Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

[dunmunro]

Dunmunro wrote: "2) the cruisers did all they could but they could not possibly achieve the needed concentration to assist PoW.
3) The "Nelsonian spirit" was bold action to achieve localized concentrations of force, to win battles during the age of sail. Nelson would have been the first one to censure one of his captains who let the enemy escape or achieve victory through foolhardy blundering, no matter how much bravery (rather than intelligence) was involved.
3) yes Leach was justified in retreating, as he was clearly at tactical disadvantage but his mobility was intact and Wake-walker/Tovey could then decide on how best to achieve the needed concentration of force to destroy Bismarck and/or thwart Lujten's mission.
4) If Leach commanded a light cruiser would his mission be to suicidally attack Bismarck after Hood's loss? Leach's mission, after the loss of Hood and Holland, was to assess the tactical AND strategic situation and then act to minimize the overall threat to the Allied cause by Lutjen's sortie.
5)Holland's mission, with his superiority of force, was to destroy Bismarck if possible but if, for example, Hood and PoW both suffered fire control damage and it was clear that they could not sink Bismarck then Holland, in all probability, would have retreated and attempted to shadow Lujtens as Wake-walker did. You want to create scenarios where Leach and PoW must commit suicide rather than follow a sensible military strategy."

2) Antonio Bonomi already demonstrated that both heavy cruisers at 5:40 were able to join action without manoeuvring away at 5:41 and 5:42, so they did not all they could.

3) We have a VERY different view of Nelson spirit, but this is ok as it is an opinion.
3b) Leach would have been justified to retreat after receiving some serious damage (thus probably inflicting some damage to BS as well). He retreated when NO other concentration of forces could be seriously foreseen. In open Atlantic WW was going to loose BS (in the Denmark Strait there was very limited way to escape a chase and WW already lost BS for a while, in open sea, just a poor chance to keep contact, as it happened !)

4) Well, if he was on a heavy cruiser, in range for torpedoes, I would expect so from a pure hero (like Commander Glasfurd in HMS Acasta)....... However he was in command of the most modern British battleship, sent there to destroy BS (not to shadow her), he was in range to hit and damage the German battleship , his ship was still efficient and he retreated just after receiving one salvo onboard. Here again I think we will disagree forever.

5) It's not the way Admiralty was thinking even after Hood blew up, when they asked WW about his intention to re-engage........

Bye, Alberto

2) but the action started 10 minutes later, and AFAIK, Holland never signalled Wake-walker with instructions so Wake-Walker continued his shadowing mission, which required him to keep clear of Bismark's guns, and to keep clear of any attempt by Lutjens to escape to the north after overwhelming one of Wake-Walkers cruisers.
3b) Leach was outnumbered and facing a deadly concentration of gunfire, and possibly torpedoes, while inside his immune zone - his actions show that he attempted to open the range and re-engage but was unable to do this due to the loss of Y turret. In any event by keeping his mobility intact he was able to shadow Bismarck until Lutjens decided to abort his mission. The odds of 3 ships including 2 cruisers and and fast battleship losing Bismarck were very low and lutjens was very lucky to break contact.
4) Glasfurd continued to engage because Glorious was still afloat and his duty was to protect her - he managed, almost miraculously, to score a torpedo hit before being sunk but I suspect that if Glorious had sunk previously that he would have turned away to shadow S&G instead. Similarly, Wake-walker would have either had to risk both cruisers to try and protect PoW, if Pow had become crippled, and this could have allowed Lutjens to destroy all the RN ships in the area - leaving the sea lanes completely open to attack.

5) and W-W had the option to re-engage (and did - twice) because PoW and the rest of his force retained their mobility and firepower.

[dunmunro]

Maybe a dumb question. Who was the helmsman on PoW and where was his battle station?

The actual steering station was located below the MAD, IIRC.

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Dunmunro:
2) if WW intended just to shadow, while others were fighting....... then you are right !
3b) No re-engagement intention, please read Leach account: after compass platform hit he decided to DISENGAGE. You think he just didn't say that, I can't believe he did not as his officer career could have been at risk for "improperly withdrawing from fight".
At open sea the odds to loose BS were very high IMHO, even in the narrow Denmark Strait the 2 cruisers lost contact .
4) Glasfurd was aware Glorious had already been doomed by gunfire. However he said to his crew that, after the sacrifice of HMS Ardent, he would never withdraw (as he was allowed to do at that point in time) but attacked again with a destroyer agaist 2 battlecruisers. That's why Capt. Netzbandt asked the crew of Gneisenau to stand on the deck to honour Acasta. I don't expect this behaviour from any RN officer of course, but at least to stay under fire for some minutes to try to perform your mission and damage the enemy, not to DISENGAGE after 40 seconds under fire (6:00:50 till 6:01:30) and one salvo on board.......
5) WW exposed clearly to the Admiralty in a LONG LONG report all the "good" reasons why he had decided not to re-engage. The 2 exchanges of hits cannot be considered voluntary re-engagement manoeuvres from his side....... That's why the Admiralty considered the Court Martial for him...........

Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul Cadogan,

you are right my friend, and you are just underlining with your good interjection that people ( from all over the places) love to read and discuss about serious arguments with new findings historically proven and carefully researched ... instead of reading the same old story on pseudo new book full of old stuffs and ... lots of new errors on it .

Not only 100 pages, ... looks at the rate of views every day especially on last months ...

@ Dunmunro,

Duncan, ... I can insert the Norfolk gunnery data ... even if you know that for a real "curious" occurrence, ... they were related to a battle period 06.06 plus 16 minutes, ... so until 06.22 ... while on Norfolk war diary and narrative ALL timing are just on the spot
What you are going to find out is that the listed 2 ranges are corresponding to 05.35 ... and the period 05.40 until 05.55 ... just before Norfolk turned toward the enemy for 5 minutes .
What I mean is that on that document signed by Wake-Walker to Tovey, we have some good data and some "errors" that "enabled" the Tovey dispatches points 17 and 19 and ... removed the 10 sea miles previously declared to the First board ... allowing " The Plot " to be created and used after.

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

Lets recap for everyone convenience.

A ) - We know now that for 72 years incorrect information and statements as been used into books about the 2 heavy cruisers approach and distance during DS battle and PoW disengagement event timing.

B ) - Those were coming from Adm Tovey dispatches points 17 ( around 15 sea miles for Norfolk and Suffolk ) and 19 ( 06.13 battle disengagement time for PoW ).

C ) - We have realized how those incorrect data ( both of them ) have been generated : both started from a June 5th, 1941 document signed by RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker, were even self contradictory data are written into on both points.
References, attached into Wake-Walker submitted document to Home Fleet ( Tovey ) itself, should have ben Capt Ellis report for Suffolk ( 14 sea miles ) and Norfolk Gunnery data ( at least 13,5 sea miles -> Gunnery Report ) and the PoW disengagement occurred just 10 minutes after the engagement started ( so 05.53+10 = 06.03 am ).

D ) - We know that “ The Plot” ADM 116/4352 Exhibit A is an incorrect document used to sustain the above incorrect statements, in particular the 15 sea miles distance for Norfolk and Suffolk. This map/document is not consistent with other official available maps and with Suffolk and Norfolk written reports.

E ) - We know that ADM 116/4351 Diagram B on First Board was done following real official existing maps at that time that once carefully analyzed with acceptable expertise, do generate that correct diagram and the relative warship positions at 06.00.

F ) – Having the 3 radio messages from Capt J.C. Leach telling us the real PoW disengagement event sequence and timing, once associated with the available PoW maps, we easily determined that the correct PoW disengagement time that was 06.01 and 30 seconds.

G ) – The British Admiralty on the Battle Summary Nr. 5 confirmed the incorrect timing for PoW disengagement declared at 06.13 calling it back at least at 06.03 ( as stated in reality it was one and a half minute before at 06.01 and 30 seconds ).

If anyone disagree about it, please show us the evidences of your fact version.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

@Dunmunro:
2) if WW intended just to shadow, while others were fighting....... then you are right !
3b) No re-engagement intention, please read Leach account: after compass platform hit he decided to DISENGAGE. You think he just didn't say that, I can't believe he did not as his officer career could have been at risk for "improperly withdrawing from fight".
At open sea the odds to loose BS were very high IMHO, even in the narrow Denmark Strait the 2 cruisers lost contact .
4) Glasfurd was aware Glorious had already been doomed by gunfire. However he said to his crew that, after the sacrifice of HMS Ardent, he would never withdraw (as he was allowed to do at that point in time) but attacked again with a destroyer agaist 2 battlecruisers. That's why Capt. Netzbandt asked the crew of Gneisenau to stand on the deck to honour Acasta. I don't expect this behaviour from any RN officer of course, but at least to stay under fire for some minutes to try to perform your mission and damage the enemy, not to DISENGAGE after 40 seconds under fire (6:00:50 till 6:01:30) and one salvo on board.......
5) WW exposed clearly to the Admiralty in a LONG LONG report all the "good" reasons why he had decided not to re-engage. The 2 exchanges of hits cannot be considered voluntary re-engagement manoeuvres from his side....... That's why the Admiralty considered the Court Martial for him...........

Bye, Alberto

2) Wake-walkers cruiser's were dispersed (as required for shadowing), not concentrated and the possibility that Lutjens would retreat when he realized that his path was blocked by a superior force was very high. If Lutjens retreated than W-W's cruisers would be overwhelmed by Bismarck and PE before Holland could intervene, if W-W closed the range to within effective gunnery range prior to Bismarck being engaged.

3b) PoW's actions are not fully explained by Leach's statement - this is an indisputable fact. If Leach's only intention was to disengage then he simply needed to continue on the course after his first ~160d turn, but instead PoW makes two more turns, both apparently under full helm, while PoW was moving at maximum speed and this simply doesn't make sense if the only object was to disengage. In fact those two additional turns would have resulted in a very substantial loss of speed due to the use of full helm and this is very strange if the the only object was to disengage which could have been accomplished much more efficiently by either remaining on course and/or by a gentle turn at ~0603 to make best use of smoke, yet at ~0603 Pow makes another turn through 90 degrees while under full helm!
The odds of a fast battleship and two cruisers losing touch with Bismarck was very low and Lutjens was very lucky to have evaded his pursuers - again this is easy to demonstrate through simulations.

4) Glasford had no way to know the actual condition of Glorious and, in fact, Acasta continued to try and shield Glorious after firing her last torpedoes; if Glorious had been sunk at the time of the torpedo hit Acasta would have been free to withdraw since her 4.7in guns had no possibility of doing serious damage to an armoured ship. Again what happened to Ardent and Acasta is what might have happened to W-W's cruisers if PoW had been crippled while engaging in a close range duel with two opponents, especially since PoW's secondary battery was not fully efficient and she had no way to effectively engage PE. It is interesting that Acasta scored her hit from extreme range - over 14000 yds (see the track chart in Battleships of the Scharnhorst class) and in this she was aided by the very long range of the RN torpedoes. Acasta's loss resulted, not from a suicidal attempt to torpedo Scharnhorst, but from a last attempt to protect Glorious AFTER her torpedoes had been expended.

5) But he did re-engage whether you want to accept that or not. Again Bismarck was sunk! W-W's strategy was ultimately successful and he was present from first sighting and at the end of the Bismarck. Nelson would have approved.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

it should be noted that the heavy cruiser shadowing until Denmark Strait battle was only one : the HMS Suffolk

The job done was very poor indeed, ... contact was lost and re-gained much later, ... information were not precise to say the least and caused all sort of evaluation errors on who was using them as reference.

HMS Norfolk was very far away east, ... it cannot be considered an enemy shadowing effort. It was sailing toward south west ... that was it.

After 02.30 ... it turned on course 240 and realized the enemy contact for the first time at 05.41 as we all know, ... even later than PoW.

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Dunmunro:
2) already addressed by Antonio above.
3) I think we can only continue to disagree here. Leach VERY HONESTLY assumed his decision to withdraw PoW immediately after Hood blew up. He could have used your argument to justify himself and he did not. Therefore retreat decision is executed at 6:01:30.
4) exactly what WW should have tried: protect PoW having at 6:00 a very difficult time. If Acasta succeeded, he could have scored some hits as well, avoiding the turnn away at 5:41. His 8" guns were not ineffective against a battleship outside the citadel . BS would have never fired at him with heavy guns being busy to fire on PoW.
5) WW contribution finding BS again after he lost her was zero. PoW "preservation" was again of no contribution for sinking BS. The merit goes to the Catalina and to Ark Royal Swordfishes ONLY.

However, YES they were VERY LUCKY that at the end BS was sunk ! This is the only point we can agree upon.

Bye, Alberto

[Steve Crandell]

I think everyone here can agree that CAs can hurt BBs. I can't imagine that Norfolk and Suffolk would not have engaged Bismarck if they thought they could hit her. One of them tried, but was mislead by false radar return. If their CO's declined any request to open fire, there would have been evidence of that from the gunnery departments as when Lutjens took so long to allow Bismarck to open fire.

I think it's because Norfolk's gunnery department didn't think they could hit the target. That is the only explanation that makes sense to me.

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

it should be noted that the heavy cruiser shadowing until Denmark Strait battle was only one : the HMS Suffolk

The job done was very poor indeed, ... contact was lost and re-gained much later, ... information were not precise to say the least and caused all sort of evaluation errors on who was using them as reference.

HMS Norfolk was very far away east, ... it cannot be considered an enemy shadowing effort. It was sailing toward south west ... that was it.

After 02.30 ... it turned on course 240 and realized the enemy contact for the first time at 05.41 as we all know, ... even later than PoW.

Bye Antonio

Antonio, so you think it was easy for two elderly RN cruisers to shadow two of the KM's latest ships including a battleship?

Norfolk was in visual contact with Bismarck prior to the battle so she was shadowing as well. I hope you are not starting lose perspective of the difficulties that W-W had to overcome.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

please refer to this dedicated thread about the shadowing effort that was conducted until Ds battle :

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6323&start=30

What I am saying is that the shadowing effort was entirely on the shoulder of Suffolk that night.

Norfolk did almost nothing, ... and unfortunately being so distant was NOT in condition to correct the many incorrect positions delivered by radio from Suffolk that night.

As a consequence the job was very poorly done, ... and Holland was directed to a failing interception at 02.00.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

@Dunmunro:
2) already addressed by Antonio above.
3) I think we can only continue to disagree here. Leach VERY HONESTLY assumed his decision to withdraw PoW immediately after Hood blew up. He could have used your argument to justify himself and he did not. Therefore retreat decision is executed at 6:01:30.
4) exactly what WW should have tried: protect PoW having at 6:00 a very difficult time. If Acasta succeeded, he could have scored some hits as well, avoiding the turnn away at 5:41. His 8" guns were not ineffective against a battleship outside the citadel . BS would have never fired at him with heavy guns being busy to fire on PoW.
5) WW contribution finding BS again after he lost her was zero. PoW "preservation" was again of no contribution for sinking BS. The merit goes to the Catalina and to Ark Royal Swordfishes ONLY.

However, YES they were VERY LUCKY that at the end BS was sunk ! This is the only point we can agree upon.

Bye, Alberto

3) Leach doesn't give a full accounting of PoW's actions from 0601 through 0605; this part of the narrative must be accounted for along with an explanation of PoW's course changes. After 0605 and the loss of Y turret, it is clear that he intended to withdraw.

4) W-W didn't have the speed to close the range sufficiently after 0552 to participate in the battle although Norfolk did turn and close at maximum speed as soon as Bismarck was engaged. Holland was in command at that time (effectively from ~0530-0600) and did not order W-W to engage nor did W-W know Holland's exact intentions, so he could only continue his mission as before until Holland opened fire. Closing the range on a battleship and a heavy cruiser prior to them being engaged could have been suicidal had Lutjens decided to retreat at full speed from Holland.

5) W-W continued shadowing Bismarck for many hours after the DS battle and his ship, along with all the others did make a contribution in finding Bismarck as their positions told Tovey where Bismarck wasn't which was very important. When Bismarck was lost in the DS prior on the night of the 23rd, W-W's positions told Holland that Bismarck must have continued to the south, since Lutjens was unlikely to have evaded them by heading north.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

ref. above :

Point 3 : read the 3 radio messages sent by Capt. J.C.Leach I have attached on page 51 on Sat Nov 02, 2013 10:35 pm. Leach wrote all the events, the official PoW battle maps ( Rowell, Gunnery and Plan 4 ) give the events timing. Here :

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=5830&start=750

Point 4 : What Wake-Walker did the night before and during the early phase on the engagements is well known, almost nothing and kept always a very safe distance.
What he should have done after Hood explosion and PoW alone under enemy fire, is well known by any person having had an uniform being an Officer.
What he did after, was just loosing the enemy he was shadowing with his cruiser squadron.

Point 5 : can you explain to me what Wake-Walker did to Holland ? Telling what ? In which way ? When ?

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

9,10, 11 or 12 at 06.00 .... 13, 14,15 or 16 sea miles 20 minutes before, ... does it really matter one sea mile more or less ?

What really matter was the attitude, and one thing is to be really unable to join the battle, ... another thing is to think yourself as a " shadower " only, ... and just watch from far away or worst than that just turn away or turn back, ... while your comrades are going to fight an enemy you are supposed to fight as well.

The Baron from Bismarck, in charge to control what they were doing wrote :

I had to concentrate on watching the Suffolk and Norfolk. I found it very difficult to deny myself glimpses of the morning's main event. The cruisers, still twelve to fifteen nautical miles astern, followed on our course, a little to one side of our wake. There was no evidence that they were preparing to make a torpedo attack. The Suffolk fired a few salvoes, but they fell hopelessly short. Wake-Walker in the Norfolk appeared to have left the battlefield completely in the hands of the senior officer, Holland, in the Hood.

That is what really matter : " ... they appeared to have left the battlefield ... ".

In military terms that attitude do have only one definition. That is what the Inquiry would have asked and charged both Wake-Walker and Ellis.

Bye Antonio

"...in the hands of the senior officer, Holland..." is the key part of that sentence. Stating that " ... they appeared to have left the battlefield ... " completely changes it's meaning. The sentence states that Holland was in command, and he was.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,


@ Dunmunro,


I agree with you Duncan !

Despite the very poor shadowing overnight, at the beginning of the battle when there were 2 battleships ( Hood and PoW ) against 1 8 Bismarck ) that battle approach by the 2 British heavy cruiser, could be considered acceptable.

What is NOT acceptable is what happened after Hood blew up, ... because at that point who was in command being a Flag Officer ?

What he did ?

Bye Antonio