Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

[alecsandros]

This suggests she was close enough to determine that the enemy ship closest to her was indeed Bismarck and not PG,

This in turn suggests that Norfolk was much closer to the Bismarck at 5:41 than Prince of Wales was at 5:45, as Norfolk's highest point was much lower than Prince of Wales's...

[tommy303]

Thomas...I don't think Antonio....sly fox that he is ....is looking at the differentiation from the perspective of Hood and PoW (although I must say that it was amazing that McMullen was able to make the correct ID so early from what the line drawings show!)...but from the perspective of Norfolk who signaled at 0541 that she had sighted 1 battleship (BB).

True, although for recognition purposes, Norfolk's view of the German's port quarter would have been as difficult as Hood and PoW's view of their port bow.

[paulcadogan]

True, although for recognition purposes, Norfolk's view of the German's port quarter would have been as difficult as Hood and PoW's view of their port bow.

Agreed. But I would think that Norfolk's bridge (or DCT as the case may be), as with PoW's, was a much better platform for observation than Hood's wind-swept, vibrating spotting top... But that was so much higher than the others - Hood's spotters would have had a full hull view earlier, but still I'd imagine it was hard to keep focused on the target...

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul,

You know me and my investigation processes very well now my friend, … … and many thanks for the nice compliment of “ Sly Fox “ … ... but in this case that evaluation confirmation request was very easy and obvious given “ The Plot “ ( Norfolk and Suffolk battle map ).

Into “ The plot “ there is an entry at 05.52 and 30 seconds, when HMS Hood opened fire, showing that HMS Norfolk was exactly at the same distance from Bismarck and Prinz Eugen they declared at 05.41, so 16 sea miles according to them.

On that plot entry, they were surely able to identify and correctly plot the Prinz Eugen ( cruiser ) from Bismarck ( BB ) since they are plotted on 2 different bearings with 2 different black lines.

This reinforce the 05.41 radio message entry of 1 battleship bearing 280 correctly identified according to them from 16 sea miles … and we miss the rest of that radio message that I suppose could have also the cruiser bearing and distance information.

But now I am sure they were at 12 sea miles when they were able to correctly identify both ships, and PoW bearing confirm this.

@ Tommy303,

We must take in consideration that on Norfolk they were looking from an height of 20 meters from the waterline, while on PoW they were looking from 28 meters and thru the : most modern large optical instruments ( 15 feet - 4,5 meter rangefinder ).

Letter Written by Colin McMullen

I remember Skipwith and I discussing the leading ship, and either he or I said "Looks like Strasburg" in other word "Prince Eugen" looked like a "big ship" but "Bismarck" even at that range looked much bigger, hence our disregard of Hood's original concentration signal to engage the "left hand ship".
On this point, Hood had an old fashioned open spotting top with the wind probably roaring through it whereas we had a modern enclosed Director Control Tower with the most modern large optical instruments."

I think we can all easily agree that Norfolk was well within visual identification and firing range with Bismarck and Prinz Eugen starting from 05.41 given the evidence available and what can be realized from the tracks and cross checked infos.

Bye Antonio

[RF]

At this point I could add that there is one more aspect that hasn't so far been mentioned - why didn't Norfolk or Suffolk report that Prinz Eugen was at that time ahead of Bismarck, so that Holland would have been made aware that his target was the right hand ship and consequently Hood would have opened fire on Bismarck rather than Prinz Eugen?

Whilst the enquiry into Hood's loss did conclude Hood opened fire on Prinz Eugen I do find it curious that the reasons for it were not gone into more detail particulary (as I would have thought) it would have a direct bearing on Hood nlowing up.

[RF]

... But that was so much higher than the others - Hood's spotters would have had a full hull view earlier, but still I'd imagine it was hard to keep focused on the target...

Another consideration was that the two German ships (as noted by Kennedy) were sufficiently far apart that they could not be viewed simultaneously through the optical instruments... a problem made more difficult on an exposed observation point.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ RF,

you are raising a very good point about the really occurred or the missing radio/flag/light transmission. This argument is still having my highest attention currently.
I hope some friends will be able to help me putting my hands on the original communication log's of ALL the warships involved that morning.

At this point we need to know as much as we can all the communication occurred in any form and at any time among them all.

When the trap was closed and the radio silence broken by PoW and Hood with their enemy interception reports and the enemy was declared being : IN SIGHT !, .... there was no reason to hide themselves anymore, ... why they did not communicate the best they could ?

When did really RearAdm Wake-Walker realize that Bismarck was back and Prinz Eugen ahead, did he fail on providing this important info ? Why ?

Did this cause the Norfolk "outrageous ARC " away at 05.41 ? ... did it cause the " circle back " of Suffolk for 13 minutes started at 05.42 ?
Did Norfolk made signal to Suffolk about it ? Why not promptly also to Hood and PoW, ... just to everybody and by radio ?

Was really RearAdm Wake-Walker expecting the " BIG SHIPS " to resolve the all things without his 2 warships involvement at all ?
Was he waiting some minutes and the Germans being heavily damaged before joining the battle ? Did Vice-Adm Holland really miss sending orders/direction to him ?

Why RearAdm Wake-Walker did not ask for directions from Vice-Adm Holland on what to do instead of accepting to be or worst placing himself "out of the battle" even if being really in the middle of it with his 2 cruisers ?

Why nobody asked W. Dundas about all this, he surely knew about it, he was there on Hood compass platform close to Vice-Adm Holland and he survived ?

What we know today is that RearAdm Wake-Walker did not open fire in ANY situation from 05.41 onward, even when Vice-Adm Holland was gone and PoW in deep troubles under concentrated enemy fire, ... and this is NOT a positive evaluation for him being a flag officer .

Bye Antonio

[paulcadogan]

Here's my perspective on your questions Antonio..

When did really RearAdm Wake-Walker realize that Bismarck was back and Prinz Eugen ahead, did he fail on providing this important info ? Why ?

WW could not have known the order of the two German ships until they were in sight and a determination was made. From the plot it is clear that the correct identification WAS made. He knew Hood & PoW already had the enemy in sight so should fully expect them to ID their targets. I have often asked the above question about Leach - why didn't he immediately signal Hood about the error when Holland ordered the targeting of the left hand ship? Of course when Hood signaled shift target right he would have thought the flagship would follow her own order, so no need to do so then.

Sometimes I wonder if Holland, uncertain of the ID of the two enemy ships, decided to split his ships' fire until the ID was made certain. So, Hood still deliberately targeted the leading ship, and PoW the following ship until Hood's spotters determined that Bismarck was on the right - hence Ted Briggs' testimony of the report from the spotting top "We're firing at the wrong ship" - with emphasis on "we're". But that's off topic....

Was really RearAdm Wake-Walker expecting the " BIG SHIPS " to resolve the all things without his 2 warships involvement at all ?
Was he waiting some minutes and the Germans being heavily damaged before joining the battle ? Did Vice-Adm Holland really miss sending orders/direction to him ?

Once again, WW's "aggressive turn" (counter to the "outrageous arc"! ) towards the German line when Hood & PoW opened fire clearly indicates his intention to take part. Had Hood not blown up throwing the main British line into disarray he would have and we would not be having this discussion. Still, as I said before, the one thing impossible to explain without word from WW himself, is why he didn't open fire in support when that happened.

With V-Adm Holland, it is hard to say too...on one hand he could have signaled instructions, but on the other, he was intent on bringing his quarry to battle and simply expected WW to join in, acting independently....just as Norfolk and Dorsetshire did in the final battle without specific instructions from Tovey.

Why RearAdm Wake-Walker did not ask for directions from Vice-Adm Holland on what to do instead of accepting to be or worst placing himself "out of the battle" even if being really in the middle of it with his 2 cruisers ?

Sure he could have, but really...are you going to 'disturb" your senior officer who is charging in to engage an enemy already in sight, when you should know already what would be expected of you?

Why nobody asked W. Dundas about all this, he surely knew about it, he was there on Hood compass platform close to Vice-Adm Holland and he survived ?

According to Dundas' bio on the Hood site:

After testifying in the first inquiry into Hood's loss, he was given a new assignment. Because of this, he was unable to testify at the second inquiry. He is believed to have served on other ships such as H.M.S. Neptune, H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth and H.M.S. Kingston during the remainder of the war. He was promoted to Lieutenant on 1 Septemeber 1944. He subsequently served as 1st Lieutenant on the T-class submarine Telemachus, commanded by Cdr. William King, DSO & Bar, DSC, RN.

Paul

[Alberto Virtuani]

Antonio Bonomi wrote: "What we know today is that RearAdm Wake-Walker did not open fire in ANY situation from 05.41 onward, even when Vice-Adm Holland was gone and PoW in deep troubles under concentrated enemy fire, ... and this is NOT a positive evaluation for him being a flag officer . "

Paul Cadogan wrote: " Still, as I said before, the one thing impossible to explain without word from WW himself, is why he didn't open fire in support when that happened."

Paul Cadogan wrote: "Sometimes I wonder if Holland, uncertain of the ID of the two enemy ships, decided to split his ships' fire until the ID was made certain."

In my opinion , highly arguable and perhaps worth to be discussed in a separate thread, you are right with Holland decision to split fire, but not because of a lack of sure identification.
I believe Holland intention was to stop both commerce raiders and concentrating fire only on BS would have possibly allowed PG to increase speed and escape into Atlantic (perhaps he even thought this was already the case as PG was ahead of BS....).
His duty was to prevent them both to exit in Atlantic and due to the fact that Suffolk and Norfolk were already not in the best possible position to engage PG, he decided to fire himself on PG, damage her and then concentrate on BS. I think in Holland's mind the engagement was to last long, not to be over in few minutes. I don't think Brigg's testimony here is against this theory because an Admiral doesn't need to explain to his officers (including Gunnery Officer) why he decided to fire on a specific target. He gave instructions and just expected execution. I can understand the surprise (and in some way the deception) in the Hood's Spotting Top...... .

Paul Cadogan wrote: "WW's "aggressive turn" (counter to the "outrageous arc"! ) towards the German line when Hood & PoW opened fire clearly indicates his intention to take part."

Well, here I doubt on his own intentions, I suspect (and it is only a personal suspect, looking at his overall attitude that day) that he received a strong "motivational" message from Holland at 5:55, dictating to bring his ship in action. However, again, he kept his forward guns silent EVEN during the "aggressive turn"......
His reluctancy to take part is quite clear from the immediate turn away at 6:00.

Paul Cadogan wrote: "are you going to 'disturb" your senior officer who is charging in to engage an enemy already in sight, when you should know already what would be expected of you? "

I agree, he should know already what was needed since 5:41AM: 1) 8" shells delivered against the enemy at highest possible rate of fire and 2) a torpedo attack manoeuvre immediately executed, not the "outrageous arc".

[RF]

Sometimes I wonder if Holland, uncertain of the ID of the two enemy ships, decided to split his ships' fire until the ID was made certain. So, Hood still deliberately targeted the leading ship, and PoW the following ship until Hood's spotters determined that Bismarck was on the right

I don't think the two targetting signals to POW would give support to that assertion. The first signal to fire on the left hand lead ship indicates an intention to concentrate fire on the one ship, evidenced by the fact Hood did open fire on the left hand ship. It appears Hood opened fire before the right hand ship could be properly targetted.
Given the vulneribility of Hood to long range fire and that only ten of his eighteen guns were available to fire initially on the enemy it is surely a huge risk to start the battle with your by far the strongest enemy only under half your available fire? Surely the aim must be to land heavy hits on Bismarck as quickly as possible in order to degrade its gunnery? As Alberto said earlier the imperative is to stop Bismarck, the Prinz is a secondary target.... surely Holland must stop and deal with Bismarck before giving serious effort into stopping the cruiser?

Another suggestion on a much older thread ''What if Hood hadn't blown up'' was that Hood would (if it hadn't blown up) have split its fire with turrets in local control, with A and B turrets still firing on the cruiser with X and Y firing on Bismarck. But again in the opening surely fire would be concentrated on the enemy with the big guns not the enemy with the 8 inchers.
Of course there is the risk of the cruiser escaping by not being under fire and Brinckman following German Fleet orders. But the Eugen on its own is nothing like the threat Bismarck posed - as evidenced by the fact that once Bismarck was sunk Brinckman made straight for Brest.
In answer to Alberto's comment immediately above that Hollands' duty was to stop both ships, well yes it is - if he can - but first Bismarck has to be weakened so he can get the upper hand to destroy Bismarck. Then sort out the cruiser.

[paulcadogan]

I don't think the two targetting signals to POW would give support to that assertion. The first signal to fire on the left hand lead ship indicates an intention to concentrate fire on the one ship, evidenced by the fact Hood did open fire on the left hand ship. It appears Hood opened fire before the right hand ship could be properly targetted.

I'm not sure you understood me correctly RF.... The signals speak for themselves - 0550: target left hand ship, then at about 0552, change target to the right. Previously he had signaled his intention for both ships to concentrate on Bismarck. BUT, what I'm saying is "what if" at 0552 Holland and his staff could not decide which ship was which - a very likely scenario. In that case what should he do? What if both ships fired at the same target and it turned out to be Prinz Eugen, what then?

It would be logical to change his strategy to ensure that Bismarck came under fire immediately, then concentrate when the ID was confirmed. This is why I believe Hood's attempt to change target only came when Bismarck opened fire, confirming her identity by her large gun flashes.

I suspect (and it is only a personal suspect, looking at his overall attitude that day) that he received a strong "motivational" message from Holland at 5:55, dictating to bring his ship in action. However, again, he kept his forward guns silent EVEN during the "aggressive turn"......

I don't think Holland communicated anything at all directly to the cruisers. His full attention was on Bismarck.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

thank for your reply and good inputs to Paul, RF and Alberto.

In order to further analyze what could have occurred, we need the most complete version of the radio communications occurred among them.

In summary as today state of our knowledge we can assess that until 05.41 Vice-Adm Holland knew about the German formation from Suffolk radio reports, and Suffolk was always placing Bismarck ahead of Prinz Eugen and not back to the cruiser on his radio reports.

Now we have found the 05.41 Norfolk enemy interception report, ... at least a partial version of it, an incomplete summary from SKL ( Group North ) ... thanking again Herr Nilsson ( Marc ).

Radio_messages_01.jpg (89.13 KiB) Viewed 777 times

On that it seems that at least the battleship was correctly identified, ... but was in that message underlined the cruiser and his bearing too ?
We do not know yet, since we do not have the full message text.

It seems that even assuming that Norfolk/Wake-Walker realized that at 05.41, ... it was not communicated promptly to Holland on Hood, ...

But it is really a very strange combination of events that Norfolk immediately started her " outregeous ARC " away immediately after ... and only 1 minutes after at 05.42 the Suffolk started her " circle backwards " enlarging a lot her distance from the enemy ...

Strange combination of events always drive me to further investigate, ... and I found another reason for that to happen ...

Anyway, at 05.52 surely Norfolk knew about the correct German warship disposition, ... but again we do not know for sure if it was for a visual correct identification ( which I assume she did since 05.41 in my personal opinion today knowing she was at only 12 sea miles distance from the Bismarck ) ... or if it was due to Holland messages driving PoW on the target to fire to at 05.50 and 05.52.

Norfolk_enemy_identification_01.jpg (61.29 KiB) Viewed 777 times

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Paul Cadogan wrote: "I don't think Holland communicated anything at all directly to the cruisers. His full attention was on Bismarck"

Hi Paul, we don't have any message form Norfolk and to Norfolk after the 5:41 Norfolk one. This is very strange as Holland should have driven his squadron after 5:35 when radio silence was not necessary anymore. I'm convinced that the ships signalled among them after 5:41 but we can't yet understand how they did it: possibly directive short range radio messages (I heard about this system, can anybody clarify if this could have been used at that range ?) or projectors light signals (does anybody know what is the range for projectors in daylight) ? I suppose flags were not usable at that distance....

Holland full attention was for sure at BS, as you say, but he directed at the same time PoW instructing her to switch target, I can't believe he didn't send any instruction to WW, especially after 5:52 when Norfolk was in range and still.... not firing......

As Antonio said, we desperately need the message logs from Norfolk to better understand what happened and what prevented WW to join action at 5:52.....

Bye, Alberto

[RF]

I'm not sure you understood me correctly RF.... The signals speak for themselves - 0550: target left hand ship, then at about 0552, change target to the right. Previously he had signaled his intention for both ships to concentrate on Bismarck. BUT, what I'm saying is "what if" at 0552 Holland and his staff could not decide which ship was which - a very likely scenario. In that case what should he do? What if both ships fired at the same target and it turned out to be Prinz Eugen, what then?

I can see what you mean, and in the event it came close to both British capital ships firing on Prinz Eugen.

Given the vulnerabilities to Hood and the restricted initial firepower, a situation in which you cannot identify your target really does compound difficulties - it may be that you are right. In that situation instead of rushing in Holland could have held the range open and then close and open fire once Bismarck is identified? It also would give time for specific orders to Wake-Walker to engage Bismarck to be given. With the period of daylight just started and only a month off the summer solstice, Holland had practically most of the day to close on Bismarck and Prinz Eugen and bring them to action on his terms....

[Tom17]

At 05:41? (or when Norfolk identified the ship as Bismarck), how much further away from Norfolk was PE than Bismarck?
Could the two German ships be differentiated from each other at that angle and different ranges? (I take it PE was not 'wooded' by Bismarck)
Could Norfolk have just assumed the 'big ship over there' was a BB because they were expecting to see a BB 'over there'?
Tom