Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

[Dave Saxton]

Warspite and Barham opened fire at far longer range, allthough equipped in the same guns as the Hood...

Prince of Wales guns could reach at 32km, yet she opened at 24km...

The British did not have a policy of opening fire as soon as in maximum gun range. The Italians kind of did though, so the Italians forced the British hand in that case. When speaking of the maximum reliable range of Type 284M radar battleship to battleship being less than 30,000 yards, Howse stated that the range was considered enough by the RN during WWII, because only very rarely would fire be opened at a range exceeding 28,000 yards. The Hood's gun range was slightly less than Warspite's because it used the older 4crh shells instead of the 6crh shells. With service charges, the 6crh shells gave a maximum range of about 32,000 yards.

Hood also opened fire just about when she would have had a useful range and rate plot from her type 284 radar.

Good point, provided it could range the cruiser at that distance. We don't know for sure but Holland would likely want to employ radar ranging if at all possible.

[dunmunro]

Dunmunro wrote: "So why didn't PE or Bismarck open fire?"

Hi, BS and PG were shadowed since a while, they knew already that it was almost useless to try to hit the heavy cruisers, as they would immediately run away. In addition, it was not the main Lutjens objective to sink British warships.... Completely different was the position of Norfolk at 5:52 when her flagship open fire.

Bye, Alberto

Previously the visibility had been very poor (night and/or constant fog), although Bismarck and/or PE did open fire at ~20,000 yards when they had first sighted the RN cruisers, but at ~535 on the 24th, the visibility was good, the seas smooth and Norfolk is supposedly well within radar range and steaming a steady course so that both PE and Bismarck would have an excellent plot and a very good FC solution, yet neither bothers to open fire (not even Bismarck's 5.9in guns) on such a tempting targets...surely the Baron would have been begging to fire off a salvo at such a steady and well plotted target, yet the Baron does no such thing except to report that the ranges varied from 12-15nm, which was probably outside the cruisers effective gun range.

[Tom17]

Antonio,
Please excuse me if this has been posted before (this thread is getting rather long), and ,I must admit, I'm getting confused (partly due to the fact that sometimes people don't reference what post they're replying to).
Is this the second board of enquiry you referenced to after my last post (Fri Jan 03, 2014 9:34 am)?
Is this all of it?
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... htm#Second Walker
In your answering post you mentioned that only WW changed his statement about sketches produced for the first inquiry. However, the other officers you mention (with the exception of Lt. Viscount Kelburn)are not in the list of witnesses called.
Also I'd like to draw your attention to answers 35. I take it what he actually saw was a salvo from POW or did Hood fire on Bismarck?
and 37. Where he states Hood's TT could not be seen. Is this remark because of their small size from that distance or because the hull was below the horizon?
All the best
Tom

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: " so that both PE and Bismarck would have an excellent plot and a very good FC solution, yet neither bothers to open fire (not even Bismarck's 5.9in guns) on such a tempting targets"

Hello, you are right, but I imagine that Germans had already realised that something more important (and dangerous) was going to happen: indeed in few minutes the British battle squadron was in sight, therefore correctly Lutjens decided not to waste ammunition against an enemy that clearly was still just shadowing (and ready to quickly run away as they already did previously), just asking the Baron to keep them under observation for the time being.

Re. the effective range of the German 5,9",I suspect that around 12 miles was at the extreme limit for them and unfortunately we will never know exactly what were the decisions of Lutjens and the reasons behind them.

At action started however, the fire of the 8" guns from Norfolk was absolutely due at a distance between 12/13 (5:41) and 11 (6:00) miles from enemy even if these were extreme ranges, and they were not....

Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

I think Alberto correctly answered already to you about the reasons why neither Bismarck nor Prinz Eugen opened fire against the HMS Norfolk once she was approaching from port side and getting closer at 05.41. The Baron von Mullenheim-Rechberg himself explained the reason in a very diplomatic way : " ... Wake-Waler on Norfolk seemed to have left the battlefield to Holland and the heavy warships fastly approaching ". In fact the Norfolk showed no real ostile intentions starting the "outrageous arc" away to south from the interception course she was sailing before on 240 degrees. A very different approach were having the Hood and PoW on that precise moment.

But I think it is better to read the evidences directly from the words of the Prinz Eugen gunnery officer KptLtnt Paulus Jasper :

Report of the 1st Artillery Officer [KptLtnt Paulus Jasper] 24 May 1941 :
About 05.45 hours I was awakened by an "Alarm". The 2nd Artillery Officer [KptLtnt Paul Schmalenbach] was located in the foretop, the battle station watch-leader of the portside watch of the battle station watch. A quick report and a panoramic view around the horizon revealed three targets to port, two of which were approaching rapidly. Off the starboard stern stood a fourth target, apparently, the surveillance cruiser from the previous night. We were advancing at the front of the battle-line, [with] Bismarck behind us.
Since no special instructions for firing assignments (division) were ordered by the flagship, and since both of the rapidly approaching ships at this instant opened fire while under full steam, I chose (ordered) to cut to the right. This was the foremost (ship) in the hostile battle-line, which, according to the usual rules of engagement (distribution of targets), appeared to be the point (leading) ship in our line (of fire) (of battle).

I like to underline the fact that the "quick report and panoramic view " Jasper was referring to above, ended up with a target at 96 degrees bearing ( the Norfolk ) and 2 warships fastly approaching at bearing 157 ( Hood and PoW ) from Prinz Eugen. Those data being communicated promptly from Brinkmann to Lutjens on Bismarck. All this has been written by F.O. Busch on his book " The story of Prinz Eugen ". Busch was on that moment on the Prinz Eugen foretop with Jasper, so he was a battle eyewitness from an important position.

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Tom 17,

you wrote :

Antonio,
Please excuse me if this has been posted before (this thread is getting rather long), and ,I must admit, I'm getting confused (partly due to the fact that sometimes people don't reference what post they're replying to).
Is this the second board of enquiry you referenced to after my last post (Fri Jan 03, 2014 9:34 am)?
Is this all of it?
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... htm#Second Walker
In your answering post you mentioned that only WW changed his statement about sketches produced for the first inquiry. However, the other officers you mention (with the exception of Lt. Viscount Kelburn )are not in the list of witnesses called.
Also I'd like to draw your attention to answers 35. I take it what he actually saw was a salvo from POW or did Hood fire on Bismarck?
and 37. Where he states Hood's TT could not be seen. Is this remark because of their small size from that distance or because the hull was below the horizon?
All the best
Tom

You are making some very good points.
In fact to avoid confusion I kindly ask everybody to stay on subject as much as possible and always refer to what and who you are answering to. Thanks

This thread is getting long and it is read by an average of 100/150 persons every day since months, we are at more than 22.000 views on 7 months.
Many are guest's from different forums that only read and never join into the discussion.

YES, you are correct, that is part of the HMS Hood Second board on Inquiry ( ADM Walker ) held on August 1941, ref doc number ADM 116/4352.

The First HMS Hood Board on Inquiry ( Adm Blake ) was held on June 1941 and is ref doc number ADM 116/4351.

Unfortunately, not all the documents are present on that link and they are not linked in an easy to find way. I am currently in contact with the Hood website administrators and I will see what I can do to help improving the layout so it will become easier to find them and understand the logic of it, now that I think I know it pretty well.

In fact you are referring to documents of ADM 116/4352 under a link that state ADM 116/4351, which is not correct as you can see yourself. Both documents are under links that state ADM 116/4351, but many are from ADM 116/4352 as said. You have to be careful and always read the date on top of the documents.
In addition many are scrambled under wrong links too, so other Norfolk ADM 116/4352 interrogations are under the Hood witnesses link, which is obviously wrong, I do not know what logic did they use to position them in that way.

Here you have the ADM 116/4352 other set of witness, including Capt A.J.L. Phillips :

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 1_Hood.htm

As said there are more not linked on the website.

Answer 35 : Kelburn saw a salvo of PoW landing on Bismarck, and he saw it pretty well so Norfolk was close enough to Bismarck to allow him to see those details. This possibility from Norfolk observers to see the fall of shells details on Bismarck during the engagement was underlined also by the British Admiralty on the Battle Summary Nr 5 on 1948.

Answer 37 : About the Hood Torpedo Tubes visibility from Norfolk, Kelburn responded : “I do not think it was possible to see them “.
But much different was the response to the same question provided by Norfolk Captain A.J.L. Phillips ( ref. 154 ) that not only saw them clearly, but showed them to Wake-Walker too and drew them again on a more precise sketch for the second board.

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... m#Phillips

It is only when you get the documents logic sequence ... Hood First Board ADM 116/4351 on June 1941, … followed by Admiral J. Tovey dispatches on early July 1941, … and than Hood Second Board on August 1941 ADM 116/4352 ... that you start understanding what has been done.
Than you need to read carefully in there and correlate the attached sketches or exhibit not always provided too. When everything will become clear to you, than the logic of the events and the content of it will have no other way to be read than the one we are discussing here in.


Bye Antonio

[alecsandros]

The British did not have a policy of opening fire as soon as in maximum gun range.

Opening fire was not an arbitrary matter. Even the ranges involved in fighting the Bismarck, were also "long ranges" according to British methodology [23km and 24km were long ranges]

The Prince of Wales was withing gun range at 5:45, yet she opened at 5:53 (8 minutes after that).
The Hood was withing gun range since 5:47, yet opened at 5:52 or so (5 minutes into range)

By contrast, the Warspite and Malaya opened at 27km and 29km respectively at Punto Stilio, so it was not out of the question if the visibility permitted it.

---

The radar ranging was still in it's early days in May 1941, and still optical corrections were required in order to straddle the target. Optical corrections could not be done without actualy seeing the enemy, and not the top of the main mast... but its waterline.

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Why didn't the Hood and Prince of Wales open fire earlier, if the conditions permitted it ?

[Dave Saxton]

Because Hood, the flagship, didn't open fire until 25,000 yards was reached regardless of visibility.

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

I think Alberto correctly answered already to you about the reasons why neither Bismarck nor Prinz Eugen opened fire against the HMS Norfolk once she was approaching from port side and getting closer at 05.41. The Baron von Mullenheim-Rechberg himself explained the reason in a very diplomatic way : " ... Wake-Waler on Norfolk seemed to have left the battlefield to Holland and the heavy warships fastly approaching ". In fact the Norfolk showed no real hostile intentions starting the "outrageous arc" away to south from the interception course she was sailing before on 240 degrees. A very different approach were having the Hood and PoW on that precise moment.

The KM ships didn't identify Hood and PoW until they opened fire at 0553, so for 12 minutes they had a perfect target to port (Norfolk) and neither ship bothered to open fire, nor did any of the gunnery officers on the KM ships request to open fire. If Norfolk had wandered into effective gun range prior to Hood opening fire, she was well justified in retreating out of range since it would be obvious that Holland could see Norfolk and could easily signal Wake-Walker to engage but Holland did not which is not surprising since a cruiser could hardly be expected to engage prior to Bismarck being engaged herself. Yet, it seems that the KM's own actions indicated that Norfolk was not in effective gun range but also we are now being told that the KM force knew they would be engaging battleships on the morning of the 24th (when they didn't know that), so they didn't bother to try and sink a mere heavy cruiser despite the nearly perfect gunnery setup which supposedly occurred.

Schmalenbach is used as a source yet here's his own recreation of the battle:

Warship Profile 18, KM Bismarck, by Paul Schmalenbach

and it doesn't seem to resemble the actual battle at all yet supposedly he had access to the best view of the battle and all the measured ranges while his chart of the battle in the Prinz Eugen profile is even more fantastic.

[alecsandros]

Because Hood, the flagship, didn't open fire until 25,000 yards was reached regardless of visibility.

What is the meaning of the 25000 yards ?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you wrote :

If Norfolk had wandered into effective gun range prior to Hood opening fire, she was well justified in retreating out of range since it would be obvious that Holland could see Norfolk and could easily signal Wake-Walker to engage but Holland did not which is not surprising since a cruiser could hardly be expected to engage prior to Bismarck being engaged herself.

I think you got exactly what happened. Norfolk found herself too close at 05.41 ( due to the German change of course 220-170-220 ) and enlarged herself from the enemy starting the " outrageous arc " away from course 240 to course 225 more or less while sending her enemy interception report after having received the PoW one at 05.37.

But on that radio message there was the distance measured some minutes before, so 16 sea miles, while on few minutes due to the relative converging course with the enemy, they felt much closer than that, and in fact they turned south from 240 to 225, on a less convergent course, not to fall too close to the enemy.

By doing that the Norfolk provided to the Baron exactly the impression he wrote : Wake-Walker was leaving the battlefield to Holland squadron.

Norfolk and Holland squadron were looking at each others since 05.16 that morning ( Ref. Russel Grenfell and Admiralty Battle Summary Nr 5 ).
This means their relative distance while on parallel course 240 was around 15 sea miles or a bit less.

This I think is pretty evident from what we have correctly positioning Norfolk in the battlefield, doing a better job that Schmalenbach did, since we have " The Plot " and all the correct maps, while Schmalenbach did not on 1970's.

So, the question to you is pretty obvious now : do you beleive Norfolk radio message at 05.41 positioning herself at 16 sea miles from the enemy, like " The Plot " shows too, or do you beleive PoW bearing with 18 degrees from her at 05.35 placing her at 12 sea miles from the enemy more or less as I have demonstrated with my geometrical calculation ?

Both are out of official Royal Navy documentations, which one of the 2 position do you beleive being the more reasonable ?

Than, anyway, we have to consider what Norfolk did and how she manoeuvred after 05.41, NOT opening fire at 05.53 after Hood did, and also after Hood was gone and PoW was under enemy fire in clear difficulties.

But this we can discuss after ... lets establish as best as we can ... were Norfolk was at 05.41 on the battlefield.

Bye Antonio

[Dave Saxton]

Because Hood, the flagship, didn't open fire until 25,000 yards was reached regardless of visibility.

What is the meaning of the 25000 yards ?

Most likely because it was about 65% of the maximum ballistic range (of the 15" too if the elevation could be greater) or approaching the threshold where it changes from not as likely to score hits to much more likely to score hits. Remember the British doctrine at that time was to close range quickly, preferably end on, and force a decision one way or the other. Where did you get the idea that the British would normally open fire as soon as in gun range, visibility permitting?

[RNfanDan]

Most likely because it was about 65% of the maximum ballistic range (of the 15" too if the elevation could be greater) or approaching the threshold where it changes from not as likely to score hits to much more likely to score hits. Remember the British doctrine at that time was to close range quickly, preferably end on, and force a decision one way or the other. Where did you get the idea that the British would normally open fire as soon as in gun range, visibility permitting?

There was recent precedent for this when, during the skirmish off Stromvaer, the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were taken under fire (in even more unfavorable weather conditions than Holland faced at Denmark Strait). Visibility was much poorer but Renown commenced fire, and continued firing whenever the opportunity presented.

[alecsandros]

Because Hood, the flagship, didn't open fire until 25,000 yards was reached regardless of visibility.

What is the meaning of the 25000 yards ?

Most likely because it was about 65% of the maximum ballistic range (of the 15" too if the elevation could be greater) or approaching the threshold where it changes from not as likely to score hits to much more likely to score hits. Remember the British doctrine at that time was to close range quickly, preferably end on, and force a decision one way or the other. Where did you get the idea that the British would normally open fire as soon as in gun range, visibility permitting?

Not at maximum range, but at a certain range... at which spotting could be effectively done and fire corrected so as not to waste ammo.
Doing some more reading, I must correct the info above about battle of Calabria (Punto Stilio): Warspite returned fire on Gulio Caesare from ranges of 26000 - 28000 yards (23.66 - 25.4 km). Malaya, 4000 yards back of Warspite, fired several salvos against the Caesare from a probable range of at least 30.000 yards (27km). The gunners from Malaya were erroneously observing Warspite's fall of shot, and only discovered that their own salvos were actualy falling short of the target by some 3000yards at the end of the battle.

---

Any navy would do the same thing more or less: open fire anytime when the conditions permitted it. Scharnhorst comes to mind - she opened at 27500y. Hiei chased the USS Edsall from 29000 yards; Iowa chased the Nowaki at 35000y... Littorio fired at 30.000yards against British cruisers at Sirte... Yamato at over 35000y at Samar...

That Bismarck and Prinz Eugen held their fire and opened at 18km was probably due to their AP ammo shortages, and the need to make every shell count...

P.S. Interestingly, Rodney and KGV opened at 21500 yards on May 27th...

Cheers,

[dunmunro]

Malaya's max elevation = 20degs so her maximum range was about 24k yds, unless she was firing supercharges, which I doubt.
Rodney and KGV opened fire at ~24000 yds.