Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Phil,

you are right and your considerations are wise.

In fact you can read yourself into Adm Tovey dispatch on July 1941 at the point : Decision to Break off the Action ( 22, 23 and 24, 25 ) the justifications of Capt. Leach, Rear Adm Wake-Walker and finally Adm Tovey.

Here :

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 9tovey.htm

Reading them one realize clearly how they justify themselves for their decisions on July 5th, 1941 one after the other : at point 22 Capt Leach, at point 23 Rear-Adm Wake-Walker and at points 24 and 25 Adm Tovey with his final evaluations.

Now everybody can have his own opinion on what happened ...

By the way, ... I love your reference on the ... " Victorian and Edwardian periods - different thought processes ".

In fact I grew up reading about John Jervis and Nelson like at the Battle of Cape Saint Vincent :

" As dawn broke, Jervis's ships were in position to engage the Spanish. On the quarter-deck of Victory, Jervis, Captain Robert Calder and Captain Benjamin Hallowell counted the ships. It was at this point Jervis discovered that he was outnumbered nearly two-to-one:

"There are eight sail of the line, Sir John"
"Very well, sir"
"There are twenty sail of the line, Sir John"
"Very well, sir"
"There are twenty five sail of the line, Sir John"
"Very well, sir"
"There are twenty seven sail of the line, Sir John"
"Enough, sir, no more of that; the die is cast, and if there are fifty sail I will go through them"

Seeing that it would be difficult to disengage, Jervis decided to continue because the situation would only get worse were the Spanish fleet to join up with the French. Meanwhile, the Canadian Captain Hallowell became so excited that he thumped the Admiral on the back, "That's right Sir John, and, by God, we'll give them a damn good licking! "

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of ... ent_(1797)


Were it was reported that just as expected Nelson was very afraid to meet Jervis after what he had done not following the orders, ... but just as you correctly wrote ... different thought processes.

Bye Antonio

[paul.mercer]

Ciao all,

@ Phil,

I see your points and agree with you.

My way to see this is very simple, given the regulations and the occurrences :

1 ) There was a battle plan agreed among Adm Tovey and Vice-Adm Holland ( Tovey on the London Gazette ), surely Rear-Adm Wake-Walker was informed either by one of them or both. Capt Leach was informed as he himself declared to Hood board of inquiry.

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 6-4352.htm

Ref : " Intend both ships to engage Bismarck and to leave Prinz Eugen to Norfolk and Suffolk = 00.32."

2) The engagement started and the 4 Royal Navy warships were called in action against the enemy as planned. The battle was ongoing the flag/order to fight clearly issued by Vice-Adm Holland.

3) Vice-Adm Holland died on board Hood and Rear-Adm Wake-Walker was supposed to continue the engagement just as the Articles of War clearly define on ref. 10 and 11. Capt Leach could not disengage the battle started ref. 11 and 12 of the Articles of War.

4) It did not happen, and 3 warships against 2 disengaged breacking off the battle/action on going. Churchill was upset about it and asked for a court martial. Probably with Ref. 10,11, 12 , 13 and 14 of the Articles of War.

5) Adm Tovey did not want that to happen and put himself clearly between Churchill and an eventual court martial call for the above reasons.

6) Churchill decided not to pursue them and Adm Tovey and accepted the Adm Tovey solution. Rear-Adm Wake-Walker and Capt. Leach got the 2 medals.

In any case this solution was not liked at all into Royal Navy and we all know what was the "nickname" the british sailors associated to HMS Prince of Wales : " the coward ship ".

Churchill was "forced" by this fact to use the HMS Prince of Wales for the trip and meeting with the USA President F.D. Roosevelt on August 1941.

What was going the real outcome of all this if Bismarck had escaped free on the Atlantic ocean after May 24th, 1941 Denmark Strait engagement.

In my personal opinion nobody was going to save Capt. Leach and Rear-Adm Wake-Walker from a sure court martial for cowardice and disengagement in front of the enemy once called into action. The fact that Bismarck was later sunk by the Home Fleet commander Adm Tovey turned the whole scenario/things the way we know today.

Having sunk the Bismarck Adm Tovey was the "man of the day", … during a war time very critical period, ... and Churchill had to back off his court martial request.

They have to say thanks to the Swordfish guy’s … for having delivered the Bismarck on a silver plate … and also Adm Tovey should join them on the thanks, .. because if Bismarck had escaped to France, ... he was going surely to have some troubles too from Churchill.

There is an evident difference with Adm A.B. Cunningham way to think and act : “ It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition “.

Vice-Adm Holland and the brave crew of HMS Hood contributed to build Royal Navy tradition on the centuries, … for the others I leave the judgment to the future generations knowing the real events …

Bye Antonio

In my personal opinion nobody was going to save Capt. Leach and Rear-Adm Wake-Walker from a sure court martial for cowardice and disengagement in front of the enemy once called into action. The fact that Bismarck was later sunk by the Home Fleet commander Adm Tovey turned the whole scenario/things the way we know today.

Gentlemen,
Sorry to come into this discussion after so long, but surely by shadowing Bismarck instead of reingaging Capt Leach was following the direct orders of Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker and could not be held responsible and if he did face a court martial would have been declared innocent of all charges? I would also presume that R-Admiral Wake-Walker would have made that clear to the court. I cannot believe that after hearing the details of the engagement and the problems and damage to PoW that the court would blame Capt Leach for disengaging and almost certainly saving his ship.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul,

if you read carefully my post and the " Articles of War " still valid at that time, I underline the word : " Disengagement " in front of the enemy while engaged into a battle on going.

That is the indisputable fact that occurred that day involving both Capt Leach on HMS Prince of Wales as well as Rear Admiral Wake-Walker on board HMS Norfolk that knowing the battle plan was supposed to join the battle and was only late on doing that.

When Holland died on Hood he was supposed to continue the battle on going being the senior officer still alive on that battle.

Vice Admiral Holland had ordered to engage the enemy and since 05.52 and 30 seconds, when HMS Hood opened fire that morning, from that moment onward the Royal Navy warship were all supposed to fight until the destruction of the enemy, which was the battle plan agreed and to be executed by all involved 4 warships, just as Admiral Tovey had ordered.

Holland ordered the engagement to Leach ( and in my opinion that was valid for Norfolk and Suffolk as well ) and no one ordered Leach or anybody else to disengage, it was his / their own initiative, despite the " Articles of War " they all knew very well.

Wake-Walker was invited/ordered to re-engage by the british Admiralty, but after his evaluations he later explained why he did not do that.

Churchill wanted them court martialled for that reason, ... the disengagement on the first action .... and not because Leach after did not follow orders by Wake-Walker.

Which problems was having according to you HMS Prince of Wales at 06.03 when she disengage that did not have from 05.53 ( open fire ) until 06.02 battle time ??
In that timeframe she made 3 hits on Bismarck and did not receive any hit herself, ... and by 06.03 she had just received 2 hits by Bismarck ??
Hood received 3 hits before being sunk and did not disengage, Bismarck had received 3 hits and was still fighting.

So when HMS Prince of Wales disengaged at 06.03, she had still the same gun firepower she had up until the moment Hood exploded and she was firing to Bismarck with no disturb scoring 3 hits, ... she had just being hit by 2 Bismarck shells one on the compass platform and the other on the funnel.

Hope now all his clear to you. Bye Antonio

[paulcadogan]

Hi Antonio,

As I'm sure you know very well there are many other instances of British ships disengaging in the face of the enemy:

1) Battle of Coronel 1914: The light cruiser Glasgow abandoned the crippled Monmouth and withdrew, signaling the pre-dreadnought Canopus to stay clear, given the destruction meted out by von Spee's ships... Sir Christopher Cradock certainly stuck to those Articles, engaging the Germans even though it was clear his ships were no match, and sacrificed his and his crews' lives.

2) River Plate: Exeter withdrew once she was silenced. But Ajax and Achilles, though they "took the fight to the enemy" and saved Exeter, still did not continue the battle - turning away after Graf Spee scored damaging hits, then simply shadowed the German ship. They gave up the fight when they had the speed and working guns to continue. Cowardice? No way.... Sensible decision? Yes.

3) Mers-el-Kebir (anniversary today!) - Somerville gave up the chase of Strasbourg (expecting a "colossal raspberry" for it) - sure Hood had a stripped turbine, but he said he did not want to risk a night action which would put his forces at great risk. Cowardice? No...sensible decision yes.

4) Spartivento: Holland's cruisers disengaged when they came under fire from Vittorio Veneto. Somerville gave up the chase shortly afterwards. Well yes...Churchill grumbled over that one too...but did Somerville and Holland act sensibly? Yes... there was an inquiry but no court martial, no firing squad.

5) Battle of the Java Sea: Exeter again...turned away without orders to do so after taking 1 damaging hit and threw the whole battle line into disorder. Yes, her speed dropped and she had to swing out of line - but her guns were functional, so why not stay and fight to the last?

6) The Barents Sea 1942: Sheffield and Jamaica had the speed, and were undamaged, so could have pursued and continued to engage Hipper and Lutzow. They did not. They turned away and allowed the German ships to exit the scene. No retribution for Burnett - the convoy was saved, his duty was done and his ships were not really equipped for a sustained battle with two heavy cruisers, one of which mounted 11-inch guns... No need for an inquiry...

I'm sure there are other examples.

In the DS, Wake Walker was not yet properly engaged when Leach withdrew. Norfolk was still just out of range and Suffolk was a long way out of range. If the 2 heavy cruisers were in range and engaging the Germans effectively when Hood was sunk, would Leach have withdrawn so precipitously? I doubt it.

In all cases the circumstances dictated the decisions taken and once properly explained/examined, in a more enlightened era, good sense will prevail over a document literally written for another era, even though it was still "on the books".

Interesting thoughts though!

Paul

[phil gollin]

.

Sheer idiocy.

.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul,

In my personal opinion, being a careful history reader not only about naval warfare, we can divide the military officers conduct among 3 major categories :

1) The courageous in any case and conditions, sometimes even when it looks like a “crazy/suicidal way” to do the things. Surely Horatio Nelson was into this category of officers.
2) The careful reader and action taken officers, that do not shine for their own initiatives and limit themselves to have the job done using all possible precautions.
3) The cowards that just wait for any possible excuse to get out of troubles as soon as possible when things start getting problematic.

Talking about naval warfare you always have to keep into consideration that one must assume that there was an “even battle contest” on going, same number of warships of the same category, otherwise this concept does not apply.

One cannot pretend upfront that a light cruiser commander is surely courageous in front of a battleship, … but when you are on a same type of a warship, … for example a battleship against a battleship … or a destroyer against a destroyer … than this surely apply.

In my opinion the “ Articles of War “ were written to “ help “ the officers falling into category 2 and 3 to act as much as possible like the one in category 1, for obvious reasons.

You can now evaluate your above list versus this approach and see were you will place the officers involved into the actions you listed.

About DS and Wake-Walker, … in my opinion he was surely engaged, … no doubts for me, … and Norfolk even opened fire, … but when he saw Capt. Leach disengaging the HMS Prince of Wales, … he turned away too, … it is just enough to read Adm Tovey report I attached above and their own justifications one after the other.

Leach wrote : "I disengaged because without Hood and being myself badly hit, … I thought I was no match only with my battleship plus Norfolk and Suffolk for Bismarck and Prinz Eugen ( ??? Churchill did not like this one for sure ??? ) and I was expecting ( and I underline : just expecting !!! ) serious gun problems"; ( that had not yet showed up at that point of the battle ) and since they showed up later just because of his turning away manouvre and also showed up on KGV on the Bismarck final battle on May 27, 1941, … one can easily think it was easy to use this additional justification, … afterwards.

Wake-Walker wrote : " I disengaged because Leach did it as he himself explained, … and when the admiralty asked and invited me to evaluate a re-engagement I thought it was not the case for the reasons Leach explained " ( speed, PoW gunnery overall conditions, Home Fleet coming in the scenario).

Tovey approved everything afterwards, since Bismarck had been sunk and he had the job done one way or the other. No court martial call. Churchill did not pursue them anymore.

But back on the thread intent meant to underline different officer approaches on battle crucial moments, I like to point out and add to your list 2 difference occurrences to be evaluated on top of your list above :

a) May 27 th, 1941 : Admiral Tovey waited the morning to engage Bismarck with Home Fleet. HMS Renown was kept out of the final battle against Bismarck unmanoeuvrable.

b) Cape Matapan : Admiral A.B. Cunningham did not wait the morning to engage a warship he was thinking being a damaged Vittorio Veneto after being torpedoed.
Just to underline once again the different determination approach I like to report here what Adm Cunningham told his officers on the HMS Warspite chartroom after having asked their opinions about a night engagement of the Italian battleship ( it was the cruiser Pola in reality ). They responded to him it was not the case for several reasons ( visibility, too many warships around that can create confusions and friendly fire etc etc ). Well, Admiral A.B. Cunningham snapped : “ You are a pack of yellow-livered skunks ! I will go and have my supper now and see if my morale isn’t higher than yours ! “
As we all know he engaged the Italians that night and sunk them all, not only the Pola, but also 2 other cruisers and 2 destroyers unexpectedly there during the action.
But I think Admiral A.B. Cunningham was an officer of category 1, … and I have several other evidence about it … in fact his statue is in Trafalgar square … were I have no evidence of statue of Tovey … Wake Walker or Leach of course.

We should have asked Sir Winston Churchill opinion about all this, … being a good naval warfare expert, … and one of the approver of the “ Articles of War “ surely it was going to be a very interesting conversation.

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

opinions ???

Bye Antonio

[paulcadogan]

Hi again Antonio,

Re: the book on Leach - What an ironic title given this present thread. But don't judge the book by its cover...here's the description from Amazon:

On 10 December 1941, the Royal Navy battleship HMS Prince of Wales was sunk by Japanese bombers in the South China Sea. Amongst the several hundred men who went down with her was her Captain, John Leach, who had fought against frightful odds and to the very end made the best of an impossible situation with courage and calmness. He embodied the best of the service, and truly was in 'the highest traditions of the Royal Navy'. Matthew B. Wills tells the story of John Leach, and analyses the influences that shaped him and led him ultimately to his heroic end. He traces his life from his time at Royal Naval College Osborne and Britannia Royal Naval College Dartmouth, his relationship with his loyal wife Evelyn, his baptism of fire in the service when he survived a direct shell hit to the bridge where he was standing, and his time as Captain of the Prince of Wales. He describes Leach's role in command in the Battle of the Denmark Strait, during which the Prince of Wales inflicted damage on the Bismarck that contributed to the latter's ultimate destruction, and later off the coast of Malaya during Prince of Wales's ill-fated attempt to intercept Japanese landings. In the Highest Traditions of the Royal Navy presents an authoritative portrait of one of the service's finest, using new research on how failures in navy intelligence were a major factor in the loss of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, and will be of great interest to the general reader and students of the period.

Hmmm... role "in command" in the DS? Needs rewording.....

Regarding your previous post, I understand what you're saying but...

Yes, Norfolk did open fire, but she was still out of range and was of no help to PoW - how long until she could actually get in range? Suffolk was too far astern to be of help any time soon - so PoW was essentially facing 2 enemy warships alone, and Leach obviously did not have confidence that his ship could handle the situation effectively especially given the fact that she had almost instantly taken repeated hits and her own gunfire accuracy had fallen off. He made a quick decision and, yes, with our hindsight, we can say it was the right one.

Wake-Walker, thousands of yards astern could not second guess Leach's decision to turn away and order him back into battle - he had no way of knowing the state of PoW until informed by Leach. He had no choice but to follow suit and get out of there. His reasoning for not re-engaging later, as reported by Tovey, was sound.

And I don't think Tovey's support only came with hindsight - according to Grenfell he was not happy with the Admiralty's signal and had it persisted in pushing Wake-Walker to re-engage he would have intervened and made his opinion known.

Those sitting behind desks or plots at the Admiralty and Mr. Churchill could huff and puff....Leach and Wake-Walker were safely in Tovey's brick house!

LOL at you quote from Adm Cunningham!

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul,

too easy to say I agree with you, ... as usual ... ... both the book title as well as some statements about DS occurrence needs a rewriting to say the least.
Those " history revisions " trials on books happens when your son was First Sea Lord ...

Same thing about Wake-Walker, I agree with you, given the scenario on that moment and after, ... all his decisions were well supported by the facts and by somebody else already taken decisions ( Leach and Tovey ) that cannot be easily called back or put him in trouble personally.

Admiral Tovey saved them all, ... with all possible precautions and avoiding also a night engagement with Bismarck, ... acting differently than Adm Cunningham at Matapan that decided not to run any risk to loose that chance and engaged as soon as it was in condition to do so.

Everything was OK for Tovey, Wake-Walker and Leach ... after Bismarck was sunk ... otherwise it was going to be a whole different story for them all.

The statement I like the most about Admiral A.B. Cunningham (ABC) is the one in Crete : " It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition ".
which is second only the best ever in british RN naval warfare by Nelson at Trafalgar : " England expects that every man will do his duty ".

Well, back we are to this thread title and the officers involved ... we are miles away from this attitude ... different men, ... different thought processes ... just as Phil wrote.

Bye Antonio

[alecsandros]

Which problems was having according to you HMS Prince of Wales at 06.03 when she disengage that did not have from 05.53 ( open fire ) until 06.02 battle time ??
D

Excuse me to intervene, but at 6:03
mechanical problems were already evdient (they started to appear at salvo 3), Hood was destroyed, and the 2 cruisers were still to far to help. The main command center was destroyed, and the 2 German ships already got excellent salvos whilst Prince of Wales was not finding the range on Bismarck any more.

Without Leech's order to disengage, AND the fatihfull torpedo alarm, which made Bimsarck and PRinz Eugen alter course abruptly, there is every possibiltiy that Prince of Wales would have been sunk.

Wether this would have been more favorably received at the Admiralty is debatable. It is possible that some decidents would have preferred a heroic battle, and more damage inflicted on Bismarck, instead of a somewhat cowardly retreat...

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Alecsandros,

HMS Prince of Wales gun problems were not different from 05.53 up to 06.00 ( first 14 salvoes with 3 hits ) compared to last 4 central control salvoes from 06.00 until 06.02 ( last 4 salvoes with no hits ) after HMS Hood was gone. Fire director C. McMullen did not report any dramatic gunnery situation on his letter, as you can read he was not feeling his warship was not able to fight on that moment because of the guns or gunnery problems.

http://hmshood.com/history/denmarkstrai ... letter.htm

You may find good reference infos in here :
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... encIVa.gif

Norfolk distance is well reported on my battle map, she was closing in to join the engagement and opened fire too, ... but as soon as Hood was gone she turned out.
Suffolk was too far away to help, .. I agree ... but this is not true for Norfolk.

Hood fire control was destroyed and she was still fighting, ... no problems ! Bismarck had received a terrible hit by PoW on the bow and was still fighting, ... no problems !

Why the compass platform hit received by Prince of Wales was not properly managed to enable the british warship to still fight as planned on any battleship ?

The hits received by Prince of Wales although many in the short time, .. did not cause too many damages ( basically upperworks damages ) and in fact the british battleship continued the pursue of the enemy and engaged again after too ... her speed was ok, .. not much water taken in ... guns came back working easily.
KGV class warship was a though nut to crack ... even for the Bismarck.

Your last point is of a very high interest ... since if one reads correctly Adm Tovey plans, ... he sent out Hood and PoW for the first engagement hoping they would have do the job ... but not sure 100 % about that ... he just counted for a kind of a dual side demolition battle ... and he was ready to come in with KGV and Repulse for the coup the grace.

Destiny decided that instead of a long range demolition battle ... he got a kind of a somewhat cowardly retreat ... tu use your wording.

That is the real reason why he had to manage everything after as he did versus the "Old Lion " W. Churchill which of course had understood the whole occurrences.

Bye Antonio

[alecsandros]

Hello Antonio,

Prince of Wales had severe turret problems during her work up, and the officers on board were probably hoping that they would not show up (but , surprise ! they did)
The turrets were formally accepted as operational in late April, and certainly there were still issues to resolve.

This is probably one of the reasons why the Hood was chosen as flag ship... Because from every point of view, the Prince of Wales was a much more formidable capital ship than the Hood...

Norfolk was within gun range , at 21-22km from the Bismarck, however the rate of approach of Norfolk at 6:00 was 1km/hour at best, as she had a maximum speed of 31kts, compared to Bismarck's 30.5kts at the moment.

22km is to far away for a cruiser to be effective even in parallel courses. As it was, Norfolk was firing end-on, against a target moving very fast. Her maximum gun range was 28km, so effective range was more likely 14-16km...

in fact, I don;t even know if anybody observed Norfolk trying to enter the battle at all

Cheers,
Alex

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Alecsandros,

the King George V quadruple turret loading mechanism problems were probably improved at the time of Howe and Hanson being commissioned.
King George V, Prince of Wales and Duke of York all had severe problems with those loading mechanism failures.
They were NOT teething problems as way too many persons incorrectly wrote, while trying to justify the PoW retreat at DS.
They were real turret loading mechanism design problems.
In fact they occurred to Kinge George V against Bismarck on May 27, 1941 ... as well as to Duke of York against Scharnhorst on December 1943.
The KGV guns were ok, as well as the double turret design, and in fact the problems were not there at all.

Hood was flagship because of her seniority and RN traditions ( flagship battlecruiser squadron).

Norfolk was at the distance you wrote and you can find all distances on my DS battle article. She could have entered the battle only if the battle was going to develop further more and with the german forced to manoeuvre and not sailing a 220 course straight at full speed, maybe to finish off a damaged Prinz Eugen, that is obvious to me.
Suffolk was intentionally ( her precious radar ) kept out of the battle.

YES, there was somebody carefully evaluating all the possible battle evolutions and it was Admiral Gunher Lutjens.
In fact he ordered the Baron Von Mullenheim-Rechberg to keep his eyes on the Bismarck aft rangefinder turned toward the 2 british cruisers and tell him any movements they were making during the battle that was going to start.

Elementary, ... he was expecting that to happen ... just elementary ...

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Alecsandros,

the King George V quadruple turret loading mechanism problems were probably improved at the time of Howe and Hanson being commissioned.
King George V, Prince of Wales and Duke of York all had severe problems with those loading mechanism failures.
They were NOT teething problems as way too many persons incorrectly wrote, while trying to justify the PoW retreat at DS.
They were real turret loading mechanism design problems.
In fact they occurred to Kinge George V against Bismarck on May 27, 1941 ... as well as to Duke of York against Scharnhorst on December 1943.
The KGV guns were ok, as well as the double turret design, and in fact the problems were not there at all.

Hood was flagship because of her seniority and RN traditions ( flagship battlecruiser squadron).

Norfolk was at the distance you wrote and you can find all distances on my DS battle article. She could have entered the battle only if the battle was going to develop further more and with the german forced to manoeuvre and not sailing a 220 course straight at full speed, maybe to finish off a damaged Prinz Eugen, that is obvious to me.
Suffolk was intentionally ( her precious radar ) kept out of the battle.

YES, there was somebody carefully evaluating all the possible battle evolutions and it was Admiral Gunher Lutjens.
In fact he ordered the Baron Von Mullenheim-Rechberg to keep his eyes on the Bismarck aft rangefinder turned toward the 2 british cruisers and tell him any movements they were making during the battle that was going to start.

Elementary, ... he was expecting that to happen ... just elementary ...

Bye Antonio

Every long battleship engagement typically results in a substantial decline in main battery output. DoY's output was also reduced by the sea state. KM ships also suffered losses in output in their engagements, with both S&G losing whole turrets during their engagement with Renown.

[paul.mercer]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul,

if you read carefully my post and the " Articles of War " still valid at that time, I underline the word : " Disengagement " in front of the enemy while engaged into a battle on going.

That is the indisputable fact that occurred that day involving both Capt Leach on HMS Prince of Wales as well as Rear Admiral Wake-Walker on board HMS Norfolk that knowing the battle plan was supposed to join the battle and was only late on doing that.

When Holland died on Hood he was supposed to continue the battle on going being the senior officer still alive on that battle.

Vice Admiral Holland had ordered to engage the enemy and since 05.52 and 30 seconds, when HMS Hood opened fire that morning, from that moment onward the Royal Navy warship were all supposed to fight until the destruction of the enemy, which was the battle plan agreed and to be executed by all involved 4 warships, just as Admiral Tovey had ordered.

Holland ordered the engagement to Leach ( and in my opinion that was valid for Norfolk and Suffolk as well ) and no one ordered Leach or anybody else to disengage, it was his / their own initiative, despite the " Articles of War " they all knew very well.

Wake-Walker was invited/ordered to re-engage by the british Admiralty, but after his evaluations he later explained why he did not do that.

Churchill wanted them court martialled for that reason, ... the disengagement on the first action .... and not because Leach after did not follow orders by Wake-Walker.

Which problems was having according to you HMS Prince of Wales at 06.03 when she disengage that did not have from 05.53 ( open fire ) until 06.02 battle time ??
In that timeframe she made 3 hits on Bismarck and did not receive any hit herself, ... and by 06.03 she had just received 2 hits by Bismarck ??
Hood received 3 hits before being sunk and did not disengage, Bismarck had received 3 hits and was still fighting.

So when HMS Prince of Wales disengaged at 06.03, she had still the same gun firepower she had up until the moment Hood exploded and she was firing to Bismarck with no disturb scoring 3 hits, ... she had just being hit by 2 Bismarck shells one on the compass platform and the other on the funnel.

Hope now all his clear to you. Bye Antonio

Thanks Antonio,
I do see what you mean, thanks for clearing it up for me