Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

[alecsandros]

Dunmunro wrote: "The idea that he would criminally collude with his subordinates is a very serious allegation that needs to be fully proven before that allegation is made as it might lead to legal action by the families of the men involved."

IMHO there is NO criminal act. There was a war to fight and propaganda is a very effective weapon. Therefore they decided just to embellish the story to cover the VERY debatable behaviours in action of some officers. An Inquiry would have been the right consequence (and again the Inquiry could have decided in any way after listening them), medals were given instead: this is the historical truth.

We have to thank Antonio for his work. Menacing will not avoid truth to come out, even if it annoys you......

Bye, Alberto

Exactly

[RF]

I have in my hands the evidences of intentional alteration of data wrongly reported by some Royal Navy Officers despite having in their hands the correct ones.

Use of the word ''intentional'' makes this statement one of interpretation rather than of pure fact.

By ''intentional'' you assume a guilty act inspired by a guilty mind?

Maybe in Italy things are different, as under Roman law, in England we have a different system of law where the concepts of guilty mind are more significant.

[RF]

Dunmunro wrote: "The idea that he would criminally collude with his subordinates is a very serious allegation that needs to be fully proven before that allegation is made as it might lead to legal action by the families of the men involved."

This is quite right.

IMHO there is NO criminal act. There was a war to fight and propaganda is a very effective weapon. Therefore they decided just to embellish the story to cover the VERY debatable behaviours in action of some officers form a pure military viewpoint. An Inquiry would have been the right consequence (and again the Inquiry could have decided in any way after listening them), medals were given instead: this is the historical truth.

I think an enquiry would have been appropriate, but not a drumhead court martial. I am pleased to see it acknowledged that there was no criminal act.

We have to thank Antonio for his work.

Agreed. He has done a very good job for which he should be congratulated. The problem I think is the interpretations that some are placing on the revisions to the battle details.

Menacing will not avoid truth to come out, even if it annoys you

For my part I have no fear of the truth, whatever that turns out to be. What is important are the facts of what did happen.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

I have in my hands the evidences of intentional alteration of data wrongly reported by some Royal Navy Officers despite having in their hands the correct ones.

Use of the word ''intentional'' makes this statement one of interpretation rather than of pure fact.

By ''intentional'' you assume a guilty act inspired by a guilty mind?

Maybe in Italy things are different, as under Roman law, in England we have a different system of law where the concepts of guilty mind are more significant.

By " intentional " I mean done on purpose, not by error or bad intentions.
I mean that it was " suggested " to them to be done in that way for the reasons I have explained above, to permit a full celebration with positive British Royal Navy propaganda ( avoiding the enemy one to be done ).
This I think was the real reason driving those decisions and acts.

Otherwise I assume that the line of Admiralty command will have surely intercepted the wrong declarations and correct them as I was able to do it lately.

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio,

Where does the 018 degree value come from on your new version of Norfolk’s track? When you created GREEN’s origin before, you used the intercept of it and 271. You know it is faulty because it is a derived, not measured, bearing from two inaccurate Estimated Positions (Norfolk's and PoW's). We actually have no idea how far away (east) from PG Norfolk was at the start of your plot. Also I note your new plot uses 276 as the PG-Norfolk reciprocal which has the effect of starting Norfolk’s track further south so as to make her look closer to Hood (and Bismarck) at the end. When you created VIOLET before you backtracked from real log entries at the southern end to derive a track origin well to the east of GREEN’s origin, and presumably more north of your new single origin. Both of which factors would make Norfolk further away from Bismarck at the end.

I presume you accept this:

Your October 12th reorientation of Diagram B gives Hood a bearing of about 215 degrees at 06:00 and of course the "Declared and Signed for" 10 miles. You needed to find this is the Norfolk log but it wasn't there.

This was the Triangle of Doom reoriented to north-up. When whoever created this Holy Relic (1941) they were presumably working with PoW’s best guess range on one side (including some control eg spotting/ranging, and Norfolk ‘s guessed range to Hood.
However since we have Norfolk's measured bearing of 230 degrees we can now discard Diagram B “Triangle of Doom” altogether as INACCURATE because it was always based on a guess of Hood's distance and now the Norfolk/ Hood bearing is wrong too. Officers “signing for/ declaring 10 miles” were not perjuring themselves by changing it later as it was only a guess. If they had been asked what Hood’s bearing was at 06:00, something which could be measured fairly accurately, and was recorded in the Log, they would have had to justify any subsequent change.

Your latest estimate pushes Norfolk's range at 06:00 out to 22,000 yds from Bismarck. This is based on knowing the final distance between Hood and Bismarck, of which there is some question, since Norfolk is only referenced relative to the British ships. The longest range at which any warship has ever hit another moving target with a gun is about 26,000 yds. This was in a stern chase with limited rate change in either range or azimuth. Norfolk would be firing at near ultimate range at a target with high rate change in both directions with only forward turrets bearing. What would be the point of wasting ammunition like this?

All the best

wadinga

[Steve Crandell]

I would think 22,000 yds was within range of Norfolk. It was certainly within range of PG during the battle. I can only guess that her speed and course and the target bearing made her fire control optics unuseable. Otherwise I think there is a good chance we would have seen recorded protests from her gunnery department, but this is all uncertain. In any case, I can't believe she wouldn't have been firing just like PG if she thought she could hit the target.

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Steve Crandell:
it could have been as you suggest, of course, but only a formal Inquiry would have been able to ask questions and to clarify why a RN heavy cruiser within gun range since 5:41 did not engage the enemy, especially after 6:00 when she was the flagship......
The Inquiry was not called for the reasons (very valid ones IMHO) that we have underlined several times in the above posts.

Bye, Alberto

[alecsandros]

I would think 22,000 yds was within range of Norfolk. It was certainly within range of PG during the battle. I can only guess that her speed and course and the target bearing made her fire control optics unuseable. Otherwise I think there is a good chance we would have seen recorded protests from her gunnery department, but this is all uncertain. In any case, I can't believe she wouldn't have been firing just like PG if she thought she could hit the target.

I would think they overestimated range to Bismarck at 5:41 (16 nautical miles according to Norfolk report, instead of ~ 14 in reality) and thus they overestimated range at 6:00 also. They probably believed themselves at 13 miles or so, when they were at 11.
It's just a theory...

[wadinga]

Hi Steve,

Well it's only verbally quoted as 22,000 yds for Antonio's latest iteration, but if there were a scale I suspect that we would find it is just a little more. I don't see why the range would be a lot less than on VIOLET given that the bearing from Hood to Norfolk is 230 the same as VIOLET. Even "adjusting" Norfolk's start point a little closer to Hood only slides her 06:00 position up and down 230 which is so close to Lutjen's 220 that the range will be little affected.

On the VIOLET track Norfolk was 12 miles or 24,000 yds from Hood and Bismarck was somewhat further even using the ratios of the discredited "Triangle of Doom". I measure it on Antonio's VIOLET map as 14 miles or 28,000 yds.

Saying someone is "in range" from 05:42 is meaningless when Antonio is still readjusting his map. It is to Antonio's eternal credit that he has found and published the information from Norfolk's war diary which make these refinements possible.

That is why I would not presume to try and produce my own map, since all the work is Antonio's and he deserves the credit. However I welcome every opportunity to persuade him to incorporate features which will make it reflect a closer approximation to reality rather than be "edited" to suit a predetermined outcome. That way lies Winklareth.

All the best

wadinga

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

I do not think that avoiding an inquiry that will enable a lot of propaganda on the enemy side on war time and having a NOT deserved medal can be considered a criminal act.

Any such inquiries will be conducted in secrecy as were the accompanying reports. The RN did, on occasion, censure or dismiss officers for dereliction of duty and I really doubt that Tovey would tolerate incompetent and/or cowardly officers under his command. Tovey was a strong willed commander not afraid to stand up to the Admiralty and to Churchill so why would be tolerate or conspire with officers whom he felt were not up to par? The whole "...enable a lot of propaganda on the enemy side..." doesn't stand up to serious scrutiny. If Tovey/Admiralty wanted to censure/retire Leach and/or W-W they could easily do so with no publicity.

I am referring to a professional naval officer that one day sign for 20.000 yards in front to a board of inquiry and two months later calls it back to 30.000 yards using a non reliable document ( The Plot ). To a professional naval officer that on the same document is able to write a time 06.13 on point 10 and one page after on the same document at point 20 writes after 10 minutes engagement so 05.53 plus 10 minutes = 06.03. And I am using just the " big " ones ....
YES, I am with you, he was surely unable to resolve conflicting sets of data, ... despite having the correct ones on his hands.
This is exactly the point in discussion here.

W-W had no reliable means of measuring the range to Hood, given that Norfolk's long base RF's were directed towards the enemy, so it is not surprising that upon reconsideration of a variety of factors including the possibility of mirage, that he changed his estimated distance. Remember that Mcmullen, with the benefit of a better vantage point and the best optics available to the RN was unable to estimate Bismarck's range at open fire to better than ~5% accuracy, yet you expect officers on Norfolk's bridge to do better than Mcmullen!

Tovey was not a witness at the Hood inquiries. Tovey wrote his own time for disengagement (0613) and quoted W-W as stating that PoW disengaged after 10 minutes. Since Tovey was not present at the battle he had to rely on the timings recorded by the various ships that were present. In any event, it is very possible that Tovey's timing of 0613 was a simple transcription error - an error undiscovered for many years because the despatch was classified until published in 1947. How was Tovey able to divine what was correct and what was error? Remember that he wrote his despatch in July 1941, with no access to KM records. To answer this riddle it would be necessary to find Tovey's original despatch with his notes.

If you look at " The plot " at 06.00 you will see the immediate turn from course 270 to course 220 by HMS Norfolk at 06.00 precisely.
Even before HMS Prince of Wales disengaged ... it has been a very fast move.
Using Wake-Walker own words, ... he must have felt uncomfortably close on that moment.

According to "the plot" Norfolk began to turn to 0220 (hardly a turn away as it parallels the enemy's course and opens Norfolk's A arcs) at 0600 but the same "plot" shows Hood sinking at 0602.

Only one gun short ( 9 instead of 10 confirmed by Wake-Walker too ) and Y turret still perfectly working. Read Capt. Leach own radio messages and narrative. Turn away at 06.01 and 30 seconds 160 degrees to port, showed on ALL PoW battle maps with perfect timing in line with Hunter-Terry declaration being considered the most reliable by the board of inquiry.

Regardless, Leach knew that he was fighting with less than his full armament. He also knew that his secondary armament had only fired 3 salvos, so PE was effectively unengaged. Again, I don't doubt that PoW began to turn to open the range at ~0601:30 but I don't accept that timing for disengagement.

I can take the "fog of war " as well as the "propaganda war reasons " to justify what happened. I will NOT judge anybody.

All I am saying is that the battle data needs to be correctly reported and written from now on given the available official evidences.

Doing an historical research work I am just using available official documents from UK archives.
If anybody would like to challenge what I am stating, he needs before to resolve what is made officially available in Kew-London at the PRO.

Bye Antonio

I think, with the data you have disclosed, that you can ask questions regarding the actions of Tovey, Leach and W-W, but you cannot draw definite conclusions.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: " The RN did, on occasion, censure or dismiss officers for dereliction of duty "

Do you refer to full Captains and Flag Officers during WWII ? Could you please provide some example to compare the situations ? I was unable to find any reference, except a couple of Inquiries called for Captains for the loss of their ships (and I imagine they could have been exonerated......)

Dunmunro wrote:" If Tovey/Admiralty wanted to censure/retire Leach and/or W-W they could easily do so with no publicity."

You are right, but they couldn't decorate the other officers and celebrate victory without generating questions re. the reasons why Leach, WW (and Ellis?) were not decorated together with the others......

Dunmunro wrote: "Norfolk began to turn to 0220 (hardly a turn away as it parallels the enemy's course and opens Norfolk's A arcs) at 0600 but the same "plot" shows Hood sinking at 0602."

What is the logic of opening A arcs without firing a single shot ?
6:00 Hood blows up, 6:02 Hood sinks.

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Do you refer to full Captains and Flag Officers during WWII ? Could you please provide some example to compare the situations ? I was unable to find any reference, except a couple of Inquiries called for Captains for the loss of their ships (and I imagine they could have been exonerated......)

HMS Manchester:

Her commanding officer, Captain Harold Drew, was court-martialled due to the Admiralty's belief that the ship was still navigable and capable of reaching a neutral port. Captain Drew was initially led to believe that he was taking part in an enquiry, and was only informed at the end of the trial that he was in fact being charged with negligence by a court martial.[2] He was found guilty, and was reprimanded and dismissed.(wikipedia)

You are right, but they couldn't decorate the other officers and celebrate victory without generating questions re. the reasons why Leach, WW (and Ellis?) were not decorated together with the others......

I don't think anybody at the Admiralty, including Tovey would lose any sleep over non-deserving officers, NOT being awarded medals.

What is the logic of opening A arcs without firing a single shot ?
6:00 Hood blows up, 6:02 Hood sinks.

Bye, Alberto

Still NOT a turn away.

[Steve Crandell]

Will someone please post a link to the latest reconstruction map?

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Dunmunro: regarding your 3 point above:

1)thanks, I saw HMS Manchester and HMS Ark Royal ship losses led to an Inquiry for their Captains.
Still no Inquiry (nor Court-Martial) for "Misconduct in presence of the enemy" for Flag Officers / Captains.

2) I'm not sure public opinion would have not noticed on October 41 that the officers involved in the May 24 battle were not decorated while the ones involved in May 27 were. Especially because WW was there also on May 27.....

3) I agree the 6:00 manoeuvre cannot be defined strictly a "turn away". It looks like WW at 6:00 (still HMS Hood was floating and Holland was alive) decided to resume his "shadowing" role even before HMS PoW disengagement. In any other case he would have open fire in support of PoW, but he did not.

Bye, Alberto

[Byron Angel]

..... At the risk of further complicating affairs, Santarini's new book on Hood/Bismarck (which I have only just received) offers an interesting view re PoW's maneuvering at the crucial moment of the battle.

The author argues that PoW made three turns:
[a] an initial turn to port conforming to Hood's turn to bring her starboard A arc to bear.
a hard turn to starboard to clear PoW's bow of Hood's wreck after she had been stricken.
[c] then a hard turn to port to swing PoW's stern away from Hood's wreck, which was continued into a full turn away.

Santarini's comment that turn [c] was initially also part of an effort to clear Hood makes it difficult to determine the precise moment when Leach actually decided to break off the action.

Interesting book so far.

B