Sean, you may find strange that also on the German side the actions during the naval main operations has been accurately scrutinized, but that was the reality for everybody on 1941.
As you may have realized now, both Brinkman and Reimann had to respond in writings to the points moved by Vize-Adm Schmundt responsible for the German cruisers, exactly like happened on the British side; this is called military procedure and discipline.
No surprise that Brinkmann deployed the answer to Reimann that had to respond to him and to Schmundt, with maps and written explanations of the error occurred. Than Adm Schniewind and Carls joined in and resolved the matter with recommendations and actions to be taken, like a 3 meter rangefinder for every warship having torpedo tubes from that moment onward.
You are right, no black boxes on 1941, but a strong discipline and lot of written reports with maps and explanations to be submitted, with your signature on it, as an Officer.
I am sure you know that in war the discipline code is stronger than during peace time, so you better be careful on what you were writing to your superiors.
On this regard, I still like to know your opinion about RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker writing both correct and incorrect statements about the same event on a single document delivered to Adm Tovey on June 5, 1941.
How come WW can write PoW disengaging at 06.13 and continuing the battle with the Germans while retreating for some more minutes after receiving more hits, … and on another phrase just a page after on the same document write PoW disengaged 10 minutes after the battle started ( so 05.53 + 10 min = 06.03 ). On another document he wrote that he saw PoW disengaging 2 minutes after Hood blew up.
I am sure you know that Norfolk turned away at 06.00, and sent a radio message at 06.15 telling Scapa Flow were Hood was sunk.
It is just like what he did with the Diagram B and his sketches, his First Board declarations and signing of 10 sea miles from Hood at 06.00, … and few days after write he was 15 sea miles from Hood … than go to the Second Board of Inquiry with “ The Plot “ that is sure incorrect document as you surely have realized at this point … and call his previous deposition back.
What do you think about this way to act for a RN Flag Officer ?
The PoW map details you saw were the warship originals.
All the maps in original are like that for every warship, even of May 27th 1941, the material is NOT paper, it is waterproof and they used special ink.
When I am telling you that in the RN Admiralty they knew everything in full details, I mean also that every map was taken on the format you saw, plotted on the warship on that material, very raw and poorly done and redone in a better format on new paper, like you saw for the PoW Gunnery map for example, putting a scale and even some more details, with a legenda.
This is a very interesting area, because I can guarantee you that it is a lot different working on the original maps compared to the Admiralty redone copy.
I am sure no one has done like I did the full research about it, the complete mapping of the overall material and the final comparison. It as been an enormous job, it took me some full working days in 2 persons, .. and at full speed all day, ... just to do part of it.
The PoW gunnery plot, the Rowell map ADM 116/4352 Exhibit B at 06.00, and the PoW plan 4 are the closest info to a black box type info we have on RN side.
On the German side we have PG battle map and Reimann plot, and once you have realized that they are very good as far as Prinz Eugen track and the enemy bearing angle, but not so much for the distances, … Reimann wrong intentionally for the known justification reasons, … than you trust Jasper distances only and by matching PoW and PG data you have the solid base I have used to build the DS battle map. Hood and Bismarck you can apply later on as I did on 2005. Now it is the turn to Norfolk and Suffolk more precise tracks as you well know.