Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

[dunmunro]

@Dunmunro: Leach himself said that he decided to disengage after the compass platform hit.

Let's at least recognize he was fairly and honestly admitting and assuming his decision. No re-emgagement intention. Never.

Bye, Alberto

You have to look at the summation of all the evidence. We don't have an explanation from Leach for all of PoW's course changes after 0600 so therefore Leach's statements alone are incomplete! Naval history would be dead easy if it could be written based solely on the statements of the participants, with no regard to their actual actions. Heck if that was the case, then Tovey's despatch would still be regarded as the last word on the whole Bismarck episode. Yet there seems to be little inclination to accept Tovey's statements as incontestable facts.

1) Leach turned away
2) Leach turned back
2) Y turret jammed
3) Leach turned away again.

Leach just doesn't explain this in any detail so the historian has to provide, through analysis, a satisfactory explanation.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

lets make things simple.

1 ) Distances during the battle and at 06.00 : on all official Royal Navy documents available is 16.300-16.500 yards and it is consistent with all previously measured distances given speed and courses.
If you have better evidences compared to the ones I have produced on my battle reconstruction and map, please bring them out and realize a battle map; I am/ we are willing to evaluate them.

2 ) When PoW turned away is visible on 3 PoW maps and several accounts. It was 06.01 and 30 secs. Again, if you have better evidences, please show it to us.

3) Reliable means POSSIBLE. ADM 116/4351 Diagram B was done using available RN official maps and a Norfolk possible course and speed from 05.35 until 06.00.
Wake-Walker declarations and " The PloT " ADM 116/4352 Exhibit A are not possible so consequently NOT reliable, because they are IMPOSSIBLE !
Go back some pages and check BLACK POINTS A to point B on " The PloT " on my post of : Sun Feb 02, 2014 7:48 pm on page 90 of this thread.
If you disagree about it, please show me/us how come respecting Wake-Walker declarations you can go on a map from 05.35 with Prinz Eugen at 276 degrees bearing at 16 sea miles to 15 sea miles from Hood bearing 230 degrees from Norfolk sailing the courses Norfolk sailed at 30 knots, without making the alteration of Hood and Prinz Eugen known course and relative distances on the same map like they did on " The Plot ".

4 ) The operational PoW guns are listed on the PoW gunnery report and available on the 3rd Capt Leach radio message, and they were 9 out of 10 when he turned PoW away.
That happened at 06.01 and 30 seconds as we can see an all PoW maps.
Capt Leach himself wrote that Y turret jammed after the turn away on his radio reports and narrative, please go and read them.

5 ) Finally 06.13. We have discovered that was Wake-Walker to start this ridiculous timing.
Now on same document he wrote 10 minutes after the engagement started, which means 05.53 + 10 minutes = 06.03.
But when he wrote 06.13 he kept on describing the battle going on and the German still firing and scoring hits on PoW, while we all know the Germans ceased fire at 06.09.
Sean how we have to consider those declarations ... please tell me ...

@ Steve Crandell,

thanks for the compliments.

Somebody wrote on some official documents that they had " the courage " to retreat : do you like this definition better ?

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

3) Reliable means POSSIBLE. ADM 116/4351 Diagram B was done using available RN official maps and a Norfolk possible course and speed from 05.35 until 06.00.
Wake-Walker declarations and " The PloT " ADM 116/4352 Exhibit A are not possible so consequently NOT reliable, because they are IMPOSSIBLE !
Go back some pages and check BLACK POINTS A to point B on " The PloT " on my post of : Sun Feb 02, 2014 7:48 pm on page 90 of this thread.
If you disagree about it, please show me/us how come respecting Wake-Walker declarations you can go on a map from 05.35 with Prinz Eugen at 276 degrees bearing at 16 sea miles to 15 sea miles from Hood bearing 230 degrees from Norfolk sailing the courses Norfolk sailed at 30 knots, without making the alteration of Hood and Prinz Eugen known course and relative distances on the same map like they did on " The Plot ".

It's obvious that the bearing info is incorrect.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@Dunmunro: Leach himself said that he decided to disengage after the compass platform hit.

Let's at least recognize he was fairly and honestly admitting and assuming his decision. No re-emgagement intention. Never.

Bye, Alberto

You have to look at the summation of all the evidence. We don't have an explanation from Leach for all of PoW's course changes after 0600 so therefore Leach's statements alone are incomplete! Naval history would be dead easy if it could be written based solely on the statements of the participants, with no regard to their actual actions. Heck if that was the case, then Tovey's despatch would still be regarded as the last word on the whole Bismarck episode. Yet there seems to be little inclination to accept Tovey's statements as incontestable facts.

1) Leach turned away
2) Leach turned back
2) Y turret jammed
3) Leach turned away again.

Leach just doesn't explain this in any detail so the historian has to provide, through analysis, a satisfactory explanation.

Leach was just turning to keep PoW hidden behind the smoke screen moved by the wind. Just read Jasper report about it ... since he was trying to hit her again ... and carefully looking at what she was doing. Here :

Immediately thereafter, the opponent turned hard onto a reciprocal course. He gave off black smoke and apparently tried to use this to escape from view. In my opinion, this smoke was artificial black fog and did not emanate from a (real) conflagration.

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

3) Reliable means POSSIBLE. ADM 116/4351 Diagram B was done using available RN official maps and a Norfolk possible course and speed from 05.35 until 06.00.
Wake-Walker declarations and " The PloT " ADM 116/4352 Exhibit A are not possible so consequently NOT reliable, because they are IMPOSSIBLE !
Go back some pages and check BLACK POINTS A to point B on " The PloT " on my post of : Sun Feb 02, 2014 7:48 pm on page 90 of this thread.
If you disagree about it, please show me/us how come respecting Wake-Walker declarations you can go on a map from 05.35 with Prinz Eugen at 276 degrees bearing at 16 sea miles to 15 sea miles from Hood bearing 230 degrees from Norfolk sailing the courses Norfolk sailed at 30 knots, without making the alteration of Hood and Prinz Eugen known course and relative distances on the same map like they did on " The Plot ".

It's obvious that the bearing info is incorrect.

Which one you mean is incorrect please ?

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

1) Before the battle, there was a battle to fight, after the battle there was..... the Atlantic (had BS not been damaged).
2) Ok, if you fight just with the immu zone in your mind and if the British heavy cruisers do.....nothing ......as they did.
3) I don't think the Admiralty would have censured a good example of Nelsonian spirit. PoW had all chances to damage BS, dooming her, before being sunk and this would have got him a "well deserved" medal. In your opinion was he right to retreat without attempting to stop BS ? Your opinion..... my one is VERY different !
4) Yes, and Holland orders were to sink BS. Once Holland dead and without explicit orders from WW (missing in his role for sure) his D.U.T.Y. was to continue the mission.
5) Ah ! Now it's clear: the Admiralty orders to Holland were: "Shadow BS , so she will not sink convoys !" . Genial
Please consider that, without the Catalina on May 26, BS would NOT have been found again. She was in range at that very moment and Leach should have fought her. No justification for me.

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@Dunmunro: Leach himself said that he decided to disengage after the compass platform hit.

Let's at least recognize he was fairly and honestly admitting and assuming his decision. No re-emgagement intention. Never.

Bye, Alberto

You have to look at the summation of all the evidence. We don't have an explanation from Leach for all of PoW's course changes after 0600 so therefore Leach's statements alone are incomplete! Naval history would be dead easy if it could be written based solely on the statements of the participants, with no regard to their actual actions. Heck if that was the case, then Tovey's despatch would still be regarded as the last word on the whole Bismarck episode. Yet there seems to be little inclination to accept Tovey's statements as incontestable facts.

1) Leach turned away
2) Leach turned back
2) Y turret jammed
3) Leach turned away again.

Leach just doesn't explain this in any detail so the historian has to provide, through analysis, a satisfactory explanation.

Leach was just turning to keep PoW hidden behind the smoke screen moved by the wind. Just read Jasper report about it ... since he was trying to hit her again ... and carefully looking at what she was doing. Here :

Immediately thereafter, the opponent turned hard onto a reciprocal course. He gave off black smoke and apparently tried to use this to escape from view. In my opinion, this smoke was artificial black fog and did not emanate from a (real) conflagration.

Bye Antonio

Too bad Jasper states that PoW was still making the same smoke 20 minutes later. However, you have tried to provide an explanation for Leach's actions since Leach statement doesn't satisfactorily explain PoW's action so therefore you accept that Leach's statement is incomplete. Again, the flaw in this explanation is that if Leach was trying to stay in the smoke he was wildly unsuccessful in doing so, until the turn at ~605, especially since you claim that Leach began to make smoke at ~0601 and so the turn that caused Y turret to jam was completely unnecessary.

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

3) Reliable means POSSIBLE. ADM 116/4351 Diagram B was done using available RN official maps and a Norfolk possible course and speed from 05.35 until 06.00.
Wake-Walker declarations and " The PloT " ADM 116/4352 Exhibit A are not possible so consequently NOT reliable, because they are IMPOSSIBLE !
Go back some pages and check BLACK POINTS A to point B on " The PloT " on my post of : Sun Feb 02, 2014 7:48 pm on page 90 of this thread.
If you disagree about it, please show me/us how come respecting Wake-Walker declarations you can go on a map from 05.35 with Prinz Eugen at 276 degrees bearing at 16 sea miles to 15 sea miles from Hood bearing 230 degrees from Norfolk sailing the courses Norfolk sailed at 30 knots, without making the alteration of Hood and Prinz Eugen known course and relative distances on the same map like they did on " The Plot ".

It's obvious that the bearing info is incorrect.

Which one you mean is incorrect please ?

Bye Antonio

Antonio you have more info on this this, after your trip to the archives, than I, but I would suggest that you insert Norfolk's ranging data (with corrected timings) into the plots and see what the resulting bearing become.

[dunmunro]

1) Before the battle, there was a battle to fight, after the battle there was..... the Atlantic (had BS not been damaged).
2) Ok, if you fight just with the immu zone in your mind and if the British heavy cruisers do.....nothing ......as they did.
3) I don't think the Admiralty would have censured a good example of Nelsonian spirit. PoW had all chances to damage BS, dooming her, before being sunk and this would have got him a "well deserved" medal. In your opinion was he right to retreat without attempting to stop BS ? Your opinion..... my one is VERY different !
4) Yes, and Holland orders were to sink BS. Once Holland dead and without explicit orders from WW (missing in his role for sure) his D.U.T.Y. was to continue the mission.
5) Ah ! Now it's clear: the Admiralty orders to Holland were: "Shadow BS , so she will not sink convoys !" . Genial
Please consider that, without the Catalina on May 26, BS would NOT have been found again. She was in range at that very moment and Leach should have fought her. No justification for me.

Bye, Alberto

2) the cruisers did all they could but they could not possibly achieve the needed concentration to assist PoW.

3) The "Nelsonian spirit" was bold action to achieve localized concentrations of force, to win battles during the age of sail. Nelson would have been the first one to censure one of his captains who let the enemy escape or achieve victory through foolhardy blundering, no matter how much bravery (rather than intelligence) was involved.

3) yes Leach was justified in retreating, as he was clearly at tactical disadvantage but his mobility was intact and Wake-walker/Tovey could then decide on how best to achieve the needed concentration of force to destroy Bismarck and/or thwart Lujten's mission.

4) If Leach commanded a light cruiser would his mission be to suicidally attack Bismarck after Hood's loss? Leach's mission, after the loss of Hood and Holland, was to assess the tactical AND strategic situation and then act to minimize the overall threat to the Allied cause by Lutjen's sortie.

5)Holland's mission, with his superiority of force, was to destroy Bismarck if possible but if, for example, Hood and PoW both suffered fire control damage and it was clear that they could not sink Bismarck then Holland, in all probability, would have retreated and attempted to shadow Lujtens as Wake-walker did. You want to create scenarios where Leach and PoW must commit suicide rather than follow a sensible military strategy.

[Tom17]

Purely hindsight,
But after Hood's loss and the (for whatever reason) POW's disengagement, a BB added to the shadowing force seems like a splendid idea.
No one in an RN ship knew IF Bismarck and PE would split up immediately after the battle. One CA shadowing Bismarck while the other shadows PE could very easily quickly end in contact lost (or shadower lost).
Tom

[paulcadogan]

Please excuse this interjection but I've just got to ask....

In all the years of this forum HAS A THREAD EVER REACHED 100 PAGES BEFORE????

[RNfanDan]

Purely hindsight,
But after Hood's loss and the (for whatever reason) POW's disengagement, a BB added to the shadowing force seems like a splendid idea.

One CA shadowing Bismarck while the other shadows PE could very easily quickly end in contact lost (or shadower lost).
Tom

BB? CA?

Oh, you must be describing US Navy vessels. I don't believe the United States could (or would) commit any of their warships to the affair, as it would be several months before they had any authority to directly engage in actions against German warships, even if it was just "hanging around" in observation mode.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: "2) the cruisers did all they could but they could not possibly achieve the needed concentration to assist PoW.
3) The "Nelsonian spirit" was bold action to achieve localized concentrations of force, to win battles during the age of sail. Nelson would have been the first one to censure one of his captains who let the enemy escape or achieve victory through foolhardy blundering, no matter how much bravery (rather than intelligence) was involved.
3) yes Leach was justified in retreating, as he was clearly at tactical disadvantage but his mobility was intact and Wake-walker/Tovey could then decide on how best to achieve the needed concentration of force to destroy Bismarck and/or thwart Lujten's mission.
4) If Leach commanded a light cruiser would his mission be to suicidally attack Bismarck after Hood's loss? Leach's mission, after the loss of Hood and Holland, was to assess the tactical AND strategic situation and then act to minimize the overall threat to the Allied cause by Lutjen's sortie.
5)Holland's mission, with his superiority of force, was to destroy Bismarck if possible but if, for example, Hood and PoW both suffered fire control damage and it was clear that they could not sink Bismarck then Holland, in all probability, would have retreated and attempted to shadow Lujtens as Wake-walker did. You want to create scenarios where Leach and PoW must commit suicide rather than follow a sensible military strategy."

2) Antonio Bonomi already demonstrated that both heavy cruisers at 5:40 were able to join action without manoeuvring away at 5:41 and 5:42, so they did not all they could.

3) We have a VERY different view of Nelson spirit, but this is ok as it is an opinion.
3) Leach would have been justified to retreat after receiving some serious damage (thus probably inflicting some damage to BS as well). He retreated when NO other concentration of forces could be seriously foreseen. In open Atlantic WW was going to loose BS (in the Denmark Strait there was very limited way to escape a chase and WW already lost BS for a while, in open sea, just a poor chance to keep contact, as it happened !)

4) Well, if he was on a heavy cruiser, in range for torpedoes, I would expect so from a pure hero (like Commander Glasfurd in HMS Acasta)....... However he was in command of the most modern British battleship, sent there to destroy BS (not to shadow her), he was in range to hit and damage the German battleship , his ship was still efficient and he retreated just after receiving one salvo onboard. Here again I think we will disagree forever.

5) It's not the way Admiralty was thinking even after Hood blew up, when they asked WW about his intention to re-engage........

Bye, Alberto

[Herr Nilsson]

Maybe a dumb question. Who was the helmsman on PoW and where was his battle station?

[Tom17]

RnFanDan,
No, I was using the american terms as a form of shorthand (BB, Battleship; BC, Battlecruiser; CA, Hevy Cruiser, etc.)
Tom