Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

[paulcadogan]

I think everybody is convinced now that the plot is incorrect. Does anybody still trust the "plot" ?

I think it's pretty clear just looking at the map that it is not accurate beyond the courses shown for Suffolk and Norfolk from their respective plots. I get the impression that it was a hurried attempt to create an overall battle scene in relation to the two ships' courses. We have two courses for Bismarck, two positions for BC1. I can just see the guy doing the tracing.. "Now then....the battlecruiser squadron was somewhere in here, approximately on this course" while drawing the dotted line. "But, wait, the position of Prince of Wales at 0537 would have been about here, which would put Bismarck about there..." Hmmm, not quite where she'd be based on Suffolk's estimate." "Bit of a mess isn't it!"

It would have been interesting to hear what the comments were if any, when the map was viewed. I would think it would have been emphasized that it was a general picture and not meant to be precise, but it was entered as an exhibit anyway! Just supposition FWIW.....

Now....I've been wondering where Admiral Tovey would have got his 0613 time for PoW breaking off the action - and I think I found it.

First - in his narrative, Leach DOES NOT GIVE A TIME for his disengagement, besides saying the ship maneuvered around the remains of Hood before turning away under smoke, and firing Y-turret in local control.

However...in Suffolk's narrative:

0559 (B). Hood blew up.

0600 (B). Enemy bore 208°.

0605 (B). Course and speed as requisite to keep on enemy's starboard quarter.

0612 (B). Firing ceased, except for some A.A. fire by Bismarck. During the action three hits were observed on Bismarck from the heavy ships' fire.

Now...... PoW has Hood blowing up at 0600, Suffolk at 0559 - one minute earlier. Suffolk has the action ending at 0612. In keeping with her 1 minute difference, Tovey might have interpreted it to.....you got it....0613!!

Did Tovey scrutinize the battle plots? Unfortunately we can't ask him. Did he read McMullen's gunnery aspects report? It seems he did not - that would have been presented to Leach I would think, then Leach would report to his superior.

It is clear that he used info from Suffolk, since he made the earlier statement "The firing of both Hood and Bismarck was excellent and both scored hits almost at once," which would have been based on Suffolk's report (not in the narrative above) that Hood's third salvo straddled and a puff of black smoke was seen from Bismarck. Plus he used Leach's report.

So, it wasn't necessarily a typo nor a figure he plucked out of the air - but a timing for the "end" of the battle according to one of the ships on the scene. I suspect he simply equated that time as the time PoW gave up - which of course was wrong.

[slaterat]

I don't think anyone in 1941 is going to take the RN Articles of War as not much more than the historical principles of an "esprit de corp". It certainly is no substitute for sound tactical thinking.The value of a capital ship in WW2 is much higher than a ship of the line in the 18th century. Leach made the right decision to withdraw. With the Hood blown up and the RN advantage in firepower gone, Leach had no reason to pursue a close range decisive action with the Bismarck. In retrospect Holland and Leach got a raw deal. The unmodernized Hood probably didn't have an immune zone at all when facing the Bismarck. In reality the Hood wasn't any better protected going against the Bismarck than the Invincible was charging into action at Jutland with its 6 inch mb. When the inevitable occurred and the Hood blew up it left the POW in a very tight situation fighting a superior enemy alone while operating with a green crew, malfunctioning guns and civilian workers still on board the ship. On top of this Leach had a 15 inch shell go through the compass platform killing and maiming almost everyone there.I'm just not sure what needed to be covered up? I have also read that afterwards Leach requesting a court martial to clear his name if there were any doubts, too bad he didn't get it.

Slaterat

[Alberto Virtuani]

Slaterat wrote: "I don't think anyone in 1941 is going to take the RN Articles of War as not much more than the historical principles of an "esprit de corp". It certainly is no substitute for sound tactical thinking.The value of a capital ship in WW2 is much higher than a ship of the line in the 18th century. Leach made the right decision to withdraw."

The Naval Discipline Act (including the revised version of the Articles of War) was issued in 1866 and it was in place until 1957. Therefore no 18th century rule in it.....
However, even in 18th century, the Articles of War were not replacing the tactical evaluation of a warship Captain, they were giving the Principles for their behaviour and these principles made up the strength of the Royal Navy.
It's debatable whether the value of a battleship during the second world war was so high as you say..... and anyway the value of PoW for Britain was much less than the value of Bismarck for Germany, that's why Leach was wrong IMHO to cease action after receiving the very first salvo onboard, leaving BS free in Atlantic. Of course I know other people can have a different opinion here.

I agree with you: it was a pity that Leach ,Wake-Walker (and Ellis) were not given a chance to explain their decisions in front of an Inquiry !
The cover up was preferred due to reasons of opportunity and propaganda during the vital war against Germany.

Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul Cadogan,

you wrote :

Now....I've been wondering where Admiral J. Tovey would have got his 06.13 time for PoW breaking off the action ....

If you get at first who did it in writings ... I will pay you a pizza and a beer at the first occasion

Just one chance my friend, who did it ? : " ................. "

Bye Antonio

[RF]

It's debatable whether the value of a battleship during the second world war was so high as you say.....

But that was not realised at the time, which is why Bismarck and later on the Tirpitz were regarded as such dangerous threats. It is only with hindsight post WW2 that the value of the battleship was realised as being overstated.

and anyway the value of PoW for Britain was much less than the value of Bismarck for Germany

This statement may be true in respect of total fleet size comparisons, but it completely ignores the context of the situation at 6 AM on 24 May 1941. At that point (as I have already said) POW along with KGV were the only Allied battleships capable of matching Bismarck for speed. Given the threat Bismarck posed, the fact that control of the sea was vital for Britain but not for a land power such as Germany, the POW was far more valuable to Britain at that point than Bismarck was to Germany.

I agree with you: it was a pity that Leach ,Wake-Walker (and Ellis) were not given a chance to explain their decisions in front of an Inquiry

Now that is something I can agree with as well, as I believe Leach and Wake-Walker were quite capable of fully justifying themselves to their Lordships.

[RF]

When the inevitable occurred and the Hood blew up

I don't disagree with the basic premise of this post but I'm not clear that it was inevitable that Hood would blow up under concentrated fire from Bismarck. If it was inevitable then Holland would have taken more steps to prevent it.

I think inevitable is the wrong word, I would say that the event was likely but not a certainty. Rerun the Hood approach to Bismarck say 100 times - on how many occassions would Hood blow up as it did? It is likely that Hood would have blown up more quickly on some, and not blow up at all on others. The joker in this pack was that Hood was firing at the wrong target: Hood opened fire prior to Bismarck, initially found the wrong target range - now rerun Hood approach firing first on the right target.... I would say there was a 50% or slighty less chance of Hood blowing up the way that it did.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ RF,

you wrote :

Now that is something I can agree with as well, as I believe Leach and Wake-Walker were quite capable of fully justifying themselves to their Lordships.

I disagree with this statement RF

Fact is that the justification to their Lordship was based on a summary of Adm J. Tovey dispatches, ... with the main event incorrectly written ( especially the points 17 and 19 ).

Bye Antonio

[RF]

Now....I've been wondering where Admiral Tovey would have got his 0613 time for PoW breaking off the action - and I think I found it.

As an aside here I would mention that I find the revelation that POW engaged Bismarck for just 90 seconds after Hood blew before the decision to break off the action was made quite astonishing. Whilst accepting that timing I find it difficult to imagine that such a situation that Captain Leach found himself in he was able in such heat of battle to ba able to give such order in only a minute and a half. Maybe that thought also occurred to Tovey as well in arriving at 6.13. I would have thought the decision process would have been of the order of two to three minutes, but of course I am saying that without the dubious privelege of battle experience on my part.

[RF]

I disagree with this statement RF

Fact is that the justification to their Lordship was based on a summary of Adm J. Tovey dispatches, ... with the main event incorrectly written ( especially the points 17 and 19 ).

That would be the point raised in cross-examination of their case. I believe they could justify their actions in the light of what they believed at the time, especially as it pre-dates the after battle reports. Depending on the precise point of any charge brought, re-examination of the evidence they would present would offer a case for re-butting such charges. I would stress the word ''offer'' it isn't a certainty as there will never be such a hearing to find out.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ RF.

instead of the : cross-examination of their case.

They got 2 medals ... on October 14th, 1941

This is how the story went, ... thanking Adm J. Tovey dispatches summary ... with the incorrect data on it.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Slaterat wrote: "I don't think anyone in 1941 is going to take the RN Articles of War as not much more than the historical principles of an "esprit de corp". It certainly is no substitute for sound tactical thinking.The value of a capital ship in WW2 is much higher than a ship of the line in the 18th century. Leach made the right decision to withdraw."

The Naval Discipline Act (including the revised version of the Articles of War) was issued in 1866 and it was in place until 1957. Therefore no 18th century rule in it.....
However, even in 18th century, the Articles of War were not replacing the tactical evaluation of a warship Captain, they were giving the Principles for their behaviour and these principles made up the strength of the Royal Navy.
It's debatable whether the value of a battleship during the second world war was so high as you say..... and anyway the value of PoW for Britain was much less than the value of Bismarck for Germany, that's why Leach was wrong IMHO to cease action after receiving the very first salvo onboard, leaving BS free in Atlantic. Of course I know other people can have a different opinion here.

I agree with you: it was a pity that Leach ,Wake-Walker (and Ellis) were not given a chance to explain their decisions in front of an Inquiry !
The cover up was preferred due to reasons of opportunity and propaganda during the vital war against Germany.

Bye, Alberto

How was Bismarck "free in the Atlantic" ?

What course should Leach have taken after Hood was sunk?

If PoW was sunk after remaining on course at 0600, would Leach have been court martialled for failing to heed Admiralty tactical instructions and for failing to safeguard his ship?

If Hood had sunk PE via a magazine hit, would Lutjens have been justified in turning away from Hood and PoW's combined firepower?


Just as an aside, it seems to me that some people feel that Lutjens should have pursued PoW and attempted to sink her, but now turn their frustrations over this failure onto Leach for failing to play his part in ensuring PoW's destruction.

[paulcadogan]

@ Paul Cadogan,

you wrote :

Now....I've been wondering where Admiral J. Tovey would have got his 06.13 time for PoW breaking off the action ....


If you get at first who did it in writings ... I will pay you a pizza and a beer at the first occasion

Just one chance my friend, who did it ? : " ................. "

Now I hope you know I LOVE pizza!!

Following on that Tovey would have read Leach's report as the senior surviving officer from the Battlecruiser Squadron, it only follows that the senior officer of the 1st Cruiser Squadron would have reported on his two cruisers (Captain Ellis of Suffolk and Captain Phillips of Norfolk would have reported to him...).... So did Rear-Admiral Frederic Wake-Walker first report 0613 to Tovey???

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul Cadogan,

Boy, ... I like you to deliver a BIG SIZE Pizza FULL dressing to my friend Paul Cadogan, ... with a gigantic Beer, ... and put it on my account please

Your answer is PERFECT ! Right on the money

I see you know very well what was the Admiralty chain of reports mandatorily to be submitted until the final summary for their Lordship.

So each warship Captain must report their summary to their Flag Officer, ... and from the Flag officer to the Commander in Chief Home Fleet which than was submitting his final report to the Admiralty, ... followed by his dispatches ... later published to the London Gazette.

All documents into Kew PRO - National Archive do have this structure.

In summary, ... Adm J. Tovey wrote incorrect statements on points 17 and 19 on his report/dispatches, ... but the inputs came in writing directly from RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker.

Ironically, on the same document , ... there are both the correct and the incorrect information and data .
The difference is that the correct data stops at the warship Captain report level attached, ... while the incorrect data starts from the RearAdm First Cruiser Squadron ( Wake-Walker ) report summary level to the Commander in Chief Home Fleet ( Adm Tovey ).

Now if you really want to know everything, … Rear Adm Wake-Walker was capable to write on the same document 2 disengagement different time for PoW : 06.13 and 05.53 + 10 minutes ( so 06.03 )

More, with Suffolk attached report of 14 sea miles, … plus Norfolk gunnery report of 13,5 sea miles … he reported 15 sea miles for both on his summary of June 5th, 1941, together with a declaration of being at 15 sea miles bearing 230 degrees from Hood at 06.00.
This, while just few days before he delivered a witness report and sketch to the Hood First Board of Inquiry being at 20.000 yards from Hood, so 10 sea miles at 06.00.


This is the truth and it is out there on the archives, together with “ The Plot “ ADM 116/4352 Exhibit A, .. that is just one page before the same document Exhibit B ( the Rowell map at 06.00 ) which proves that Exhibit A is incorrect.

With that map RearAdm Wake-Walker went to the Second Board of Inquiry in August 1941 and removed the evidence of the 10 sea miles previously released which matches with the official maps used to realize the Diagram B on the First Board.

I do not think at this point being necessary from my side to add anything more, because everything is out there into the Official documents in Kew PRO.

Bye Antonio

[Steve Crandell]

Antonio,

I'm not sure if you've actually said this, but is it your opinion that Norfolk and Suffolk didn't fire at Bismarck because they were afraid she would shoot back at them?

[paulcadogan]

OHHHHH!! I'm hypersalivating at the thought of 100% Italian pizza!! But sadly for me the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea are in the way..

Ah well..it's the thought that counts!