Bismarck Returns to Norway

[Vic Dale]

I only included Rodney in the calculation in case Lutjens decided to go back via the Faroes-Hebrides route. Only on that route would she be able to form up with Tovey.

I have taken a little time to draw up a position chart based upon Lutjens turning back immediately the Hood was sunk. As you can see the cruisers Arethusa, Birmingham and Manchester are in position across the Iceland-faroes and ready to move north to the eastern end of the Strait. Tovey in KGV with repulse and Victorious are to the South of Iceland, ready to turn Northeast and follow them. Wake-Walker in Norfolk with Suffolk and PoW will be hard on the heels of Bismarck as she makes her return towards the minefield.

At the point where Bismarck and PG start to negotiate the minefield, the three cruisers and four destroyers will be in position to intercept and Tovey with the battle squadron will already be on the eastern coast of Iceland. If Bismarck gets through the minefield again without difficulty, she will be intercepted by Tovey and the full force at about 0600, unless Lutjens fancied his chances of fighting against the ice edge.

I am certain that as Bismarck and PG made their way up toward the minefield, heavy air attacks would be planned to coincide with that event. Additional mines will have been sewn by aircraft throughout the day and bombers and torpedo bombers from all over the UK will have been concentrating at Reykjavik in order to make that passage as difficult for Bismarck as possible. The swordfish had a range of 546 miles on normal fuel load and carrying a torpedo, but if the torpedoes went to Reykjavik by transport, the Swordfish would be able to make the trip direct from the Scottish mainland with ease.

Even if Lutjens managed to get his squadron through the Strait in Battle Order, they would come under the guns of KGV, PoW and Repulse on the 25th at around 0600.

It would likely that Bismarck would need to stand off and guard PG as she negotiated the minefield, lest PoW and the cruisers tried to get at her. When Bismarck made the passage, she would be shelled in a very uneven fight, since PoW would be able to stand beam on and fire all 9 guns (one being permanently out of action) whilst Bismarck could only fire back with four guns. She would be a sitting duck and PoW's accuracy during the battle the previous morning should not be forgotten.

I think attempting to go back through the Strait would be an utterly hopeless undertaking - suicide.

North Atlantic 0600 24th May 1941.jpg (99.5 KiB) Viewed 4383 times

[alecsandros]

I am certain that as Bismarck and PG made their way up toward the minefield, heavy air attacks would be planned to coincide with that event.

What heavy air attacks ? Coming from where ? With what aircraft ?

Additional mines will have been sewn by aircraft throughout the day and bombers and torpedo bombers from all over the UK will have been concentrating at Reykjavik in order to make that passage as difficult for Bismarck as possible. The swordfish had a range of 546 miles on normal fuel load and carrying a torpedo, but if the torpedoes went to Reykjavik by transport, the Swordfish would be able to make the trip direct from the Scottish mainland with ease.

This is extremely unlikely to happen in 10-12 hours. Mine laying isn't that simple, and it isn't done at random. Aircraft transfer takes a while, as well as refueiling and preparing for a strike.

Even if Lutjens managed to get his squadron through the Strait in Battle Order, they would come under the guns of KGV, PoW and Repulse on the 25th at around 0600.

No, Bismarck would not need to take the eastern route directly, but as I've already pointed out, move further north along the ice sheet and then east to Jan Mayen Island.

I think attempting to go back through the Strait would be an utterly hopeless undertaking - suicide.

Suicide is to take a 4-day journey with a single damaged battleship against the entire HOme Fleet.

[Vic Dale]

The Vickers Wellington had a range of 2,500 miles so could make the flight to the Denmark Strait with ease. It could carry a good bomb load and some had been converted to carry mines. Britain had quite a lot of these aircraft and also the ability to respond very quickly to a need to bomb a target. The Channel Dash in February 1942 showed how quickly the RAF could respond, despite the confusion around the sightings as late as 1030 that morning. The German ships also had the benefit of poor visibility for much of the time. The RAF had a very short window of opportunity whilst the ships were negotiating the Dover Strait and there was nothing to restrict their speed or their maneuverability.

Arming and fueling a bomber of this type should take no more than three hours and the flight out from Scotland would take about four and a half hours. Knowing that Bismarck was headed back the way she came, the RAF and Coastal Command would begin their response. The target would be in the minefield at about midnight, so there was time to get sufficient numbers of aircraft ranged and primed ready for take off in groups starting at around 1900. The aircraft would have sufficient fuel to be able to wait to be called in to attack by their master bomber. Hudsons and Sunderlands would be circling over the enemy ships acting as markers.

Coastal Command had Wellingtons and other aircraft fitted out and with crews trained for torpedo attacks, so a great deal was already in place to make a successful attack on the German ships. The mine laying wellingtons should be in the Strait by about mid-day and the first pattern would have been sewn by about 1300. This would permit a landing at Reykjavik and a few more mine laying sorties before midnight, providing sufficient mines were available. Whilst the bombers were being prepared, air transports should be shipping supplies of mines and torpedoes to Reykjavik.

An operation of this sort bears no comparison to the casual, work-a-day routine of the bomber squadrons preparing the nightly raids on Germany from 1943. This would be a rush job and god help anyone who did not pull his finger out. With the loss of the Hood fresh on everyone's lips they would all be moving at double time.

Supposing Bismarck did manage to get through the minefield unscathed and was in a position to fight her way out of the Strait. Lutjens might - as has been suggested - try and go as far north as he could, but tactically he would not want his options for maneuver limited by being close to the ice edge. He would not have wanted to go any where near it, because the ice floes which extend for quite some distance from the solid ice could damage a ship moving fast - at battle speed. A ship could easily lose a screw blade to a lump of floating ice, so there would not be much room for choice. We have seen on the chart I provided, that the three cruisers would have reached the eastern end of the Strait long before the flagship and it might be as well to position them closer to the ice, so as to be able to launch torpedo attacks on the German squadron as they came out, the destroyers would also be useful here, they could lay smoke screens to mask the cruisers and also attack through them.

By my reckoning, the disadvantages Lutjens would incur if he took his squadron back through the Strait, would probably mean that Tovey would be lucky to get a shot in before both ships foundered. Whatever Lutjens did he would have no opportunity to shake off his pursuers. With Tovey off the eastern coast of Iceland at the time Bismarck and PG were coming through the minefield, he would be able to learn from the regular sighting reports, if she was heading north on exit and steer northeast himself to intercept.

Whichever way you play it, Lutjens cannot avoid interception by a very powerful battle squadron. All he could do would be to alter the position of the battleground. PG is a liability still and would definitely not survive, even if Bismarck somehow managed to overwhelm Tovey's force of KGV, PoW and Repulse, plus five cruisers and an aircraft carrier.

[alecsandros]

The Vickers Wellington had a range of 2,500 miles so could make the flight to the Denmark Strait with ease...

This was not possible not even in 1942, with improved sights and aiming methods.
The Wellington's obtained consistently bad results against moving ships in the Mediteranean and in the Atlantic. [and it was not a problem restricted to Wellington's at all - level bombing against warships proved extremely ineffective throughout the war, for all nations involved]

Coastal Command had Wellingtons and other aircraft fitted out and with crews trained for torpedo attacks, so a great deal was already in place to make a successful attack on the German ships. The mine laying wellingtons should be in the Strait by about mid-day and the first pattern would have been sewn by about 1300. This would permit a landing at Reykjavik and a few more mine laying sorties before midnight, providing sufficient mines were available. Whilst the bombers were being prepared, air transports should be shipping supplies of mines and torpedoes to Reykjavik.

No, this is pure fantasy, just as the "raid" proposed above. A mine laying procedure takes some time, as the grid needs to be defined and then transmitted to the British warships in the area, before being set into place. Setting the grid from the air is another fantsy, as a large number of bombers and mines would be required to be used instantly. I have never heard of mine laying in the Denmark Strait using Scottish-based bombers - the distance is to great. It's a 4000km journey to-and-from Denmark Strait, and a heavily loaded Wellington did not have that kind of range. Refueling in Iceland would take time, and I don't know if there was the necessary logistics available there to receive and refuel hundreds of medium bombers

Regardless, a one-way trip to Denmark Strait would require some 6-7 hours for a Wellington [cruise speed loaded was about 320km/h]. Add the hours necessary for decisions, transmissions, loading of mines and formation of the bomber groups. It would be 8-10 hours easy, in total, and that would mean letting go of the mines and endangering PoW, Norfolk and Suffoklk, which would also be "passing by"

Supposing Bismarck did manage to get through the minefield unscathed and was in a position to fight her way out of the Strait. Lutjens might - as has been suggested - try and go as far north as he could, but tactically he would not want his options for maneuver limited by being close to the ice edge.

No, he would avoid a fight at all costs (just as he did at Denmark Strait) and try to keep as "low" as possible. At 28kts, Bismarck would escape KGV and Repulse, which would be at least 300km to the south-east of the German squadron at 6:00 on May 25th (I'm taking references from your map), IF Lutjens would contiune northwards.
That would be probably the only time when VIctorious may launch her Swordfishes (9 in total, and not 12 as I have written above)

Without a decisive hit by that 9 swordfish raid, the Germans would simply escape, towards Jan Mayn and then towards Norway.

Prince of Wales would be in a dire fuel situation at that time, and could not continue pursuing until Jan Mayen island. Without her, Suffolk and NOrfolk would also head back.

Whichever way you play it, Lutjens cannot avoid interception by a very powerful battle squadron. All he could do would be to alter the position of the battleground. PG is a liability still and would definitely not survive, even if Bismarck somehow managed to overwhelm Tovey's force of KGV, PoW and Repulse, plus five cruisers and an aircraft carrier.

What interception where ?
Lutjens would be mad to head east, as that would be the most probable position of Victorious squadron. HE would continue to the north, taking the risks necessary.

[José M. Rico]

You must also take into consideration the unfavourable weather conditions in the northern latitudes. Thick fog could reduce the visibility to a couple of miles.


The Prinz Eugen follows Bismarck in the fog with the help of a searchlight. 22 May 1941.

[Vic Dale]

Firstly, fog can ruin any aerial attack and that is a chance that every RAF commander has to consider, but should not deter him from mounting an attack, if a target presents itself. The Denmark Strait was bright and clear for whole periods during Bismarck's passage as some of the photos show. The weather was changeable that is all. The RAF's failure to bomb Germany's ships is largely down to having to attack at night, or attack through a fighter screen during the day. The RN lost a number of good ships to air attack and avoided at all cost any chance of exposure to heavy aerial attacks.

I take the point about flying from Scotland. I made an error in my calculations and now realise it might not have been possible to achieve such an operation in that time if at all, but it is something Lutjens would have had to consider. He would have no idea what aerial resources the enemy had at Reykjavik and he could definitely reckon on aerial torpedo attacks in the Strait. Coastal Command did have that capability in 1941. Also mining the Strait might not be a good idea if PoW and the cruisers were intent on passing through, but again it is something Lutjens would need to consider. However, having stirred the hornets nest by sinking Hood, he would know that the enemy would have a full 12 hours to prepare some sort of reception for him at a known position. Not something any fleet commander would relish.

In any event, once out of the minefield Lutjens would have PoW behind him and KGV and Repulse ahead of him, with Victorious and her aircraft able to cover a surveillance area 250 miles wide and for 125 miles ahead of her. The Home Fleet would be in prime position to intercept and sink the German squadron.

When Lutjens evaded his pursuers in the early hours of the 25th, he could not go north, because of Victorious and her aircraft. Too little attention is paid to the brilliance of his evasion tactics that morning. Given the number of ships after his blood, he did just enough to slip through and I would suggest that instead of heading directly southeast as shown on various charts, he will have followed Wake-Walker's squadron for a few hours, knowing that the enemy would be unlikely to spend precious resources scouring an area they had just combed. If he had headed southeast too soon, he would have announced his intentions in the event that he was discovered. Only after it was clear to him that the enemy was searching the wrong areas, through their sighting reports which B-Dienst would be decoding, would he shape course for France.

No such opportunities would present themselves when he emerged from the eastern end of the Denmark Strait. At any time he managed to escape due to poor visibility, fatigue of his pursuers, or breakdown of equipment, Victorious' aircraft would be able to search an area covering his "farthest on" from the point contact was lost. That would most certainly have been done on the morning of the 25th, if Victorious had not been sent tracking in the wrong direction, to the northwest thanks to that bogus DF fix. With so many ships around Lutjens when he emerged from the eastern end of the strait, there would be no chances for him to shake the enemy off. Tovey would gradually close in and choose his moment for battle.

[RF]

Thick fog certainly can provide a cloak, but both sides do have radar.

I would envisage that Bismarck could be tracked on a course back to Norway, BUT the problem for the RN is concentrating a sufficient force with the firepower to stop Bismarck. A combination of two KGV's both with dodgy guns is insufficient. Repulse presents the possibility of being another Hood and thus a double fiasco for the RN. If POW does drop out then Suffolk has no heavy ship protection for the radar tracking of Bismarck, which could simply turn round and sink her.
Going back to Norway, almost anything could happen but I wouldn't necessarily think the Germans would come off worst.

[Vic Dale]

The battle on the 24th lasted just 15 minutes and if we discount bad luck, Holland was not in prime position to nail Bismarck. He had to compromise the safety of his ship to try and get ahead. Had he been able to approach head-on, Hood might have stood a better chance of survival. PoW made a very good account of herself that morning, registering three straddles and with an alteration of course to contend with. Undoubtedly this would have been made known to the crew who would have redoubled their efforts to avenge the Hood. Tovey would be able to approach Bismarck head-on to close the range with both his KGVs and from different angles to either divide her fire or leave one ship unmolested and Bismarck would find herself in much the same position as she was on the 27th. Once Bismarck was fully engaged with one or other KGV, Repulse would move in and add her four-penny worth in the form of and additional six 15inch guns.

I have just revisited my calculation of the distance between an air base in Scotland and the Denmark Strait and yes, I did indeed make a serious error in that calculation, it is not 1000 nautical miles as I had thought but 770 miles, so the flight would take just 3 hours. I am not at all sure how anyone could reach a figure of 4000 km for the round trip, it would be 1540 km. There would be no necessity for a round trip anyway. Reykjavik could hold a good number of Wellingtons if they needed to land. So the air operation is back on.

Let us forget mining operations as this might hazard the ships following Bismarck, though in the event of a mechanical breakdown aboard PoW that is the way I would go. I personally would sacrifice having Wake Walker join Tovey if he did not have PoW with him and those mines would be sewn right across the opening in the minefield - as many as could be laid in the allotted time. You can bet your life that the necessary patterns for such an operation will have been worked out well in advance. The minefield is a static entity and closing that gap would be an important tactic for trapping marauding German warships. I would also time a sizeable torpedo bomber attack for transit of the minefield.

The RAF's lack of success against German ships is down to them not being out at sea very much and wherever they lay, they would have more than adequate fighter cover and also massed flak batteries, combined with smoke pots. Bismarck and PG on the run would be very hard put to defend themselves and every maneuver to avoid attack would give Tovey extra time to gain position.

When PG had topped her bunkers off in Kors Fiord she held 3233 cubic metres of fuel. At 1700 on the evening of the 24th she had just 1350 cubic metres left. We can absolutely rule out any chance of her fueling from Bismarck, so some way would have to be found to detach her. Once more she presents as a liability and will very likely be sunk together with the tanker even if she manages to locate it. In heading south as he did, Lutjens gave PG the best chance of survival and had it not been for a defect in one of her engines she would have carried on with the anti commerce operation. Going back the way he had come would not be a workable ides at all.

Having detached PG it would still be possible to head for Norway, but what and ordeal by fire that would have been. KGV, Victorious and Repulse ahead of him and PoW half a day behind him. Rodney to the south east and a welter of cruisers and destroyers, all converging on him. There were four Sunderlands flying out of Iceland maintaining a constant patrol across his path and linking up with a heavy long range Catalina patrols from Northern Ireland and another two Sunderlands flying between Iceland and the faroes. There was just as much chance of locating Bismarck on that route as there was heading for France. At least on that route the Home Fleet was astern of him, not ahead of him.

[alecsandros]

Tovey would be able to approach Bismarck head-on

When, where and how ?
Lutjes should be insane to go east, as it would be the most likely area from which British forces would appear.

I have just revisited my calculation of the distance between an air base in Scotland and the Denmark Strait and yes, I did indeed make a serious error in that calculation, it is not 1000 nautical miles as I had thought but 770 miles, so the flight would take just 3 hours. I am not at all sure how anyone could reach a figure of 4000 km for the round trip, it would be 1540 km. There would be no necessity for a round trip anyway. Reykjavik could hold a good number of Wellingtons if they needed to land. So the air operation is back on.

Apart from the grave error in calculation (those would be 1540 NAUTICAL MILES, not KM - and I think it was out of Wellington range), the "air operations" would be "back on" only in a fantasy world. There were not enough bombers, not enough time, and even if they were, level bombing against moving ships in 1941 was a complete screw-up.

The minefield is a static entity and closing that gap would be an important tactic for trapping marauding German warships. I would also time a sizeable torpedo bomber attack for transit of the minefield.

... For the last time: thousands of mines would be needed, and consequently hundreds of bombers. Where would they be ? How quickly can they be available, loaded and sent into action ? Did the RAF even have that kind of operational bomber force in may 1941 ?

The RAF's lack of success against German ships is down to them not being out at sea

No, it was the same in the Mediteranean against Regia Maria ships. And it was the same everywhere where level bombing was attempted against moving ships.

Bismarck and PG on the run would be very hard put to defend themselves and every maneuver to avoid attack would give Tovey extra time to gain position.

What attack ? By who ? With what forces ?

When PG had topped her bunkers off in Kors Fiord she held 3233 cubic metres of fuel. At 1700 on the evening of the 24th she had just 1350 cubic metres left.

Indeed.

Any action to go back to Norway should have been taken immediately after Hood's demise. At 17:00 on the 24th of May, it was simply to late.

Once more she presents as a liability

No.

Having detached PG it would still be possible to head for Norway, but what and ordeal by fire that would have been. KGV, Victorious and Repulse ahead of him and PoW half a day behind him.

What do you mean "ahead of him" ? You mean to the east of him, of course.

[Vic Dale]

The Wellington had a range of 2500 miles. That is a fact and that is without long range tanks or anything fancy. One of the things for which the ministry of war was criticised, was buying loads of bombers, when it was fighters Britain needed for defence. Without too much difficulty I have managed to identify no less than nine fully equipped Wellington squadrons. So there are 100 Wellingtons to start with and that is without the training squadrons. Bristol Beauforts would also be ideal for this task. With a normal range of 1600 miles they could make the round trip from a base in Scotland, as detailed earlier and could also land at Reykjavik to reload with torpedoes which transports had flown in, in the event that there were no adequate stocks already there.

I too think Lutjens would have been mad to go east after sinking Hood, I only mention it because it is a route back to Germany, which given the circumstances is no worse than going back through the Denmark Strait. If he was going to try his luck back through the Strait, I agree he would have needed to make that decision immediately Hood Blew up. I doubt the High Command would have allowed it for most of the reasons I have given.

Tovey would be able to approach Bismarck head on for the final battle, because he would not be out of position as Holland was when Hood got wiped out. Tovey will have been getting sighting reports from Wake-Walker. Aircraft will have been flying continually over head and giving visual target indication to Tovey's scouting forces. He would be able to approach Bismarck from ahead and PoW would be steaming along behind, so the main battle squadron will be already approaching Bismarck head on so as to get into battle range and Lutjens would then have to decide what he was going to do about it.

Now for the detail about getting back into the Strait; if Lutjens' squadron made an immediate about turn, after sinking Hood, Bismarck would be leading, roughly 3000m ahead of PG, a simple numbers change. With Norfolk and Suffolk to the north, PG would have to run the gauntlet, she could now be attacked which is the task they had been allotted once Holland was engaging Bismarck. PoW would not be too far away and could come up and re-engage. PG could come under a welter of fire from a battleship and two cruisers. In order for her to stay relatively safe, she would have to increase speed to get ahead of Bismarck. Bismarck would not wish to slow down to permit this as it would give the rest of the Home Fleet time to think. Tovey would have extra time to get into position at the eastern end of the Strait. I would expect him to detach Repulse so she could use her speed to gain a good position to the north.

From about 1400, eight hours after Hood's demise, Lutjens would be subjected to a rolling series of torpedo attacks from land based aircraft. Lutjens might well wonder where they were coming from.

Wake-Walker would be wise to keep PoW engaging Bismarck once PG got ahead, so that unless Bismarck wished to trade shot on a five to four basis, she would have to turn up for a fight. It would be a stern chase, without hope of ever being able to adequately patch the hole in the bow and no chance of shaking off his shadowers. Even if the weather and radar gremlins came to Lutjens rescue, aircraft from Iceland would be over head the whole time, over a broad area and able to act as a constant marker, for Wake-Walker's ships to form up on.

Whichever way Lutjens decided to go, if determined to go back to Germany, he would have Tovey across his path ie, ahead of him.
I have plotted the best courses and speeds of the two forces and Tovey would just have the edge on Lutjens. If Bismarck did not slow at any time, she could steam 531 miles to reach a point along Greenland's eastern coast in the same latitude as Jan Mayen and Tovey would get there ahead of her, by about 2 hours. Tovey was 577 miles away from Jan Mayen and Bismarck was 710 miles away.

As regards the minefield. It was already in place. What I am suggesting is sewing floating mines in the gap between the ice and the end of the field. It is 22 miles wide, so although mines will not form an absolute barrier, they will present the possibility that Bismarck or PG or both will strike one. Aircraft sewed mines ahead of Adm. Ciliax's ships in the Channel and Scharnhorst hit one off Flushing. The Channel there is twice as wide as the gap between the minefield and the ice in the Denmark Strait. That was less than four hours after the squadron was first sighted. So Coastal Command could move when it knew what it was doing. My money would be on PoW making the trip through the minefield, so the mine laying operation is a secondary concern.

If the weather was clear at the time Bismarck and PG were negotiating the minefields, they would be good targets for a bombing raid and of course continuing torpedo attacks.

[alecsandros]

The Wellington had a range of 2500 miles.

Are you sure that's the combat radius ?

So there are 100 Wellingtons to start with

Where were they on the 24th of May. How quickly can they be sent to Scottland and loaded and prepared for such an operation.

I doubt the High Command would have allowed it for most of the reasons I have given.

What reasons would those be ?

He would be able to approach Bismarck from ahead and PoW would be steaming along behind, so the main battle squadron will be already approaching Bismarck head on so as to get into battle range and Lutjens would then have to decide what he was going to do about it.

No, for the last time, Lutjens would NOT be steaming to the east, and towards Tovey, but to the north. Prine of Wales would drop out of the race somewhere on the 25h of May due to lack of fuel, and thus surveillance of the German squadron would not be feasible anymore. Thus the possible movement toward Jan Mayen islnd would not be known to Tovey. Regardless, KGV would drop out of the race soon after Prince of Wales, as she would have fuel problems also.

PoW would not be too far away and could come up and re-engage. PG could come under a welter of fire from a battleship and two cruisers.

The absurdities never stop, it seems.
PoW escaped to the east, and only got her main guns back online at 8:30 in the morning, 2,5 hours after the battle. Distance to the German squadron was about 30km. Norfolk and Suffolk would also be heading east, to escape the 15" gunfire.

I would expect him to detach Repulse so she could use her speed to gain a good position to the north.

Repulse's max speed was about 29kts in 1941.

From about 1400, eight hours after Hood's demise, Lutjens would be subjected to a rolling series of torpedo attacks from land based aircraft. Lutjens might well wonder where they were coming from.

What land based aircraft ? Where would they be coming from, how would they be coordonated towards Bismarck (or do you suppose Prnce of Wales had a direct line to RAF command ?), how many would they be ? Why weren't they used on the 23rd of May, especialy as the RAF and RN knew about the Germans departure with 4 days in advance ?

Whichever way Lutjens decided to go, if determined to go back to Germany, he would have Tovey across his path ie, ahead of him.

No.

My money would be on PoW making the trip through the minefield, so the mine laying operation is a secondary concern.

If the weather was clear at the time Bismarck and PG were negotiating the minefields, they would be good targets for a bombing raid and of course continuing torpedo attacks.

Why didn't the British done this on the 22nd or 23rd of May ?

[RF]

This certainly a one sided dialogue. I am not convinced of Vic's certainty that Bismarck must be intercepted, and intercepted all at once by two KGV's, Repulse, Norfolk, Suffolk etc plus Wellingtons regardless of weather and radar.

[Vic Dale]

Well nothing is absolute, but given that Bismarck would be being chased, by a Battleship and two cruisers into the Strait, aircraft were in constant contact during that morning and would probably continue to be for the rest of the day. That her course and intentions were very well known and that Tovey in KGV with Victorious and Repluse were always going to be one jump ahead, due to Tovey's position at 0600 and Bismarck's reduced speed, I'd say her chances of escaping contact with a vastly superior force were close to nil. But Lutjens was a wily old fox so if anyone could get Bismarck safely home it would be him.

It would be a catastrophic breakdown in communications, equipment and logistics which let Bismarck through the net and Tovey could expect to be wearing an outsize in bowler hats in short order. And rightly so!

[alecsandros]

and would probably continue to be for the rest of the day

Why wasn't aircraft contact mantained for the rest of the 24th of May than ?

Tovey in KGV with Victorious and Repluse were always going to be one jump ahead, due to Tovey's position at 0600 and Bismarck's reduced speed

According to the ship's reconstructed log, Bismarck's "reduced speed" was 28kts, the same as KGV and PoW.
Bismarck was much more closer to the northern part of the strait than KGV and Victorious were, and asuming the same speed for both formations, Bismarck would get out of the northern part of the strait much sooner than KGV would get there.

PoW would be forced to turn around due to lack of fuel on the 25th of May, thus leaving Norfolk and Suffolk without heavy cover. KGV would turn away for the same reason on the 26th of May. Prinz EUgen would also need refueling on the 26th of May [but there are various scenarios for this]

Fog, night, and low clouds were all impediments to any kind of surveillance, [except Suffolk's radar] and given the atmospheric conditions of the 23/24th of May, the German squadron could get away quite easily to the north, possibly losing their shadowers fast [remember Norfolk was straddled by Bismarck when it came out of the fog at only 6000 meters distance !]

[Guest]

The RAF miserably failed to attack German ships in the channel in February 1942 (only one Swordfish squadron made contact). It appears difficult to believe that Bismarck could be sunk by British land based bombers in may 1941.

Best regards,

Francis