Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,


@ Dunmunro,


I agree with you Duncan !

Despite the very poor shadowing overnight, at the beginning of the battle when there were 2 battleships ( Hood and PoW ) against 1 8 Bismarck ) that battle approach by the 2 British heavy cruiser, could be considered acceptable.

What is NOT acceptable is what happened after Hood blew up, ... because at that point who was in command being a Flag Officer ?

What he did ?

Bye Antonio

"Despite the very poor shadowing overnight" Poor compared to what? Can you provide an example of "good" shadowing?

W-W was unable to exercise control of RN forces until PoW withdrew, and he then consolidated his forces and continued his mission.

[Steve Crandell]

What was the comparative radar capability between PoW and Norfolk? I'm thinking W-W might have been on the wrong ship to exercise effective control of the formation.

[dunmunro]

What was the comparative radar capability between PoW and Norfolk? I'm thinking W-W might have been on the wrong ship to exercise effective control of the formation.

Of the 3 ships under his command (After PoW joined), Norfolk had the poorest radar, with the shortest effective range. Suffolk and PoW, could, in theory shadow Bismarck from 20-25000 yards using their type 284 (Suffolk + PoW) or type 281 (PoW). Norfolk only had a short range type 286 with very limited capability search range (~15k yds) and a fixed antennae.

[paulcadogan]

What I am saying is that the shadowing effort was entirely on the shoulder of Suffolk that night.

Norfolk did almost nothing, ... and unfortunately being so distant was NOT in condition to correct the many incorrect positions delivered by radio from Suffolk that night.

As a consequence the job was very poorly done, ... and Holland was directed to a failing interception at 02.00.

Point 4 : What Wake-Walker did the night before and during the early phase on the engagements is well known, almost nothing and kept always a very safe distance.
What he should have done after Hood explosion and PoW alone under enemy fire, is well known by any person having had an uniform being an Officer.
What he did after, was just loosing the enemy he was shadowing with his cruiser squadron.

Come on now....I really have to protest the now wholesale characterization of CS1's performance during the chase as some gross incompetence and dereliction of duty!

Do not forget that this operation was the FIRST time that German ships breaking out into the Atlantic were being succesfully shadowed! The Scheer passed patrolling cruisers undetected. Scharnhorst & Gneisenau encountered a cruiser in the Iceland-Faeroes gap and quickly shook her off to disappear and then negotiate the DS unseen.

The difference this time was Suffolk's radar and YES the shadowing was dependent on her. It had to be. Norfolk's radar was not fit for the job - so what was Wake-Walker to do - close in and haul into line 3000 yards astern of Bismarck to keep an eye on her??? When Norfolk charged in after initial contact by Suffolk she almost got blown out of the water! All WW could do was maintain a position at a SAFE distance off the enemy's port quarter, and keep track of movements based on Suffolk's signals. If the enemy altered to port he might detect them in good time to prevent a repeat of the initial encounter and make any necessary report - and this is precisely what happened when the Germans tracked briefly to port shortly before BC1 intercepted.

Again, this was the first time shadowing of an enemy unit was being done using the type 284 - this was on-the-job training! As for inaccurate dead reckoning positions, was that unusual for 1941?? Or were Captains Ellis & Phillips to call on Dr. Who to juice up the TARDIS to bring them 21st century GPS devices?? Come on now...

Then the loss of contact before Tovey could intercept - YES it might have been a questionable move to keep all three shadowing ships together - but why might WW have done that?

Much has been made of the "protection" PoW gave the cruisers. Well, even with that protection, Suffolk, on her own on the starboard quarter, could very well have been mauled and sunk when Bismarck attacked to cover PG's escape, before PoW could effectively intervene. PoW was 30,000 yards away. After that close call, and with visibility not so great, WW put Suffolk safely under PoW's wing, but with the negative effect of leaving Bismarck's starboard side uncovered which, coupled with the shadowers having to zigzag, allowed her later escape. Damned if you do, damned if you dont.....

So, from my standpoint, I can understand and accept the scrutiny, criticism and debate of WW's reporting of the DS action, and the "to engage or not to engage", but to cast the whole operation as a "cock-up" is unfair. CS1 did FAR better than any other ship or ships had done previously - more than 30 hours through cold, fog, snow, battle, rough seas and potential uboats!

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

I see all your points, ... and based on what has been published on 72 years I can understand from were they come from.

That is exactly what I realized was going to be this all discussion given what I have read and found.

There is one think that I should have made more clear probably earlier, the fact that in London, at the RN Admiralty, they realized immediately and well understood everything occurred before doing what they did after for PoW and the CS1 cruisers, for Leach and Wake-Walker.

Talking about shadowing and the performances of the 2 heavy cruisers, the internal recommendation was that in future the shadowing was going to be done from a much closer distance compared to what was done by HMS Suffolk, taking some more risk and not doing it at the border of the equipment capabilities.

Now with this in mind, you can better realize what was their opinion of what Suffolk, and mostly Norfolk did that night.

But like in the case of PoW, the truth cannot be revealed the way they well realize on June 1941, ... there was a war to fight, ... the morale to be kept high, ... and a celebration to be done for having sunk the German most powerful battleship.

That is the real reason why the 15 sea miles has been communicated on official reports, ... their performance been judged positively overall ... and at the end the medals delivered to them as well ... even if in the case of Norfolk there was a very curious misunderstanding ... making somebody nervous about it ...

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Paul Cadogan wrote: "I can understand and accept the scrutiny, criticism and debate of WW's reporting of the DS action, and the "to engage or not to engage", but to cast the whole operation as a "cock-up" is unfair. CS1 did FAR better than any other ship or ships had done previously - more than 30 hours through cold, fog, snow, battle, rough seas and potential uboats!"

Hi Paul ,
for the first time in this thread I tend to be in partial disagreement with my friend Antonio Bonomi evaluation. I'm more in line with your judgement about the shadowing performances.

I don't say that Norfolk was doing a great job in absolute terms with his obsolete radar, but Suffolk did a sufficient job to allow Holland to intercept and engage at 5:35.
Your point that it was the first time and a kind of on-the-job training is IMHO fair and correct, even if (as Antonio said) aftermath conclusions were recommending a very different shadowing approach to be adopted from shorter range.

"When Norfolk charged in after initial contact by Suffolk she almost got blown out of the water! "

I think this is the key event during the first part of the night: after that, Norfolk was kept by WW too far from Bismarck; this can be debatable as, from this point on, WW left the whole responsibility of the shadowing to Suffolk even steering his ship just after 2:00AM to be more to the south than PoW and Hood to keep distance ! But again, fairly acceptable due to your considerations and the risk in getting closer.

Regarding the second part of the shadowing (after battle), again I don't say it was done badly in absolute terms (some errors were done for sure but as you say explainable and understandable).

However the point is exactly this one: WW did a fairly acceptable job until 5:35 but clealy had to realise the difficulty of keeping contact with a battleship and a cruiser forced to move together on a fixed course in the narrow Denmark Strait. It should have been clear to him at that point that in open Atlantic, with the German ships able to take different courses (as they did) it was almost impossible to guarantee to keep contact . The opportunity should have been taken at interception to damage both German ships. Here he failed miserably.

After the enemy report of PoW he (together with Ellis) was UNABLE to change his shadowing attitude into an aggressive one (from shadower to fighter and later to senior officer), he was happy to see his big brother coming and he considered his mission to be over, preparing to assist as a spectator to the coming show (see the Baron judgement) , even taking at 5:41 an "evasive" action with the "outrageous" arc !
Most of all, having been an officer myself, I can't justify from a military standpoint that, after Hood blew up, his only concern was to resume his shadowing mission, turning away from enemy even BEFORE PoW did, when Holland was probably still alive on board the sinking Hood . All this without firing his guns while being at 11 miles (Diagram B) from the enemy to support PoW........

Then he did nothing to re-engage as well .....

Bye, Alberto

[Herr Nilsson]

Talking about shadowing and the performances of the 2 heavy cruisers, the internal recommendation was that in future the shadowing was going to be done from a much closer distance compared to what was done by HMS Suffolk, taking some more risk and not doing it at the border of the equipment capabilities.

Now with this in mind, you can better realize what was their opinion of what Suffolk, and mostly Norfolk did that night.

No, I can't.

... even if in the case of Norfolk there was a very curious misunderstanding ... making somebody nervous about it ...

I think talking in riddles doesn't make this thread much shorter.

[wadinga]

Hi Marc,

Antonio is being circumspect because he is accusing Wake-Walker of falsifying records (by changing the times) because otherwise the ranging figures are incompatible with his "Norfolk was 11 miles from Bismarck at 06:00" scenario, but without using the sensitive word "lying".

the whole quote is:

Duncan, ... I can insert the Norfolk gunnery data ... even if you know that for a real "curious" occurrence, ... they were related to a battle period 06.06 plus 16 minutes, ... so until 06.22 ... while on Norfolk war diary and narrative ALL timing are just on the spot
What you are going to find out is that the listed 2 ranges are corresponding to 05.35 ... and the period 05.40 until 05.55 ... just before Norfolk turned toward the enemy for 5 minutes .
What I mean is that on that document signed by Wake-Walker to Tovey, we have some good data and some "errors" that "enabled" the Tovey dispatches points 17 and 19 and ... removed the 10 sea miles previously declared to the First board ... allowing " The Plot " to be created and used after.

As for your sensible question about who was actually steering PoW with a wheel in his hands, the Quartermaster would have been many decks below the forward superstructure (nowhere near the Magnetic Anomaly Detector - joke ). As I suggested nearly a hundred pages ago, to me it is quite clear PoW turned to port to follow Hood, an emergency turn to starboard followed to avoid Hood's wreck (seen by the Germans but not recorded/remembered by Rowell the following day when he attempted to map the occurences during the time he was disabled- he also admits he may be two minutes out), followed by another emergency helm order down the voicepipe to turn to port again to open A arcs again, slow the ridiculous rate of closure and continue the fight. At which point the voicepipe to the helmsman unaccountably went quiet, due to the Compass Platform staff being maimed, stunned or killed. With hard aport still on the rudder. As even the reconstructed salvo plot shows, PoW was aiming at ever shorter ranges, because she was still closing the enemy.

As Duncan has emphatically observed the starboard turn back towards the enemy only makes sense in terms of re-engaging, when Leach regained full consciousness. If he was really calling it a day he would have laid in a course for Scapa, sat back in his chair, (what remained of it) and said "Engage".

At which point he gets the news about Y turret.

All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote: ".....to me it is quite clear PoW turned to port to follow Hood..........the starboard turn back towards the enemy only makes sense in terms of re-engaging........At which point he gets the news about Y turret. ......"

Hi Sean, nice reconstruction, explaining almost everything....... A pity that (apart from Rowell, Hunter-Terry etc.) this IS NOT what Leach declared as repeated several times in this thread (please refer to what Antonio posted at page 51 of this same thread, second post in the page)........

Capt. Leach account: "It was considered expedient to break off the action and consolidate the position, and the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away behind a smoke screen. "Y" Turret fired in local during the turn as smoke blanked the after director......
........"Y" Turret's shell ring jammed during the turn away and the turret was out of action until 0825. "

Therefore 1) decision to disengage, 2) smoke screen and turn away (break off action + turn away = disengagement), 3) local control salvo from Y turret 4)Y turret jam during the turn away
This is therefore the only possible sequence of events and decisions. No intent to re-engage at all, just a turn to follow smoke.

Bye, Alberto

[paulcadogan]

...or to try to evade incoming German salvoes.

BUT - note Leach says the ship turned away AFTER being maneuvered around the remains of Hood.

One thought that comes to me is that we do not have specific times logged for the local control salvos from Y-turret (do we?). We have the battle photos and film showing splashes. BUT....as I suggested elsewhere, in NH69725 in which we see two terribly short splashes, PoW appears much further to the right of Hood's sinking site than she should have given the tight turn around the wreck shown on the maps if the salvos were fired during that phase. How can you reconcile that?

Even the single splashes seen in the PG film - can we be absolutely certain they were from the local control salvos? The last controlled salvos fired by PoW had very wide spreads (even coming close enough to PG to put a splinter aboard) and if I'm not wrong, Bismarck had altered away at that time.

From PoW's Gunnery report:

When the Fore Director was wooded during the turn away after salvo 18, the main switch in the T.S. was put over to after director. This director was also unable to see the enemy due to the ship's smoke screen, and the Officer of "Y" turret, using his own initiative, went into local control and fired three salvoes as he was able to see under the smoke.

The fall of shot of these three salvoes is uncertain.

So how long would it take for the turret officer to decide to go to local control, get a range from his RF, lay the guns and fire?

For a local control gunner to "up-ladder" from the hopeless short shown in NH69725 to the two reasonably close to target splashes seen in the PG film is IMHO - REMARKABLE!!

So...don't crucify me for this but I think this is a loose end that remains unresolved. Antonio, can you the ABSOLUTELY sure about the timing of these salvos??

AND HANG ON!! Could these have been the salvos that Brinkmann referred to in his report as having come from PoW that "fell outboard of the ships" - only mis-timing them to 0620 because of the Suffolk confusion???

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

the evaluation of RDF performances by Suffolk and Norfolk and the relative recommendation were written directly by Adm J. Tovey.

Suffolk lesson ( type 284 )recommended that the shadowing was going to be executed inside the radar capabilities and NOT at the border of it, so basically the cruiser should have shadowed from closer taking more risks, between 10 to 15 sea miles with a solid and stable radar echo and not at 15 sea miles with the radar echo being taken and lost frequently.

Norfolk was evaluated having done very little, due to the limited capabilities of his radar type 286.

Sorry for my little riddle. It happened that when the celebration started and congratulations went all over the places in writings from RN Admiralty, … they just forgot to include into the long distribution list the HMS Norfolk, … and you can imagine Adm J. Tovey comments and comeback about it.

In Italy we call it : " The hand of destiny " ...

@ Wadinga,

Sean my friend, …. you are just very sharp and intelligent, … and in fact I avoid to use sensitive words and personal evaluations about the Officers involved into this discussion.

But in my current evaluations I am really having difficulties to define RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker conduct being a RN Flag Officer, … due to his several debatable actions during that operation and obviously after in writings.

How will you define an Officer of that rank that is able to write on the same document the truth ( with attachments proving it ) and also a different version and data about 2 such critical aspects ? He did it, signed and submitted to C in C Home Fleet Adm J. Tovey.

Differently, Captain J.C. Leach wrote 3 radio messages progressively declaring the truth and never went back changing his data with incorrect ones, … at the end on his narrative he just avoided putting too many data and just listed the events.

Somebody else did the dirty job for him too ( 06.13 ) … apparently very easily and with no precautions at all.

I like your opinion about all this …

Bye Antonio

[Dave Saxton]

Suffolk lesson ( type 284 )recommended that the shadowing was going to be executed inside the radar capabilities and NOT at the border of it, so basically the cruiser should have shadowed from closer taking more risks, between 10 to 15 sea miles with a solid and stable radar echo and not at 15 sea miles with the radar echo being taken and lost frequently.

Type 284 (the 1941 models) could not track Bismarck from 15nm. Ellis reported that the 284 could track Bismarck to a max range of 13nm but it was rather hit and miss. When the visibility permitted, Ellis would drop back to a safer range and rest his radar, but he usually had to close range to ~19,000 yards to reacquire radar contact when the visibility closed up again according to the ADM documents on the shadowing. Tests of an early model 284 on KGV yielded these ranges:

14,000 yards to destroyers.
20,000 yards to cruisers.

It was not tested vs a battleship but Ellis's reports demonstrate it was around 25,000 yards.

The cruisers had to expose themselves to just stay within unreliable radar contact range, and to do what Tovey reccomended would have involved greater risk. A year later, however, with the introduction of Type 273 shadowing from 15nm or more would have been feasable. Norfolk's radar was effective to about 5 miles during the Bismarck chase.

[alecsandros]

If he was really calling it a day he would have laid in a course for Scapa, sat back in his chair, (what remained of it) and said "Engage".

... Set a course for Scapa... maximum Warp

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul Cadogan,

... or to try to evade incoming German salvoes.

BUT - note Leach says the ship turned away AFTER being maneuvered around the remains of Hood.

One thought that comes to me is that we do not have specific times logged for the local control salvos from Y-turret (do we?). We have the battle photos and film showing splashes. BUT....as I suggested elsewhere, in NH69725 in which we see two terribly short splashes, PoW appears much further to the right of Hood's sinking site than she should have given the tight turn around the wreck shown on the maps if the salvos were fired during that phase. How can you reconcile that?

Even the single splashes seen in the PG film - can we be absolutely certain they were from the local control salvos? The last controlled salvos fired by PoW had very wide spreads (even coming close enough to PG to put a splinter aboard) and if I'm not wrong, Bismarck had altered away at that time.

From PoW's Gunnery report:

When the Fore Director was wooded during the turn away after salvo 18, the main switch in the T.S. was put over to after director. This director was also unable to see the enemy due to the ship's smoke screen, and the Officer of "Y" turret, using his own initiative, went into local control and fired three salvoes as he was able to see under the smoke.

The fall of shot of these three salvoes is uncertain.

So how long would it take for the turret officer to decide to go to local control, get a range from his RF, lay the guns and fire?

For a local control gunner to "up-ladder" from the hopeless short shown in NH69725 to the two reasonably close to target splashes seen in the PG film is IMHO - REMARKABLE!!

So...don't crucify me for this but I think this is a loose end that remains unresolved. Antonio, can you the ABSOLUTELY sure about the timing of these salvos??

AND HANG ON!! Could these have been the salvos that Brinkmann referred to in his report as having come from PoW that "fell outboard of the ships" - only miss-timing them to 0620 because of the Suffolk confusion???

My friend you are surely referring to your well known photo Nh 69731 and not Nh 69725 when you talk of the 2 shell splashes.

You know I did reconcile everything nailing down the overall battle timing and connecting the PG with PoW tracks, which is the solid foundation of my battle re-construction.

Until my trip to Kew-London, ... all timing was only based on my work and the photo and film evidences, ... enough for me but a lot challenged by everybody else frequently.

I am glad to announce you that I now have in my hand a SOLID evidence in writing on a map that all my hard researched work and my intuition of those 3 PoW local control salvoes being the KEY to understand all the events timing before and after ... was CORRECT ! ... and consequently now there is NO room anymore even to put them in discussion ... especially the photo Nh 69731 showing exactly the first one, ... the 19th PoW salvo ... or the 1st in local control if you like it better, ... 2 shells.

Somebody into an official PoW gunnery map made a cross to declare when they were really fired, ..and just like the 18 degrees on Plan 4, … that makes for me all the difference in this world. Again, into RN Admiralty in London, … they understood and carefully analyze EVERYTHING, … just like I did for last 10 years ,…but they were much better than me of course.

PoW_local_salvoes.jpg (147.93 KiB) Viewed 693 times

It has been a pleasure for me to open those official documents and find out so many confirmations of my hard work on this battle re-construction.
Those are sensations and satisfactions I will never forget.

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dave Saxton,

you wrote :

Suffolk lesson ( type 284 )recommended that the shadowing was going to be executed inside the radar capabilities and NOT at the border of it, so basically the cruiser should have shadowed from closer taking more risks, between 10 to 15 sea miles with a solid and stable radar echo and not at 15 sea miles with the radar echo being taken and lost frequently.

Type 284 (the 1941 models) could not track Bismarck from 15nm. Ellis reported that the 284 could track Bismarck to a max range of 13nm but it was rather hit and miss. When the visibility permitted, Ellis would drop back to a safer range and rest his radar, but he usually had to close range to ~19,000 yards to reacquire radar contact when the visibility closed up again according to the ADM documents on the shadowing. Tests of an early model 284 on KGV yielded these ranges:

14,000 yards to destroyers.
20,000 yards to cruisers.

It was not tested vs a battleship but Ellis's reports demonstrate it was around 25,000 yards.

The cruisers had to expose themselves to just stay within unreliable radar contact range, and to do what Tovey reccomended would have involved greater risk. A year later, however, with the introduction of Type 273 shadowing from 15nm or more would have been feasable. Norfolk's radar was effective to about 5 miles during the Bismarck chase.

Nice job and analysis Dave, as usual

This is going to be a lot valuable for me when I will analyze the Suffolk distances and tracks accurately.
I had this feeling, but with this confirmation all is more clear to me now.
More to come soon on this one ...

Bye Antonio