facts have been properly assimilated. Have we lost anything by this? I think not and if anything I have done here and elsewhere has caused people to think for themselves instead of regurgitating what others have written, I have achieved what I set out to do. I am not a published writer and at the time of writing these lines do not intend to become one. In my own view, history is not best served by those hurrying to publish. A great many have done a rushed job on the basis of assumptions and erroneous interpretation, and got it wrong.

The likes of Dan seem to want history to be some sort of touch stone, something solid to make up for the lack certainty perhaps in a shifting world. If you have woodworm in your joists, it is no good giving the floorboards which cover them an additional coat of varnish. Those floor boards have to come up so the joists can be got at and the suspect wood replaced. The same is true of history. If there is a flaw in what has come to be known as the foundation of a particular historical event, that flaw has to be examined even at the expense of some heart felt and cherished notions.

I do not approach the question of history from the stand point of stroking my own ego - unlike some here - through bullying, or to gain personal accolade. There are easier ways to make friends - and enemies. I am only interested in logic and if I find the train of logic wanting in some way, that is where I will focus. I don't simply want to become convinced, I want to know.

It is my contention that PG could not aid Bismarck through direct intervention, using her flak or otherwise. The most use she could be would be to engage in cruiser warfare and diffused the intense focus on Bismarck. If Bismarck has already drawn the enemy battleships away from the convoys, PG can attack at will. The basic tenet of the operation has been served. If Bismarck has managed to patch the holes on her bow, the operation can continue. She can remain at sea and if Lutjens can keep Tovey guessing, he will be able to make the operation a success even though he has had to adapt the original plan to the new situation in the Atlantic.

Had PG been able to remain at sea herself, she could have done untold damage to British commerce and in combination with the U-Boats may have decisively tipped the balance in the Atlantic in favour of Germany, even with the Home Fleet being more or less fully intact. With Tovey's need to draw on such large naval resources, the convoy system was badly disrupted, robbed of their heavy and medium escorts. Had PG managed to steam unmolested she could have destroyed any convoy she found in short order, even with Bismarck sunk on the 27th. Had Bismarck managed to remain at sea, the toll could have quadrupled and more in a couple of weeks. The only way to save the ships would be to stop the convoys.

[RNfanDan]

There have been a great many "established facts" in world history and it is only when challenged that a more sound alternative emerges. {and} I ... will happily stand as a minority of one if I think I have a point to make.

I fully concur, Vic. The difference between having a point to make and actually MAKING it, especially if you wish to achieve "a more sound alternative" ---and make it stick--- is to back up your challenge with solid facts and research. If you disagree with me, that is freely your call to make---but I don't expect you will be taken very seriously, and CERTAINLY you should not expect to successfully achieve your aim.

I cite the Battle of the River Plate, which on the day was actually a German Victory. Commodore Harwood lost more than a third of his fighting force, trying to take Graf Spee on with guns, when in his arsenal he had the perfect weapons with which to sink the German, Torpedoes, but in a belated attempt to use them and with only two vessels under his command, having effectively lost Exeter, was driven off and was forced to open the range. The history books following the British propaganda line, maintained that Graf Spee had run away. How could a ship which could only make 24 knots (with a foul bottom) run away from two 32 knot cruisers, who were determined to fight?

Wrong question to ask, Vic.

The proper one (in my opinion) is: Why did Langsdorff flee into Montevideo when he had only two, damaged, six-inch cruisers to defeat, after having knocked Exeter out of the fight? I agree Ajax and Achilles were, in the usual RN tradition, very aggressive and willing to press the issue; Langsdorff, however, chose NOT to remain at sea and continue the fight, despite having guns that could easily outrange both light cruisers.

If Ajax and Achilles had turned to flee, as your comment implies, there seems little left to have stopped Langsdorff from finishing off the crippled Exeter, now unsupported by the other cruisers. The very best that can be offered to Langsdorff, in that event, is credit for no more than a draw (considering he was now mission-killed), and I would love to see some hard facts or at least, good references for supporting this diversion from topic.

Another long held belief is that Bismarck ran out of fuel.

I don't agree. I have read nearly all publications extant that are worth reading of the Denmark Strait action, and not a single one of them cite an empty-tanked Bismarck wallowing in circles off Biscay on the morning of May 27th. If you are aware of any serious treatises which state that Bismarck was indeed out of fuel, and not crippled by what really happened (jammed rudder(s) from a torpedo strike) I'd sincerely appreciate it if you'd clue me in on their titles (offline via PM, of course).

The 30 minute signal sent by Lutjens now turns out to be four much shorter signals...{and} We now know that Bismarck was not subjected to accurate DF fixing and that she was rediscovered on the 26th by long range aircraft patrolling along lines predicted to be her heading.

I agree, Vic--but this has already been challenged and established by others, in older accounts of the chase than this discussion, which have appeared after the 1970s & '80s-era publications includingPursuit and Battleship Bismarck (original edition, 1980) were marketed. If you would have taken time to LOCATE and CITE those more recent and correct references, rather than posting draughty, anecdote-riddled diatribes here and elsewhere/now and then, a whole lot less website bandwidth and circular forum arguments could have been spared.

As to the sighting by

...an astute RAF officer from Coastal Command who made an informed guess... {and} Doesn't he deserve recognition for this feat?

I do believe he DOES. In fact, I believe (correction invited) he has been at least credited with the feat in Ludovic Kennedy's book, Pursuit, complete with photograph, a fellow named Dennis Briggs IIRC--I don't have the book to hand at this time, but I am aware of his achievement and have been, for some 40 years now. As him receiving "official" merits for his task---if he has not, to date, then I wholeheartedly endorse such official recognition. What needs to be done to achieve this?

I am not a published writer and at the time of writing these lines do not intend to become one. In my own view, history is not best served by those hurrying to publish. A great many have done a rushed job on the basis of assumptions and erroneous interpretation, and got it wrong.

Not a great many however, have posted lengthy threads since the mid-2000s filled with anecdotal fluff, distracting asides, and ever-changing "facts" in their attempt(s) to bring historical revisions to light.

One need NOT actually write a book-length manuscript, but the documentation of one's efforts---as I stated---SHOULD be supported by evidence (preferably by not less than primary and strong secondary in its nature). There are persons and facilities available, eager to acquire well-founded, corrective research--including those whom will pay for such material. None of those venues seem likely to accept ill-founded, anecdotal, misinterpreted, baseless, inconclusive, opinion-based, speculative, flawed, or adulterated material. Your photographic evidence, alone has been debunked not only here, but at other forums and internet sites, dating back several years.

I'm not knocking all of your suspicions, in fact I feel you DO have some reasonably strong arguments to bring forth; but good arguments NEED good support, otherwise they differ little from those of a bellicose pub "regular", pining over his lost loves. It is also unfair, in my opinion, to campaign for your ideas at various forums and not expect opposition, Vic---especially when you rely on the work of others at those forums to support your contentions, without the research you should at least have begun to acquire in order to buttress your contentions.

The likes of Dan seem to want history to be some sort of touch stone, something solid to make up for the lack {of} certainty perhaps in a shifting world.

Vic, did you bother to even read my earlier post, re: Shattered Sword? I am nothing but thrilled by their overhaul of some six decades' worth of the "accepted" historical record regarding Midway, and I sure as Hell am not averse to any similar efforts regarding other "not quite accurate" history, either! At least one author has begun to address the "accepted" historical perceptions of the Mediterranean war and, although his opinions and conclusions are somewhat biased in my opinion, his FACTUAL research seems unimpeachable.

As far as my regard of history as a "touchstone", you nailed me spot-on! There is NO history that actually changes after all; the past IS the past, and events CANNOT be altered from what actually happened. On the other hand, there is no lack of conspiracy theorists, axe-grinders, frauds, miscreants, and misinformation out there. I know this, because I used to count myself among a group of "believers" in a JFK conspiracy (more than one gunman); that is, until I performed some in-depth research and removed myself from a "camp" wholly informed by ill-founded, anecdotal, misinterpreted, baseless, inconclusive, opinion-based, speculative, flawed, and adulterated information. What a waste of my time.

You'll pardon me, I'm hopeful, if I seem "once-burned, twice shy"....

Dan